INSULA 


iUEXANDEE  S.Webb 


of  t?)e 

(HniDetgitp  of  jQortI)  Carolina 


'^1)10  book  ta)a0  pttiSfmteti 


Mrs.  Herbert  Barr 


DATE  DUE 




PRIhfTED  IN  U.S.A. 

Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2014 


https://archive.org/details/peninsulamcclell03webb 


THE  PENINSULA 


CAMPAIGNS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR.~\\\. 

THE  PENINSULA  -w/s 


McCLELLAN'S  CAMPAIGN  OF  1862 


^5 


BY 

ALEXANDER  S.  WEBB,  LL.D. 

PRESIDENT  OF  THE  COLLEGE  OF  THE  CITY  OF  NEW  YORK;    ASSISTANT  CHIEF 
OF    ARTILLERY,  ARMY  OF  THE    POTOMAC  ;    INSPECTOR-GENERAL,  FIFTH 
ARMY  CORPS  ;    GENERAL  COMMANDING  SECOND  DIVISION,  SECOND 
corps;    MAJOK-GENERAL  assigned,   and   CHIEF  OF  STAFF, 
ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 


NEW  YORK 
CHARLES  SCRIBNEJ 

743  AND  745  Broad\" 
1881 


Copyright  by 
CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 
1881 


Trow's 

Printing  and  Bookbinding  Company 
201-213  East  \'2th  Street 

new  YORK 


PEEFACE. 


'I 


^  ■■ 

To  be  of  any  practical  use,  all  history,  and  particularly 
military  history,  must  be  gradually  sifted  and  reduced  to 
small  compass.  To  carry  out  this  idea,  the  publishers  have 
asked  the  writer  to  prepare  for  them,  in  a  condensed  form, 
that  part  of  the  History  of  the  War  of  the  Eebellion  which 
includes  the  operations  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  from 
the  assumption  of  the  command  of  that  army  by  General 
McClellan,  in  July,  1861,  to  its  arrival  at  Harrison's  Land- 
ing, in  July,  1862. 

So  much  has  been  written  on  this  subject  that  it  would 
not  at  first  appear  to  be  a  difficult  matter  to  condense  the 
various  accounts  ;  but  to  the  writer's  task  has  been  added 
the  special  work  required  in  comparing  and  collating  for 
careful  investigation  the  7iew  material  gathered  by  the  War 
Department,  and  now  for  the  first  time  made  the  basis  of  a 
history  of  that  period.  The  results  of  that  labor  he  presents 
/y)      in  these  pages. 


vi  PREFACE. 

An  actor  himself  in  everything  here  treated  of,  he  has  in 
a  large  measure  been  guided  in  his  research  by  his  memory 
of  scenes  never  to  be  effaced,  but  not  by  the  false  impres- 
sions of  those  days,  with  which,  on  most  occasions,  he  was 
heartily  in  accord. 

In  speaking  of  the  "  President  of  the  United  States  and 
his  advisers,"  he  must  not  be  understood  as  recalling  or 
changing  at  any  time  his  constant  and  repeated  expressions 
of  admiration,  affection  and  regard  for  the  President  him- 
self. He  appeals  to  the  closing  chapter,  reviewing  the 
whole  work  of  the  army  during  the  twelve  months  covered 
by  this  volume,  to  prove  that  he  is  as  loyal  to  that  noble 
man's  memory  as  ever  he  was  to  him  in  person,  and  is  but 
doing  the  work  of  an  honest  historian  in  recording  the  sad 
tale  of  the  want  of  unity,  the  want  of  confidence,  the  want 
of  co-operation  between  the  Administration  and  the  General 
commanding  the  army. 

In  this  work  we  cannot  give  in  extenso  the  most  important 
of  the  better-known  documents,  so  often  printed  by  the 
writers  on  both  sides  of  the  questions  which  arose  between 
General  McClellan  and  the  Administration,  and  omit  every 
f  one  not  absolutely  necessary  to  a  proper  understanding  of 
the  narrative.  "We  hope,  however,  that  the  attention  of 
thinking  men  will  be  attracted  to  a  more  thorough  investi- 
gation of  the  questions  not  yet  settled,  and  that  this  work 
will  serve  as  an  aid  to  any  one  who  desires  to  seek  what  is 


PREFACE.  vii 

the  vital  lesson  to  be  derived  from  our  failure  on  the 
Peninsula. 

We  have  been  unable  to  do  justice  to  many  of  our  most 
gallant  officers  or  to  their  commands,  by  giving  in  full  the 
history  of  their  achievements  during  this  campaign.  We 
have  been  limited  in  the  space  assigned  to  this  narrative, 
and  we  have  been  forced  to  choose  between  repeating  the 
well-known  accounts  of  various  battles  and  giving  from  new 
data  the  proof  of  the  restless  and  daring  activity  of  the 
Eebels  who  fought  us.  We  have  chosen  the  latter  course, 
believing  that  there  is  a  public  demand  for  information  of 
this  kind.  Our  sketch  of  the  campaign  will,  we  hope,  serve 
as  a  reliable  introduction  to  a  larger  volume. 

We  are  under  especial  obligations  to  Secretary  of  War 
Lincoln,  to  Secretary  of  the  Navy  Hunt,  to  Colonel  Eobert 
N.  Scott,  of  the  Bureau  of  Archives  in  the  War  Department, 
to  Generals  Wright,  Meigs,  Barnes,  Humphreys,  Keyes,  and 
others,  for  their  continued  kindness  in  furnishing  maps  and 
documents,  during  the  four  months  in  which  we  have  been 
engaged  in  the  preparation  of  this  volume. 

New  Yobk  Citt, 

November,  1881. 


OOKTEi^TTS. 


List  of  Maps,  .      .  xi 

CHAPTER  I. 

General  McClellan  and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  1 


CHAPTER  11. 

Campaign  Plans,       .  10 

CHAPTER  III. 

Active  Operations— Siege  of  Yorktown,    .      .  .85 
CHAPTER  IV. 


Forward  from  Yorktown- -Battle  of  Williamsburg,  69 
CHAPTER  V. 

To  the  Chickahominy — McDowell  — Jackson  in  the 
Shenandoah  Valley — Affair  of  Hanover  Court 


House,  83 

CHAPTER  VI. 

Battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  97 

CHAPTER  VIL 

Withdrawal  to  the  James  —  The     Seven  Days' 
Battle,"  118 


X 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  VIII.  PAGE 
Battle  of  Malvern  Hill,  153 

CHAPTER  IX. 

Termination  of  the  Campaign,  168 

APPENDIX  A. 

Troops  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  sent  to  the 
Peninsula  in  March  and  April,  1862,  .      .      .  191 

APPENDIX  B. 

Organization  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia 
During  Engagements  around  Richmond,  Va.,    .  200 


LIST  OF  MAPS. 


PAGE 

The  Peninsula  of  Virginia,  ,  18 

Field  of  Operations  in  Virginia,       .      ...  21 

Washington  and  Its  Defences,  33 

Cram's  Map,       .  55 

The  Position  at  Yorktown,  67 

Battle-Field  of  "  Fair  Oaks,"  101 

Battle-Field  of  Gaines'  Mill,  .....  131 
Field  of  the    Seven  Days'"  Battle,       .      .      .  149 


THE  PENINSULA. 


CHAPTEE  I 

GENERAL  McCLELLAN  AND  THE  ARMY  OP  THE 
POTOMAC. 

When  the  Union  troops  returned  to  Washington  from  the 
disastrous  field  of  Manassas,  or  the  better  known  Bull  Run, 
the  usual  results  of  a  defeat,  where  the  forces  engaged  have 
been  raw  levies  led  by  untried  and  unskilled  commanders, 
were  presented  to  the  general  Government.  The  capital  of 
the  nation  was  almost  within  the  lines  of  the  rebellious  ter- 
ritory. All  that  was  most  demoralized  or  least  apt  to  pre- 
sent either  a  truthful  or  fair  account  of  the  incidents  of  the 
few  past  days  swarmed  in  the  streets  of  Washington,  and 
through  the  medium  of  a  sensitive  press  spread  alarm  on 
every  side.  From  such  a  presentation  of  the  situation  in 
front,  it  was  not  to  be  expected  that  the  Government,  sur- 
rounded by  every  evidence  of  the  complete  discomfiture 
of  its  main  army,  would  be  found  either  ready  to  view  the 
reverses  calmly  or  to  act  with  the  boldness  and  promptitude 
which  the  sudden  events  then  demanded.  Centreville,  the 
key-point,  or  point  of  safety,  twenty  miles  in  advance  of 
Washington,  was  given  up ;  the  reserves,  under  Colonel 
Miles,  were  allowed  to  leave  it ;  and  the  whole  force  of  the 
1 


2 


THE  PENINSULA. 


nation  was  immediately  called  into  action  to  solve  the  gi-eat 
problem — how  to  regain  the  abandoned  position  and  finally 
compel  the  submission  of  the  enemy. 

The  rebels,  at  first  no  wiser  than  ourselves,  were  there 
tanght  that,  by  a  little  attention  to  our  general  tardiness  or 
want  of  prompt  decision  in  cases  of  emergency,  they  might 
hold  their  interior  lines  for  an  indefinite  period.  Men  on 
the  defensive  are  recej)tive  scholars,  and  we  found  that  our 
adversaries  had  learned  this  great  lesson  still  more  perfectly 
after  our  bitter  experience  in  the  Peninsula  campaign. 

On  July  21st  the  streets  of  Washington  were  crowded  with 
stragglers  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  On  July  22d, 
General  George  B.  McClellan  was  relieved  from  command 
of  the  Army  of  the  West,  and  that  command  was  given  to 
General  W.  S.  Rosecrans.  On  July  27th,  General  McClellan, 
by  order  of  President  Lincoln,  assumed  control  of  the  lately 
defeated  troops  in  the  vicinity  of  the  capital. 

Who  was  this  new  general  selected  to  produce  order  and 
organize  our  armies  ? 

George  Brinton  McClellan  was  born  in  Philadelphia,  De- 
cember 3,  1826.  He  entered  the  Military  Academy  in  June, 
1842,  and  graduated  in  June,  1846.  After  serving  under 
Captain  A.  J.  Smith  and  Lieutenant  Gustavus  W.  Smith, 
with  the  new  engineer  company  of  sappers  and  miners  at 
West  Point,  he  sailed  for  the  army  in  Mexico  in  September, 

1846,  and  served  with  especial  distinction  until  the  army 
under  General  Scott  entered  the  capital,  on  September  14, 

1847.  For  distinguished  ser^dces  and  personal  gallantry  he 
was  breveted  first  lieutenant  and  captain,  to  date  from  the 
day  of  the  capture  of  that  city.  He  served  at  West  Point 
with  the  Engineer  Comx>any;  Avith  Ca^Dtain  Eandolph  B. 
Marcy,  Fifth  Infantry,  in  making  the  explorations  of  the 


McCLELLAN  AND  THE  POTOMAC  ARMY. 


3 


country  embraced  within  the  basin  of  the  upper  Eed  Eiver ; 
on  the  staff  of  General  Persifer  F.  Smith,  in  Texas,  as  Chief 
Engineer ;  under  Governor  Isaac  I.  Stevens,  of  Washington 
Territory,  examining  the  lines  of  the  forty-seventh  and  forty- 
ninth  parallels  of  north  latitude,  and  determining  a  railroad 
route  from  the  head  waters  of  the  Mississippi  to  Puget  Sound ; 
was  detailed  to  select  a  coaling-station  in  the  West  Indies ; 
and  employed  on  duties  in  Washington  connected  with  the 
Pacific  Eailroad  surveys.  In  all  these  various  positions  he  ex- 
hibited the  largest  capacity  and  the  most  commendable  zeal. 
As  a  reward  and  as  an  exhibit  of  the  special  favor  in  which 
he  was  held  by  the  United  States  Government,  he  was  ap- 
pointed one  of  the  Military  Commission  to  Europe  to  observe 
the  operations  in  the  Crimea.  With  him  were  associated 
General  Delafield  and  Major  Mordecai,  then  majors  in  the 
regular  army. 

At  that  time  he  was  in  his  twenty-ninth  year,  and  was  one 
of  the  youngest  captains  in  the  United  States  Army.  Return- 
ing from  this  duty,  after  hard  mental  labor,  and  after  gaining 
a  valuable  experience  as  an  officer,  he  served  in  various  sta- 
tions until  1857,  when  he  resigned  his  commission  and  ac- 
cepted the  appointment  of  Chief  Engineer  of  the  Illinois 
Central  Eailroad,  of  which  corporation  he  was  made  Vice- 
President  in  a  very  short  period.  In  1860  he  was  chosen 
President  of  the  Ohio  &  Mississippi  Eailroad,  and  resided 
in  Cincinnati  until  the  war  of  the  rebellion. 

When  the  rebels  had  taken  Sumter,  and  the  North  was 
turning  to  the  graduates  of  the  military  academy  for  assist- 
ance and  direction  in  the  organization  of  the  new  troops  to 
be  ordered  into  the  field.  Governor  William  Denison,  of 
Ohio,  naturally  sought  the  advice  and  counsel  of  George  B. 
McClellan,  and  finally  appointed  him  Major-General  of  the 
"  Militia  Volunteers  "  of  that  State.     His  friends  realized 


4 


THE  PENINSULA. 


that  lie  liad  a  lieavj  task  before  him,  but  his  large  experience 
and  general  military  education  rendered  him  equal  to  its 
requirements,  and  he  readily  organized,  equipped,  and  put 
in  the  field  the  Army  of  the  Department  of  the  Ohio.  As 
the  result  of  his  operations  in  "Western  Virginia  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  received  from  that  army  the  glad 
intelligence  of  the  rout  of  Garnett  and  Pegram,  on  July  12 
and  13,  1861.  It  was,  therefore,  but  natural  that  he  should 
have  been  summoned  to  Washington  to  recreate  the  army 
which  was  destined  to  defend  the  capital  for  the  next  three 
years. 

From  July  27th  to  October  31st,  General  McClellan  re- 
mained in  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  only,  un- 
til, on  November  1st,  he  assumed  control  of  the  armies  of 
the  United  States  in  accordance  with  General  Order  No.  94. 
His  own  order  of  that  date  is  noteworthy,  as  coming  from  so 
young  an  officer  on  assuming  so  vast  a  responsibility.  His 
subsequent  orders  to  General  Buell,  in  charge  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  the  Ohio,  and  General  Halleck,  in  charge  of  that  of 
the  Missouri,  together  with  his  letters  to  General  Sherman, 
commanding  at  Port  Royal,  and  to  General  Butler  in  the 
Southwest,  show  the  vigor  of  thought  and  the  grasp  of  the 
man  who  had  been  called  to  the  prosecution  of  a  war  which 
extended  over  half  the  continent.  He  perfected  a  gTand 
scheme,  in  which  all  the  armies  were  to  bear  their  part,  and 
in  which  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  only  its  subordinate 
movements  assigned  to  it. 

General  McOlellan  became  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
forces  of  the  United  States  through  the  expressed  will  of 
the  people  and  with  the  approval  of  the  veteran  General 
Scott.  No  higher  compliment  could  have  been  paid  the 
new  commander  than  that  contained  in  the  message  of 
President  Lincoln,  in  December,  1861,  when  he  says,  that 


McCLELLAN  AND  THE  POTOMAC  ARMY.  5 


"  the  retiring  chief  expressed  his  judgment  in  favor  of  Gen- 
eral McClellan  for  the  position,  and  in  this  the  nation 
seemed  to  give  an  unanimous  concurrence." 

Such  was  the  man  who  was  to  command  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  in  its  campaign  against  Richmond.  No  one  had 
then  the  right  to  complain  or  to  protest  against  his  appoint- 
ment. He  was  at  that  date  our  most  successful  general. 
He  accepted  the  full  responsibility  devolved  upon  him,  and 
the  nation  has  much  to  thank  him  for.  It  was  he  who  or- 
ganized, equipped,  and  trained,  with  skill,  that  grand  body 
of  troops  which  for  four  long  years  confronted  the  strong- 
est, best  appointed,  and  most  confident  army  in  the  South." 

Upon  reaching  Washington,  on  July  27,  1861,  the  General 
found  the  forces  in  and  around  the  city  numbering  about 
fifty  thousand  infantry,  less  than  one  thousand  cavalry,  and 
six  hundred  and  fifty  artillerymen,  with  nine  imperfect 
field-batteries  of  thirty  pieces  and  four  hundred  horses.  No 
more  faithful  picture  of  the  situation  there  could  be  pre- 
sented than  is  to  be  found  in  the  General's  own  report,  as 
follows : 

"  On  the  Virginia  bank  of  the  Potomac  the  brigade  organ- 
ization of  General  McDowell  still  existed,  and  the  troops 
were  stationed  at  and  in  rear  of  Forts  Corcoran,  Arlington, 
and  Fort  Albany,  at  Fort  Runyon,  Eoach's  Mills,  Cole's 
Mills,  and  in  the  vicinity  of  Fort  Ellsworth,  with  a  detach- 
ment at  the  Theological  Seminary,  near  Alexandria.  There 
were  no  troops  south  of  Hunting  Creek,  and  many  of  the 
regiments  were  encamped  on  the  low  grounds  bordering  the 
Potomac — seldom  in  the  best  positions  for  defence,  and  en- 
tirely inadequate  in  numbers  and  condition  to  defend  the 
long  line  from  Fort  Corcoran  to  Alexandria.    On  the  Mary- 


*  Grant  to  Washburne,  December  23,  1861. 


6 


THE  PENINSULA. 


land  side  of  the  river,  upon  the  heights  overlooking  the 
Chain  Bridge,  two  regiments  were  stationed,  whose  com- 
manders were  independent  of  each  other.  There  were  no 
troops  on  the  important  Tenallytown  road,  or  on  the  roads 
entering  the  city  from  the  south.  The  camps  were  located 
without  regard  to  purposes  of  defence  or  instruction ;  the 
roads  were  not  picketed,  and  there  was  no  attempt  at  an 
organization  into  brigades. 

'^In  no  quarter  were  the  dispositions  for  defence  such  as 
to  offer  a  vigorous  resistance  to  a  respectable  body  of  the 
enemy,  either  in  the  positions  or  numbers  of  the  troops,  or 
the  number  and  character  of  the  defensive  works.  Earth- 
works, in  the  nature  of  tetes-de-pont  looked  upon  the  ap- 
proaches to  the  Georgetown  aqueduct  and  ferry,  the  Long 
Bridge,  and  Alexandria,  by  the  Little  Biver  Turnpike,  and 
some  simple  defensive  arrangements  were  made  at  the  Chain 
Bridge.  With  the  latter  exception,  not  a  single  defensive 
work  had  been  constructed  on  the  Maryland  side.  There 
was  nothing  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  shelling  the  city 
from  the  opposite  heights,  which  were  within  easy  range,  and 
which  could  have  been  occupied  by  a  hostile  column  almost 
without  resistance.  Many  soldiers  had  deserted,  and  the 
streets  of  Washington  were  crowded  with  straggling  officers 
and  men,  absent  from  their  stations  without  authority,  whose 
behavior  indicated  the  general  want  of  discipline  and  organ- 
ization." 

General  McClellan  immediately  appointed  his  general 
staff,  and  the  work  of  receiving,  organizing,  and  preparing 
for  the  field  an  enormous  army  was  forthwith  undertaken. 
On  October  27,  1861,  he  officially  reported  to  the  Secretary 
of  War  that  on  that  date  there  were  present  for  duty  147,695 
men,  with  an  aggregate  strength  of  168,318.  Of  this  num- 
ber, 4,268  cavalry  were  completely  unarmed,  3,163  partially 


McCLELLAN  AND  THE  POTOMAC  AKMY.  7 


armed,  5,979  infantry  unequipped — making  13,410  unfit  for 
the  field,  but  leaving  an  effective  force  of  134,285.  He  states 
that  he  had  76,285  men  disposable  for  an  advance,  but  had 
but  two  hundred  and  twenty-eight  artillery  pieces  ready  for 
the  field,  and  required  one  hundred  and  twelve  more.  This 
seems  to  have  been  a  rapid  increase  for  the  army  in  ninety 
days,  being  an  addition  of  40,000  men  per  month. ^' 

Proceeding  to  its  efficient  organization,  the  General  formed 
the  new  levies  of  infantry,  upon  their  arrival  in  Washington, 
into  provisional  brigades,  and  stationed  them  in  the  sub- 
urbs of  the  city  to  be  perfected  by  instruction  and  disci- 
pline. Brigadier-General  F.  J.  Porter  was  at  first  assigned 
to  the  charge  of  these  brigades.  He  was  followed  by  Brig- 
adier-General A.  E.  Burnside,  who,  in  turn,  vras  soon  after 
relieved  by  Brigadier-General  Silas  Casey,  who  continued  in 
charge  of  the  constantly  arriving  regiments  until  the  Army 
embarked  for  the  Peninsula  in  March,  1862.  The  new  artil- 
lery troops  reported  to  Brigadier-General  William  F,  Barry, 


*  The  following  abstract  from  the  consolidated  monthly  returns  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  shows  its  strength,  from  November  30,  1801,  to  the  time  it  took 
the  field  on  the  Peninsula,  inclusive  of  troops  in  the  Shenandoah;  on  the  Poto- 
mac, and  at  posts  in  the  vicinity  of  Washington  : 


PRESENT  FOR  DUTY. 


PIECES  OF 
AKTIIiliERY. 


Date  of  Returns. 


Officers. 


Men. 


Aggregate 
present 

and 
absent. 


November  30,  1861 
December  31,  1861 
January  31,  1862.. 
Februarv  28,  1862. 
March  31,  1862.... 


6.867 

7,653 
7,842 
7,862 
7,760 


155,870 
175.854 
174,831 
177,556 
171,602 


198,238 
219,781 
22i,227 
222,018 
214,983 


133 
221 
92 
69 
242 


248 
293 
381 
465 
440 


2 


2 
1 
6 


Records  Adjutaat-Geaerars  Office. 


8 


THE  PENINSULA. 


the  Chief  of  Artillery,  and  the  cavalry  to  Brigadier-General 
George  Stoneman,  Chief  of  Cavalry. 

By  the  opening  of  the  spring  of  1862  the  expectations  of 
General  McClellan  appear  to  have  been  realized  in  the  cre- 
ation of  as  noble  a  body  of  men  as  could  have  been  raised, 
under  similar  circumstances,  the  world  over.  Exclusive  of 
detachments  necessary  to  garrison  the  defences  of  Washing- 
ton and  Alexandria,  to  retain  Manassas  and  Warrenton,  to 
watch  the  Valley  of  the  Shenandoah,  and  guard  the  Mary- 
land shore  of  the  Potomac,  both  above  and  below  the  capi- 
tal, which  together  mustered  fifty-five  thousand  strong,  the 
army  proper,  intended  by  its  commander  to  act  as  a  solid 
body  for  field  operations,  represented  a  force,  on  the  rolls, 
of  158,000  men.  At  the  close  of  this  volume  is  inserted  a 
roster  showing  its  final  composition  and  organization,  to 
which  the  interested  reader  may  wish  to  refer.  From  an 
examination  of  the  tables  there  given,  we  may  deduce  much 
that  would  seem  to  secure  to  the  General-in-Chief,  for  his 
labors,  the  respect  and  admiration  of  his  countrymen.  At 
the  same  time,  to  have  been  enabled  to  establish  a  force  of 
such  proportions  and  efficiency  within  a  few  months,  he 
must  necessarily  have  received  from  the  general  Govern- 
ment, fi'om  the  governors  of  the  several  States,  and  from  the 
various  bureaus  and  offices  under  the  War  Department,  the 
most  cordial  and  largest  assistance.  Without  that  sujDport, 
and  without  almost  superhuman  efforts  on  their  part,  such 
an  army  could  never  have  been  created. 

It  was  an  army,  furthermore,  which  was  thoroughl}'  repre- 
sentative ;  an  army  of  volunteers,  composing,  with  the  armies 
elsewhere  in  the  field,  the  nation's  posse  comitatus.  The 
troops  immediately  under  the  leadership  of  General  McClel- 
lan, in  March,  1862 — this  Army  of  the  Potomac — were  drawn, 
naturally,  from  the  Eastern  and  Atlantic  States  of  the  Union, 


McCLELLAN  AND  THE  POTOMAC  ARMY.  9 


as  the  armies  operating  along  the  lines  of  the  Tennessee 
and  Mississippi  were  recruited,  in  the  main,  from  the  Cen- 
tral States  and  the  great  Northwest.  The  New  England 
States  contributed  a  quota  of  some  thirty-five  regiments  ; 
New  York,  seventy  ;  New  Jersey,  ten ;  Pennsylvania,  sixty  ; 
Delaware,  one  ;  Maryland,  nine  (posted  chiefly  along  the  Po- 
tomac) ;  while  Ohio,  Illinois,  Indiana,  "Wisconsin,  and  Minne- 
sota were  also  in  line  with  from  one  to  three  thousand  men 
each.  The  little  corps  of  regulars,  mustering  in  August, 
1861,  only  a  thousand  strong,  had  been  increased  by  April 
30,  1862,  to  a  respectable  and  highly  effective  brigade  of 
4,600,  rank  and  file,  under  Brigadier- General  George  Sykes, 
then  Major  of  the  Third  Infantry.  Irrespective  of  the  lat- 
ter, the  mass  of .  the  army  was  composed  of  intelligent 
voters,  coming  from  every  walk  in  life.  It  represented  the 
bone  and  sinew  of  the  land,  its  truest  homes  and  best 
industries,  its  humblest,  its  toiling,  its  prosperous,  and  its 
educated  classes  alike.  They  were  men,  the  vast  majority 
of  them,  who  thoroughly  understood  the  merits  of  the 
struggle,  who  appreciated  the  value  of  the  principle  at 
stake,  who  believed  they  were  right,  and  were  ready  to  sup- 
port their  convictions  and  their  Government  with  their 
blood.  It  was,  indeed,  a  people's  cause  and  a  people's 
war.  Bull  Eun  had  neither  dispirited  nor  overawed  them. 
That  defeat  had  served  only  to  bring  into  clearer  light 
the  magnitude  and  desperate  character  of  the  work  in  hand, 
and  they  girded  their  loins  for  the  emergency.  They  were, 
in  a  word,  as  they  have  been  and  always  must  be  described, 
an  organized  collection  of  citizen-soldiers,  who  did  not  des- 
pair of  the  Union,  and  only  prayed  that  they  might  be 
ably  led  against  the  enemy,  that  their  services  and  sacrifices 
might  contribute  decisively  to  success. 


CHAPTEE  n. 


CAMPAIGN  PLAKS. 

NECESSAKiLy,  soon  after  assuming  his  duties  as  Commander- 
in-Chief,  General  McClellan  turned  his  attention  to  the  en- 
tire field  of  operations,  treating  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  as 
only  one,  although  the  most  important  of  the  several  armies 
under  his  control.  Already,  as  Department  Commander,  he 
had  prepared  for  the  President,  at  the  latter's  request,  a 
memorandum  setting  forth  his  views  as  to  the  proper  method 
of  suppressing  the  rebellion,  which  views  he  still  retained, 
and  upon  which,  it  is  generally  claimed  by  his  friends,  the 
subsequent  successful  campaigns  were  practically  based.  He 
proposed  to  strike  at  two  centres.  East  and  West — Eichmond 
and  Nashville — moving  thus  into  the  heart  of  secession ; 
while,  at  the  same  time,  expeditionary  forces  were  to  assail 
the  principal  points  on  the  coast,  and  on  and  beyond  the 
Mississippi.  War  all  along  the  line  was  his  purpose.  While 
he  himself  marched  down  into  Virginia,  General  Buell,  in 
Eastern  Kentucky,  was  to  secure  that  State,  relieve  Eastern 
Tennessee,  and  then  point  to  Nashville ;  General  Halleck  was 
to  look  after  the  troublesome  State  of  Missouri,  and  Western 
Kentucky,  and  Tennessee ;  General  Burnside  was  to  occupy 
the  coast  of  North  Carolina ;  General  T.  W.  Sherman  was  to 
seize  Savannah,  but  chiefly  to  prepare  to  regain  Charleston  ; 
for  by  the  capture  of  that  city,  "  the  greatest  moral  effect 
would  be  produced,"  as  it  was  the  birthplace  of  the  rebellion. 


CAMPAIGN  PLANS. 


11 


and  "the  centre  of  the  boasted  power  and  courage  of  the 
rebels  ; "  and  lastly,  General  Butler  was  to  attempt  the  re- 
covery of  New  Orleans,  by  which,  the  eventual  control  of  the 
Mississippi  could  be  more  easily  established. 

That  this  extensive  plan  might  work  effectually,  General 
McClellan  aimed  to  deliver  the  meditated  blows,  or  the 
principal  ones,  simultaneously.  The  responsibility,  accord- 
ingly, devolved  upon  him  to  have  everything  ready  every- 
where at  the  proper  moment.  This  alone  would  have  been 
a  great  task,  especially  as  he  claims  that  no  general  plan  ex- 
isted before  his  assumption  of  the  chief  command,  and  that 
he  was  wholly  ignorant  of  the  "utter  disorganization  and 
want  of  preparation "  that  pervaded  the  Western  armies. 
"  The  labor  of  creation  and  organization  had  to  be  performed 
there  "  as  well  as  in  the  East,  says  the  General ;  and  by  Janu- 
ary 1,  1862,  the  forward  movement  was  still  delayed.  Several 
months  thus  passed  devoted  to  preparation,  and  the  country 
for  the  most  part,  understanding  that  the  inaction  was 
necessary,  quietly  awaited  the  compensating  results  that 
were  expected  to  follow  when  active  movements  should 
begin. 

But  the  trouble  was  that  the  delay  was  protracted  too 
long,  even  for  a  patient  people.  The  fall  of  1861  passed,  and 
the  rebels  were  as  strong  as  ever  and  more  defiant.  The  fol- 
lowing winter  also  promised  to  be  one  of  stagnation,  espe- 
cially for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  soon  toward  the  close 
of  1861,  and  in  the  beginning  of  1862,  much  curiosity  and 
uneasiness  was  betrayed  respecting  the  intentions  of  the  new 
and  then  popular  Commander-in-Chief.  The  latter,  however, 
was  clearly  determined  not  to  be  hurried.  As  late  as  Febru- 
ary 3,  1862,  he  wrote  to  the  President,  "  I  have  ever  regarded 
our  true  policy  as  being  that  of  fully  preparing  ourselves,  and 
then  seeking  for  the  most  decisive  results  ; "  and  it  was  not 


12 


THE  PENINSULA. 


until  a  short  time  before  that  date,  that  he  disclosed  his  own 
plan  of  campaign  in  Virginia  to  the  Government  authorities. 
His  inaction  he  reported  to  be  unavoidable.  Prepara- 
tions for  the  execution  of  the  general  plan — the  simultaneous 
movement — were  incomplete.  He  had  hoped  that  every- 
thing would  have  been  ready  to  take  advantage  of  the  good 
weather  in  the  previous  December,  but  it  was  not.  His  own 
army  even,  he  declared,  was  not  yet  in  condition  to  take  the 
field.  We  are  still  delayed,"  he  told  the  President,  in 
his  February  letter,  and,  furthermore,  gave  no  hint  as  to 
the  time  when  he  should  be  completely  ready. 

How  this  unfortunate  situation  might  have  been  avoided — 
what  General  McClellan  ought  to  have  done  during  those  six 
months  his  army  remained  around  "Washington — is  a  specula- 
tive question  which  we  do  not  feel  called  upon  to  consider. 
It  will  be  enough  to  discuss  the  plan  for  action  which  he 
finally  did  propose,  and  to  follow  out  his  movements  in  the 
field  when  actually  undertaken.  That  the  delay,  however 
satisfactory  or  unsatisfactory  his  own  explanation  and  de- 
fence of  it  may  be  regarded,  worked  to  his  disadvantage 
and  paved  the  way  for  future  distrust  of  his  generalship,  is 
certain.  He  drew  too  heavily  upon  the  faith  of  the  public. 
By  March  1st  the  nation  had  incurred  a  debt  of  $600,000,000 
for  the  war ;  while  the  results  were  far  from  commensurate 
with  such  a  cost.  Dissatisfaction  arose,  especially  at  Wash- 
ington, in  Government  circles,  and  in  Congress.  Criticisms 
were  freely  indulged  in.  The  General,  in  addition,  kept  his 
councils  to  himself,  consulted  with  but  one  or  two  favorite 
officers,  and  seemed  to  hold  close  relations  with  men  not  in 
political  sympathy  with  the  Administration.  All  this  gave 
umbrage  in  high  places  ;  and  it  became  the  more  incumbent 
upon  him  to  act,  to  act  speedily,  energetically,  and  success- 
fully, if  he  hoped  to  retain  the  confidence  of  the  powers  to 


CAMPAIGN  PLANS. 


13 


wMch  he  was  amenable,  or  entitle  himself  to  the  obligations 
of  a  grateful  people. 

At  length  General  McClellan  was  compelled  to  divulge 
his  plans  and  move  forward;  and  this  brings  us  to  some  im- 
portant points  in  the  history  of  the  campaign. 

Among  those  who  deeply  felt  the  necessity  of  renewing 
the  advance  upon  the  enemy,  was  President  Lincoln.  An 
immense  and  ,  oppressive  responsibility  rested  upon  his 
shoulders.  He  was  constantly  anxious  both  in  success  and 
defeat ;  and  extremely  anxious  now,  at  the  close  of  the  year 
1861.  The  situation  was  anything  but  satisfactory.  In 
October  previous,  the  disastrous  affair  of  Ball's  Bluff  had 
occurred,  in  which  Colonel  Baker,  lately  of  the  Senate,  lost 
his  life.  The  rebels,  also,  had  blocked  the  navigation  of  the 
Potomac  by  planting  batteries  on  the  Virginia  side  twenty 
or  thirty  miles  down  the  river  ;  and  their  flag  floated  insult- 
ingly, from  their  advanced  works  on  Munson's  Hill,  in  sight 
of  Washington.  These  untoward  circumstances,  and  the  in- 
activity of  McClellan,  seemed  to  have  prompted  the  Presi- 
dent, as  early  as  December  1st,  to  propose  informally  to  the 
General,  a  plan  of  attack  upon  the  enemy — his  idea  being 
that  a  column  of  50,000  men  should  menace  and  hold  the 
rebels  at  their  Centre ville  position,  while  50,000  more — part 
going  by  the  Potomac,  and  part  by  land — should  move  to 
Occoquan  Creek  below,  and  place  themselves  nearer  to  Eich- 
mond  than  the  main  body  of  the  enemy  were  at  Centreville. 
This  is  interesting,  not  only  as  being  the  first  plan,  so  far  as 
the  writer  can  discover  from  the  records,  suggested  for  the 
campaign,  but  as  emanating  from  Mr.  Lincoln  himself,  who 
made  no  pretensions  to  military  knowledge ;  thus  disclosing 
his  intense  desire  that  something  should  be  done. 

Up  to  this  time.  General  McClellan  had  given  no  intima- 


u 


THE  PENINSULA. 


tion  of  his  own  plans,  other  than  the  general  assertion,  made 
in  the  latter  part  of  October,  that  "the  crushing  defeat  of  the 
rebel  army  at  Manassas,"  was  the  great  object  to  be  accom- 
plished; and  that  the  advance  upon  it  "should  not  be  post- 
poned beyond  November  25th."  On  December  10th,  how- 
ever, he  wrote  a  confidential  note  to  the  President,  apparently 
in  answer  to  the  latter's  proposal,  in  which  he  impliedly  dis- 
approved of  it,  by  stating  that  he  believed  the  enemy's  force 
to  be  equal  to  his  own ;  and  then  added,  "  I  have  now  my 
mind  actually  turned  toward  another  plan  of  campaign  that 
I  do  not  think  at  all  anticipated  by  the  enemy,  nor  by  many 
of  our  own  people."  ^  This  is  the  first  hint  we  have  that  any 
plan  was  taking  sliape  in  the  General's  mind ;  and  the  first 
that  foreshadowed  the  final  move  to  the  Peninsula. 

It  will  be  observed,  that  here  was  the  possibility  of  a  seri- 
ous conflict  of  opinion.  In  case  the  President  and  the  Gen- 
eral matured  plans  diametrically  opposed  to  each  other, 
which  was  to  be  followed  ?  What  is  our  highest  military 
authority  ?  According  to  the  Constitution,  it  is  the  Presi- 
dent, Commander-in-Chief  of  all  the  land  and  naval  forces 
of  the  United  States.  But  if  the  President  disclaims  all 
military  ability,  as  Mr.  Lincoln  did,  it  still  becomes  a  ques- 
tion how  far  he  should  defer  the  conduct  of  a  war  to  his 
generals  commanding  in  the  field.  In  the  closing  chapter 
of  this  work  certain  precedents  are  adduced  upon  this  point, 
showing  the  position  assumed  by  our  Presidents  during  the 
War  of  1812  and  the  Mexican  War.  They  asserted  their 
right  to  disapprove  and  interfere,  and  the  propriety  of  their 
interference  seemed  to  be  justified.  There  never  w^as  any 
question  in  President  Lincoln's  case,  as  to  his  right  to  order 
and  direct ;  but  the  dilemma  lay  here — whose  plans  and  ad- 


*  See  Appendix  to  Rfiymoncrs  Life  of  Lincoln  for  this  note  and  the  Presi- 
dent's plan  referred  to. 


CAMPAIGN  PLANS. 


15 


vice  should  he  follow  where  it  was  necessary  for  him  to  ap- 
prove and  decide,  where  he  did  not  or  would  not  trust  his 
own  judgment  ?  Should  he  lean  implicitly  on  the  general 
actually  in  command  of  the  armies,  placed  there  by  virtue 
of  his  presumed  fitness  for  the  position,  or  upon  other 
selected  advisers  ?  We  are  bold  to  say  that  it  was  doubt 
and  hesitation  upon  this  point,  that  occasioned  many  of  the 
blunders  of  the  campaign.  Instead  of  one  mind,  there  were 
many  minds  influencing  the  management  of  military  affairs. 

To  one  source  of  this  influence,  beyond  the  members  of 
the  President's  Cabinet,  who  were  by  right  his  advisers,  we 
must  revert.  This  was  the  Joint  Committee  of  Congress, 
appointed  in  December,  1861,  to  inquire  into  the  conduct  of 
the  war.  Its  members  were  Hons.  Benjamin  F.  Wade,  of 
Ohio,  Zachariah  Chandler,  of  Michigan,  and  Andrew  John- 
son, of  Tennessee,  from  the  Senate  ;  and  Hons.  Daniel  W. 
Gooch,  of  Massachusetts,  John  Covode,  of  Pennsylvania, 
George  W.  Julian,  of  Indiana,  and  Moses  F.  Odell,  of  New 
York,  from  the  House  of  Eepresentatives.  Organizing  De- 
cember 20th,  with  Senator  Wade  as  chairman,  it  proceeded 
to  summon  many  of  the  general  officers  of  the  army  to  ob- 
tain their  views  as  to  its  efficiency,  and  the  best  lines  of  ad- 
vance upon  the  enemy.  It  was  a  strong  representative  com- 
mittee, and  not  only  held  consultations  with  the  President 
and  the  new  Secretary  of  War,  Hon.  Edwin  M.  Stanton, 
but  also  with  the  President  and  his  entire  Cabinet.  No 
record  of  these  interviews  appears  to  have  been  preserved ; 
but  no  one  can  doubt  their  effect  upon  the  Administration 
in  influencing  its  action.  Executive,  Cabinet  and  Commit- 
tee, were  in  earnest  in  their  wish  to  prosecute  the  war  to  a 
speedy  and  successful  termination. 

In  common  with  the  President  and  the  country  at  large, 
this  Committee  was  entirely  dissatisfied  with  the  prolonged 


16 


THE  PENINSULA. 


inactivity  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  The  members  were 
especially  mortified  and  indignant  that  the  rebels  should 
have  been  suffered  to  blockade  the  Potomac  Eiver  so  long, 
preventing  free  access  by  water  to  the  capital  of  the  na- 
tion, and  thereby  seriously  affecting  our  delicate  rela- 
tions abroad.  They  demanded  from  the  Secretary  of  War 
that  the  blockade  should  be  raised — the  chairman,  on  one 
occasion,  using  "  pretty  strong  and  emphatic  language  "  on 
the  subject  in  the  presence  of  both  the  Secretary  and  Gen- 
eral McClellan ;  and  in  their  report  the  Committee  lay  the 
blame  upon  the  General,  who,  in  his  report,  holds  the  navy 
accountable.  Again,  the  Committee  examined  many  officers 
on  the  subject  of  organizing  the  army  into  corps ;  and  find- 
ing great  unanimity  as  to  the  necessity  of  such  organization, 
j)ressed  the  matter  upon  the  attention  of  the  President  more 
than  once.  Their  last  consultation  with  him  on  this  subject 
occurred  on  March  5th,  when  he  promised  to  take  the  mat- 
ter "  into  earnest  and  serious  consideration."  Three  days 
later,  on  the  8th,  he  promulgated  an  order  dividing  the 
army  into  four  army  corps,  to  the  command  of  which  Gen- 
erals McDowell,  Sumner,  Heintzelman,  and  Keyes  were  as- 
signed. The  order  was  contrary  to  the  wishes  of  McClellan, 
who  proposed  to  defer  the  organization  until  after  active 
operations  had  opened.  The  Committee,  furthermore,  ob- 
tained opinions  from  officers  as  to  the  best  line  of  attack  for 
the  army  to  follow ;  and  seemed  to  have  become  impressed 
with  the  superior  advantages  of  a  direct  advance  upon  Cen- 
treville.  That  its  preferences  were  known  to  the  President, 
can  hardly  be  questioned.  Indeed,  without  a  particular  exam- 
ination of  the  proceedings  of  this  important  Committee  and 
a  proper  estimate  of  its  influence,  the  action  of  Mr.  Lincoln 
and  his  Cabinet,  in  certain  matters  affecting  this  campaign, 
cannot  be  fully  understood.    That  body  must  be  counted 


CAMPAIGN  PLANS. 


17 


among  the  President's  most  influential  advisers.  It  was  a 
power  during  the  war. 

Eeturning  to  the  plan  of  the  campaign,  we  find  that  Mr. 
Lincoln,  who  on  December  1st  had  suggested  operating 
against  the  enemy  in  front  and  flank,  took  up  the  matter 
again  early  in  January  following,  by  seeking  the  opinions  of 
a  few  of  the  more  prominent  generals  in  the  army.  General 
McClellan  had  ^  had  the  misfortune  of  falling  ill  about  the 
middle  of  December,  and  was  confined  to  his  house  for 
nearly  a  month.  Mr.  Lincoln,  more  than  ever  exercised  and 
worried  over  the  delays,  called  in  Generals  McDowell  and 
Franklin,  and  in  a  confidential  interview  inquired  as  to  the 
possibility  of  soon  commencing  active  operations  with  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac.  The  President  stated  that  "  if  some- 
thing was  not  soon  done,  the  bottom  would  be  out  of  the 
whole  affair."  *  A  day  or  two  later  these  officers,  who  had 
consulted  with  Quartermaster-General  Meigs  and  others, 
reported,  that  of  the  two  lines  of  attack  considered — one 
direct  upon  the  enemy,  the  other  by  moving  the  army  to 
another  base  down  the  Chesapeake — they  advised  the  former, 
which  could  be  undertaken  in  three  weeks,  f  General  McClel- 
lan, recovering  from  his  illness,  and  finding  that  "  excessive 
anxiety  for  an  immediate  movement  of  the  Army  of  the  Po- 
tomac had  taken  possession  of  the  minds  of  the  Administra- 
tion," finally  unfolded  his  plan  of  operations  to  the  President, 
which  contemplated  an  attack  upon  Eichmond  by  the  lower 
Chesapeake.    He  was  not  in  favor  of  a  direct  attack  upon 

*  General  McDoweirs  memorandum  in  Swinton's  "  Army  of  the  Potomac." 

t  General  Franklin,  it  seems,  favored  a  movement  by  way  of  the  Yorh  Rive)% 
and  so  testified  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  ;  but  according 
to  General  McDowell's  statements  (in  Swinton)  he  deferred  his  plan  in  favor  of 
a  direct  attack  on  the  enemy  as  the  most  feasible  at  that  lime,  namely,  in  Janu- 
ary, and  because  of  the  President's  wish  for  immediate  action. 
2 


18 


THE  PENINSULA. 


the  enemy  at  Centre ville.  But  the  President  had  now  be- 
come confirmed  in  his  preference  for  the  latter  plan  bv  the 
opinions  of  McDowell,  Franklin  an  d  Meigs ;  and  undoubtedly, 
as  stated  above,  by  the  known  preferences  of  the  Committee 
on  the  Conduct  of  the  War.  We  thus  find  the  two  leaders 
upon  whom  the  eyes  of  the  nation  were  then  fixed — ^Mr.  Lin- 
coln and  General  McClellan — at  issue  with  each  other  at  a 
most  critical  moment. 

It  has  been,  and  probably  always  will  be  one  of  the  stand- 
ing questions  of  dispute  in  this  campaign,  whose  plan  was 
the  soundest,  the  President's  or  the  General's  ?  The  President, 
certainly,  was  so  far  convinced  of  the  advisability  of  adopting 
his  own,  or,  as  it  may  be  called,  the  Administration  plan, 
that  he  formally  disapproved  of  McClellan's,  and  in  a  special 
war  order,  "No.  1,"  dated  January  31st,  directed  that  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  "after  providing  safely  for  the  defence 
of  Washington,"  should  move  forward,  on  or  before  February 
22d,  and  seize  and  occupy  a  point  upon  the  railroad  south- 
west of  Manassas  Junction.  The  first  effect  of  this,  would 
be  the  withdrawal  of  the  enemy  from  their  position  in  front 
of  the  capital.  Four  days  before — January  27tli — the  Presi- 
dent had  ordered  a  general  advance  of  all  the  armies  of  the 
United  States  upon  the  same  date. 

General  McClellan,  feeling  that  his  own  plan  should  be 
preferred,  obtained  permission  from  Mr.  Lincoln  to  present 
his  reasons  therefor,  in  full ;  and  in  a  letter  prepared  under 
date  of  February  3d,  he  reviewed  the  military  situation  at 
large  and  discussed  in  particular  the  two  different  lines  of 
advance  proposed  for  the  army  of  the  Potomac.  The  "  best 
possible  plan,"  in  his  judgment,  he  believed  to  be,  to  descend 
the  Potomac,  enter  the  Eappahannock,  land  at  Urbana  for 
a  base,  and  by  a  rapid  march  gain  West  Point  at  the  head  of 
the  York  Eiver ;  and  thus  threaten  Eichmond  before  John- 


CAMPAIGN  PLANS. 


19 


stones  army  at  Centreville  could  fall  back  and  meet  liim  in 
condition  to  resist  his  progress.  In  other  words,  he  pro- 
posed to  outflank  the  enemy  far  on  the  left,  and  suddenly 
turn  the  tables  by  making  the  vicinity  of  Richmond  and  not 
Washington,  the  theatre  of  operations.  This  plan,  he 
claimed,  presented  the  shortest  land  route  to  the  Con- 
federate capital,  and  struck  directly  at  the  heart  of  the 
enemy's  power  at  the  East.  Explaining  further,  he  wrote  : 
"  The  total  force  to  be  thrown  upon  the  new  line  would 
be,  according  to  circumstances,  from  one  hundred  and  ten 
thousand  to  one  hundred  and  forty  thousand.  I  hope  to  use 
the  latter  number  by  bringing  fresh  troops  into  Washington, 
and  still  leaving  it  quite  safe.  I  fully  realize  that,  in  all 
projects  offered,  time  will  probably  be  the  most  valuable 
consideration.  It  is  my  decided  opinion  that  in  that  point 
of  view,  the  second  plan  should  be  adopted.  It  is  possible — 
nay,  highly  probable,  that  the  weather  and  state  of  the  roads 
may  be  such  as  to  delay  the  direct  movement  from  Washing- 
ton, with  its  unsatisfactory  results  and  great  risks,  far  be- 
yond the  time  required  to  complete  the  second  plan.  In 
the  first  case,  we  can  fix  no  definite  time  for  an  advance. 
The  roads  have  gone  from  bad  to  worse.  Nothing  like  their 
present  condition  was  ever  known  here  before ;  they  are 
impassable  at  present.  We  are  entirely  at  the  mercy  of  the 
weather.  It  is  by  no  means  certain  that  we  can  beat  them 
at  Manassas.  On  the  other  line  I  regard  success  as  certain 
by  all  the  chances  of  war.  We  demoralize  the  enemy  by 
forcing  him  to  abandon  his  prepared  position  for  one  which 
we  have  chosen,  in  which  all  is  in  our  favor,  and  where 
success  must  produce  immense  results.  My  judgment  as  a 
general  is  clearly  in  favor  of  this  project.    Nothing  is  cer- 


*  To  Secretary  Stanton. 


20 


THE  PENINSULA. 


tain  in  war,  but  all  the  ckances  are  in  favor  of  this  move- 
ment. So  much  am  I  in  favor  of  the  southern  line  of  opera- 
tions, that  1  would  prefer  the  move  from  Forti^ess  Monroe  as  a 
base,  as  a  certain  though  less  brilliant  movement  than  that 
from  Urbana,  to  an  attack  upon  Manassas.  I  know  that  the 
President  and  you  and  I  all  agree  in  our  wishes,  and  that 
these  wishes  are  to  bring  this  war  to  a  close  as  promptly  as 
the  means  in  our  possession  will  permit.  I  believe  that  the 
mass  of  the  people  have  entire  confidence  in  us — I  am  sure 
of  it.  Let  us  then  look  only  to  the  great  result  to  be  ac- 
complished, and  disregard  everything  else." 

The  merits  of  the  Administration  plan,  on  the  other  hand,  as 
claimed  by  its  advocates,  lay  in  the  fact,  that  a  direct  advance 
upon  the  enemy  in  front,  first  of  all,  kept  the  army  between 
Washington  and  the  rebels  and  rendered  a  counter  attack  upon 
the  city  impossible.  This  was  a  point  of  the  greatest  conse- 
quence. "Washington,  at  all  events,  for  sound  political  reasons, 
should  be  secured  from  insult  and  capture.  The  direct  attack 
also  involved  a  smaller  expenditure  of  time  and  money ;  and 
in  case  of  disaster,  retreat  could  be  effected  with  less  difficulty. 

Now,  in  regard  to  the  Urbana  plan,  pronounced  absurd  by 
some  of  our  best  critics,  we  think  that  it  was  bold  and  not 
rash ;  that  it  was  general  and  not  limited.  It  was  proved  to 
be  possible,  if  carried  out  as  at  first  conceived.  What  prin- 
ciple of  war  is  violated  we  are  not  prepared  to  discuss,  un- 
less we  take  time  and  space  to  show  how  little  we  applied 
such  principles  throughout  the  contest.  In  handling  the 
army  of  the  Potomac,  our  main  principle  was  to  secure  Wash- 
ington and  take  Kichmond. 

The  rebels'  principle  was  to  take  advantage,  after  they  had 
had  experience,  of  every  demonstration  of  distrust  or  doubt 
of  our  ability  to  do  that  which  would  have  been  ordinarily 
done  in  war. 


Field  of  Operations  iu  Virginia. 


22 


THE  PENINSULA. 


This  plan  compreliended  decided  and  active  operations  in 
the  Shenandoah  Valley ;  it  designed  to  turn  Yorktown  and 
Gloucester ;  it  ignored  Norfolk  and  the  use  of  the  James  ; 
it  carried  with  it  all  the  dash  of  spirit  a  good  plan  should 
require  and  produce. 

General  McClellan  became  convinced  that  the  enemy  had 
115,000  men  at  Manassas  and  on  its  flanks ;  and  upon  these 
false  data,  he  determined  that  he  could  not  take  or  turn 
those  works.  He  was  therefore  driven  to  other  plans  than 
those  involving  direct  attack.  He  did  not  prepare  to  carry 
out  the  plan  proposed  and  endorsed  by  President  Lincoln. 

His  sole  object  was  to  bring  his  army,  as  an  invading 
army,  as  close  to  the  enemy's  capital  as  possible.  He  hoped 
to  prevent  unnecessary  bloodshed  ;  he  expected  to  demoral- 
ize the  enemy  by  rapid  movements,  bringing  his  army  close 
to  Richmond,  to  meet  the  rebels  near  that  point  before 
their  troops  should  be  "brought  w^ell  in  hand." 

There  was  nothing  in  this  plan  new  or  impossible. 

One  of  the  best  military  authorities  we  have  now  living, 
General  A.  A.  Humphreys,  late  Chief  of  Engineers,  former 
Chief  of  Staff  to  General  Meade,  late  Commander  of  the 
Second  Army  Corps  in  front  of  Eichmond,  was  in  favor  of 
this  movement.  Combined  with  a  strong  and  active  series 
of  operations  in  the  valley,  it  threatened  Eichmond  in  rear 
and  front,  d^ndi  protected  Waslmigton;  and  it  would  have  forced 
a  sudden  attempt  to  bring  about  reconciliation  and  a  patch- 
work peace  from  the  rebels  then  and  there,  if  our  rulers 
were  meek  enough  to  make  such  a  one.  Some  feared  they 
were.  They  proved  they  were  not.  The  fears  of  our  best 
counsellors  were  transmitted  to  our  generals.  Politics  en- 
tered and  strategy  retired. 

The  general  commanding  had  conceived  a  plan  which 
could  have  been  carried  out ;  and  which  would  have  jilaced 


CAMPAIGN  PLANS. 


23 


us  close  to  the  city  of  Eichmond  in  a  very  few  days.  He 
foresaw  the  trouble  we  afterward  encountered  by  the  direct 
route.  He  turned  all  the  defences  south  of  Urbana,  and 
protected  Washington,  we  repeat,  through  active  operations 
directly  upon  Eichmond ;  and  more  than  all,  he  protected 
Washington  by  menacing  the  rebel  communications  with 
the  West,  through  the  operations  in  the  valley  of  the 
Shenandoah. 

It  was  absolutely  impossible  for  the  enemy  to  threaten 
Washington,  even  morally,  if  lie  were  rapid  and  dashing  in 
his  movements.  The  movement  to  Urbana  might  have  been 
the  "stride  of  the  giant." 

Criticisms  of  this  plan,  based  upon  operations  conducted 
in  countries  where  every  stream  is  well  known,  where  every 
road  is  accurately  mapped,  and  based  upon  so-called  prin- 
ciples of  war,  cannot  apply  to  this  movement  of  new  troops 
against  new  levies  of  insurgents,  in  a  country  of  which  but 
little  was  known  to  either  of  the  commanding  generals. 

Finally,  after  many  conferences,  and  the  result  of  a  coun- 
cil of  war,  wherein  eight  out  of  the  twelve  division  com- 
manders of  the  army  reported  in  favor  of  McClellan's  route 
by  way  of  the  lower  Chesapeake,  President  Lincoln  yielded 
his  preference,  and  on  March  8th,  issued  the  following 
order : 

*  The  generals  favoring  the  Administration  plan  were  McDowell,  Sumner, 
Heintzelman,  and  Barnard,  the  latter,  Chief  of  Engineers.  Those  favoring  the 
Urbana  movement  were  Keyes,  Franklin,  Fitz- John  Porter,  W.  F.  Smith,  McCall, 
Blenker,  Andrew  Porter,  and  Naglee,  who  represented  Hooker.  Keyes  voted 
wath  the  qualification  that  no  change  of  base  should  be  made  until  the  Potomac 
was  cleared  of  the  rebel  batteries. 

The  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  report  that  they  had  "  no  evidence, 
either  oral  or  documentary,  of  the  discussions  that  ensued,  or  the  arguments 
that  were  submitted  to  the  consideration  of  the  President,  that  led  him  to  re- 
linquish his  own  line  of  operations,  and  consent  to  the  one  proposed  by  General 
McClellan,  except  the  result  of  this  Council  of  War." 


24 


THE  PENINSULA. 


PRESIDENT'S  GENERAL  WAR  ORDER,  NO.  3. 

Executive  Mansion, 
Washington,  March  8,  1862. 

Ordered^  That  no  change  of  the  base  of  operations  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  shall  be  made  without  leaving  in  and  about  Washington 
such  a  force  as,  in  the  opinion  of  the  General-in-Chief  and  the  com- 
manders of  army  corps,  shall  leave  said  city  entirely  secure. 

That  no  more  than  two  army  corps  (about  fifty  thousand  troops) 
of  said  Army  of  the  Potomac  shall  be  moved  en  route  for  a  new  base 
of  operations  until  the  navigation  of  the  Potomac  from  Washington  to 
Chesapsake  Bay  shall  be  free  from  the  enemy's  batteries  and  other  ob- 
str  actions,  or  until  the  President  shall  hereafter  give  express  permis- 
sion. 

That  any  movement  as  aforesaid,  en  route  for  a  new  base  of  opera* 
tions,  which  may  be  ordered  by  the  General-in-Chief,  and  which  may 
be  intended  to  move  upon  the  Chesapeake  Bay,  shall  begin  to  move 
upon  the  bay  as  early  as  the  18th  of  March  instant ;  and  the  General-in- 
Chief  shall  be  responsible  that  it  so  moves  as  early  as  that  day. 

Ordered,  That  the  army  and  navy  co-operate  in  an  immediate  effort 
fio  capture  the  enemy's  batteries  upon  the  Potomac,  between  Washing- 
ton and  the  Chesapeake  Bay. 

ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

L.  Thomas,  Adjutant-General. 

On  March  9tli,  the  day  after  the  issue  of  this  order,  the 
rebels  evacuated  Gentremlle. 

This  unexpected  evacuation,  General  McClellan  claims 
in  his  testimony  before  the  Committee  of  Congress,  to  have 
been  induced  by  information  which  reached  the  enemy 
while  he  was  discussing  his  plans  with  the  Administration. 
One  reason  why  he  had  been  so  reserved  was  a  mistrust  that 
secrecy  was  not  closely  observed  by  others  with  whom  he 
was  obliged  to  have  official  communications.  But  General 
Johnston,  on  the  other  side,  makes  no  admission  that  his 
movements  were  guided  by  espionage.    He  shows,  in  his 


CAMPAIGN  PLANS. 


25 


"  Narrative,"  that  the  abandonment  of  Centreville  had  been 
contemplated  for  more  than  two  weeks  ;  and  actually  begun 
on  March  7th,  or  the  day  before  the  promulgation  of  the 
President's  order  given  above.  Johnston's  reasons  for  fall- 
ing back  and  taking  up  a  new  position  on  the  line  of  the 
Eappahannock  are  so  fully  expressed,  that  we  quote  his 
words  :  "  We  had  to  regard,"  he  says,  "  four  routes  to  Eicli- 
mond  as  practicable  for  the  Federal  army :  that  chosen  in 
the  previous  July  [via  Bull  Eun]  ;  another  east  of  the  Poto- 
mac to  the  mouth  of  Potomac  Creek,  and  thence  by  Fred- 
ericksburg ;  the  third  and  fourth  by  water — the  one  to  the 
Lower  Eappahannock,  the  other  to  Fort  Monroe  ;  and  from 
these  points  respectively  by  direct  roads.  As  the  Confed- 
erate troops  in  Virginia  were  disposed,  it  seemed  to  me  that 
invasion  by  the  second  route  would  be  the  most  difficult  to 
meet ;  for  as  the  march  in  Maryland  would  be  covered  by 
the  Potomac,  the  Federal  general  might  hope  to  conceal  it 
from  us  until  the  passage  of  the  river  was  begun,  and  so 
place  himself  at  least  two  days'  march  nearer  to  Eichmond 
than  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  on  Bull  Eun.  I  did 
not  doubt,  therefore,  that  this  route  would  be  taken  by  Gen- 
eral McClellan.  The  opinion  was  first  suggested  by  the  lo- 
cation of  a  division  of  the  United  States  Army  [Hooker's] 
opposite  to  Dumfries.  On  the  5th,  information  from  Briga- 
dier-General Whiting  of  unusal  activity  in  the  division  oppo- 
site to  him — that  referred  to  above — suggested  that  the  Fed- 
eral army  was  about  to  take  the  field,  so  I  determined  to 
move  to  the  position  already  prepared  for  such  an  emergency 
— the  south  bank  of  the  Eappahannock,  strengthened  by  field- 
works,  and  provided  with  a  depot  of  food ;  for  in  it  we  should 
be  better  able  to  resist  the  Federal  army  advancing  by  Ma- 
nassas, and  near  enough  to  Fredericksburg  to  meet  the  enemy 
there,  should  he  take  that  route,  as  well  as  to  unite  with  any 


26 


THE  PENINSULA. 


Confederate  forces  that  might  be  sent  to  oppose  him  should 
he  move  by  the  Lower  Eappahannock  or  Fort  Monroe."* 

By  the  11th  the  entire  rebel  army  had  moved  unmolested 
to  the  south  bank  of  the  Eappahannock,  where  Johnston 
fixed  his  headquarters  near  Rappahannock  Station. 

To  but  a  single  fact  do  we  call  attention  in  this  connec-  > 
tion :  that  during  all  the  time  that  army  lay  at  Centreville,  in- 
solently menacing  Washington  and  frightening  our  civil  and 
military  authorities  into  the  concentration  of  an  enormous 
force  around  the  city,  it  never  presented  an  effective  strength 
of  over  50,000  men.  f 

With  more  than  thrice  that  number,  McClellan  remained 
inactive  for  many  jDrecious  weeks,  under  the  delusion  that 
he  was  confronted  by  a  force  very  nearly  equal  to  his  own.  It 
is  astonishing  that  neither  the  General,  nor  the  President, 
nor  the  searching  Committee  of  Congress,  nor  the  exacting 
Secretary  of  War,  should  have  been  able  to  ascertain  the 
truth  in  the  case  during  this  long  period.  The  only  sources 
of  intelligence  upon  which  estimates  seem  to  have  been 
made,  were  the  reports  of  deserters,  contrabands,  and  coun- 
try people  who  came  into  the  lines,  and  underwent  an  ex- 
amination at  the  hands  of  a  detective  at  headquarters,  who 
ranked  upon  the  rolls  as  Cliief  of  the  Secret  Service. 

There  now  again  arose  the  question,  what  was  to  be  done  ? 
Upon  hearing  that  the  rebels  had  left  his  front,  McClellan 
broke  up  his  camps  around  the  capital  and  marched  toward 
Centreville,  establishing  himself  at  Fairfax  Court  House. 

*  Narrative  of  Military  Operations  Directed  during  the  Late  War  between  the 
States,  p.  101.    By  Joseph  E.  Johnston,  General  C.S.A. 

t  The  aggregate  "  present in  camp  in  Johnston's  army  for  Februarj',  1862.  waa 
50,392;  present  for  duty.  47,300,  JircClellan's  aggregate,  present  for  duty,  for 
the  same  month  was  150.000  in  round  numbers,  excluding  troops  in  the  valley 
and  in  Maryland. 


CAMPAIGN  PLANS. 


27 


No  wonder  the  Prince  de  Joinville  describes  tlie  young  gen- 
eral as  appearing  anxions  and  disturbed  when  directing  this 
movement.  To  follow  the  enemy  was  deemed  impractica- 
ble ;  to  change  the  base  seemed  at  this  time  to  be  the  only 
plan  which  would  give  to  the  out-generalled  army  a  chance 
to  gain  either  reputation  or  increase  of  spirit. 

General  McClellan  had  left  his  headquarters  in  Washing- 
ton, and  might  well  be  considered  to  have  taken  the  field; 
and  on  March  11th,  the  President  in  another  war  order,  re- 
lieved him  of  the  command  of  all  the  military  departments 
save  the  Department  of  the  Potomac.  Commanding  from 
this  period  this  army  and  department  only,  he  confined  his 
attention  to  active  operations. 

To  repeat — what  was  to  be  done  under  the  changed  situa- 
tion ?    Should  the  Urbana  plan  still  be  carried  out  ? 

To  solve  this  new  question,  a  council  of  war  assembled  at 
Fairfax  Court  House,  March  13th,  composed  of  the  four 
Corps  Commanders,  Generals  McDowell,  Sumner,  Heintzel- 
man,  and  Keyes ;  before  whom,  in  what  seems  to  have  been  an 
informal  conversation.  General  McClellan  laid  the  proposi- 
tion of  moving  further  down  the  Chesapeake,  and  making 
Fort  Monroe  the  base  of  operations."^  This  was  at  last  the 
Peninsula  plan,  the  third  that  had  been  considered,  a  kind  of 
^'dernier  ressort.''^  It  had  already  been  mentioned  by 
McClellan,  as  a  possible  alternative,  in  his  letter  of  February 
3d,  where  he  writes  :  "  Should  circumstances  render  it  not 
advisable  to  land  at  Urbana,  we  can  use  Mob  Jack  Bay — 
or  the  worst  coming  to  the  worst,  we  can  take  Fort  Monroe 
as  a  base,  and  operate  with  complete  security,  although  with 
less  celerity  and  brilliancy  of  results,  up  the  Peninsula."  The 
Urbana  plan  had  been  shorn  of  its  merits  and  feasibility 


*  This  council  was  summoned  by  General  McClellan,  not  by  the  President. 


28 


THE  PENINSULA. 


since  Jolinston's  retirement  to  the  Eappahannock.  MeClel- 
lan  now  could  not  expect  to  steal  a  march  upon  him.  There 
remained  no  other  course  but  to  take  what  the  General  de- 
scribes as  the  safe  route  between  the  York  and  the  James. 
That  it  was  a  route  which  had  its  advantages  will  not  be  de- 
nied. It  was  expected  that  West  Point  could  be  speedily 
reached  at  little  sacrifice  of  life  ;  and,  as  meditated  in  the  TJr- 
bana  plan,  the  scene  of  operations  would  thus  be  transferred 
to  the  immediate  vicinity  of  Richmond.  If  the  Urbana  plan 
was  a  good  one,  as  we  thoroughly  believe  it  to  have  been, 
there  are  substantial  reasons  for  also  regarding  the  Peninsula 
plan  in  a  favorable  light ;  securing,  as  it  would  have  done, 
about  the  same,  or  at  least,  satisfactory  results.  Necessarily 
the  approval  of  any  plan  must  be  premised  upon  the  ex- 
pected vigorous  execution  of  it. 

The  corps  commanders  at  the  council  of  the  13th,  al- 
though three  of  their  number  (McDowell,  Sumner,  and 
Heintzelman)  had,  as  division  commanders,  disapproved 
the  Urbana  plan,  adopted  General  McClellan's  final  Penin- 
sula proposition,  without  dissent.  Their  proceedings  were 
summed  up  as  follows  : 

Headquarters  Army  of  the  Potomac, 

Fairfax  Court  House,  March  13,  1862. 
-    *' A  council  of  the  generals  commanding  army  corps,  at  the  head- 
quarters of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  were  of  the  opinion  : 

"  I.  That,  the  enemy  having  retreated  from  Manassas  to  Gordonsville, 
behind  the  Rappahannock  and  Rapidan,  it  is  the  opinion  of  generals 
commanding  army  corps  that  the  operations  to  be  carried  on  will  be 
best  undertaken  from  Old  Point  Comfort,  between  the  York  and  James 
Rivers,  provided,  1st,  that  the  enemy's  vessel,  Merrimac,  can  be  neu- 
tralized ;  2d,  that  the  means  of  transportation  sufficient  for  an  imme- 
diate transfer  of  the  force  to  its  new  base  can  be  ready  at  Washington 
and  Alexandria  to  move  down  the  Potomac  ;  and  3d,  that  a  naval  auxil- 
iary force  can  be  had  to  silence,  or  aid  in  silencing  the  enemy's  batter- 


CAMPAIGN  PLANS. 


29 


ies  on  the  York  River  ;  4th,  that  the  force  to  be  left  to  cover  Washing- 
ton shall  be  such  as  to  give  an  entire  feeling  of  security  for  its  safety 
from  menace.    (Unanimous  ) 

"II.  If  the  foregoing  cannot  be,  the  army  should  then  be  moved 
against  the  enemy  behind  the  Rappahannock  at  the  earliest  possible 
moment,  and  the  means  for  reconstructing  bridges,  repairing  railroads, 
and  stocking  them  with  materials  for  supplying  the  army  should  at 
once  be  collected  for  both  the  Orange  and  Alexandria  and  the  Acquia 
and  Richmond  Railroads  (unanimous).  N.  B. — That,  with  the  forts 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  Potomac  fully  garrisoned,  and  those  on  the 
laft  bank  occupied,  a  covering  force  in  front  of  the  Virginia  line  of 
twenty-five  thousand  men  would  suffice  (Keyes,  Heintzelman,  and  Mc- 
Dov/ell).  A  total  of  forty  thousand  men  for  the  defence  of  the  city 
v/ould  sufiice  (Sumner)." 

This  was  approved  by  General  McClellan,  and  imme- 
diately communicated  to  tlie  "War  Department ;  and  on  the 
same  dav  the  following  reply  was  received : 

"War  Department,  March  13,  1862. 
"  The  President,  having  considered  the  plan  of  operations  agreed 
upon  by  yourself  and  the  commanders  of  army  corps,  makes  no  ob- 
jection to  the  same,  but  gives  the  following  directions  as  to  its  exe- 
cution : 

"1.  Leave  such  force  at  Manassas  Junction  as  shall  make  it  en- 
tirely certain  that  the  enemy  shall  not  repossess  himself  of  that  situ- 
ation and  line  of  communication. 

"2.  Leave  Washington  entirely  secure. 

"3.  Move  the  remainder  of  the  force  down  the  Potomac,  choosing 
a  new  base  at  Fortress  Monroe,  or  anywhere  between  there  and  here ; 
or  at  any  event,  move  such  remainder  of  the  army  at  once  in  pursuit 
of  the  enemy  by  some  route. 

"Edwin  M.  Stanton,  Secretary  of  War. 

"Major-General  George  B.  McClellan." 

But  the  council  demanded  a  great  deal  more  than  it  was 
ever  possible  to  carry  out.  The  whole  position  of  affairs, 
as  presented  when  General  McClellan  made  known  his  first 


30 


THE  PENINSULA. 


plans,  had  been  changed  by  the  appearance  of  the  rebel  ram 
Merrimac,  or  Virginia,  on  March  8th.  Although  the  navy 
had  neutralized  her  power  in  so  far  as  to  prevent  her  injur- 
ing our  new  base,  she  still  prevented  us  from  utilizing  the 
James  Eiver,  and  also  demanded  the  diversion  of  a  large 
portion  of  the  naval  forces  to  watch  her,  and  prevented  the 
admiral  even  from  considering  the  practicability  of  running 
by  the  batteries  at  Yorktown  or  co-operating  with  the  army 
in  the  movement  up  the  Peninsula,  had  he  been  called  uipon 
so  to  do.  General  McClellan  (page  118,  Eeport)  says  :  *'The 
general  plan,  therefore,  remained  undisturbed,  although  less 
promising  in  its  details  than  when  the  James  Eiver  was  in 
our  control."  Unfortunately,  the  fact  was  that  we  were  now 
to  work  upon  Plan  No.  3,  or  the  plan  of  the  council,  with  the 
western  flank  of  the  Army  of  the  Peninsula  resting  on  the 
rebel  gunboats,  and  not  on  the  United  States  Navy. 

Here,  also,  let  us  present  one  fatal  consequence  of  McClel- 
lan's  long  dwelling  on  the  Urbana  plan,  and  his  delay  in 
executing  it.  He  probably,  little  thought  he  would  be 
driven  to  his  "  dernier  ressorV  for  a  base  ;  and  he  committed 
a  fatal  error  in  leaving  Norfolk  to  be  turned. 

Admiral  Goldsborough,  commanding  the  fleet  in  the  lower 
Chesapeake,  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy  G.  Y.  Fox,  and 
General  J.  G.  Barnard  had,  as  early  as  December,  1861, 
pointed  out  to  General  McClellan  the  necessity  of  his  taking 
Norfolk.  This  rebel  navy  yard  was  in  full  blast,  and  the 
rebel  rams  and  the  Merrimac  were  growing,  and  threatening 
our  navy  and  our  transports.  All  that  was  required  to  se- 
cure to  us  the  whole  of  their  machinery,  naval  supplies,  and 
their  fleet,  was  a  detachment  of  thirty  or  forty  thousand 


*  The  doings  of  the  Merrimac  and  the  subsequent  gallant  action  of  the  Mon- 
itor are  omitted  here  to  preserve  the  continuity  of  the  narrative.  We  must  refer 
the  reader  to  more  extended  works  for  the  naval  operations. 


CAMPAIGN  PLANS. 


31 


men.  The  capture  of  Norfolk  would  have  changed  every- 
thing. General  McClellan  probably  believed  that  that 
place  would  fall  through  his  own  then  contemplated  move- 
ment ;  and  he  did  nothing  to  carry  out  these  news,  so  ably 
presented  by  our  very  best  naval  and  military  advisers. 

Had  he  made  the  attempt  and  secured  the  success  of  this 
movement  by  a  strong  attack  or  feint  threatening  Manassas, 
the  problem. presented  to  the  council  of  corps  commanders 
would  have  been  very  different  from  the  one  they  encoun- 
tered at  Fairfax  Court  House. 

Nothing  that  was  proposed  or  ordered,  which  contemplated 
r       making  Fortress  Monroe  a  base,  had  anything  to  do  with 
General  McClellan's  first  and  only  well-digested  plan. 

At  this  point  we  defer  all  further  consideration  of  the 
campaign  plans,  and  the  plan  finally  adopted,  for  a  brief 
review  in  the  closing  chapter.  Why  the  Peninsula  route 
was  at  length  followed,  we  have  seen.  McClellan  could  not 
bring  himself  to  adojDt  the  Administration  plan  of  a  direct 
advance  upon  Centreville  and  the  overland  route  to  Eich- 
mond.  Mr.  Lincoln  could  not  agree  with  the  General  in  the 
choice  of  the  Urbana  base,  but  yielded  his  preferences ; 
especially  before  the  expressed  opinion  of  the  council  of 
division  commanders.  Johnston  suddenly  moved  and  de- 
ranged the  Urbana  scheme ;  and  McClellan  and  his  corps 
commanders  could  fix  upon  nothing  else  than  an  advance 
upon  Eichmond  by  way  of  the  Peninsula.  To  this  the  Presi- 
dent gave  his  consent,  under  certain  conditions ;  and  it  re- 
mained the  final  plan  for  the  campaign. 

When  the  plan  had  been  adopted,  the  Secretary  of  War 
naturally  required  from  General  McClellan  a  detailed  state- 
ment of  his  designs  with  regard  to  the  employment  of  the 


32 


THE  PENINSULA. 


Army  of  the  Potomac ;  and  on  March  19th  the  General  gave 
to  the  Secretary,  the  following  as  these  details :  Fort  Monroe 
was  to  be  the  base ;  the  line  of  operations,  that  of  Yorktown 
and  West  Point  upon  Eichmond.  A  decisive  battle  was  to 
be  expected  between  West  Point  and  Eichmond.  To  succeed, 
he  wished  all  the  available  forces  to  be  collected  at  once, 
and  to  reach  West  Point  as  soon  as  possible,  in  order  that  he 
might  establish  his  main  depot  there.  To  reach  West  Point 
he  stated  there  were  two  methods :  First,  to  move  directly 
from  Fortress  Monroe  with  the  main  force,  and  to  land  troops 
near  Yorktown,  driving  out  the  troops  south  of  that  point ; 
then  reduce  Yorktown  and  Gloucester  by  a  siege  ;  second,  to 
make  a  combined  naval  and  land  attack  upon  Yorktown,  the 
first  object  of  the  campaign.  To  do  this  he  required  a  con- 
centration of  all  the  most  powerful  batteries  in  the  navy 
upon  the  York  Eiver ;  and  he  urged  repeatedly,  the  necessity 
of  the  navy's  throwing  all  its  available  force  against  York- 
town.  Neither  in  this  letter,  nor  in  any  communication  that 
we  can  discover,  did  General  McClellan  intimate  that  he 
could  carry  out  the  orders  of  the  Government  with  a  smaller 
movable  force  than  that  he  had  first  proposed ;  that  is  to 
say,  140,000  men. 

Our  unhappy  campaign  opened  with  a  march  to  Centre- 
ville — a  mere  movement,  calculated  to  rid  the  army  of  useless 
baggage,  and  fit  it  for  embarkation  for  the  new  base.  Dur- 
ing this  month,  the  transports  which  had  previously  been 
collected  at  Annapolis  for  the  Urbana  movement,  were 
rapidly  accumulating  at  Alexandria ;  but  they  did  not  assem- 
ble in  numbers  and  capacity  sufficient  to  transport,  as  Gen- 
eral McGlellan  claims  he  w^as  promised  they  would,  50,000 
men  at  a  time. 

The  embarkation  began  March  17th.  Heintzelman's  corps 


CAMPAIGN  PLANS. 


33 


led,  Hamilton's  division  moving  first ;  on  the  22d  Porter's 
followed,  and  the  General  placed  both  in  position  on  roads 
leading  to  Newport  News  and  to  Yorktown.  The  rest  of  the 
army  embarked  as  best  it  could.  General  McClellan  left  with 
his  headquarters  on  the  steamer  Commodore,  on  April  1st,  and 


Washington  and  its  Defences. 


reached  Fort  Monroe  on  the  afternoon  of  the  2d.  He  re- 
ports that  he  had  at  Fort  Monroe  and  its  vicinity,  ready  to 
move,  two  divisions  of  the  Third  Corps  nnder  General 
Heintzelman  ;  two  divisions  of  the  Fourth,  or  Keyes'  corps  ; 
3 


34: 


THE  PENINSULA. 


one  division  of  the  Second,  or  Sumner's  corps ;  Sykes'  regu- 
lar infantry  brigade ;  Hunt's  reserve  artillery,  and  three  re- 
giments of  cavalry,  in  all  about  fifty-eight  thousand  men 
and  one  hundred  guns.  Casey's  division  of  the  Fourth 
Corps  could  not  move  without  wagons,  and  Eichardson's 
division  of  the  Second,  and  Hooker's,  of  the  Third  Corps, 
had  not  arrived. 

At  Washington,  as  will  be  seen,  there  was  to  be  left  a  gar- 
rison of  about  twenty  thousand  men,  some  of  them  raw  and 
indifferent  troops,  who  were  expected  to  hold  the  defences 
against  sudden  attack.  These  defences  consisted  of  a  cordon 
of  strong,  independent  forts,  supporting  each  other,  and  ex- 
tending on  the  south  bank  of  the  Potomac  from  belov/  Alex- 
andria along  beyond  Arlington  Heights  to  Chain  Bridge, 
above  the  capital.  On  the  Maryland  side  the  line  continued 
from  the  Potomac  to  the  eastern  branch,  near  Bladensburgh, 
and  thence  along  the  heights  south  of  the  eastern  branch 
to  a  point  nearly  opposite  Alexandria — making  a  circuit,  or 

total  development,"  as  Barnard  reports,  of  thirty-three 
miles. 


CHAPTER  ni. 


ACTIVE  OPERATIONS. —SIEGE  OF  YORKTOWN, 

In  entering  upon  the  narrative  of  the  active  operations  of 
the  campaign^  the  two  leading  facts  to  be  met  and  dealt 
with  are : 

First. — That  while  General  McClellan  succeeded  in  reach- 
ing the  vicinity  of  his  objective  point — the  Confederate  capi- 
tal— the  results  at  each  stage  of  his  progress  were  inadequate 
and  disappointing. 

Second, — That  when  that  point  seemed  to  be  within  his 
grasp,  his  army  suddenly  encountered  reverses^  and  retreated 
from  its  advanced  position  to  the  banks  of  the  James. 

The  history  of  the  campaign,  in  short,  is  the  history  of  a 
lamentable  failure — nothing  less  ;  and  in  presenting  its  fea- 
tures and  incidents,  the  natural  tendency  will  be  to  investi- 
gate fully  and  radically,  so  far  as  such  a  course  is  possible, 
those  movements  or  delays  upon  which  the  failure  appar- 
ently hinged.  The  point  of  interest  must  always  necessarily, 
be,  to  indicate  and  establish  the  responsibility  in  each  case ; 
whether  that  responsibility  is  found  to  rest  with  one  indi- 
vidual or  many,  or  with  those  unforeseen  or  uncontrollable 
agencies  which  are  vaguely  described  as  the  "fortune  of 
war,"  but  which  usually  prove  to  be  the  superior  ability  or 
resources  of  the  antagonist. 

What,  then,  we  ask,  as  a  proper  initial  inquiry,  were 


36 


THE  PENINSULA. 


General  McClellan's  intentions  and  immediate  plan  upon 
aiTi\'ing  to  take  the  field  from  Fort  Monroe  ? 

He  i^roposed  the  prompt,  direct,  and  vigorous  offensive. 
Upon  this  point  there  is  no  obscurity.  I  had  hoped,"  says 
the  General  in  his  report,  "by  ra^Did  movements  to  drive 
before  me  or  capture  the  enemy  on  the  Peninsula,  open 
the  James  Eiver,  and  iDUsh  on  to  Richmond  before  he  should 
be  materially  reinforced  from  other  portions  of  his  terri- 
tory." Entering  into  details,  it  will  be  observed  that  the 
plan  contemplated  the  advance  of  the  main  body  of  the  army 
up  the  Peninsula,  with  the  co-operation  of  the  na^w  in  the 
rivers ;  while  a  powerful  column,  consisting  of  McDowell's 
First  CoriDS,  over  40,000  strong,  was  to  ox)erate  U23on  the 
right,  on  either  bank  of  the  York,  to  tiu'n  the  enemy's  posi- 
tions should  they  offer  resistance  on  the  direct  route. This 
was  but  a  pro^DOsal  to  execute  one  of  those  large  flank  move- 
ments which  met  with  such  frequent  success  on  both  sides  in 
the  after-camx3aigns  of  the  war.  Under  this  plan  it  was  ex- 
X:)ected  that  the  advance  of  the  army  would  be  continuous, 
or  at  least  be  only  briefly  delayed,  until  West  Point  should 
be  reached,  where  the  base  of  immediate  oj)erations  against 
Richmond  was  to  be  established. 

But  McClellan  had  not  been  on  the  Peninsula  six  days, 
before  he  ex^Derienced  two  serious  disappointments — his 
l^lans  suffered  derangement  in  two  important  respects.  In 
the  first  place,  he  ascertained  upon  his  arrival  at  Fort  Monroe 
that  the  navy  would  be  unable  to  co-operate  with  him  effi- 
ciently ;  and  five  days  later  the  more  sui-prising  information 
was  received,  that  McDowell's  entire  corps  was  detached 
from  his  command  and  ordered  to  remain  in  front  of  Wash- 


*  Referring  to  the  First  Corps,  McClellan  reports  :  "  .  .  .  .  I  intended  to 
move  it  in  mass  to  its  point  of  disemb.irkation,  and  to  land  it  on  either  bank  of 
the  York,  as  might  then  be  determined." — Report,  p.  73. 


SIEGE  OP  YORKTOWN^. 


37 


ington.  Whether  General  McClellan  was  himself  at  fault  in 
the  case,  and  made  his  combinations  upon  insufficient  assur- 
ance that  he  would  receive  all  the  assistance  he  expected,  is 
a  question  to  be  considered ;  but  the  fact  itself  stands,  that 
after  entering  upon  the  execution  of  his  matured  plaus,  he 
found  them  unexpectedly  interrupted  and  requiring,  as  he 
believed,  material  modification."^ 

Now,  as  to  the  failure  of  the  navy,  or  rather  its  non-co- 
operation, the  question  of  responsibility  turns  upon  the 
representations  made  to  General  McClellan  before  he  left 
Washington.  That  he  confidently  anticipated  its  aid,  is 
clear  from  what  he  says  in  proposing  a  combined  naval  and 
land  attack  upon  Yorktown  as  the  preliminary  operation  on 
the  Peninsula.  "To  accomplish  this,"  he  wrote  to  Secre- 
tary Stanton,  March  19th,  "the  navy  should  at  once  concen- 
trate upon  the  York  Eiver  all  their  available  and  most  pow- 
erful batteries ;  its  reduction  should  not  in  that  case  require 
many  hours.  A  strong  corps  would  be  pushed  up  the  York, 
under  cover  of  the  navy,  directly  upon  West  Point,  immedi- 
ately upon  the  fall  of  Yorktown,  and  we  could  at  once 
establish  our  new  base  of  operations  at  a  distance  of  some 
twenty-five  miles  from  Richmond ;  with  every  facility  for  de- 
veloping and  bringing  into  play  the  whole  of  our  available 
force  on  either  or  both  banks  of  the  James.  It  is  impossible 
to  urge  too  strongly  the  absolute  necessity  of  the  full  co- 
operation of  the  navy  as  a  part  of  this  programme." 

So  urgent  was  McClellan  on  this  point,  that  on  the  same 
evening  he  telegraphed  from  Fairfax  Court  House  to  the 
Secretary  as  follows  : 


*  '*  This  army  being  reduced  by  forty-five  thousand  troops — some  of  them  among 
the  best  in  the  service — and  without  the  support  of  the  navy,  the  plan  to  which 
we  are  reduced  bears  scarcely  any  resemblance  to  the  one  I  voted  for." — General 
Keyes  to  Senator  Harris  :  McClellan's  Report,  p.  80. 


38 


THE  PENINSULA. 


' '  Please  have  an  immediate  decision  upon  the  letter  which  will  reach 
you  to-morrow  morning  in  regard  to  co-operation  of  the  navy.  That 
matter  is  important." 

Mr.  Stanton  replied  at  once  : 

"In  order  to  determine  the  precise  co-operation  you  want  with  the 
navy,  the  President  will  go  immediately  to  Alexandria,  and  desires  you 
to  meet  him  at  the  wharf." 

Tlie  result  of  this  interview,  if  it  occurred,  does  not  ap- 
pear ;  but  on  that  day,  the  20th,  McDowell  w^as  at  Washing- 
ton, and  wrote  the  following  to  McClellan  : 

"Nothing  decisive  at  the  President's. 

"  The  plan  seemed  to  find  favor  with  all  who  spoke.  The  only  question 
seemed  to  be  as  to  the  ability  of  the  navy  to  do  their  part.  I  am  to  go 
again  in  the  morning  when  Barnard  returns.  Whether  the  navy  can 
or  not  do  anything,  I  think  it  evident  they  cannot  before  you  can 
ship  another  division  of  Heintzelman's  to  Old  Point.  I  spoke  to  the 
President,  and  he  thought  this  would  be  best,  so  as  not  to  keep  the 
means  of  transportation  idle.  I  would  therefore  send  Heintzelman's 
second  division  at  once,  or  as  soon  as  you  can.  His  first  arrived  safe 
last  night  and  was  landing.  The  Secretary  says  you  should  have  no 
difficulty  with  Wool." 

Three  days  before,  on  the  17th,  McDowell  had  written 
this  : 

' '  In  connection  with  General  Barnard,  I  have  had  a  long  conference 
with  the  Assistant  Secretary,  Fox,  as  to  naval  co-operation.  He  prom- 
ises all  the  power  of  the  Department  shall  be  at  our  disposal.  At  my 
suggestion  he  has  told  Commodore  Goldsborough  to  confer  with  Colonel 
Woodbury  concerning  the  plans  now  in  view." 

On  the  same  day  Mr.  Welles,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  sent 
despatches  to  the  commandants  of  the  navy  yards  at  New 
York  and  Boston,  to  send  what  gunboats  they  had  ready 
"  to  Hampton  Eoads  at  once."  *    Furthermore,  General 

*  The  despatches  quoted  appear  on  file  in  the  War  and  Navy  Departments. 


SIEGE  OF  YORKTOWN. 


39 


Barnard  went  down  to  Hampton  Eoads,  to  consult  Com- 
modore Goldsborongh,  but  it  would  appear  from  the  latter's 
testimony,  that  the  question  of  breaking  through  between 
Yorktown  and  Gloucester  was  not  discussed. 

From  the  foregoing  despatches,  it  is  evident  that  McClel- 
lan  cannot  be  charged  with  not  having  pressed  the  matter  ofi* 
naval  co-operation  upon  the  attention  of  the  Government. 

On  the  other  hand,  how  did  the  naval  authorities  under- 
stand this  plan  of  co-operation  with  the  army  ?  If  General 
McClellan  was  distinctly  informed,  as  stated  by  himself, 
that  the  navy  would  assist  him  as  he  desired,  it  is  impossible 
to  assume  that  either  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  or  the  officer 
commanding  the  fleet  in  Hampton  Eoads  would  not  have 
known  the  fact,  and  been  impressed  with  his  needs  and  ex- 
pectations. 

The  naval  authorities,  on  the  contrary,  claim  to  have  re- 
ceived no  intimation  that  any  special  co-operation,  in  the  way 
of  a  difficult  attempt,  was  required  of  them.  The  testimony 
of  Mr..  Fox,  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  and  of  Admiral 
Goldsborough,  commanding  the  Hampton  Eoads  fleet,  is 
conclusive  as  to  this.  Mr.  Fox,  for  instance,  was  asked  by 
Mr.  Gooch  : 

(Question. — "Do  you  know  whether  or  not  it  was  expected 
that  the  navy  should  take  the  batteries  of  the  enemy  at  or 
about  Yorktown?" 

Answer. — "I  never  heard  that  it  was." 

Question. — "Was  that  feasible?" 

Answer. — "Not  to  attack  those  batteries.  Wooden  vessels 
could  not  have  attacked  the  batteries  at  Yorktown  and 
Gloucester  with  any  degree  of  success.  The  forts  at  York- 
town  were  situated  too  high ;  were  beyond  the  reach  of 
naval  guns  ;  and  I  understood  that  General  McClellan  never 
expected  any  attack  to  be  made  upon  them  by  the  navy. " 


40 


THE  PENINSULA. 


And  to  a  previous  question  he  had  replied  in  the  same  vein : 
*'So  far  as  I  know,  all  the  vessels  that  General  McClellan 
required  in  his  operations  against  Yorktown,  were  placed  at 
his  disposal  by  Admiral  Goldsborough.  I  am  not  aware 
that  he  ever  required  that  we  should  attack  Yorktown ;  or 
that  it  was  ever  expected  that  we  should  do  so." 

Admiral  Goldsborough's  testimony  is  still  more  emphatic  : 
Question. — "What  part  was  the  navy  called  upon  to  act 
in  the  campaign  of  the  Peninsula,  as  it  is  called?" 

Answer. — "With  regard  to  that  campaign,  no  naval  au- 
thority whatever,  to  my  knowledge,  was  ever  consulted  until 
after  a  considerable  part  of  the  army  got  down  there.  The 
whole  matter  was  arranged  here  in  Washington  by  officers 
in  the  army,  as  I  understood.  I  believe  they  never  said  a 
word,  even  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy.  Certainly,  noth- 
ing was  ever  said  to  me  until  the  eleventh  hour.  Then  it 
was  that  I  heard  that  they  expected  the  navy  to  co-operate 
with  them.  The  Assistant  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  W^atson, 
came  down  to  see  me  in  behalf,  as  he  said,  of  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  and  the  President  of  the  United  States.  He 
told  me  of  the  great  anxiety  felt  in  Washington  in  regard 
to  the  Merrimac ;  that  they  were  apprehensive  she  might 
get  up  the  York  Eiver  and  entirely  disconcert  all  the  move- 
ments of  the  army.  I  told  Mr.  Watson  that  the  President 
might  make  his  mind  perfectly  easy  about  the  Merrimac 
going  up  Y'ork  Eiver ;  that  she  never  could  get  there,  for 
I  had  ample  means  to  prevent  that.  This  was  in  the  latter 
part  of  March,  1862.  The  army  at  that  time  was  about  as= 
sembling  at  Old  Point  Comfort.  General  McClellan  had  not 
then  arrived." 

The  Admiral  goes  on  further  to  declare,  that  he  did  every- 
thing that  the  General  requested  of  him — detailing  seven 
gunboats  for  his  purposes,  being  all  the  former  wanted  ;  and 


SIEGE  OF  YOKKTOWN". 


41 


adds  tliat,  upon  the  day  of  liis  arrival  off  Fort  Monroe  and 
before  going  ashore,  the  General  came  on  board  of  his  ship 
to  consult  with  him  "as  to  the  best  mode  of  attacking  York- 
town."  This  mode  contemplated  a  flank  attack  by  way  of 
the  Severn  Eiver  upon  the  Gloucester  works  ;  on  the  fall  of 
which,  the  gunboats  could  run  by  Yorktown  and  render  that 
position  untenable. 

These'  extracts  from  the  testimony  before  the  Committee 
on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  are  introduced  for  the  single 
purpose  of  testing  the  charge  that  the  navy  is  to  be  held 
responsible  for  causing  the  first  serious  derangement  of 
McClellan's  campaign  plan.  The  navy  was  clearly  ignorant 
of  the  scope  and  intent  of  that  plan  ;  was  not  a  party  to  it ; 
had  not  promised  to  join  in  a  combined  attack  upon  York, 
town,  and  moreover,  could  probably  have  effected  nothing 
in  such  an  Mempt.^ 

*  The  files  of  the  Navy  Department  contain  no  orders  in  the  matter.  At  a  later 
date,  April  17th,  Secretary  Welles  sent  the  following  to  Admiral  G-oldsborough, 
the  tenor  of  which  hardly  warrants  the  inference  that  he  had  previously  de- 
spatched more  specific  instructions : 

Sir — The  attention  of  the  whole  country,  as  well  as  of  the  Department,  is 
turned  with  intense  interest  at  this  time  to  the  naval  and  army  movements  in 
Lower  Virginia.  I  commend  your  determination  not  to  be  drawn  into  a  conflict 
where  the  enemy  can  take  you  at  disadvantage,  and  would  enjoin  unceasing  vigi- 
lance at  every  point.  It  cannot  be  many  days  before  the  Galena,  which  is  now 
receiving  her  armament  on  board,  will  bo  with  you,  and  will,  I  trust,  prove  an 
efficient  acquisition  to  your  squadron.  Your  determination,  should  the  enemy 
shell  Newport  News,  not  to  be  drawn  among  the  shoals  and  narrow  waters  there- 
abouts, seems  to  me  wise  and  proper. 

'*  You  will  actively  and  earnestly  co-operate  with  Major-General  McClellan, 
whose  position  and  movements  at  Yorktown  and  on  York  River  are  of  momentous 
interest  and  consequence  to  the  whole  country.  Any  and  all  aid  that  you  can 
render  him  and  the  army  you  will  extend  at  all  times.  It  is  important  and  ab- 
solutely essential  that  he  should  secure  all  the  assistance  that  he  may  require  of 
the  navy  and  that  it  is  in  your  power  to  bestow  consistently  with  your  other  duties. 

The  general  objects  and  designs  of  the  Government  and  the  great  interests  de- 
pendent on  the  naval  and  army  movements  in  the  vicinity  of  Hampton  Roads 
are  well  understood  by  you. 

*'  In  addition  to  the  general  facts  from  time  to  time  communicated  to  you,  the 


42 


THE  PENINSULA. 


The  whole  explanation  of  the  matter  seems  to  be,  that 
while  General  McClellan  expressed  his  profound  anxiety 
that  the  navy  should  render  its  aid,  he  expected  more  than 
the  Government  conld  promise  or  the  navy  accomplish.  If 
he  was  disappointed  to  find  at  Fort  Monroe  that  the  gun- 
boats were  not  to  batter  down  and  run  by  Yorktown,  we 
must  assume  that  it  was  because  he  had  not  assured  himself 
before  leaving  Washington  that  that  particular  service  could 
be  and  was  to  be  performed  by  them.  The  General  dis- 
tinctly intimated  that  he  should  depend  upon  them  to  re- 
duce the  place,  but  it  remains  to  be  shown  by  evidence 
which  has  not  come  within  our  reach,  whether  he  had  been 
promised  that  they  would.  To  us  it  appears  that  McClellan 
meant  one  thing  by  "  co-operation,"  and  that  the  navy,  then 
absorbed  with  the  Merrimac,  and  not  impressed  with  the 
scope  of  his  expectations,  meant  another. 

The  nature  of  General  McClellan's  second  disappointment 
— the  retention  of  McDowell's  corps — and  who  was  there 
at  fault,  will  be  presently  noticed  in  its  proper  connection. 

Compelled  to  forego  all  thought  of  valuable  assistance 
from  the  nsivj,  McClellan,  depending  now  entirely  upon  his 

Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy  has  visited  you  on  your  station  and  made  known 
the  wishes  of  the  Government  in  person. 

"  Whether  and  to  what  extent  you  can  detach  any  portion  of  your  com- 
mand from  their  employment  on  other  stations  at  this  juncture,  I  am  unable  to 
decide.  To  your  judgment  these  and  other  matters  are  confided  with  a  solici- 
tude and  anxiety  I  cannot  express,  but  with  a  confidence  that  the  country  will 
not  be  disappointed  in  you. 

"  I  am,  respectfully, 

"Your  ob't  servant, 

"  GIDEON  WELLES. 

**  Flag  Officer  L .  M.  Goldsborough, 

*•  Command'g  N.  A.  Block'g  Squad., 
"Hampton  Roads,  Va."" 

[From  the  MS.  Records,  Navy  Department.] 


SIEGE  OF  YORKTOWN. 


43 


army,  modified  his  plans  to  a  certain  extent.  The  modifica- 
tion, however,  does  not  prove  to  have  been  radical.  No  im- 
portant change  was  made.  He  proceeded  with  the  original 
idea— an  advance  of  the  main  army  up  the  Peninsula,  with  a 
flanking  column  on  the  right.  The  only  deviation  appears  in 
the  fact  that  whereas,  before,  the  navy  was  expected  to  at- 
tack and  reduce  Yorktown  without  delay,  and  continue  to 
turn  all  -the  enemy's  positions  on  the  York,  this  work  was  now 
to  be  done  somewhat  more  slowly  by  McDowell's  flanking 
column,' moving  up  the  left  bank  of  that  river. 

In  other  words.  General  McClellan's  initial  plan,  adopted 
at  and  undertaken  from  Fort  Monroe,  was  this  :  to  move  for- 
ward, first,  in  two  columns  with  the  troops  already  disem- 
barked— one  column  marching  on  the  right  direct  to  York- 
town,  and  another  along  the  James  River  westward  of  and 
beyond  Yorktown  to  the  vicinity  of  "Williamsburg.  Then, 
to  use  the  General's  own  words,  it  was  designed,  should  the 
works  at  Yorktowm  and  Williamsburg  ofier  serious  resist- 
ance, to  land  the  First  Corps  (McDowell's),  reinforced  if 
necessary,  on  the  left  bank  of  the  York  or  on  the  Severn,  to 
move  it  on  Gloucester  and  West  Point,  in  order  to  take  in 
reverse  whatever  force  the  enemy  might  have  on  the  Penin- 
sula, and  compel  him  to  abandon  his  positions."  From  this 
it  will  be  seen,  that  whatever  obstacles  the  main  army  met 
with  in  marching  to  Richmond,  or  the  base  at  West  Point, 
they  were  all  to  be  turned  by  McDowell.  Delay  in  carrying 
these  positions  would  thus  be  overcome  and  preliminary 
losses  avoided.  The  plan  was  based  on  sound  military  prin- 
ciples. 

The  movement  forward  began  on  April  4th.  The  column 
directed  against  Yorktown  included  the  Third  Corps — Por- 
ter's and  Hamilton's  divisions  only  having  arrived — Sedg- 
wick's division  of  the  Second  Corps,  and  Averill's  Third 


44 


THE  PENINSULA. 


Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  under  General  Heintzelman.  The 
column  on  the  left,  commanded  by  General  Keyes,  was  com- 
posed of  tlie  divisions  of  Smith  and  Couch,  of  the  Fourth 
Corps,  with  the  Fifth  Eegular  Cavalry  temporarily  attached. 
The  transportation  of  Casey's  division,  of  the  Fourth,  not 
being  disembarked,  it  remained  in  camp  at  Newport  News, 
from  which  point  the  left  column  started.  The  columns 
marched  from  ten  to  twelve  miles  and  bivouacked  at  night 
at  Young's  Mills  on  the  left,  near  the  James,  and  on  the 
right  at  Howard's  Bridge  and  Cockletown  beyond.  The 
enemy  showed  themselves  on  the  right ;  but  offered  no  se- 
rious resistance.  The  reserve,  consisting  of  Hunt's  artillery, 
Stoneman's  cavalry,  and  Sykes'  brigade  of  regular  infantry, 
encamped  at  Big  Bethel. 

At  six  o'clock  on  the  following  morning,  the  5th,  the  march 
was  resumed.  Heintzelman  received  orders  to  advance  with 
the  Third  Corps  to  a  point  two  and  three-fourths  miles  from 
Yorktown ;  w4iile  Keyes  was  instructed  to  continue  on  the 
left,  by  way  of  "Warwick  Court  House,  to  an  old  landmark 
known  as  the  "  Half-way  House,"  between  Yorktown  and 
Williamsburg.  The  orders  to  Keyes,  which  will  be  presently 
noticed,  were  significant ;  requiring  him  to  occupy  and  hold 
"  the  narrow  dividing  ridge  near  the  Half-way  House,  so  as 
to  prevent  the  escape  of  the  garrison  at  Yorktown  by  land, 
and  prevent  reinforcements  being  thrown  in."  Had  these 
orders  been  executed  to  the  letter,  and  the  left  column  espe- 
cially been  able  to  reach  and  hold  the  point  indicated,  on 
the  evening  of  the  5th,  the  Commanding  General  would  have 
had  the  satisfaction  of  reporting  most  substantial  progress 
made  "  up  the  Peninsula  "  during  these  first  two  days. 

But  hardly  had  the  army  filed  into  the  roads  for  the  march 
of  the  5th,  before  it  encountered  that  series  of  fatalities 
which  were  to  be  its  almost  daily  experience  through  this 


SIEGE  OF  YORKTOWN. 


45 


dislieartening  campaign.  To  follow  the  column  under 
Keyes,  whose  immediate  success  was  of  most  importance, 
we  find  that  general  sending  word  to  headquarters  just  as 
Smith's  division  was  moving  out,  "6  a.m.,"  that,  from  the 
best  information  he  could  obtain,  a  large  force  of  the  enemy 
was  occupying  a  strong  position,  defended  by  three  guns,  at 
Lee's  Mills,  six  miles  beyond  on  the  road  he  was  following. 
**It  is  my  opinion,"  he  said,  "that  we  shall  encounter  very 
serious  resistance ;  if  so,  we  shall  not  be  able  to  reach  the 
Half-way  House  on  the  Yorktown  and  Williamsburg  road 
to-day.  ...  I  respectfully  suggest  that  a  strong  reserve 
force  be  within  my  reach.  .  .  .  Our  wagons  did  not 
arrive  last  night,  and  we  shall  be  obliged  to  halt  at  Warwick 
Court  House  for  the  infantry  reserve  ammunition  to  come 
up.  .  .  .  It  is  a  heavy  march  to  the  Half-way  House, 
even  without  opposition."  At  half -past  seven  he  added : 
"  The  roads  are  very  bad  ahead.  Shall  I  push  on  to  Half- 
way House  if  artillery  cannot  get  on  fast  enough  ?  I  sup- 
pose not,  of  course."  And  again,  at  3  p.m.,  he  reports  :  "  I 
am  stopped  by  the  enemy's  works  at  Lee's  Mills,  which  offer 
a  severe  resistance  ;  the  road  through  the  woods  for  nearly  a 
mile  having  become  absolutely  impassable  for  artillery,  I 
am  cutting  a  new  road  through.  One  battery  is  replying  to 
the  enemy,  and  another  is  nearly  or  quite  through." 

The  rain  had  been  falling  in  torrents  all  the  morning ;  and 
it  was  not  until  about  noon  that  the  advance,  under  Keyes, 
struck  the  enemy's  skirmishers.  Hancock's  brigade,  of 
Smith's  division,  deployed  on  the  right,  Davidson's  on  the 
left,  and  Brooks'  in  reserve.  Couch's  division  rested  at 
Warwick  Court  House,  with  part  of  Peck's  and  Graham's 
brigades,  extended  down  the  Warwick  Eiver.  Finding  the 
march  thus  seriously  obstructed  at  Lee's  Mills,  the  column 
encamped  for  the  night  in  the  above  order. 


46 


THE  PENINSULA. 


Upon  the  right,  Heintzelman  was  also  stopped ;  but  that 
was  expected,  his  march  being  upon  Yorktown.  From 
Cockletown,  Porter's  division  moved  forward  on  the  5th, 
with  Morell's  brigade  in  advance  —  Berdan's  Independent 
Eegiment  of  Sharpshooters  taking  the  lead  —  and  after  a 
march  of  three  miles,  came  nnder  the  fire  of  the  enemy's 
works.  It  happened  to  be  at  the  point  designated  by  Gen- 
eral McClellan,  where  this  column  was  to  halt  for  further 
orders,  and  General  Morell  thus  describes  the  preliminary 
incidents  in  his  report  to  General  Porter:  "At  seven  o'clock 
on  the  morning  of  the  5tli,  we  were  again  in  motion,  the  cav- 
alry still  in  the  rear.  The  rain  commenced  falling  at  the 
same  time,  which  made  the  road  exceedingly  heavy,  and 
delayed  our  progress.  You  joined  me  at  the  saw-mill,  your 
staff  and  mine  forming  a  conspicuous  group  ;  and  at  10  a.m., 
as  we  arrived  at  the  junction  of  the  Warwick  wdth  the  York- 
town  road,  we  received  the  first  shot  from  the  enemy.  It 
came  from  their  works  on  our  right  near  the  town,  and  was 
well  aimed,  though  a  little  too  high.  The  sharpshooters,  un- 
der Colonel  Berdan,  were  alone  in  front  of  us."  "Looming 
up  in  the  mist  and  rain,"  says  General  Porter  at  the  same 
time,  "were  extensive  defences  of  the  enemy,  from  which  we 
were  immediately  saluted  with  the  fire  of  artillery."  Porter 
at  once  made  his  dispositions  :  Morell  deploying  in  front  and 
supporting  Weeden's  and  Griffin's  batteries,  which  opened 
upon  the  enemy's  works  at  a  distance  of  two  thousand  yards, 
and  Martindale's  brigade,  at  one  o'clock,  taking  position  on 
the  left  of  Morell's,  with  Butterfield's  brigade  in  reserve. 
Artillery  firing  and  some  skirmishing  occurred  with  little 
loss  during  the  afternoon ;  and  at  night,  the  division  en- 
camped on  the  ground  fronting  the  works  at  Yorktown  and 
those  connecting  on  its  right. 

The  position,  then,  of  McClellan's  army,  on  the  morning 

3 


SIEGE  OF  YORKTOWN. 


47 


of  the  6th,  was  not  that  contemplated  in  his  orders  for  the 
6th.  Kejes,  certainly,  shonld  have  been  at  the  Half-way 
House,  near  Williamsburg.  But  he  had  met  an  obstruction. 
His  progress  on  the  5th  was  five  miles — no  more  ;  Porter's, 
four.  Eight  here  begins  that  month's  delay  at  Yorktown. 
One  thing  is  certain  :  it  was  not  strategic  delay — delay  for  a 
purpose,  since  the  General  had  promised  rapid  movements 
forward,  and  had  provided  flank  operations  to  expedite  the 
direct.  What,  then,  caused  it?  Could  not  and  ought  not 
the  delay  to  have  been  avoided  ?  Let  us  look  at  this  care- 
fully and  impartially. 

Preliminary  to  these  questions,  it  should  be  ascertained 
what  the  enemy  had  been  doing  on  the  Peninsula,  and  what 
precisely  was  their  position  on  the  5th,  when  resistance  by 
them  first  proved  serious. 

The  Confederate  attitude  in  this  quarter  had  been,  from 
the  first,  that  of  defence.  For  some  time  after  the  affair  of 
Big  Bethel,  June  10,  1861,  they  had  made  Yorktown  their 
base  of  observation,  with  posts  thrown  out  several  miles  in 
advance.  Major-General  J.  Bankhead  Magruder,  late  of 
the  United  States  Army,  commanded.  By  March  1,  1862, 
Magruder  had  laid  out,  and  partially  completed,  three  de- 
fensive lines  across  the  Peninsula,  from  Williamsburg  down 
toward  Fort  Monroe.  What  he  proposed  and  describes 
as  his  "  real  line  of  defence  positions,"  was  the  one  at  the 
front,  seven  miles  below  Yorktown ;  or  at  that  point  between 
Howard's  and  Young's  Mills,  where  the  setting  back  of 
the  Poquosin  Eiver  from  the  York  and  the  mouths  of  the 
Warwick  and  Deep  Creek,  on  the  James,  contract  the  inter- 
vening solid  ground  to  the  short  distance  of  three  miles. 

Both  flanks  of  this  line,"  says  Magruder,  "were  defended 
by  boggy  and  difficult  streams  and  swamps.  In  addition, 
the  left  flank  was  defended  by  elaborate  fortifications  at 


48 


THE  PEmNSULA. 


Ship  Point,  connected  by  a  broken  line  of  redoubts  crossing 
the  heads  of  the  various  ravines  emptying  into  York  Eiver 
and  "Wormley's  Creek,  and  terminating  at  Fort  Grafton, 
nearly  in  front  of  Yorktown.  The  right  flank  was  defended 
by  the  fortifications  at  the  mouth  of  "Warwick  Eiver  and  at 
Mulberry  Island  Point,  and  the  redoubts  extending  from 
the  Warwick  to  James  Eiver.  Intervening  between  the  two 
mills  was  a  wooded  country,  about  two  miles  in  extent.  This 
wooded  line,  forming  the  centre,  needed  the  defence  of  in- 
fantry in  a  sufficient  force  to  prevent  any  attempt  on  the 
part  of  the  enemy  to  break  through  it.  In  my  opinion,  this 
advanced  line,  with  its  flank  defences,  might  have  been  held 
by  20,000  troops.  With  25,000 1  do  not  believe  it  could  have 
been  broken  by  any  force  the  enemy  could  have  brought 
against  it.  Its  two  flanks  were  protected  by  the  Virginia 
(Merrimac)  and  the  works  on  one  side,  and  the  fortifications 
at  Yorktown  and  Gloucester  Point  on  the  other." 

His  force  being  reduced  by  detachments  sent  across  the 
James  to  Suffolk  and  Portsmouth,  Magruder  abandoned  this 
advanced  line  about  March  1st,  and  fell  back  to  his  second 
line,  running  from  Yorktown  on  his  left  along  the  Warwick 
Eiver  to  Mulberry  Island,  and  the  James  upon  the  right. 
The  third  line,  to  be  noticed  later,  was  that  constructed  in 
front  of  Williamsburg,  eleven  miles  farther  up  the  Penin- 
sula. His  second,  or  the  Yorktown  position,  was,  in  point  of 
extent,  the  least  defensible  of  the  three  ;  but  it  presented  the 
counterbalancing  advantage  of  having  its  left  protected  by  the 
projecting  bank  of  the  York  at  Gloucester,  whose  works,  in 
conjunction  with  those  at  Yorktown  opposite,  were  expected 
to  close  the  river  to  the  passage  of  the  Union  gun-boats."^ 


*  The  Count  de  Paris  in  his  well  known  and  admirable  work,  states  that  Ma- 
gruder persisted  in  holding  the  Yorktown  position  in  spite  of  orders  from  Rich- 
mond to  abandon  it.    I  find  no  confirmation  of  this  statement,  but  infer  from 


SIEGE  OF  YORKTOWN. 


40 


Although  embracing  a  front  of  ^Hwelve  miles,"  as  Ma- 
grnder  reports,  this  line  had  been  converted  by  various  for- 
tifications and  devices  into  a  considerable  barrier.  Around 
Yorktown  itself,  the  old  embankments  thrown  up  by  the 
British  in  1781,  were  substantially  revived ;  and,  at  com- 
manding positions  outside  of  the  village,  two  works  were 
constructed,  known  as  the  "red"  and  white"  redoubts, 
united  by  long  curtains.  In  the  vicinity  and  to  the  west  of 
these,  or  a  mile  and  a  half  from  Yorktown,  the  Warwick 
River  takes  its  rise  and  flows  in  a  southerly  direction  to  the 
James.  Its  upper  part,  originally  known  as  Beaverdam 
Creek,  is  described  by  Magruder  as  a  sluggish  and  boggy 
stream,"  twenty  or  thirty  yards  wide  in  some  places,  and 
running  through  "  a  dense  wood  fringed  by  swamps."  There 
were  two  mills  with  dams  upon  its  banks,  one — Wynne's 
Mill — about  three  miles  from  Yorktown  ;  the  other — Lee's 
Mills — two  and  one-half  miles  below,  where  the  James  River 
road  crosses  the  stream.  Three  additional  dams  were  con- 
structed by  the  enemy,  making  five  in  all ;  which  had  the 
effect  of  backing  up  the  water  and  rendering  its  passage  im- 
practicable for  either  artillery  or  infantry,  for  nearly  three- 
fourths  of  the  distance.  So,  at  least,  reports  Magruder. 
Each  dam  was  covered  by  artillery  and  earthworks ;  while 
along  the  rear  of  the  line,  ran  a  recently  opened  military 
road.  At  Lee's  Mills,  strong  fortifications  had  been  erected, 
and  from  that  point,  the  line  presented  a  refused  right,  turn- 
ing across  Mulberry  Island  to  Skiff  Creek.  The  Confed- 
erate force  defending  this  position,  numbered  11,000  strong 
at  the  time  McClellan  moved  forward  from  Fort  Monroe, 
6,000  defending  the  flanks  at  Yorktown  and  Mulberry  Island, 

what  both  Davis  and  Johnston  say,  and  from  Mogruder's  own  report,  that  he  was 
expected  to  dispute  every  inch  of  the  Peninsula — the  retention  of  Norfolk  de- 
pending on  his  position. 

4 


50 


THE  PENINSULA. 


and  5,000  posted  at  the  dams  and  assailable  points  along  tlie 
Warwick  front. ^ 

The  existence  of  this  line,  in  front  of  whicli  he  was 
brought  to  a  halt  on  April  5tli,  was  unknown  to  General 
McClellan.  Both  in  the  re23ort  of  his  operations  and  in  his 
testimony  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  "War, 
he  refers  to  the  lack  of  precise  information  respecting  the 
topogTaphy  of  the  Peninsula,  as  an  element  of  delay  and  con- 
fusion in  his  movements.  Our  maps,"  he  testifies,  "  proved 
entirely  inaccurate,  and  did  us  more  harm  than  good,  for  we 
were  constantly  misled  by  them."  Again,  in  his  report,  he 
observes  :  "  The  country,  though  known  in  its  general  fea- 
tures, we  found  to  be  inaccurately  described  in  essential 
particulars  in  the  only  maps  and  geographical  memoirs  or 
papers  to  which  access  could  be  had.  Erroneous  courses  to 
streams  and  roads  were  frequently  given,  and  no  dependence 
could  be  placed  on  the  information  thus  derived.  .  .  . 
Eeconnoissances,  frequently  under  fire,  proved  the  only 
trustworthy  sources  of  information."  Heintzelman,  Keyes, 
and  other  officers,  mention  the  same  want ;  and  the  inconve- 
nience and  difficulties  arising  from  it. 

*  Colonel  Cabell,  of  the  Confederate  artillery,  reported  May  10,  1862,  as  follows 
in  regard  to  this  position  :  ' '  Three  roads  led  up  from  the  Peninsula  and  crossed 
the  line  of  our  defences.  The  first  on  our  right  was  the  Warwick  road,  that 
crossed  at  Lee's  Mills  ;  the  second  crossed  at  Wynne's  Mill,  and  the  third  was  com- 
manded by  the  reboubts  (Nos,  4  and  5)  near  Yorktown.  The  crossing  at  Lee's 
Mills  was  naturally  strong,  and  fortifications  had  been  erected  there  and  at 
Wynne's  Mill.  Below  Lee's  Mills  the  V\^arwick  River,  affected  by  the  tides  and  in- 
vested by  swamps  on  each  side,  formed  a  tolerable  protection  ;  but  the  marshes 
could  easily  be  made  passable  and  the  river  bridged.  Between  Lee's  and 
Wynne's  Mills  an  unbroken  forest  extended  on  the  right  bank  of  the  stream  to  a 
distance  of  about  three  miles.  Two  additional  dams  were  constructed,  the  one 
(Dam  No.  1)  nearest  to  Wynne's  Mill,  and  the  other.  Dam  No,  2.  A  dam  called 
the  upper  dam  was  constructed  in  the  stream  above  Wynne's  Mill.  This  detailed 
description  of  the  line  of  defence  seems  necessary  to  explain  the  position  of  the 
artillery  of  the  I*eninsula." 


SIEGE  OF  YORKTOWX. 


51 


But  this  was  to  have  been  anticipated.  The  Virginia 
Peninsula,  like  many  portions  even  of  the  older  States,  was 
practically  teri^a  incognita  for  military  purposes.  Careful 
surveys  of  its  entire  extent  had  never  been  made,  and  when 
the  topographical  engineers  set  to  work  to  construct  maxDS 
for  General  McClelian's  guidance,  in  view  of  his  possible 
movement  by  that  route,  their  results  were  necessarily  insuf- 
ficiently full  or  precise.  Major-General  A.  A.  Humphreys, 
then  at  the  head  of  the  Topographical  Corps,  consulted  every 
available  authority  and  record  bearing  upon  the  features  of 
that  region ;  and  this  information  was  used  by  the  Command- 
ing General.  Among  other  maps  brought  to  light,  were  the 
British  plans  of  the  siege  of  Yorktown,  in  1781,  and  the  orig^ 
inal  survey  of  the  Peninsula  from  Fort  Monroe  to  Williams- 
burg, made  in  1818  by  Major  James  Kearney,  of  the  corps  of 
Topographical  Engineers,  both  of  which  satisfactorily  es- 
tablished certain  points.  Various  outlines  were  compiled ; 
but  the  most  elaborate,  so  far  as  it  went,  and  the  one  followed 
by  General  McClellan,  was  that  furnished  by  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  T.  J.  Cram,  then  serving  as  engineer  and  aid-de-camp 
to  General  Wool,  at  Fort  Monroe,  which  embraced  Norfolk, 
Suffolk,  and  the  Peninsula  as  far  as  the  Half-way  House 
above  l^orktown.  And  yet  this  map,  which,  in  view  of  its 
source,  appears  to  have  been  regarded  as  the  most  reliable, 
was  found  to  be  in  error  in  several  important  particulars, 
especially  in  indicating  the  course  of  the  Warwick ;  which  it 
represented  as  running  nearly  parallel  with  the  road  up  the 
Peninsula,  instead  of  running  across  it  to  the  vicinity  of 
Y^orktown.  Kearney's  survey,  on  the  other  hand,  indicates 
the  true  direction  of  the  stream ;  but  gives  it  no  prominence 
as  an  impediment.  With  these  maps  before  him,  it  is  clear 
that  McClellan  did  not  expect  to  find  the  extensive  line  of 
defence  which,  as  we  have  seen,  Magruder  had  constructed 


52 


THE  PENINSULA. 


and  occupied.  Thus,  to  the  question  asked  bv  the  Committee 
on  the  Conduct  of  the  War, — whether  he  knew  of  the  enemy's 
works  before  he  landed  on  the  Peninsula,  McClellan  replied : 
*'No ;  we  did  not  know  of  the  line  of  works  along  the  War- 
wick. We  knew  that  Yorktown  itself  was  surrounded  by  a 
continuous  line  of  earthworks,  but  we  did  not  know  of  the 
line  of  the  Warwick.  .  .  .  When  we  did  advance,  we 
found  the  enemy  intrenched  and  in  strong  force  wherever  we 
approached.  The  nature  and  extent  of  his  position  along 
the  Warwick  Eiver  was  not  known  to  us  when  we  left  Fort 
Monroe." 

How  far  a  general  may  base  the  delay  or  failure  of  his 
movements  on  the  meagreness  and  inaccuracy  of  his  topo- 
graphical information,  depends  upon  the  given  case.  Gen- 
eral McClellan's  situation  in  this  respect,  was  probably  but 
little  different  from  that  of  other  generals  in  other  parts  of 
the  field.  It  was  a  war  in  which  he  who  pushed  and  found 
out  for  himself,  was  the  most  likely  to  achieve  results.  In 
this  particular  instance,  we  may  be  permitted  to  quote  from 
General  Humphreys,  that  the  information  collected  by 
his  corps,  in  advancing  up  the  Peninsula,  "  was  quite  as  full 
as  anything  we  had  in  the  pursuit  of  Lee  in  April,  1865,  after 
we  got  ten  miles  from  Petersburg — indeed,  more  full,  more 
complete."  ^ 

But,  aside  from  the  inadequate  and  misleading  maps — 
aside,  in  fact,  from  the  alleged  non-co-operation  of  the  navy, 
an  important  criticism  is  here  suggested.  Was  this  advance 
from  Fort  Monroe  toward  Yorktown  itself,  conducted  upon 
correct  tactical  principles  ?  Was  it  based  upon  a  proper  ap- 
preciation of  the  enemy's  probable  dispositions  and  fore- 
sight? 


*  Letter  from  G-eneral  Humphreys  to  the  writer,  Jane,  1881. 


SIEGE  OF  YORKTOWN. 


53 


Two  things  are  beyond  dispute :  the  topographical  maps 
presented  an  accurate  outline  of  the  Peninsula — that  is,  the 
lines  of  the  James  and  York  ;  and,  second,  McClellan  ad- 
vanced upon  the  enemy  in  expectation  of  meeting  resistance 
at  Yorktown.  As  to  the  latter  point,  he  states  in  his  report, 
that,  as  he  had  ascertained  that  the  Confederate  General 
Huger  could  readily  reinforce'  Magruder  from  Norfolk,  and 
had  already  done  so,  and  that  Johnston's  army  could  be  rap- 
idly transferred  from  Manassas  to  Yorktown,  he  proposed 
*'to  invest  that  town  without  delay."  Cram's  map,  says 
McClellan,  indicated  "  the  feasibility  of  the  design ; "  and 
from  Fort  Monroe  the  General  hurried  forward  to  execute 
it  before  the  enemy  could  be  reinforced.  This  was  to  be 
the  first  of  the  promised  "  rapid  movements  "  toward  Kich- 
mond. 

By  the  courtesy  of  General  H.  G.  Wright,  the  present 
Chief  of  the  Corps  of  Topographical  Engineers,  the  author 
is  placed  in  possession  of  all  the  requisite  official  maps  cov- 
ering this  campaign,  inclusive  of  tracings  of  those  by  Kear- 
ney and  Cram  ;  and  it  is  to  be  admitted,  that  according  to 
the  latter,  Yorktown  stands  in  a  dangerously  isolated  situa- 
tion, inviting  attack,  being  apparently  fortified  for  no  other 
purjDOse  than  to  close  the  York  Eiver  in  connection  with  the 
Gloucester  works,  and  having  no  relation  to  the  Peninsula 
as  a  defence  against  the  approach  of  an  army  by  land.  To 
the  uneducated  eye,  it  seems  to  be  a  most  "feasible"  ma- 
noeuvre to  march  to  its  rear,  surround  and  invest  it,  and 
thus  repeat  what  Washington  effected  upon  the  same  spot 
in  1781,  or  what  Grant  enforced  at  Vicksburg  in  1863.  That 
General  McClellan  expected,  upon  the  strength  of  Cram's 
map,  to  be  able  to  surround  Yorktown,  is  not  only  evident 
from  his  report,  but,  as  we  have  already  noticed,  his  orders 
to  Keyes  on  April  5th,  to  march  and  encamp  at  the  Half-way 


54 


THE  PENINSULA. 


House,  six  miles  in  the  rear  of  Yorktown,  indicate  no  mis- 
givings on  liis  part  as  to  Keyes'  ability  to  reach  that  point 
without  much,  if  any,  resistance. 

But  General  McClellan's  expectations  here,  were  clearly 
too  sanguine.  Sound  military  judgment  would  have  pro- 
nounced at  once,  that  Keyes  could  not  reach  the  Half-way 
House,  nor  any  point  to  the  rear  of  Yorktown,  without  the 
most  obstinate  resistance ;  and  that,  if  that  resistance  had 
been  overcome,  the  Confederates  would  have  immediately 
abandoned  the  town.  It  was  correctly  presumed,  that  Ma* 
gruder's  purpose  was  to  delay  MeOlellan's  progress  up  the 
Peninsula  as  long  as  possible.  But  did  not  this  require 
him  to  present  a  front  entirely  across  the  Peninsula  ?  What 
would  it  have  availed  to  hold  the  road  up  the  York  and 
leave  that  along  the  James  unguarded?  Did  McClellan  ex- 
pect that  Magruder  would  shut  himself  up  within  the  "  con- 
tinuous line  of  earthworks  "  around  Yorktown,  and  suffer  the 
former  to  throw  a  heavy  column  in  his  rear  and  thus  |)revent 
his  escape  ?  The  moment  Keyes  reached  the  Half-way  House, 
Magruder  would  be  doomed.  And  yet  it  appears  that  the 
advance  from  Fort  Monroe  was  based  and  hurried,  upon  this 
very  anticipation.  It  will  be  observed,  for  instance,  that 
McClellan  reports  himself  as  being  surprised  to  learn  that 
Keyes  was  checked  in  his  march  on  April  5th.  "  Unexpect- 
edly,''^ he  says,  Keyes  was  brought  to  a  halt  before  the  ene- 
my's works  at  Lee's  Mills. 

Now,  on  the  contrary,  just  such  a  halt  ouglit  to  have  been 
expected.  Nothing  less  than  a  continuous  front  of  opposition 
from  the  York  to  the  James  should  have  been  looked  for. 
The  existence  of  a  strong  fortified  post  at  Yorktown,  neces- 
sitated and  implied  the  existence  of  an  equally  strong  bar- 
rier at  the  other  flank  on  the  James,  at  or  about  Lee's  Mills, 
with  the  intervening  centre  also  defended.    General  Ma- 


SIEGE  OF  YORKTOWN. 


55 


grnder,  on  the  other  side,  certainly  felt  the  necessity. 
"  Deeming  it  of  vital  importance,^^  he  reports,  "  to  hold  York- 
town,  on  York  Eiver,  and  Mulberry  Island,  on  James  Eiver, 
^  and  to  keep  the  enemy  in  check  by  an  intervening  line,  until 
the  authorities  might  take  such  steps  as  should  be  deemed 


The  ♦'Cram"  Map. 


necessary  to  meet  a  serious  advance  of  the  enemy  on  the 
Peninsula,  I  felt  compelled  to  dispose  my  forces  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  accomplish  these  objects  with  the  least  risk 
possible,  under  the  circumstances  of  great  hazard  which 
surrounded  the  little  army  I  commanded."    Cram's  map 


56 


THE  PEXIXSULA. 


erroneously  places  Warwick  Court  House  on  the  Warwick 
Eiver,  where  Lee's  Mills  shonld  be,  the  latter  not  being  in- 
dicated at  all,  and  describes  it  simply  as  a  rebel  military 
dejDot,"  eight  or  ten  miles  distant  from  Yorktown.  That  it  is 
gravely  misleading  in  its  representation  of  the  Confederate 
situation  and  the  topography  in  that  vicinity,  is  not  to  be 
denied.  But  the  fact  that  it  was  acce^^ted  as  correct,  and 
made  the  basis  of  operations,  when  obviously  it  was  to  be 
discredited  as  a  compilation  made  ux^on  uncertain  and 
meagTe  information,  is  open  to  the  criticism  suggested. 

Jl  blunders  were  committed  in  the  advance  upon  Rich- 
mond, this  may  be  regarded  as  the  first  one :  the  failure  to  di- 
vine the  iDrobable  jDOsition  of  the  enemy  at  the  Yorktown  line. 
The  natural  desire  and  determination  to  reach  it  before 
they  were  reinforced,  was,  imfortunately,  unaccompanied  with 
a  light  appreciation  of  the  true  method  of  taking  advantage 
of  their  weakness.  McClellan  estimated  the  enemy's  strength 
at  about  fifteen  thousand ;  his  own,  at  the  start,  was  fifty- 
eight  thousand.  He  proposed  to  use  this  preponderating 
force  immediately  and  with  efi"ect ;  and  it  could  only  have 
been  so  used,  by  expecting  to  find  a  long  defensive  line  in 
front  of  the  enemy,  and  marching  with  a  ^iew  of  discovering 
its  weakest  jDoint  with  the  least  possible  delay,  and  breaking- 
through  it  at  once.  But,  instead,  we  find  surprise  at  meet- 
ing with  opposition — halt,  and  uncertainty. 

In  advancing  these  criticisms,  it  is  true,  a  certain  modifica- 
tion is  to  be  made  in  General  McClellan's  favor.  His  plan 
of  campaign  did  not  require  absolutely  precise  information 
of  the  enemy's  position  at  Yorktown,  or  anywhere  else  on  the 
Peninsula,  with  the  view  of  overcoming  it.  That  plan  al- 
ready provided  for  the  obstacle  of  the  Warwick.  If  anything 
like  it  existed,  and  could  not  readily  be  forced,  it  was  to  be 
tamed.    Whatever  obstruction  the  main  force  on  the  Penin- 


SIEGE  OF  YORKTOWN. 


57 


STila  encountered,  McDowell  was  expected  to  outflank  it  on 
the  other  side  of  the  York.  So  that,  while  McClellan  blun- 
dered in  his  expectations  of  surrounding  Yorktown,  his  gen- 
eral plan  remained  feasible^  The  Warwick,  in  the  execution 
of  the  latter,  should  have  delayed  him  but  a  few  days. 
Magruder  would  have  retreated  on  learning  of  McDowell's 
march  along  the  York  to  the  White  House  in  his  rear. 

It  is  at  this  point  that  we  reach  McClellan's  second  disap- 
pointment in  the  campaign — the  retention  of  McDowell's 
corps  at  Washington. 

The  facts  here  may  be  briefly  summarized  as  follows  :  One 
of  the  conditions  on  which  the  President  approved  the  Pe- 
ninsula plan,  was,  that  Washington  should  be  left  completely 
secure  against  attack ;  and  the  council  of  corps  com- 
manders on  March  13th,  had  named  a  force  of  about  55,000 
men  as  necessary  for  this  purpose.  Upon  McClellan's  de- 
parture. General  Wadswofth,  the  Military  Governor  of  the 
city,  reported  that  he  could  muster  scarcely  20,000  troops 
for  its  defence  in  case  of  an  emergency.  Apparently  alarmed 
that  so  scanty  a  force  had  been  left.  President  Lincoln  di- 
rected, on  April  3d,  that  either  McDowell's  or  Sumner's 
Corps,  which  had  not  all  embarked  for  the  new  base,  should 
be  retained  in  front  of  Washington.  It  was  claimed  that 
McClellan  had  not  complied  with  the  condition  above  re- 
ferred to,  and  that  the  retention  of  part  of  his  own  force  was 
necessary  for  the  safety  of  the  capital.  In  his  report  the 
General  ventures  the  defence,  that  he  had  left  the  prescribed 
number  of  troops ;  but  we  find  that  he  includes  among  them 
the  force  under  Banks,  in  the  Shenandoah — a  force  which  he 
regarded  as  a  movable  column  thrown  out  for  the  defence  of 
the  caiDital.  The  corps  commanders  at  the  council  did  not 
so  regard  Banks,  but  fixed  the  55,000  men  for  Washington  as 


58 


THE  PENINSULA. 


over  and  above  wliat  the  latter  commanded.  In  tliis  light  it 
is  to  be  admitted  that  McClellan  had  failed  to  comply  with 
President  Lincoln's  "  explicit  directions "  and  the  decision 
of  the  council ;  and  in  view  of  the  well-known  feeling  of  the 
Government  respecting  the  safety  of  the  city,  and  the  fact 
that  the  not  over-friendly  Committee  of  Congress  w^atched 
every  step  he  took,  it  is  strange  that  the  General  should  have 
given  even  the  semblance  of  an  opportunity  to  be  interfered 
with,  after  once  taking  the  field.  A  grave  mistake  it  was, 
when  he  left  "Washington  without  having  the  President's  as- 
surance that  all  was  well  at  least  there. 

That  the  withholding  of  McDowell  was  a  shock  to  Mc- 
Clellan is  certain.  The  news  reached  him  on  the  5th,  con- 
veyed in  a  brief  telegram  from  the  Adjutant-General,  at  the 
very  moment  when  the  Warwick  was  discovered  to  be  a  con- 
siderable obstruction;  and  when  the  necessity  of  a  flank- 
ing column  was  immediately  obvious.  Eight  in  the  emer- 
gency, that  column  was  withheld  from  his  control ;  and 
we  affirm,  that,  looking  at  the  matter  irrespective  of  every 
political  bias,  no  matter  how  far  McClellan's  alleged  disre- 
gard of  instructions  in  leaving  Washington  unprotected, 
may  have  been  true — no  matter  what  the  alarm  of  the  com- 
mander of  the  Washington  defences,  or  of  the  President's 
military  advisers — either  McClellan  should  have  been  re- 
lieved, or  else  every  possible  effort  should  have  been  made 
to  keep  his  force,  now  actively  engaged  in  the  field,  at  the 
full  strength  with  which  alone  he  proposed  to  undertake 
his  operations.  Whether  his  own  view  was  correct  or  incor- 
rect, in  that  view  he  was  crippled.  He  proposed  a  plan 
with  McDowell  as  a  principal  actor  in  it.  McDowell  with- 
drawn, the  plan  was  radically  interfered  with. 

Writers  have  said  that  McClellan  had  none  but  himself 
to  blame.    Granted.    But  who  shall  be  blamed  for  permit- 


SIEGE  OF  YORKTOWN. 


59 


ting  a  situation  which,  at  all  hazards,  should  just  then  have 
been  avoided?  If  McClellan  was  still  retained,  one  duty 
was  incumbent  upon  the  Government :  it  should  have  suffered 
at  least  half  of  McDowell's  corps  to  proceed  to  the  Peninsula 
at  once,  and  then  made  every  effort  to  reinforce  the  capital 
from  other  points.  To  allow  the  General  to  remain  in  com- 
mand and  then  cut  off  the  very  arm  with  which  he  was  about 
to  strike,  we  hold  to  have  been  inexcusable  and  unmilitary 
to  the  last  degree. 

Leaving  this  question  as,  perhaps,  the  leading  point  of 
dispute  in  the  campaign,  and  one  which  may  never  be  satis- 
factorily set  at  rest,  there  come  up  all  those  various  specula- 
tions indulged  in  by  critics,  respecting  the  course  McClellan 
ought  to  have  pursued  after  losing  McDowell.  A  general 
of  high  spirit  and  sensitive  soul  might  have  found  in  the 
Government's  action  the  occasion  for  sending  in  his  resigna- 
tion. Another,  deeply  earnest  in  the  national  behalf,  might 
have  suddenly  roused  himself  to  great  exertions,  and  proved 
by  successful  strokes  that  he  was  worthy  of  the  fullest  con- 
fidence. General  McClellan  continued  in  command,  ac- 
cepted the  situation,  and  endeavored  to  make  the  best  of  it. 

What  to  do — was  now  the  question.  It  has  been  claimed 
that  the  General  should  have  immediately  forced  the  "War- 
wick, and  effected  the  capture  or  compelled  the  evacuation  of 
Yorktown — thus  opening  the  York  Eiver  and  securing  the 
White  House  as  a  base.  That  the  Warwick  line  could  have 
been  readily  broken  within  a  week  after  the  army's  arrival 
before  it,  we  now  know.  McClellan  at  the  time  was  of  a  dif- 
ferent opinion ;  although  but  a  few  days  before  he  had  cal- 
culated the  relative  forces  at  58,000  against  15,000.  In  ex- 
planation he  testified  that  Johnston  arrived  opposite  to  him 
the  same  evening  that  he  reached  the  Yorktown  front,  April 


60 


THE  PENINSULA. 


5th,  implying  that  the  rebel  army  lately  at  Manassas  was 
now  again  in  his  front.  The  General's  information — based, 
by  the  way,  on  altogether  insufficient,  if  not  unreliable  data 
— was  erroneous.  Johnston  did  not  arrive  in  person  to 
supersede  Magruder  until  after  the  14th ;  and  of  his  army, 
the  advance  division,  under  General  D.  H.  Hill,  did  not 
arrive  at  Yorktown  until  the  10th ;  the  other  divisions  fol- 
lowing a  few  days  later.  For  six  days  at  least,  after  McClel- 
lan  appeared  in  front  of  the  "Warwick,  he  was  fully  three 
times  stronger  than  the  enemy  in  point  of  numbers. 

Eut  here  again,  it  is  to  be  admitted  that  McClellan  pre- 
sented plausible  reasons — reasons  already  referred  to — for 
not  attempting  a  direct  attack  on  Magruder's  position  at  that 
time.  The  General,  despite  the  retention  of  McDowell,  still 
clung  to  his  original  plan  (modified  slightly)  of  flanking  the 
enemy.  It  was  a  plan  adopted  after  long  deliberation  ;  and 
he  was  wholly  unwilling  to  abandon  it,  though  seemingly 
deprived  of  the  means  of  its  execution.  Thus,  when  President 
Lincoln  urged  him,  April  6th,  to  break  the  line  of  the  War- 
wick at  once,  McClellan  rej)lied  :  "  Under  the  circumstances 
that  have  been  developed  since  we  arrived  here,  I  feel  fully 
impressed  with  the  conviction,  that  here  is  to  be  fought  the 
great  battle  that  is  to  decide  the  existing  contest.  I  shall, 
of  course,  commence  the  attack  as  soon  as  I  can  get  up  my 
siege-train,  and  shall  do  all  in  my  power  to  carry  the  enemy's 
works ;  but,  to  do  this  with  a  reasonable  degree  of  certainty, 
requires,  in  my  judgment,  that  I  should,  if  possible,  have 
at  least  the  whole  of  the  First  Army  Corps  (McDowell's)  to 
land  upon  York  Eiver  and  attack  Gloucester  in  the  rear. 
My  jDresent  strength  will  not  admit  of  a  detachment  suffi- 
cient for  this  purpose  without  materially  impairing  the  effi- 
ciency of  this  column."  More  definitely  he  writes  to  Secre- 
tary Stanton  on  the   lOtli :  '^The  reconnoissance  to-day, 


SIEGE  OF  YORKTOWN. 


61 


proves  that  it  is  necessary  to  invest  and  attack  Gloncester 
Point.  Give  me  Franklin's  and  McCall's  divisions  (of  Mc- 
Dowell's corps),  under  command  of  Franklin,  and  I  will  at 
once  undertake  it.  If  circumstances  of  which  I  am  not 
aware,  make  it  impossible  for  you  to  send  me  two  divisions 
to  carry  out  this  final  plan  of  campaign,  I  will  run  the  risk, 
and  hold  myself  responsible  for  the  results,  if  you  will  give 
me  Franklin's  division.  If  you  still  confide  in  my  judgment, 
I  entreat  that  you  will  grant  this  request.  The  fate  of  our 
cause  depends  upon  it.  Although  willing,  under  the  pressure 
of  necessity,  to  carry  this  through  with  Franklin  alone,  I 
wish  it  to  be  distinctly  understood  that  I  think  two  divisions 
necessary.  Franklin  and  his  division  are  indispensable  to 
me.  General  Barnard  concurs  in  this  view."  And  once 
more,  on  the  12th  and  13th,  he  adds :  Franklin  will  attack 
on  the  other  side.  .  .  ."  "  Our  work  progressing  well. 
"We  shall  soon  be  at  them,  and  I  am  sure  of  the  result." 

In  response  to  these  very  urgent  and  confident  expressions 
on  McClellan's  part,  the  President  ordered  Franklin's  divi- 
sion to  report  to  him  forthwith ;  but  it  failed  to  reach  the 
landing  at  Cheesman's  Creek,  below  Yorktown,  until  the 
20th  of  the  month.  Late  as  it  was,  preparations  were  begun 
to  disembark  the  division  on  the  Gloucester  side,  about 
three  and  a  half  miles  below  that  point.  A  reconnoissance 
of  the  shore  was  made  "a  few  days"  after  the  arrival  of  the 
division  by  McClellan  in  person,  in  company  with  General 
Franklin,  Captain  Eodgers,  of  the  navy,  and  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Alexander,  of  the  Corps  of  Engineers.  The  latter 
officer  was  then  instructed  to  devise  the  proper  arrange- 
ments and  superintend  the  landing  of  the  troops  ;  but,  ex- 
traordinary as  it  may  seem,  more  than  two  weeks  were  con- 
sumed in  the  preliminaries ;  and  when  everything  was  nearly 
ready  for  the  disembarkation,  the  enemy  had  vanished  from 


62 


THE  PEIS^INSULA. 


the  scene!  "All  these  preparations,"  to  quote  from  Alex- 
ander's report,  "  were  about  completed,  and  we  were  en- 
gaged in  making  scaling-ladders,  thinking  we  might  be 
called  upon  to  assault  the  works  at  Gloucester  Point,  when 
suddenly,  on  the  morning  of  May  4th,  the  news  spread 
through  the  fleet,  that  the  enemy  had  evacuated  Yorktown. " 
How  long  it  would  have  taken  the  whole  of  McDowell's 
corps  to  disembark  at  this  rate,  assuming  that  it  was  to  dis- 
embark at  the  same  point,  the  reader  may  judge  ;  and  yet  for 
days  it  had  been  General  McClellan's  pet  project,  in  connec- 
tion with  his  plan  of  campaign,  to  utilize  McDowell  in  just  this 
manner  as  a  flanking  column.  The  merest  novice  in  military- 
matters  would  assume  that  every  preparation  for  its  prompt 
disembarkation  would  have  been  attended  to,  and  delays 
avoided.  So  much  for  the  project  on  the  Gloucester  side — 
excellent  in  conception,  necessary  to  swift  advance,  but 
sadly  interfered  with  by  the  Government;  and,  as  far  as 
attempted,  too  sluggishly  prosecuted. 

Surprised  that  he  could  not  surround  the  place  in  the 
first  instance,  overawed  by  the  appearance  of  the  Warwick 
and  its  supposed  defences,  estimating  the  enemy's  numbers 
far  beyond  the  fact,  and  delayed  or  delaying  in  the  attempt 
upon  Gloucester — McClellan  settled  down  to  the  scientific 
siege  of  Yorktown.  Beyond  noticing  some  of  its  incidents, 
we  shall  not  dwell  upon  this  final  operation.  It  is  clear  that 
McClellan  had  it  in  contemplation,  as  an  alternative,  before 
he  left  Washington.  Why  take  along  a  siege-train  ?  If  it 
was  meant  for  the  investment  of  Eichmond,  it  should  have 
come  later  by  way  of  the  James.  It  was  out  of  place  in  ac- 
tive field  movements.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  been 
placed  in  the  General's  hands  as  a  drawn  sword,  to  be 
wielded  with  rapid  and  sweeping  effect ;  not  only  was  suc- 
cess looked  for,  but  immediate  success.    No  wonder  many 


SIEGE  OF  YORKTOWK 


63 


hearts  at  the  North  betrayed  anxiety,  as  time  passed  at 
Yorktown  with  nothing  done  and  a  siege  in  progress. 

No  doubt  a  brilliant  siege  operation  would  have  been  most 
acceptable  to  the  country,  as  it  certainly  was  coveted  by 
McClellan,  could  it  have  been  attended  by  the  usual  results 
of  such  an  operation,  namely,  the  capture  of  many  prisoners, 
or  the  rout  and  demoralization  of  the  enemy's  force  ;  but 
in  this  case,  these  results  were  not  to  be  anticipated.  There 
could  be  no  siege  in  the  true  sense  of  the  term.  It  was 
simply  an  approach  to  the  enemy's  position,  which  they 
could  leave  the  moment  they  jDleased,  and  in  good  order. 
Under  the  circumstances,  it  could  hardly  be  regarded  as  a 
great  triumph,  that  we  were  finally  enabled  to  follow  them. 

Having  determined  thus  to  besiege  Yorktown,  McClellan 
appears  to  have  given  up  all  thought  of  piercing  the  War- 
wick line  at  any  point ;  but  meditated  instead  a  grand  assault 
on  the  main  works  after  damaging  them  sufficiently  with  his 
heavy  guns.  The  latter  plan  would  have  resulted  in  seri- 
ous loss  of  life  ;  with  results  less  satisfactory,  probably,  than 
would  have  attended  an  attempt  to  break  through  at  the 
weakest  point.  Eeconnoissances,  however,  were  made  all 
along  the  front,  and  the  enemy  kept  in  anticipation  of  an  at- 
tack ;  but  no  assaulting  columns  were  ever  organized,  to 
take  advantage  of  any  opportunity  offered.  The  brisk  affair 
which  occurred  on  April  16th,  in  front  of  Smith's  division  on 
the  right  of  Keyes'  corps,  which  has  sometimes  been  repre- 
sented as  the  beginning  of  a  determined  attack,  had  another 
purpose.       The  object  of  the  movement,"  says  McClellan, 

was  to  force  the  enemy  to  discontinue  his  work  in  strength- 
ening his  batteries,  to  silence  his  fire,  and  gain  control  of 
the  dam  existing  at  that  point."  * 


*  McClellan  to  Adjutant-General  Thomas,  April  19,  1862.  This  letter  is  not  in- 
cluded in  the  former's  official  report. 


64 


THE  PENINSULA. 


The  position  in  question  was  known  as  Dam  No.  1,  on  the 
Warwick,  nearly  midway  between  Lee's  and  Wynn's  Mills, 
and  in  front  of  a  clearing  just  in  advance  of  Smith's  di- 
vision, in  which  three  burned  chimneys  stood — *^  Garrow's 
chimneys"  the  spot  was  called.  On  the  rebel  side,  the 
crossing  at  the  dam  was  covered  by  a  one-gun  battery  ;  near 
which  other  works  were  supposed  to  be  in  process  of  con- 
struction. In  pursuance  of  instructions  conveyed  by 
McClellan  himself,  General  William  F.  Smith  proceeded,  on 
the  morning  of  the  16th,  to  closely  reconnoitre  the  position, 
and  for  the  purpose,  advanced  Brooks'  Vermont  Brigade,  with 
Captain  Mott's  Third  New  York  Battery,  toward  the  dam. 
The  troops  pushed  well  forward,  carrying  on  a  sharp  fire ; 
during  which  Smith  examined  the  ground.  ascertained 
from  personal  observation,"  he  reports,  "that  the  gun  in  the 
angle  of  the  upper  work  had  been  replaced  by  a  wooden 
gun,  and  that  scarcely  anybody  showed  above  the  parapet, 
the  skirmishers  from  the  Fourth  Vermont  doing  good  execu- 
tion." More  important  was  a  daring  feat  on  the  part  of 
Lieutenant  E.  M.  Noyes,  of  the  Third  Vermont,  aid  to  Gen- 
eral Brooks,  who  actually  crossed  the  Warwick  below  the 
dam,  finding  the  water  about  waist-deep,  and  approached 
within  fifty  yards  of  the  enemy's  works  undiscovered.  Ke- 
turning,  he  reported  his  observations  to  General  McClellan, 
who  now,  about  noon,  had  come  upon  the  field,  and  who 
had  ordered  Smith  to  bring  up  his  entire  division  to  hold 
or  command  the  advanced  position  occupied  by  Brooks' 
brigade.  Smith,  however,  who  heard  what  Lieutenant 
Noyes  reported,  went  farther  and  obtained  the  consent  of 
the  General  Commanding  to  push  on  a  strong  party  across  the 
stream,  ''to  ascertain  if  the  works  had  been  sufficiently  de- 
nuded to  ena-ble  a  column  to  effect  a  lodgement."  Four  com- 
panies of  Colonel  Hyde's  Third  Vermont,  200  strong,  under 


SIEGE  OF  YORKTOWK 


65 


CaiDtain  F.  C.  Harrington,  of  that  regiment,  were  accordingiv 
ordered  to  advance  and  cross  the  Warwick,  to  determine,  as 
Brooks  rejDorts,  "  the  true  state  of  affairs "  on  the  other 
-side.  Promptly  and  gallantly  the  troops  dashed  through 
the  water,  and  under  a  close  fire  from  the  enemy  gained  the 
latter's  rifle-pits;  which  they  held  for  over  half  an  hour, 
returning  the  fire  with  spirit. 

The  enemy,  who  seem  to  have  been  surprised  at  this  bold 
mancBUvre,  quickly  increased  in  strength  at  this  point. 
Magruder  admits  that  the  charge  of  the  Yermonters  was  "very 
rapid  and  vigorous,"  and  that  the  Fifteenth  North  Carolina, 
who  were  throwing  up  a  work  beyond  the  rifle-pits  for  the 
protection  of  their  camp,  were  thrown  into  confusion  and  their 
Colonel,  McKenney,  killed  in  attemx)ting  to  recover  the  pits. 
But  other  troops,  including  Anderson's  Georgia  brigade, 
under  Howell  Cobb,  were  brought  ui^  and  the  skirmish  grew 
in  intensity.  Unfortunately,  Captain  Harrington  failed  to 
be  reinforced  in  time ;  and  receiving  orders  to  withdi^aw,  he 
recrossed  the  stream  with  a  loss  of  75  men,  22  of  whom  were 
killed.    This  was  at  about  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon. 

The  practicability  of  effecting  a  lodgement  on  the  other 
side  being  thus  demonstrated,  another  effort  was  made  a 
little  later ;  when  four  companies  of  the  Sixth  Vermont,  under 
Colonel  Lord,  were  ordered  to  cross  at  the  point  of  Captain 
Harrington's  advance,  while  Colonel  Stoughton  with  four 
companies  of  the  Fourth  Vermont  was  directed  to  attempt 
the  passage  of  the  dam  above,  under  the  fire  of  the  division 
batteries,  all  of  which — 20  guns — were  brought  into  position. 
Lord's  detachment,  however,  was  met  by  a  heavy  fire  from 
the  now  watchful  enemy ;  and  could  not  reach  the  rifle-pits. 
Colonel  Stoughton  reached  the- dam  and  prepared  to  push 
across,  when  General  Smith  ordered  his  return,  and  Lord 
followed.  Notwithstanding  the  well-directed  fire  of  the  guns 
5 


66 


THE  PENINSULA. 


under  Captain  Ayres,  Division  Chief  of  Artillery,  the  enemy 
vrem  able  to  deliver  a  heavy  musketry  fire  ;  and  the  second 
attempt  to  cross  was  thus  abandoned.  It  will  be  apparent," 
says  General  Smith,  in  his  report,  "  that  no  attempt  to  mass 
the  troops  of  the  division  was  made  for  an  assault  upon  the 
works,  but  only  such  troops  as  were  absolutely  necessary 
to  cover  the  movements  of  the  companies  of  the  Third  and 
Fourth  Vermont,  and  to  be  at  hand  to  secure  to  us  the  ene- 
my's works  if  we  found  them  abandoned.  The  moment  I 
found  resistance  serious,  and  the  numbers  opiDosed  great,  I 
acted  in  obedience  to  the  w aiming  instructions  oi  the  General- 
in-Chief,  and  withdrew  the  small  number  of  troops  exposed 
from  under  fire."  Eegret  that  the  movement  was  not  pushed 
is  enhanced  by  Smith's  reflection,  that  among  the  four  com- 
l^anies  of  the  Third  Vermont,  who  first  crossed  the  creek, 
there  were  "  more  individual  acts  of  heroism  performed " 
than  he  had  ever  before  read  of. 

Thus  a  fair  opportunity  to  break  the  Warwick  line  was 
missed.  Had  the  same  effort  been  made  when  the  army 
first  reached  the  line,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  success 
would  have  attended  it. 

Passing  to  the  siege  itself,  we  find  that  the  operations 
were  conducted  with  skill.  Batteries  were  constructed  un- 
der the  supervision  of  Generals  F.  J.  Porter,  W.  F.  Barry, 
Chief  of  Artillery,  and  J.  G.  Barnard,  Chief  of  Engineers  ; 
the  former  being  designated  as  Director  of  the  Siege. 
Nearly  one  hundred  heavy  Parrott  guns,  mortars,  and  how- 
itzers were  established  opposite  the  town  and  the  redoubts 
to  its  right,  at  ranges  varying  from  fifteen  hundred  to  two 
thousand  yards.  The  enemy  made  but  a  slight  effort  to  in- 
terfere with  the  work  on  our  batteries  and  parallels ;  and  on 
May  1st,  Battery  No.  1,  on  the  bank  of  the  river  below  the 
Moore  House,  was  opened  on  the  town  and  its  dock,  as  Bar- 


SIEGE  OF  YORKTOVVN. 


6T 


nard  reports,  *'witli  great  effect."  Four  days  later  the  fire 
was  to  open  from  all  the  guns  and  the  siege  pressed  with 
vigor  until  the  final  assanlt  should  be  deemed  practicable. 

There  was  at  this  time  a  small  fleet  of  gunboats  in  the 
river  (the  greater  part  of  the  naval  armament  being  still  en- 
gaged at  Hampton  Eoads  watching  the  Merrimac),  and  their 
participation  in  the  siege  operations  was  expected,  but  how 


The  Position  at  Yorktown. 


much  their  officers  felt  able  or  willing  to  do  may  be  gathered 
from  the  tenor  of  the  following  letter  from  Commander  Miss- 
roon,  of  the  Wachusett,  to  Admiral  Goldsborough,  dated 
April  23d : 

''The  works  of  the  enemy  are  excessively  strong  and  powerfully 
armed.  Their  cannon  are  managed  and  served  with  surprising  accuracy, 


68 


THE  PENINSULA. 


exceeding  anything  I  have  heretofore  known,  and  there  is  every  indica- 
tion of  a  most  determined  resistance.  More  than  fifty  heavy  cannon 
bear  upon  this  bay,  and  the  destruction  of  vessels  of  this  class  is  in- 
evitable, if  taken  under  such  a  fire,  without  their  having  the  power  to 
inflict  any  damage,  or  but  trifling  damage  to  the  enemy,  owing,  to  the 
superior  and  well-chosen  position  of  their  batteries.  I  believe  that  any 
number  of  vessels  of  this,  or  the  gunboat  class,  will  not  prevail  against 
works  so  located  as  those  now  before  me,  and  that  an  increase  of  num- 
bers will  only  add  to  our  casualties.  General  McClellan  proposes  to  dis- 
mount some  of  the  cannon  before  these  vessels  advance,  and  it  is  an  evi- 
dent necessity  that  he  should  do  so  to  a  very  large  extent  "  * 

But  the  enemy  were  too  shrewd  to  await  our  onslaught 
with  guns  and  storming  columns.  By  May  5th,  they  had 
remained  long  enough  at  the  Yorktown  line  for  their  pur- 
IDOse.  A  month's  time  had  been  gained  in  keeping  Mc- 
Clellan back,  and  early  on  the  morning  of  the  5th,  after  an 
unusual  cannonade  of  our  lines  during  the  previous  night, 
they  abandoned  Yorktown  and  the  Warwick  line ;  retreating 
up  the  Peninsula  through  Williamsburg. 


*  Prom  archives,  Navy  Department, 


CHAPTEE  TV. 


FORWARD  FROM  YORKTOWN— BATTLE  OF  WIL- 
LIAMSBURG. 

The  evacTiation  of  Yorktown  took  the  Union  army  by  sur- 
prise. If  the  somewhat  tardy  pursuit  of  the  enemy  be  any 
indication,  the  movement  was  not  anticipated  at  head-quar- 
ters. The  troops  had  settled  down  to  siege  preparations, 
and  a  fixed  camp  life  for  at  least  a  time  longer.  Hence, 
when  orders  came  to  break  up  and  push  after  the  rebels, 
several  hours  were  consumed  in  having  the  commands  prop- 
erly provisioned  for  the  march.  The  evacuation  was  re- 
ported at  dawn,  and  the  report  confirmed  soon  after ;  it  was 
not  until  noon  that  the  cavalry  and  infantry  were  fairly  off. 
The  delay  may  have  been  immaterial ;  but  it  was  a  delay 
which  presupposed  the  continuation  of  the  siege. 

The  enemy,  on  their  part,  abandoned  the  place  deliberately. 
If  their  retreat  was  a  measure  of  safety,  and  so  far  forced 
upon  them,  it  was  still  in  accordance  with  a  settled  plan. 
They  proposed  to  remain  at  the  Warwick  line  only  so  long 
as  prudence  dictated,  and  for  the  single  purpose  of  delaying 
McClellan.  This  they  had  succeeded  in  doing  for  an  entire 
month.  General  Johnston  is  clear  on  this  point.  "  It  seemed 
to  me,"  he  reported  May  19th,  "  that  there  w^ere  but  two  ob- 
jects in  remaining  on  the  Peninsula.  The  possibility  of  an 
advance  upon  us  by  the  enemy,  and  gaining  time  in  which 
arms  might  be  received  and  troops  organized.     I  deter- 


70 


THE  PENINSULA. 


mined,  therefore,  to  hold  the  position  as  long  as  it  t?ould  be 
done  without  exposing  our  troops  to  the  fire  of  the  powerful 
artillery,  which,  I  doubted  not,  would  be  brought  to  bear 
upon  them.  I  believed  that  after  silencing  our  batteries  on 
York  Eiver,  the  enemy  would  attempt  to  turn  us  by  moving 
up  to  West  Point  by  water.  .  .  .  Circumstances  indi- 
cating that  the  enemy's  batteries  were  nearly  ready,  I  di- 
rected the  troops  to  move  toward  Williamsburg  on  the  night 
of  the  3d."  His  narrative  on  this  point  is  to  the  same  effect ; 
in  fact,  Johnston,  we  have  seen,  did  not  favor  the  defence  of 
the  Peninsula,  from  the  outset.  On  the  4th,  at  noon,  his 
troops  had  all  reached  Williamsburg,  whence  they  were  or- 
dered to  march  to  Eichmond,  with  Magruder's  division  lead- 
ing. 

The  Union  forces,  once  upon  the  road,  hurried  after  the 
retreating  enemy.  Stoneman,  with  the  cavalry,  received 
orders  to  harass  their  rear,  and,  if  possible,  cut  off  that  por- 
tion of  it  which  must  have  taken  the  longer  route  by  the 
Lee's  Mills  road.  As  the  rebels  had  some  twelve  hours  the 
start — the  rear,  certainly  six — Stoneman  could  not  have  ac- 
complished the  latter  object.  He  caught  up  with  Stuart's 
cavalry  near  the  Half-way  House,  which  fell  back  skirmish- 
ing as  far  as  a  line  of  redoubts  which  Magruder  had  thrown 
up  long  before  as  a  possible  defensive  position  across  the 
Peninsula — the  most  westerly  of  the  three  he  had  partially 
or  wholly  completed.  When  Stoneman  neared  this  line,  of 
which  he  had  but  a  vague,  if  any  knowledge,  he  sent  Gen- 
eral Emory  to  the  left,  to  head  off  such  rebels  as  might  be 
on  that  road.  Emory  encountered  a  cavalry  regiment  and 
battery  under  Stuart  himself ;  but,  without  infantry  supports, 
could  not  corner  them.  To  the  front,  Stoneman  pursued 
with  General  Cooke's  command  of  the  Eirst  and  Sixth  Keg- 
ular  Cavalry,  and  a  battery  of  horse-artillery ;  and  soon  en- 


FORWARD  FROM  YORKTOWK 


71 


countered  the  works  referred  to.  The  larger  redoubt,  in  his 
immediate  front,  Fort  Magruder,  was  occupied,  while  those 
to  its  left  seemed  to  be  empty ;  but  as  he  manoeuvred  and 
skirmished,  the  enemy  were  seen  to  be  reoccupying  them, 
and  he  retired  to  await  the  arrival  of  infantry.  In  doing  so, 
the  enemy  attacked  him,  though  without  much  effect ;  the 
one  piece  of  artillery  that  was  lost  had  to  be  abandoned  in  the 
mud,  after  the  unavailing  efforts  of  ten  horses  to  bring  it  off. 

To  follow  and  co-operate  with  Stoneman,  the  infantry  divi- 
sions of  Hooker,  of  the  Third  Corps,  and  Smith  of  the  Fourth, 
were  directed  by  McClellan,  to  take  the  lead  of  the  columns 
and  hasten  forward — Hooker  marching  by  the  direct  and 
shorter  road  on  the  right  from  Yorktown  to  "Williamsburg, 
and  Smith  filing  from  his  position  opposite  "  Dam  No.  1," 
into  the  Lee's  Mills  road  on  the  left.  Kearney  was  to  follow 
Hooker ;  Couch  and  Casey  were  to  follow  Smith.  In  the 
afternoon  of  the  next  day,  the  divisions  of  Sedgwick  and 
Richardson,  or  Sumner's  corps,  were  also  set  in  motion, 
while  Franklin  and  Porter  remained  at  Yorktown  to  go  up 
the  river  in  transports.  The  entire  army  was  thus  upon  its 
feet  again,  with  the  eyes  of  the  country  intent  upon  its  prog- 
ress. 

The  General  Commanding,  not  anticipating  any  serious" 
engagement  during  the  first  day  or  two  of  the  pursuit,  kept 
his  headquarters  near  Yorktown,  to  superintend  what  he  re- 
garded as  the  more  important  advance  of  Franklin  by  water. 
The  direction  of  the  divisions  moving  by  land,  was  accord- 
ingly assigned  to  Sumner,  second  in  rank  to  the  Chief.  His 
instructions,  received  at  noon  on  the  4th,  were  *^to  take 
command  of  the  troops  ordered  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy  " 
until  McClellan's  arrival.  General  Heintzelman,  on  the 
other  hand,  moving  with  his  corps,  confesses  some  surprise 
at  finding  Sumner  at  the  front  and  in  charge,  since  he  re- 


72 


THE  PENINSULA. 


ports  tliat  he  bad  been  directed  "  to  take  control  of  the 
entire  movement"  himself.  It  is  probable  that  Heintzel- 
man  was  expected  to  be  in  the  advance  sooner  than  Sumner, 
where  his  "  control,"  until  the  latter's  arrival,  would  be 
necessary.  As  it  was,  they  seemed,  with  Keyes,  the  remain- 
ing corps  commander,  to  act  in  unison  during  the  approach- 
ing events  ;  but  the  tone  of  certain  passages  in  Heintzelman's 
report  and  the  sensitive  reply  of  Sumner,  indicate,  that  as 
betwee^i  these  two  officers,  an  undercurrent  of  jealousy  or 
unfriendliness  existed,  which,  on  a  subsequent  occasion, 
came  near  working  mischief. 

The  troops  under  Sumner's  command,  who  were  to  be- 
come identified  more  than  others  with  the  approaching 
battle  of  Williamsburg,  were  Hooker's,  Smith's,  Kearney's 
and  part  of  Couch's  divisions.  Hooker  on  the  miarch  was 
expected  to  be  up  first  to  support  the  cavalry.  Smith, 
moving  on  the  parallel  road  to  the  left,  made  greater  pro- 
gress, but  was  stopped  at  the  head  of  Skiff  Creek,  by  the 
burning  of  the  bridge.  Between  two  and  three  o'clock, 
Sumner  ordered  him  to  turn  to  the  right  and  into  the  road 
which  Hooker  was  following.  Smith  reached  it  near  the 
Half-way  house  just  before  Hooker's  troops  came  up ;  and 
keeping  on,  obliged  the  latter  to  halt  for  over  three  hours. 
Contrary,  thus,  to  the  original  intention.  Smith  was  in  the 
same  road  with,  and  in  advance  of  Hooker,  scarcely  six  miles 
distant  fron^  their  respective  starting-points  ;  and  as  Hooker 
now  could  not  act  as  the  immediate  support  of  the  cavalry, 
he  suggested  to  his  Corps  Commander,  Heintzelman,  who 
consented,  that  after  advancing  about  three  miles,  he  in  turn 
should  cross  over  to  the  road  Smith  was  to  have  followed, 
and  where  Emory's  cavalry  were,  and  pursue  or  attack  from 
that  direction.  How  far  this  apparent  confusion  and  change 
of  place  on  the  part  of  the  two  divisions  affected  the  jjursuit 


FORWARD  FROM  YORKTOWK 


73 


on  tliat  day  may  be  a  question,  Stoneman  claiming  that  had 
Smith  been  able  to  continue  on  the  Lee's  Mills  road  he  might 
have  assisted  Emory  and  his  cavalry  in  capturing  Stuart's 
troopers  ;  while  Hooker,  with  his  own  road  clear  before  him, 
could  have  pushed  on  and  taken  possession  of  the  enemy's 
works  before  they  could  be  reoccupied.  But,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  Stuart  was  in  no  immediate  danger ;  and  as  to  the 
works,  Smith  reached  the  front,  under  Sumner,  quite  as  soon 
as  Hooker  could  have  done. 

Smith's  division — Hancock's  brigade  in  advance — came  up 
with  the  cavalry  about  half -past  five  o'clock  in  the  afternoon. 
Sumner,  who  tells  us  that  he  felt  "  the  importance  of  pressing 
the  pursuit  as  fast  as^ possible,"  encouraged  by  Stoneman's 
representations,  that  the  infantry  could  accomplish  what  the 
cavalry  could  not,  determined,  late  as  it  was,  to  advance  at 
once  upon  the  enemy.  Forming  his  division  in  three  lines 
of  battle,  Smith  prepared  for  a  charge  through  a  piece  of 
woods  and  beyond  to  the  works.  It  was  half -past  six  before 
the  lines  moved  ;  and  hardly  did  they  move  before  the  woods 
were  found  to  be  "  utterly  impracticable."  What  with  the 
close,  tangled  undergrowth  and  the  increasing  darkness  in 
which  the  formations  could  not  be  preserved,  a  halt  was  or- 
dered and  the  troops  bivouacked  where  they  w^ere,  Sumner, 
himself,  remaining  with  Hancock  and  Brooks  until  dawn; 
whence  the  report  arose,  that  he  had  lost  his  way  and  slept 
at  the  foot  of  a  tree  between  our  own  and  the  enemy's 
pickets.  Hooker,  meanwhile,  after  filing  to  the  left,  marched 
until  eleven  o'clock  at  night,  halting  at  about  the  same  dis- 
tance from  the  enemy  that  Smith  was,  on  the  main  road  to 
his  right. 

On  the  following  morning  the  battle  of  Williamsburg 

opened, — a  battle  fought  without  a  plan,  with  inadequate 

numbers,  and  at  a  serious  sacrifice  without  compensating  re- 
4 


74 


THE  PENINSULA. 


suit.  The  responsibility  lias  been  laid  by  some  upon  the 
shoulders  of  McClellan  because  of  his  absence  from  the 
field ;  and  by  others  upon  Sumner,  who  seems  to  have  di- 
rected the  movements  of  the  day  without  method.  What- 
ever may  have  prevented  McClellan's  presence  with  the  ad- 
vance, one  might  at  least  expect  that  his  senior  corps  com- 
mander should  have  been  competent  to  fight  a  battle  of 
moderate  proportions. 

Hooker  began  the  attack.  He  began  it  on  the  strength  of 
the  orders  he  had  received  from  McClellan  the  previous 
morning,  before  leaving  Yorktown — a  noteworthy  feature  of 
the  battle,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  three  corps  commanders, 
Sumner,  Heintzelman,  and  Keyes,  were  then  at  the  front, 
and  the  former  in  command.  Heintzelman,  to  whose  corps 
Hooker  belonged,  thought,  as  we  infer  from  his  report, 
that  Sumner  should  have  given  directions  to  the  leading 
divisions  on  the  jpreceding  night,  if  a  battle  was  imminent, 
and  states  that  he  could  not  be  found ;  but  he  never- 
theless failed  himself  to  caution  Hooker  as  to  his  move- 
ments, without  first  hearing  from  Sumner.  So  Hooker, 
in  the  position  of  an  independent  commander,  moved  to 
attack  the  enemy  early  on  the  morning  of  the  5th.  There 
was  something  vigorous  about  his  action.  Despite  the  rain 
which  was  falling  plentifully,  and  the  thick,  slij^peiy  mud^ 
into  which  the  artillery  wheels  sank  deep,  he  pressed  for- 
ward and  soon  became  engaged.  Fort  Magruder  stood  in 
his  immediate  front  commanding  the  junction  of  the  left  or 
Hampton  road,  into  which  he  had  turned,  and  the  main 
Yorktown  road,  where  Sumner,  with  Smith's  division,  was  to 
be  found.  To  the  right  and  left  the  smaller  redoubts,  twelve 
in  all,  formed  an  irregular  line  nearly  across  the  peninsula. 
Besting  on  creeks  and  marshes,  with  a  belt  of  clearing  in 
their  front,  they  could  have  proved,  if  properly  manned  and 


FORWARD  FROM  YORKTOWK 


75 


supported,  a  formidable  barrier.  The  approaches  to  the 
line  were  singularly  disadvantageous  for  the  attacking 
party,  thick  woods  lining  the  roads,  in  which  artillery  could 
not  operate,  and  the  clearings  being  "  dotted  all  over,"  a3 
Hooker  reports,  with  rifle-pits,  from  which  a  deadly  firo 
was  directed  against  the  troops  while  taking  up  position. 

As  early  as  half-past  seven,  the  First  Brigade,  Grover's, 
was  at  work.  "  Being  in  pursuit  of  a  retreating  army,"  say3 
Hooker,  "  I  deemed  it  my  duty  to  lose  no  time  in  making 
the  disposition  of  my  forces  to  attack,  regardless  of  their 
number  and  position,  except  to  accomplish  the  result  with 
the  least  possible  sacrifice  of  life.  By  so  doing,  my  division, 
if  it  did  not  capture  the  army  before  me,  would  at  least  hold 
it  that  some  others  might  ....  and  Grover  was  di- 
rected to  commence  the  attack."  The  latter  opened  fire 
upon  the  rifle-pits  from  the  woods  to  the  right  and  left  of  the 
road,  and  "Webber's  and  Bramhall's  batteries  were  brought 
into  action  on  the  right,  some  seven  hundred  yards  from 
Fort  Magruder.  By  nine  o'clock  the  fort  was  silenced  and 
all  the  enemy's  troops  in  sight  on  the  plain  dispersed.  Thi3 
was  satisfactory,  as  well  as  the  movement  of  two  of  Grover'j 
regiments  on  the  right,  who  were  directed  by  Hooker  to 
open  up  communication  with  Sumner  on  the  Yorktown  road. 
These  regiments,  the  Eleventh  Massachusetts  and  Twenty- 
sixth  Pennsylvania,  skirmished  through  the  woods,  found 
no  enemy,  communicated  with  Sumner's  command,  and  the 
former  returning,  reported  the  fact  to  Hooker,  who  now  felt 
that  he  was  not  fighting  in  an  isolated  position,  but  on  the 
right  of  a  general  line  which  could  be  kept  connected  under 
the  control  of  his  superior. 

Meanwhile,  the  rear  divisions  of  the  enemy  had  halted  in 
their  retreat.  The  demonstration  of  the  Union  cavalry  the 
previous  afternoon,  and  Hooker's  pressure  early  the  next 


76 


THE  PENINSULA. 


morning,  compelled  tliem  to  face  about  to  escape  being  run 
over  at  will  by  tlieir  pursuers.  Johnston  left  Longstreet  in 
command  at  Williamsburg,  on  tlie  5th,  and  that  officer,  in 
the  course  of  the  morning,  put  his  entire  division  in  front  of 
Hooker.  As  the  successive  brigades  went  into  action,  it  in- 
creased in  intensity,  and,  at  eleven  o'clock,  Hooker  found 
himself  warmly  engaged.  E.  H.  Anderson's  and  Pryor's 
brigades  formed  the  right  and  left  of  the  enemy's  line. 
"Wilcox  reinforced  Anderson,  with  A.  P.  Hill  in  supporting 
distance,  and,  at  ten  o'clock,  Pickett's  brigade  w^as  also  added. 
These  brigades  Longstreet  directed  against  Hooker's  centre 
and  left,  and  endeavored  to  turn  his  position.  They  issued 
from  and  about  the  redoubts  to  the  right  of  Fort  Magruder 
into  a  wooded  ravine,  and  pressed  in  masses  upon  our  line. 
The  left  especially  was  in  danger,  where  Patterson's  Third 
Brigade,  of  New  Jersey  troops,  was  fighting  manfully  against 
superior  numbers.  Grover,  who  also  felt  the  attack,  moved 
part  of  his  first  brigade  to  Patterson's  support.  The  line 
nevertheless  was  pushed  back  as  far  as  the  batteries  in  the 
road,  and  that  of  Webber  was  lost,  and  Bramhall's  aban- 
doned but  recovered  again.  The  situation  was  growing 
serious,  and  Hooker  called  for  reinforcements,  or  rather  for 
a  diversion  in  his  favor.  At  half -past  eleven  he  sent  a  note 
to  Heintzelman,  who  was  sup]30sed  to  be  with  Sumner.  "I 
have  had  a  hard  contest  all  the  morning,"  he  wrote,  "but 
do  not  desi3air  of  success.  My  men  are  hard  at  work,  but  a 
good  deal  exhausted.  Ifc  is  reported  to  me  that  my  com- 
munication with  you  by  the  Yorktown  road  is  clear  of  the 
enemy.  Batteries,  cavalry,  and  infantry  can  take  post  by 
the  side  of  mine  to  whip  the  enemy."  It  was  this  latter 
suggestion  that  should  have  been  followed  out,  but  Heintzel- 
man was  not  in  command  and  did  not  receive  the  message, 
as  he  had  started  by  a  roundabout  road  to  reach  Hooker,  and 


FORWARD  FROM  YORKTOWK 


77 


Siimner,  to  whom  the  note  was  handed,  returned  it  with  the 
single  endorsement  that  he  had  opened  and  read  it.  Just 
before  that  he  had  sent  word  to  Kearney  to  hurry  to  Hooker's 
support.  Why  he  did  not  send  Casey,  who  was  much  nearer, 
and  two  of  whose  brigades  were  once  ordered  to  Hooker  and 
then  ordered  back,  is  not  perfectly  clear.  There  was  con- 
fusion in  the  instructions. 

Thus  from  seven  o'clock,  a.m.,  till  about  twelve,  Hooker, 
alone  on  the  left,  had  been  doing  all  the  fighting.  No  troops 
fell  into  line  of  battle  on  his  right.  No  other  line  was 
engaged  anywhere  during  the  forenoon. 

This  state  of  things  reveals  the  true  defect  of  the  "Williams- 
burg affair.  The  fact  is  that  when  Hooker  began  his  attack, 
Sumner,  Heintzelman,  and  Keyes  had  adopted  another  plan 
of  action,  irrespective  of  Hooker.  There  was  no  concerted 
movement ;  hence  failure. 

The  plan  these  corps  commanders  agreed  upon  at  an 
informal  consultation  early  in  the  morning  meditated  a  flank 
movement  around  the  enemy's  left.  Neither  of  them  seemed 
to  know  what  Hooker  proposed  to  do.  They  looked  to 
another  part  of  the  field.  A  countryman  had  reported  that 
the  rebels  had  not  occupied  certain  works  on  their  left,  and 
negroes,  questioned  by  Keyes  and  others,  confirmed  the 
story.  To  put  the  matter  beyond  doubt,  Captain  Stewart,  of 
the  Engineer  Corps,  and  four  comjjanies  of  the  Fourth  Ver- 
mont, were  sent,  under  General  Smith's  direction,  to  ascer- 
tain the  topography  of  the  country,  and  learn  whether  a  road 
existed  by  which  the  works  in  question  could  be  seized  or 
turned,  if  found  to  be  occupied.  At  ten  o'clock  Stewart 
reported  that  a  redoubt,  covering  a  stream  called  Cub  Dam 
Creek,  on  the  right,  seemed  to  be  abandoned.  Sumner  then 
directed  General  Hancock,  who  was  sent  for,  to  march  with 
his  own  and  part  of  Davidson's  brigades,  of  Smith's  division, 


78 


THE  PENINSULA. 


and  Cowan's  New  York  Battery,  of  six  guns,  and  take  tlie 
redoubt. 

The  passage  of  tlie  dam  was  only  practicable  by  tlie  nar- 
row mill  bridge  across  its  breast,  and  which  was  about  two 
hundred  and  thiity  feet  in  length.  Major  Larabee  with  the 
Fifth  Wisconsin  and  Sixth  Maine  in  column  of  assault,  led 
by  Lieutenant  Custer,  the  late  cavalry  general,  entered 
the  redoubt  and  found  it  unoccupied.  Hancock  imme- 
diately garrisoned  it  with  three  companies  of  the  Thirty- 
third  New  York,  as  a  rear  guard.  He  then  threw  his  skir- 
mishers into  the  open  field  beyond  the  earthwork,  the 
remainder  of  his  infantry  in  line  of  battle  to  their  rear,  with 
the  artillery  in  the  centre.  At  twelve  o'clock,  word  w^as  dis- 
patched to  Smith  that  the  redoubt  and  the  imjDortant  posi- 
tion at  Cub  Dam  Creek  were  in  possession  of  the  Union 
troops,  under  Hancock.  Here  was  the  first  advantage 
gained  by  the  Federals,  and  it  ultimately  determined  the  re- 
sult. Ey  this  time  Hooker's  entire  command  had  been  pre- 
cipitated against  the  enemy  on  the  left.  This  stubborn  fight 
so  engrossed  the  attention  of  the  Confederate  leader  that 
Hancock's  manoeuvre  had  been  executed  before  its  danger- 
ous significance  became  apparent.  But  Hancock  was  uneasy 
and  readily  appreciated  the  necessity  of  securing  another 
work,  two-thirds  of  a  mile  in  advance,  as  it  commanded  the 
position  he  then  occupied.  He  accordingly  requested  Smith 
to  reinforce  him  with  a  brigade  of  infantry  to  protect  his  rear 
from  sudden  assault. 

Smith  promised  him  four  regiments  and  one  battery. 
Acting  on  this  assurance  Hancock  took  quiet  possession 
of  the  advance  redoubt.  In  order  to  divert  the  heavy 
firing  on  Hooker,  he  (Hancock)  now  determined  to  engage  the 
enemy  and  endeavor  to  drive  them  out  of  two  works  nearest 
to  his  front.    His  position  was  a  strong  one,  having  a  crest 


FOHWARD  FROM  YOBKTOWK 


79 


and  natural  glacis  on  either  flank,  extending  to  the  woods  on 
the  right  and  left.  Advancing  his  skirmishers  he  soon  drove 
the  enemy  out  of  the  position,  but  declined  occupying  it,  as 
the  reinforcements  did  not  arrive.  A  little  later  he  deemed  it 
prudent  to  fall  back  to  a  crest  near  the  redoubt  first  reached. 

By  these  movements  on  our  right,  the  enemy  were  forced 
to  i3ay  special  attention  to  Hancock.  They  proposed  to  at- 
tack him.  Johnston  states  that  neither  he  nor  Longstreet 
knew  of  the  abandoned  redoubts  until  late  in  the  afternoon, 
w^hen  General  Early  sent  an  officer  to  report  the  situation  in 
that  part  of  the  field,  and  request  permission  to  drive  off  the 
Union  troops,  which  Johnston  gave.  D.  H.  Hill,  senior  in 
command  on  that  flank,  was  directed  to  take  charge  of  the 
movement.  Four  regiments  were  pushed  forward.  Early 
led  the  Twenty-fourth  and  Thirty-eighth  Virginia  on  the  left ; 
Hill  commanded  the  Fifth  and  Twenty-third  North  Carolina 
on  the  right.  They  crossed  a  stream  in  their  front,  and 
pushed  through  a  dense  undergrowth  to  an  open  field.  In 
this  passage  the  line  was  broken,  and  when  the  brigade 
reached  the  open,  the  left  wing  was  in  advance,  chasing  the 
"  Yankees,"  according  to  Hill,  who  soon  found  himself  in  a 
most  unpleasant  position.  For,  as  the  rebels  emerged  into 
easy  range,  Hancock,  who  appeared  to  be  retiring,  turned 
upon  them — his  men  cheering  and  firing  over  the  crest  men- 
tioned— and  dealt  destruction  in  their  ranks.  The  volleys  of 
musketry  were  followed  up  with  an  effective  charge.  Early 
was  wounded  and  many  of  his  men  and  officers  fell.  Hill 
endeavored  to  support  him,  but  his  regiments  could  not  be 
handled  under  fire,  and  the  entire  force  fell  back.  It  had 
suffered  a  bloody  repulse,  losing  nearly  400  men.  Hill's  and 
Early's  discomfited  commands  remained  in  line  of  battle  at 
a  distance  all  night,  expecting  to  be  attacked,  and  suffered 
greatly  from  the  cold  rain  that  fell. 


80 


THE  PENINSULA. 


This  conduct  of  Hancock  and  his  command  was  the  re- 
lieving feature  of  the  day.  "  The  brilliancy  of  the  x^lan  of 
battle,"  reports  General  Smith,  "the  coolness  of  its  execu- 
tion, the  seizing  of  the  proper  instant  for  changing  from  the 
defensive  to  the  offensive,  the  steadiness  of  the  troops  en- 
gaged, and  the  completeness  of  the  victory,  are  subjects  to 
which  I  earnestly  call  the  attention  of  the  General-in-Chief 
for  his  just  praise." 

Upon  the  left,  meantime.  Hooker  had  been  fighting  man- 
fully, but  lost  ground,  until  Kearney  came  to  his  relief 
about  two  o'clock,  and  threw  Birney's  and  Berry's  brigades 
into  the  action,  with  Jameson's  forming  a  second  line. 
Hooker's  men  fell  back  out  of  fire,  exhausted  and  with 
thinned  ranks.  Kearney  engaged  the  enemy  vigorously,  and 
by  nightfall  had  recovered  the  field.  About  the  same  time 
in  the  afternoon,  two  o'clock,  Couch's  division  appeared  on 
the  ground  on  the  main  road,  and  Peck's  brigade  was  or- 
dered to  deploy  as  near  as  possible  on  Hooker's  right,  where 
he  also  became  closely  engaged,  but  held  his  own.  When 
night  closed,  the  Union  forces  were  still  confronting  the  line 
of  rebel  works.  The  tactics  of  the  day  had  proved  a  failure. 
Sumner  had  hoped  to  accomplish  something  by  Hancock's 
move,  but  was  distracted  by  Hooker's  serious  action.  He 
proposed  to  reinforce  Hancock  with  the  rest  of  Smith's  di- 
vision, but  the  heavy  firing  on  his  left  warned  him  that  the 
enemy  might  succeed  in  interposing  themselves  between 
Hooker  and  Smith,  and  the  latter  was  retained  near  the  cen- 
tre, or  rather  near  the  main  road ;  for  it  would  be  within 
the  truth  to  say  that  up  to  two  o'clock,  when  Peck  arrived, 
there  was  no  centre  to  this  battle.  During  the  forenoon  at 
least.  Hooker  was  fighting  a  battle  of  his  own  on  the  left  and 
Sumner  was  planning  to  fight  another  on  the  right.  At  the 
moment  the  latter  wished  to  follow  up  his  own  plan  and  push 


FORWARD  FROM  YORKTOWX.  81 

r 

Hancock  forward,  Hooker's  somewhat  alarming  situation, 
wliich  had  not  been  counted  on,  suddenly  baffled  him.  In  a 
word,  neither  Sumner  nor  any  one  else  had  the  entire  field 
under  his  eye  and  control.  The  battle  was  fought  by  piece- 
meal and  ended  in  disajopointment.  "We  lost  that  day,  2,228 
killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  and  five  guns.  Longstreet 
reports  the  total  rebel  loss  at  1,560. 

Toward  five  o'clock  the  continued  cheering  of  troops  at 
Sumner's  front  announced  the  arrival  of  General  McClellan 
upon  the  field.  He  had  hastily  ridden  forward  on  receiving 
the  tardy  intelligence,  conveyed  to  him  by  two  members  of 
his  staff,  that  matters  were  not  going  on  well  at  the  front. 
There  he  made  the  necessary  dispositions  for  more  united 
action  on  the  following  day.  By  this  time  the  divisions  of 
Hooker,  Kearney,  Smith,  Couch,  and  Casey  were  well  in 
hand.  Sedgwick's  and  Bichardson's  were  turned  back  to 
Yorktown  to  follow  Franklin's  and  Porter's  to  West  Point  by 
water. 

At  night  the  enemy  abandoned  Williamsburg,  and  contin- 
ued their  retreat  toward  Bichmond. 

That  portion  of  the  army  that  was  to  advance  by  water 
from  Yorktown  made  more  comfortable  progress  and  at  less 
sacrifice  than  the  divisions  which  had  been  marching  by 
land  and  fighting  at  Williamsburg.  Something  more  was 
expected  of  it  at  first  than  simple  progress.  It  was  intended 
that  Franklin,  followed  by  Porter,  Sedgwick,  and  Bichard- 
son,  should  be  moved  in  transj)orts  to  West  Point  above,  and 
striking  across  to  the  main  roads,  cut  off  the  retreat  of  such 
bodies  of  the  enemy  as  might  be  below.  But  delays,  as 
usual,  prevented.  Franklin,  whose  troops  had  been  so  long 
on  the  boats,  tiring  of  inaction,  obtained  permission  the  day 
before  the  evacuation  of  Yorktown  to  land  his  men  and  go 
4* 


82 


THE  PENINSULA. 


into  camp.  Ordered  back  again  tlie  next  day,  it  was  evening 
before  all  were  ready  to  steam  forward,  and  then,  in  conse- 
quence of  tlie  extreme  darkness  of  the  night,  the  commander 
of  the  gunboat  flotilla  declined  to  act  as  convoy  until  the 
following  morning.  So  Franklin  did  not  get  off  from  York- 
town  until  the  6th.  At  one  o'clock  he  reached  Eltham 
Landing  above  West  Point,  disembarked  his  troops,  and  im- 
mediately sent  the  transports  back  for  Sedgwick's  division. 
His  instructions  were  to  wait  at  Eltham  until  further  orders. 
No  mention  was  made  about  cutting  off  the  enemy.  To 
make  the  attempt  alone  would  have  been  hazardous,  and  the 
remaining  divisions  could  not  concentrate  for  several  days. 
Franklin,  indeed,  on  the  7th,  was  himself  attacked.  About 
nine  o'clock  in  the  morning,  a  large  force  of  the  enemy  ap- 
peared in  front  of  General  Newton's  brigade,  which  they  at- 
tacked with  vigor  an  hour  later.  Parts  of  Slocum's  and 
Taylor's  brigades  supported  Newton,  and  a  smart  action 
continued  until  three  o'clock,  when  the  enemy  withdrew. 
Their  object  in  attacking  was  twofold :  first,  to  protect  their 
trains,  which  were  in  an  exposed  position  at  Barhamsville, 
and  upon  which  they  apprehended  an  assault  from  the  troops 
landed  from  the  transports  at  West  Point ;  and  second  to 
drive  the  Union  army  into  the  river  if  they  could,  or,  at  least, 
send  them  back  under  the  protection  of  their  gunboats.  The 
rebel  force  consisted  of  Whitney's  division  of  G.  W.  Smith's 
command,  the  command  of  General  Magruder,  then  under 
Brigadier-General  Jones,  and  Hill  and  Longstreet's  forces  in 
reserve. 


( 


CHAPTER  V. 

TO   THE   CHICKAHOMINY  —  McDOWELL  —  JACKSON 

THE  SHENANDOAH  VALLEY— APE  AIR  OF  HANOVER 
COURT  HOUSE. 

Afteb  Williamsburg,  as  from  the  outset,  the  course  of 
advance  up  the  peninsula  lay  straight  toward  Richmond, 
wifch  the  base  of  supplies  either  on  the  York  or.  the  James. 
The  York  was  followed,  and  within  two  weeks  the  army 
had  again  been  concentrated,  resting  between  that  river, 
or  its  southern  branch — the  Pamunkey — and  the  Chicka- 
hominy.  From  "Williamsburg,  the  distance  marched  in 
the  interval  was  no  more  than  forty  miles — the  few  and 
wretched  roads  continuing  to  prove  serious  obstacles — and 
the  promise  of  a  rapid  pursuit  failed  of  being  made  good. 
The  troops  moved  on  the  8th,  Keyes  in  advance,  follow^- 
ing  Stoneman's  cavalry,  who  opened  communication  with 
Franklin  at  Eltham.  On  the  15th,  headquarters  were  es- 
tablished at  Cumberland  on  the  south  bank  or  the  Pamun- 
key, and  on  the  following  day  at  the  White  House,  where  a 
permanent  depot  was  organized,  the  troops  having  marched 
up  through  Barhamsville,  Roper's  Church,  and  New  Kent 
Court  House.  On  the  21st  the  army  was  collected  and  in 
line  once  more,  with  its  face  toward  Richmond,  from  seven 
to  twelve  miles  distant.  The  intervening  obstacles  to  be 
overcome  were  the  ever-present  enemy,  and  in  addition,  as 
it  was  to  prove,  the  formidable  Chickahominy.  Franklin's 


84 


THE  PENINSULA. 


newly  organized  corps'^  lield  the  right  of  the  line  three 
miles  from  New  Bridge,  with  Porter's  corps,  also  just  formed, 
supporting,  while  Sumner  occupied  the  centre,  connecting 
with  Kejes,  who  held  the  left  near  Bottom's  Bridge,  with 
Heintzelman  in  reserve.  Stoneman  and  the  cavalry  watched 
the  extreme  right  within  a  mile  of  New  Bridge. 

The  position  thus  occupied  by  the  Union  army  is  one  to 
be  noticed,  since  General  McClellan  implies  in  his  report 
that  it  was  not  entirely  his  own  choice.  The  reason  of  his 
being  there,  as  explained  by  himself,  introduces  the  reader 
to  a  new  phase  of  the  campaign,  with  McDowell  reappear- 
ing as  the  aid  with  whom  alone  success  could  be  hoped  for. 

Soon  after  the  Williamsburg  battle  McClellan  resumed  his 
calls  for  a  larger  force.  Casualties  and  sickness  had  reduced 
his  numbers  considerably,  and  on  the  14th  he  reported  that 
he  could  not  put  into  battle  against  the  enemy  more  than 
80,000  men  at  the  utmost.  Johnston,  he  believed,  was  far 
stronger.  To  the  President  he  reported  :  "I  have  found  no 
fighting  men  left  in  this  Peninsula.  All  are  in  the  ranks  of 
the  o^jposing  foe  ;  "  and  then  he  urged  that  he  might  be  re- 
inforced with  all  the  disposable  troops  of  the  Government. 

ask  for  every  man  that  the  "War  Department  can  send 
me,"  was  his  powerful  appeal.  "  I  will  fight  the  enemy," 
he  continues,  whatever  their  force  may  be,  with,  whatever 
force  I  may  have,  and  I  firmly  believe  that  we  shall  beat 
them,  but  our  triumph  should  be  made  decisive  and  com- 
plete.   The  soldiers  of  this  army  love  their  Government, 


*  The  two  new  "Provisional"  Corps,  as  they  were  called,  became  the  Fifth  and 
Sixth.  They  were  organized  about  May  15th,  by  making  Franklin  commander 
o£  the  former,  which  was  composed  of  his  own  division,  now  Slocum's,  with 
Smith's  from  Keyes"  Corps,  and  Fitz  John  Porter  commander  of  the  latter,  in- 
cluding his  own  division,  now  Morell's,  and  another  under  Sykes.  The  latter's 
brigade  of  regulars  had  been  enlarged  to  a  division  by  the  addition  of  Duryea's 
New  York  Zouaves,  and  the  Tenth  New  York,  under  Colonel  Bendix. 


TO  THE  CHICKAHOMINY. 


85 


and  will  fight  well  in  its  support.  You  may  rely  upon  them. 
They  have  confidence  in  me  as  their  General,  and  in  you  as 
their  President.  Strong  reinforcements  will  at  least  save 
the  lives  of  many  of  them.  The  greater  our  force  the  more 
perfect  will  be  our  combinations,  and  the  less  our  loss." 

To  this  pressing  entreaty  for  more  troops,  President  Lin- 
coln returned  an  encouraging  reply.  There  was  McDowell's 
corps,  which  had  been  withheld  from  the  Peninsula  Army 
since  March,  still  in  front  of  Washington.  It  had  been 
guarding  the  city  with  eminent  satisfaction  during  McClel- 
lan's  weary  progress  toward  Eichmond,  and  was  to  continue 
there  for  that  purpose  until  the  Government  could  safely 
spare  it  for  more  active  operations.  "You  will  consider  the 
national  capital,"  wrote  Stanton  to  McDowell,  April  11th, 
"as  especially  under  your  protection,  and  make  no  move- 
ment throwing  your  force  out  of  position  for  the  discharge 
of  this  primary  duty."  McDowell  repaired  first  to  Catlett's 
Station,  and  in  the  direction  of  Culpeper,  and  soon  after 
moved  down  the  Eappahannock  ojaposite  to  Fredericksburg, 
intending  to  occupy  that  town  as  his  advanced  defensive 
position  in  front  of  Washington.  To  supply  the  place  of 
Franklin's  division  of  his  corps  which  had  joined  McClellan, 
General  Shields'  division  of  Banks'  Shenandoah  force  was  or- 
dered to  report  to  him.  With  his  corps  thus  augmented  and 
completed — his  four  Division  Commanders  being  McCall, 
King,  Ord,  and  Shields — General  McDowell  could  muster, 
about  May  20th,  the  very  respectable  army  of  41,000  men, 
inclusive  of  a  brigade  of  cavalry  and  100  pieces  of  artillery. 
Opposed  to  him,  hovering  to  the  south  of  and  in  the  vicinity 
of  Fredericksburg,  was  a  fluctuating  force  of  the  rebels, 
generally  some  twelve  thousand  strong,  commanded  by 
Brigadier-General  J.  E.  Anderson,  of  the  Tradegar  Iron 
Works,  Virginia. 


86 


THE  PENINSULA. 


It  was  necessarily  to  McDowell's  command  that  President 
Lincoln  looked  when  he  received  McClellan's  urgent  call  for 
reinforcements.  There  were  no  other  troops  to  be  had.  On 
May  17th,  accordingly,  the  former  received  instructions  to 
move  down  the  Eichmond  and  Fredericksburg  Eailroad  and 

co-operate"  with  the  army  under  McClellan,  then  threat- 
ening the  Confederate  capital,  as  we  have  seen,  from  the  line 
of  the  Pamunkey  and  York  Eivers.  It  will  be  observed  that 
this  was  not  a  reinforcement  proper,  but  an  independent  co- 
operating army.  The  "  2^^™^iT  <iuty  "  of  protecting  Wash- 
ington still  outweighed  all  other  considerations,  and  McDow- 
ell thus  could  not,  in  the  eyes  of  the  Government,  be  placed 
under  the  untrammelled  command  of  McClellan  with  any 
more  reason  now  than  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign. 
Stanton's  reply  to  the  latter  presenis  the  situation  perfectly. 
"Your  despatch  to  the  President,"  he  writes.  May  17th, 
2  P.M.,  "'  asking  reinforcements,  has  been  received  and  care- 
fully considered.  The  President  is  not  willing  to  uncover 
the  capital  entirely,  and  it  is  believed  that,  even  if  this  were 
prudent,  it  would  require  more  time  to  effect  a  junction  be- 
tween your  army  and  that  of  the  Eappahannock  by  the  way 
of  the  Potomac  and  York  rivers  than  by  a  land  march.  In 
order,  therefore,  to  increase  the  strength  of  the  attack  upon 
Eichmond  at  the  earliest  moment.  General  McDowell  has 
been  ordered  to  march  upon  that  city  by  the  shortest  route. 
.  .  .  At  your  earnest  call  for  reinforcements  he  is  sent 
forward  to  co-operate  in  the  reduction  of  Eichmond,  but 
charged,  in  attempting  this,  not  to  uncover  the  city  of  Wash- 
ington ;  and  you  will  give  no  orders,  either  before  or  after 
your  junction,  which  can  put  him  out  of  position  to  cover 
this  city." 

To  these  instructions  McClellan  demurred  at  the  time 
only  so  far  as  to  request  that  McDowell  be  placed  under  his 


TO  THE  CHICK  A  HOMINY. 


87 


orders  in  the  usual  way  after  the  junction,  and  the  obliga- 
tion imposed  upon  himself  not  to  uncover  "Washington ;  and 
to  this  the  President  assented.  What  seems  strange,  how- 
ever, in  the  perusal  of  the  despatches,  is  that  McClellan  felt 
hampered  rather  than  relieved  by  the  Government's  answer 
to  his  appeal.  The  claim,  for  instance,  is  made  in  that  docu- 
ment that  the  order  to  McDowell  to  move  down  upon  Eich- 
mond  forced  him  to  take  up  a  position  to  the  north  of  that 
city  and  establish  depots  on  the  Pamunkey,  by  which  he  was 
prevented  from  using  the  James  River  as  a  line  of  operations. 
"Iliad  advised  and  preferred,"  writes  the  General,  "that 
reinforcements  should  be  sent  by  water  for  the  reasons  that 
their  arrival  would  be  more  safe  and  certain,  and  that  I 
would  be  left  free  to  rest  the  army  on  the  James  River  when- 
ever the  navigation  of  that  stream  should  be  opened. 
.  .  .  Had  General  McDowell  joined  me  by  w^ater  I  could 
have  approached  Richmond  by  the  James,  and  thus  avoided 
the  delays  and  losses  incurred  in  bridging  the  Chickahominy, 
and  would  have  had  the  army  massed  in  one  body  instead  of 
being  necessarily  divided  by  that  stream."  But  in  regard 
to  this,  it  is  but  repeating  the  proper  criticisms  made  by  other 
writers  that  General  McClellan  had  frequently  mentioned 
the  Pamunkey  as  his  prospective  base,  that  he  made  no  re- 
presentation to  the  Government  at  the  time  that  he  wished 
to  be  free  to  move  by  the  James,  and  that  (to  anticipate  some- 
what) it  was  within  his  power  during  the  first  three  weeks  of 
June,  when  he  found  that  McDowell  was  again  withheld  from 
him,  to  follow  the  latter  route.  On  one  point  there  can  be 
no  question,  that  the  position  of  his  army,  as  already  given, 
along  the  left  bank  of  the  Chickahominy  from  Bottom's 
toward  New  Bridge,  on  May  20th,  with  the  White  House,  on 
the  Pamunkey,  as  the  base  of  supplies,  was  one  of  McClel- 
lan's  own  choice,  uninfluenced  by  McDowell's  movements. 


88 


THE  PENINSULA. 


The  interests  of  tlie  North  and  the  reputations  of  the  gen- 
erals commanding  everywhere  in  the  field  called  loudly  for 
action  and  success.  It  was  time  something  was  done,  espe- 
cially in  Virginia.  Forty  thousand  or  even  twenty  thousand 
men  joined  to  McClellan's  army  would  seem  to  have  made  it 
irresistible,  regardless  of  the  route  it  might  take.  McClellan 
must  have  thought  so  then,  whatever  he  may  have  written 
ivf terward,  and  it  is  certain  that  he  did  his  part  to  form  a 
junction  with  McDowell  as  soon  as  possible.  Unfortunately 
fjr  the  fate  of  the  campaign  the  latter  was  delayed.  It  was 
ten  days  after  the  order  to  move  down,  before  he  could  do  so. 
That  delay,  at  least,  could  not  be  laid  at  McClellan's  doors. 
Shields'  division  for  one  thing  was  behind  in  its  supplies,  biit 
could  not  the  other  three  have  advanced  without  him  ?  The 
very  demonstration  might  have  proved  effectual  in  preventing 
or  modifying  tho  subsequent  situation  in  the  Shenandoah 
Valley,  which  so  seriously  disturbed  the  situation  on  the 
Peninsulao  Not  until  the  26th  could  McDowell  promise  to 
march. 

But  McDowell  was  destined  not  to  move  toward  Eichmond 
at  all.  The  fatality  w^hicli  had  so  far  attended  the  Peninsula 
movements,  was  to  afflict  other  fields  nearer  Washington.  A 
new  element  had  now  to  be  considered  in  calculating  the 
chances  of  the  campaign — "  Stonew^all "  Jackson ;  and  to  the 
field  of  his  fame,  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  let  us  turn  for  a 
moment. 

In  December,  1861,  Eosecrans,  who  commanded  in  West 
Virginia,  proi^osed  to  occupy  Winchester,  as  the  best  way 
to  cover  that  State,  and  guard  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Eail- 
way.  His  plan  was  foiled  by  Jackson,  who  took  possession 
of  Winchester  in  force,  in  November  of  that  year.  In  Janu- 
SbYj,  1862,  he  moved  against  Bath,  in  Morgan  County,  which 
was  evacuated ;  but  General  Lander,  who  had  succeeded 


( 

TO  THE  CHICKAHOMINY.  89 

Eosecrans  in  command,  prevented  him  from  crossing  tlie  Po- 
tomac— though  not  from  damaging  the  raih'oad  and  placing 
himself  between  General  Lander  at  Hancock,  and  Kelly  at 
Bomney.  Compelling  the  evacuation  of  Eomney,  Jack- 
son remained  in  winter  quarters  at  Winchester,  until  the 
advance  of  Banks,  in  March,  obliged  him  to  withdraw  to 
Woodstock,  forty  miles  farther  south.  As  soon  as  this  ad- 
vance of  Banks  relieved  McClellan  of  anxiety  as  to  that  quar- 
ter, he  ordered  Banks,  on  March  16th,  to  j^ost  his  command 
in  the  vicinity  of  Manassas,  to  rebuild  the  railway  from 
Washington,  occupy  Winchester,  and  scour  the  country 
south  of  the  railroad  and  up  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  Shields 
w^as  withdrawn  from  Strasburg,  and  Jackson  immediately  fol- 
lowed him.  Ashby's  cavalry  came  up  with  his  rear  guard 
within  a  mile  of  Winchester — and  encamped  for  the  night  at 
Kernstown,  three  miles  south  of  that  place,  where  he  was  joined 
by  Jackson  with  his  whole  force  at  2  p.m.  on  March  23d. 
Shields,  who  did  not  expect  an  attack,  had  posted  his  force 
on  a  ridge  near  Kernstown,  with  Kimball's  brigade  and  Daum's 
artillery  in  advance,  Sullivan's  in  his  rear,  and  Tyler  with 
Broadhead's  cavalry  in  reserve.  Jackson,  who  was  deceived 
as  to  the  number  of  the  troops  in  his  front,  attacked  about 
three  o'clock,  and  led  his  men,  weary  as  they  were  by  a  long 
march,  against  the  ridge  where  the  right  flank  of  Shields  was 
posted,  hoping  to  turn  it  and  cut  them  off  from  Winchester. 
The  impetus  of  his  assault  was  sufficient  to  carry  him  to  the 
top  of  the  ridge,  but  there  Shields  held  him  until  he  brought 
his  own  reserves  into  action  and  became  the  attacking  party. 

After  a  stubborn  contest  of  three  hours,  Jackson  was  de- 
feated, with  the  loss  of  two  guns  and  200  prisoners,  besides 
500  killed  and  wounded.  The  unexpected  audacity  of  this 
attack  had  immediate  and  important  results ;  Banks'  corps 
was  turned  back  from  its  march  to  the  Potomac  and  Man- 


90 


THE  PENINSULA. 


assas,  and  lie  himself  returned  to  take  command  of  tlie  pur- 
suit, wliicli  was  continued  to  Woodstock.  A  few  days  later, 
Marcli  31st,  Blenker's  division,  10,000  strong,  was  ordered 
to  join  Fremont,  lately  appointed  to  tlie  command  in  West 
Virginia — with,  instructions  to  report  to  Banks,  and  remain 
with  him  as  long  as  there  was  any  apprehension  of  Jack- 
son's renewing  the  attack.  Banks  followed  Jackson  down 
the  valley,  and  about  April  20th,  the  latter  took  up  a  strong 
position  at  Swift  Eun  gap — his  front  covered  by  the  Shen- 
andoah, his  flanks  by  the  mountains,  and  with  good  roads 
to  his  rear,  toward  Gordonsville,  where  lay  General  Ewell's 
division  of  Johnston's  army,  within  easy  reach.  Should 
Banks  endeavor  to  go  on  to  Staunton,  he  exposed  his  flank 
and  rear  and  his  line  of  communication  with  the  Potomac 
to  attack  from  Jackson,  while  if  he  attacked  Jackson,  and 
should  be  defeated,  his  army  would  be  cut  off  in  the  heart 
of  a  hostile  country. 

This  was  the  situation  on  April  28th,  when  Jackson  again 
assumed  the  offensive,  and  began  that  succession  of  move- 
ments which  ended  in  the  complete  derangement  of  the 
Union  -plans  in  Yirginia — on  the  Peninsula  as  well  as  in  the 
Shenandoah. 

In*  order  that  he  might  operate  effectively,  Jackson  ap- 
plied to  Lee  for  reinforcements,  and  asked  that  Ewell's  di- 
vision might  be  given  him.  Lee  answered  on  the  29th,  that 
he  feared  to  detach  Ewell,  lest  he  should  imdte  an  attack 
on  Eichmond  and  peril  the  safety  of  the  army  on  the  Penin- 
sula;  but  he  ]Dut  the  command  of  Edward  Johnson,  3,500 
strong,  then  at  West  View,  seven  miles  west  of  Staunton,  un- 
der his  orders.  The  letter  suggests  that  in  case  Jackson 
should  feel  strong  enough  to  hold  Banks  in  check,  Ewell 
and  Anderson's  army  near  Fredericksburg  might  attack  Mc- 
Dowell between  that  place  and  Acquia  Creek,  with  much 


TO  THE  CHICKAHOMINY; 


91 


promise  of  success.  This  shows  that  the  great  flank  move- 
ment of  Jackson,  made  later,  was  not  then  thought  of. 

At  that  time  the  Union  forces  in  Northern  Virginia  were 
disxDosed  as  follows :  Banks  with  about  20,000  men  near 
Harrisonburg;  Schenck  and  Milroy,  of  Fremont's  corps, 
with  6,000  men,  had  pushed  their  pickets  east  of  the '  moun- 
tains and  were  in  front  of  Johnson ;  Fremont,  with  10,000 
more,  was  marching  to  join  them ;  McDowell,  with  40,000, 
was  at  Fredericksburg.  Jackson  j)roceeded  to  act.  Joining 
his  own  forces  and  Johnson^s  he  moved  promptly  to  attack 
Milroy,  leaving  Ewell,  who  w^as  freed  by  McDowell's  change 
of  position,  to  watch  Banks.  Jackson  moved  by  a  round- 
about course  to  Staunton.  Pushing  forward  from  that  place, 
he  reached  the  village  of  McDowell,  where  he  gained  a  hill 
which  commanded  the  camps  of  Milroy  and  Schenck,  who 
had  united.  These,  in  order  to  escape,  were  obliged  to  attack 
Jackson  in  his  strong  position  on  Sittlington's  Hill.  The 
battle  continued  for  three  or  four  hours,  but  was  unfavorable 
to  the  Union  arms.  Their  forces  were  withdrawn  during  the 
night  and  retired  to  Franklin,  where  a  junction  was  made 
with  Fremont.  Banks'  force  had  been  weakened  by  Shields' 
division  sent  to  McDowell,  and  learning  that  Ewell  was  in 
the  valley,  he  fell  back  to  New  Market,  and  thence  to  Stras- 
burg,  which  he  fortified  to  cover  the  valley  and  the  Balti- 
more and  Ohio  Eailroad.  Jackson  followed  swiftly,  united 
with  Ewell,  and  fell  upon  Colonel  Kenly's  force  of  1,000 
men  at  Front  Royal,  which  he  destroyed,  and  thence  pressed 
forward  against  Banks,  who,  hearing  of  his  approach,  re- 
treated in  considerable  confusion  and  disorder  to  Winches- 
ter. Here  he  made  a  stand,  but  the  rebel  attack  was  too 
vigorous  and  in  too  overwhelming  numbers  to  be  resisted. 
The  retreat  was  resumed  and  did  not  stop  short  of  the  Poto- 
mac River. 


92 


THE  PENINSULA. 


The  sndden  intelligence  of  Banks'  reverses,  and  the  fact 
that  Jackson  was  on  the  Potomac,  caused  the  wildest  excite- 
ment at  Washington.  McDowell,  who  had  already  taken  np 
his  line  of  march  to  join  McClellan,  was  turned  back  and 
ordered  to  put  20,000  men  in  motion  at  once  for  the  Shenan- 
doah, in  conjunction  with  Fremont,  to  capture  the  force  of 
Jackson  and  Ewell ;  and  on  the  24th  McClellan  was  advised 
by  telegrai^h  from  the  President  that  he  must  not  look  for  co- 
operation from  that  quarter.  So  here  again  did  the  promis- 
ing j)lan  on  the  Peninsula  fall  through.  McClellan  was  not 
to  have  McDowell's  40,000  men.  Both  generals  protested 
or  represented  to  the  Government  that  Jackson's  movement 
w^as  evidently  intended  as  a  "  scare,"  and  that  not  only  was 
"Washington  not  in  danger,  but  that  an  attempt  to  entrap 
"  Stonewall "  in  the  Valley  by  moving  part  of  McDowell's 
corps  to  that  quarter  would  probably  not  succeed.  The 
Government  authorities  and  "  advisers  "  however,  appear  to 
have  been  in  no  mood  to  listen  to  calm  military  reasoning, 
and  McDowell  was  again  withheld  from  McClellan,  while  his 
reinforcements,  as  j)redicted,  could  effect  nothing  against 
Jackson.  The  latter  eluded  Fremont,  approaching  from  the 
West,  and  Shields'  from  the  East,  fought  and  gained  the 
battles  of  Cross  Keys  and  Port  Eepublic,  and  resumed  a 
safe  position  up  the  Valley.  By  these  flying  movements  he 
had  paralyzed  McDowell's  force,  which  was  to  have,  and 
should  have,  joined  McClellan  and  fallen  like  a  hammer 
upon  Richmond. 


*  The  proceedings  of  the  McDowell  Court  of  Inquiry  in  December,  1862,  contain 
important  testimony  and  documents  in  regard  to  this  period  of  the  campaign. 
The  following  is  a  brief  extract  from  General  McClellan's  statements  ; 

"  I  have  no  doubt  said,  for  it  has  ever  been  my  opinion,  that  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  would  have  taken  Richmond  had  not  the  corps  of  General  McDowell 
been  separated  from  it.  It  is  also  my  opinion  that  had  the  command  of  General 
McDowell  joined  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  the  mouth  of  May  by  way  of  Han- 


TO  THE  CHICKAHOMINY. 


93 


Proceeding  wich  tlie  narrative  of  McClellan's  movements, 
we  recall  tlie  fact  that  Anderson's  rebel  brigade  was  near 
Fredericksburg,  and  a  part  of  Stewart's  cavalry  also,  watch- 
ing the  movements  of  McDowell.  Branch's  brigade  was 
at  Hanover  Court  House,  fourteen  miles  north  of  Eich- 
mond.  The  two  brigades,  in  number  some  twelve  thousand 
men,  thus  interposed  between  the  right  of  McClellan  and 
McDowell's  line  of  advance,  was  a  threat  which  was  not  to 
be  disregarded.  They  were  at  once  a  menace  to  his  flank 
and  McDowell's  approach.  When  McClellan  was  advised  of 
these  facts,  and  that  McDowell's  forward  movement  had 
begun,  he  resolved  to  take  the  initiative  and  strike  a  blow 
at  Branch  which  should  make  him  harmless  for  a  time,  re- 
lieve his  own  fl^nk  and  rear,  hinder  him  from  reinforcing 
Jackson  and  impeding  McDowell,  who  at  this  time  was 
eight  miles  south  of  Fredericksburg. 

This  task  was  intrusted  to  General  Fitz  John  Porter  with 
a  command  of  his  own  selection,  about  12,000  strong.  Porter 
adds  that  the  object  of  the  expedition  was  "to  clear  the 
enemy  from  the  Upper  Peninsula  as  far  as  Hanover  Courfc 
House  or  beyond  ; "  the  destruction  of  the  bridges  over  the 
South  Anna  and  Pamunkey  Rivers,  in  order  to  prevent  the 
enemy  in  large  force  from  getting  into  our  rear  from  that 
direction,  and  in  order,  further,  to  cut  one  great  line  of  the 
enemy's  communications,  le.,  that  connecting  Eichmond 
directly  with  Northern  Virginia." 

For  the  destruction  of  the  bridges  over  the  Pamunkey, 
Warren's  brigade  had  been  already  detailed  and  had  been 
posted  at  Old  Church.  It  was  composed,  provisionally,  of 
the  Fifth  New  York,  Warren's  regiment,  the  Thirteenth  New 


over  Court  House  from  Fredericksburg,  that  we  would  have  had  Richmond  with- 
in a  week  after  the  junction.  I  do  not  hold  General  McDowell  responsible  in  my 
own  mind  for  the  failure  to  join  me  on  either  occasion." 


94: 


THE  PENINSULA. 


York,  tinder  Colonel  Marshall,  the  First  Connecticut  Artil- 
lery under  Colonel  R.  O.  Tjler,  the  Sixth  Pennsylvania  Cav- 
alry and  Weeden's  battery.  This  force  had  already  been 
successful  in  destroying  all  means  of  communication  over 
the  Pamunkey  as  far  as  Hanover  Court  House.  On  the  morn- 
ing of  May  27th  the  brigade  moved  toward  the  Court 
House,  on  a  road  running  j^arallel  to  the  Pamunkey.  At 
4:  A.M.  the  same  day  General  Porter  left  New  Bridge  with 
General  Morell's  division,  consisting  of  his  old  brigade, 
commanded  by  Colonel  McQuade,  and  Generals  Butterfield's 
and  Martindale's  brigades.  This  infantiy  force  was  pre- 
ceded by  an  advance  guard  under  General  Emory,  com- 
posed of  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  regiments  of  United  States 
Cavalry  and  Benson's  Horse  Battery  of  the  Second  United 
States  Artillery.  The  route  was  from  New  Bridge,  via 
Mechanicsville,  to  Hanover  Court  House,  north. 

As  usual,  it  rained  heavily  and  the  roads  were  reduced  to 
a  terrible  condition.  About  noon,  the  cavalry,  upon  passing 
the  junction  of  the  Ashland  road  and  the  Hanover  Court 
House  road,  encountered  a  portion  of  Branch's  brigade  of 
North  Carolina  men,  which,  supporting  two  pieces  of  artillery 
posted  near  Dr.  Kinney's  house,  attempted  to  hold  the  road 
leading  to  the  Court  House.  Colonel  Johnson's  regiment, 
the  Twenty -fifth  New  York  Volunteers,  was  moving  with  the 
cavalry,  with  skirmishers  deployed,  and  came  in  direct  col- 
lision with  a  portion  of  Branch's  command,  which  extended 
into  the  woods  on  the  right  and  east  of  the  Court  House 
road.  The  cavalry  had  disengaged  itself  from  the  main 
column  and  had  moved  toward  the  front,  leaving  Benson's 
battery  engaged  with  the  rebels,  who  had  developed  at  that 
time  but  little  strength.  Owing  to  our  ignorance  of  the 
enemy's  position,  a  portion  of  Johnson's- regiment  was  cap- 
tured near  Kinney's  house,  by  that  portion  of  the  enemy 


TO  THE  CHICKAHOMINY. 


95 


wliicli  had  been  passed  by  the  cavalry,  and  which  was  hidden 
by  the  woods  before  alluded  to.  One  piece  of  rebel  artillery 
was  driven  from  the  field  and  one  piece  disabled  by  Benson. 
Upon  reaching  the  front  General  Porter,  finding  that  the  ex- 
istence of  both  infantry  and  artillery  had  been  developed 
during  this  action  near  Kinney's  house,  deployed  General 
Butterfield's  brigade  in  two  lines  and  directed  him  to  charge 
and  drive  the  rebels  from  the  wheat  field.  Butterfield's 
brigade  moved  over  in  handsome  style,  as  if  on  parade,  cap- 
tured the  gun  and  cleared  the  field.  It  was  then  supposed 
thai  the  enemy  had  retreated  from  his  front  in  the  direction 
of  Hanover  Court  House,  and  orders  were  given  to  pursue. 
But  upon  approaching  the  junction  of  these  roads.  General 
Porter  sent)  toward  Ashland  two  regiments  of  Martindale's 
brigade  to  guard  our  flank  from  an  approach  from  Richmond, 
and  to  destroy  the  railroad  and  telegraph  lines  running  to 
that  city.  This  command  discovered  the  presence  of  a  large 
force  of  rebels  at  the  railroad  station,  and  Martindale's  bri- 
gade thus  became  immediately  engaged.  All  this  was  un- 
known to  the  corps  commander,  who  was  pressing  toward 
the  Court  House  with  the  remainder  of  Morell's  division, 
Butterfield  leading.  The  Twenty-eighth  North  Carolina, 
which  had  retreated  toward  the  Court  House,  was  almost 
entirely  captured  by  our  cavalry  under  Emory,  who  at  that 
time,  and  until  he  was  ordered  to  return,  was  accompanied 
by  the  Seventeenth  New  York,  under  Colonel  Lansing. 

Thus  Martindale  w^as  left  to  meet  a  sudden  attack  from 
Branch's  whole  command,  and  it  was  with  difficulty  that  he 
could  inform  General  Porter  of  his  exact  position,  so  little 
was  it  thought  possible  for  a  rebel  force  to  appear  on  our 
left  and  rear.  When  informed  of  the  critical  situation  of 
Martindale's  brigade,  General  Porter  ordered  the  entire 
command  to  face  about  and  toward  Martindale,  left  in  front. 


90 


THE  PENINSULA. 


General  Morell,  leading  his  old  brigade,-  now  under  Colonel 
McQuade,  reached  Martindale,  who  had  been  forced  back  to 
the  east  of  the  main  road,  with  the  Fourteenth  New  York  in 
advance,  and  in  time  to  change  the  whole  face  of  affairs. 
This  regiment  relieved  the  Second  Maine  and  Forty-fourth 
New  York,  who  had  been  nearly  overwhelmed  by  Branch's 
large  brigade,  and  who  were  also  almost  out  of  ammunition. 
The  remainder  of  McQuade's  brigade  moved  toward  the 
west  en  escJielon  and  through  the  woods,  striking  Branch  on 
his  left  and  rear ;  and  in  conjunction  with  Martindale,  who 
now  pushed  forward,  completely  routed  the  enemy. 

In  the  meantime  Butterfield,  brought  by  Porter's  move- 
ment into  the  rear  of  the  column,  directed  his  troops  to- 
ward the  sound  of  the  firing,  in  two  columns — one  along  the 
railroad  and  one  by  the  turnpike.  This  force  came  upon 
the  field  as  the  enemy  were  being  driven,  but  in  time  to  take 
some  prisoners  on  their  left.  Griffin's  Battery  "  D  "  Fifth 
United  States  Artillery,  Martin's  Battery  "  C  "  Massachusetts 
Artillery,  and  Benson's  battery  were  warmly  engaged  for 
some  hours.  On  the  rebel  side  the  troops  were  mainly  of 
Branch's  North  Carolinians,  but  General  Porter  reports  that. 
Georgia  troops  were  present.  These  latter  must  have  be- 
longed to  E.  H.  Anderson's  brigade,  which  had  fallen  back 
from  the  front  of  General  McDowell  then  advancing  from 
Fredericksburg.  Branch's  command  must  have  been  about 
10,000  strong. 

The  objects  of  the  expedition  were  accomplished,  and  the 
destruction  of  bridges  and  railroads  as  far  as  Ashland  being 
completed,  General  Porter  returned  to  his  old  camps. 


CHAPTEK  VI. 


BATTLE  OF  FAIR  OAKS. 

Meanwhile  McClellan  was  moving  steadily  toward  the 
rebel  capital.  On  May  20tli  Naglee's  brigade,  of  Casey's 
division,  crossed  the  Chickahominy  at  Bottom's  Bridge,  and, 
three  days  later,  the  remainder  of  the  corps,  the  Fourth,  fol- 
lowed nnder  General  Keyes.  On  the  25th  it  took  up  a  posi- 
tion at  the  Seven  Pines,  on  the  main  turnpike  leading  to 
Eichmond,  about  five  miles  from  the  city.  The  Third 
Corps,  Heintzelman's,  also  crossed  on  this  date.  Hooker's 
division  moved  southward  to  guard  the  White  Oak  Swamp 
Bridge,  and  Kearny's  division  took  position  in  advance  of 
Savage's  Station.  On  the  left  bank  of  the  Chickahominy 
were  Sumner's,  Franklin's,  and  Porter's  corps,  with  General 
McClellan's  Headquarters  at  Gaines'  Mill.  The  consolidated 
returns  of  the  army  show  an  aggregate  of  126,089  officers  and 
men  present  on  May  31st,  with  280  pieces  of  field  artillery. 

Serious  work  was  now  at  hand,  and  we  pass  to  the  inci- 
dents of  the  first  bloody  and  important  contest  of  the  cam- 
paign, known  as  the  Battle  of  Fair  Oaks  or  Seven  Pines. 

Johnston,  who  was  in  communication  with  Jackson,  and 
probably  felt  certain  that  the  junction  of  McDowell  would  be 
attempted  as  the  best  way  to  utilize  that  force,  and  as  sug- 
gested by  military  prudence,  resolved  to  anticipate  the 
event  and  strike  McClellan  before  he  was  reinforced  by  so 
formidable  a  body  of  fresh  troops.  He  had  made  all  neces- 
5 


98 


THE  PENINSULA. 


sary  dispositions  for  an  attack.  Huger's  division  of  three 
brigades  was  moved  up  from  Petersburg.  A.  P.  Hill's  was 
ordered  to  march  to  the  north  of  the  Chickahominy  at 
Meadows  Bridge  and  to  remain  on  that  side  of  the  stream. 
General  Smith  was  directed  to  place  his  division  on  the  left 
of  Magi'uder's  on  the  Mechanicsville  turnpike,  that  he,  the 
second  officer  in  rank,  might  be  in  position  to  command  on 
the  left.  Longstreet's  division  was  placed  on  the  left  of 
that  of  D,  H.  Hill,  and  Huger's  in  rear  of  the  interval  be- 
tween those  last  named.  It  was  intended  that  Smith  and 
Huger  should  move  against  the  Union  right,  that  Magi^uder 
and  Hill,  crossing  by  New  Bridge,  should  form  between  the 
left  wing  and  the  Chickahominy,  while  Longstreet's  and  D. 
H.  HilFs,  their  left  thrown  forward,  assailed  the  right  flank 
of  the  two  corps  on  the  "Williamsburg  road  and  on  the 
Eichmond  side  of  the  stream.  Johnston  supposed  that 
the  bridges  and  fords  would  furnish  sufficient  means  of 
communication  between  the  two  parts  of  the  Confederate 
army.  Such  are  the  words  used  by  General  Johnston  in  his 
narrative.  It  is  true  that  he  writes  after  the  fact,  but  it  is 
plain  that  he  had  no  fear  as  to  the  result  of  an  encounter 
with  the  whole  of  McClellan's  force,  and  also  that  he  did  not 
regard  the  Chickahominy  as  a  barrier  to  prompt  and  easy 
communication  between  the  two  wings  of  his  own  army, 
which,  by  this  plan  of  battle,  would  be  divided  by  that 
stream.  While  the  generals  of  division  were  with  Johnston 
to  receive  his  final  instructions  for  this  attack,  the  expedi- 
ency of  which  was  urged  before  the  accession  of  McDowell's 
large  and  fresh  corps.  General  Stewart,  who  had  a  small 
force  of  cavalry  watching  McDowell  at  Fredericksburg, 
reported  that  the  force,  which  had  been  marching  southward, 
had  turned  back,  indicating  a  change  of  intention  by  the 
two  portions  of  the  Federal  army.    This  intelligence  caused 


BATTLE  OF  FAIR  OAKS. 


99 


General  Johnston  to  begin  the  offensive  at  once  and  attack 
the  two  Federal  corps  on  the  south  of  the  Chickahominy  at 
Fair  Oaks  as  soon  as  they  had  advanced  far  enough  to  put  a 
sufficient  interval  between  themselves  and  the  three  corps 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  river.  On  the  morning  of  the  30th, 
by  orders  of  General  D.  H.  Hill,  a  reconnoissance  in  force 
was  made  by  Brigadier-General  Ehodes  on  the  Charles  City 
road,  and  by  Brigadier-General  Garland  on  the  Williams- 
burg road.  General  Ehodes  met  no  enemy,  but  General 
Garland  encountered  Federal  outposts  more  than  two  miles 
to  the  west  of  Seven  Pines,  in  numbers  sufficient  to  indicate 
the  presence  of  a  corps  at  least.  Of  this  eTohnston  was  in- 
formed about  noon  and  at  once  told  General  Hill  to  prepare 
for  an  attack  the  next  morning.  Orders  were  promptly 
given  to  concentrate  twenty-three  out  of  twenty-seven  bri- 
gades of  the  rebel  army  against  the  two  Union  corps,  about 
two-fifths  of  McClellan's  army.  The  four  others  were  observ- 
ing the  river  from  New  Bridge  up  to  Meadow  Bridge.  Long- 
street  and  Hill  were  directed  to  move  to  D.  H.  Hill's  posi- 
tion as  early  as  possible  next  morning,  and  Smith  to  march 
with  his  to  the  point  of  meeting  of  the  New  Bridge  and  Nine 
Mile  roads,  near  which  Magruder  had  five  brigades. 

Longstreet,  the  ranking  officer  of  the  three  divisions  to  be 
united  near  Hill's  camp,  was  instructed  verbally  to  form  his 
own  and  Hill's  division  in  two  lines  of  attack  at  right  angles 
to  the  Williamsburg  road,  and  Huger  was  instructed  to  ad- 
vance down  the  Charles  City  road  until  he  reached  a  point 
opposite,  and  in  the  rear  of  the  Federal  left  flank,  to  attack 
as  soon  as  he  became  aware  that  they  were  fully  engaged  in 
front.  In  case  abatis  or  entrenchments  were  encountered, 
the  troops  were  ordered  to  turn  them.  General  Smith  was 
to  engage  reinforcements  should  any  be  sent  across  the 
Chickahominy ;  and,  in  case  he  should  encounter  none,  to 


100 


THE  PENINSULA. 


attack  on  the  left  of  the  troops  already  engaged.  Althongli 
the  second  in  command,  General  Smith  was  not  transferred 
to  the  point  of  first  attack,  lest  the  delay  in  moving  his  troops 
from  the  left,  where  they  lay,  should  take  np  valuable  time. 

Let  us  turn  to  the  Federal  side,  and  study  the  disposition 
of  the  left  wing,  advanced  and  cut  off  from  support,  as  John- 
ston supposed  it  was,  after  the  passage  of  the  Chickahominy. 
On  the  24th  General  Naglee  led  a  reconnoissance  in  force 
from  the  camp  near  Bottom's  Bridge,  and  penetrated  as  far 
along  the  right  bank  of  the  river  as  the  woods  next  beyond 
Savage's  Station,  where  he  met  a  strong  body  of  the  rebels, 
consisting  of  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery,  under  command 
of  General  Stuart.  As  he  reports,  a  conflict  ensued,  which 
resulted  in  the  enforced  abandonment  of  their  position  by 
the  rebels. 

On  the  27th  the  troops  again  moved  forward,  and  sup- 
ported the  advanced  picket-line,  w^hich  was  within  about 
five  miles  of  Eichmond.  The  Eleventh  Maine  and  One 
Hundred  and  Fourth  Pennsylvania  held  this  honorable  and 
exposed  position,  which  they  maintained  until  the  31st,  when 
they  met  the  first  force  of  the  enemy's  attack.  General  Keyes, 
commanding  the  corps,  was  ordered  to  select  and  fortify 
a  strong  position  on  the  Eichmond  road.  He  accordingly 
commenced  a  line  near  Savage's  Station,  a  mile  and  a  half 
behind  Seven  Pines.  This  is  the  work  mentioned  by  Gen- 
eral Couch,  in  his  diary,  on  the  27th,  where  he  speaks  of  a 
strong  entrenched  line  constructed  by  his  men,  under  orders 
of  General  McClellan — the  position  of  which  is  shown  on  the 
map.  As  it  was  deemed  important  by  the  commanding  gen- 
eral that  the  i:>osition  of  Seven  Pines — the  junction  of  the 
Williamsburg  road  with  the  Nine  Mile  road — should  be 
strongly  held,  Lieutenant  McAllester  was  directed  by  Gen- 
eral Barnard,  Chief  of  Engineers,  to  fortify  the  ground. 


BATTLE  OF  FAIR  OAKS. 


101 


He  selected  a  position  a  miie  and  a  half  in  advance  of  the 
Seven  Pines,  which  he  deemed  tenable,  and  which  was 
visited  by  General  Barnard  on  the  28th,  who  directed  the 
commencement  of  a  redoubt,  rifle-pits,  felling  of  trees,  etc. 
McAllester  was  unable  to  procure  men  enough  to  throw  up 
rapidly  an  adequate  defensive  line,  and  the  redoubt  was  un- 


Battle-field  of  "Fair  Oaks." 


finished  at  the  time  of  the  attack.  The  brigades  composing 
Casey's  Second  Division,  Fourth  Corps,  which  occupied 
the  advance  of  this  wing,  covered  only  by  the  unfinished 
works  above  described,  were,  respectively :  1st,  Naglee  on 
the  right;  2d,  Wessels  in  the  centre;  3d,  Palmer  on  the 


102 


THE  PENINSULA. 


left.  The  First  Dmsion,  Couchs',  consisted  of :  1st,  Peck's 
Brigade  ;  2d,  Abercrombie's ;  3d,  Devens'.  The  corps  num- 
bered on  the  muster-rolls  about  12,000  men,  of  all  arms,  but 
no  more  than  two-thirds  were  present  fit  for  duty  on  May 
31,  1862. 

General  Keyes  expected,  and  was  preparing  for,  a  battle. 
Couch  in  his  diary  notes  that  he  w^as  sending  back  wagons 
to  the  north  side  of  the  river.  His  own  division  was  en- 
camped at  Seven  Pines  about  half  a  mile  in  the  rear  of 
Casey's,  of  whom  he  speaks,  saying  that  Casey's  pickets  were 
skirmishing  hotly  on  the  29th,  and  that  the  enemy  were  threat- 
ening both  flanks  of  the  corps.  On  the  30th  he  notes  that  the 
skirmishing  was  so  severe  in  Casey's  front  that  at  his  request  a 
part  of  Peck's  brigade  was  sent  to  him.  This  is  the  recon- 
noissance  mentioned  by  Johnston,  which  determined  the 
time  and  manner  of  his  attack. 

It  will  readily  be  seen  that  there  was  nothing  in  the  nature 
of  a  surprise  about  the  rebel  attack  on  the  31st.  The  com- 
manding officers  were  on  the  alert,  and  everything  indicated 
that  a  few  hours  at  the  latest  would  open  the  contest.  But 
before  the  strife  of  men  began  the  elements  joined  battle. 
On  the  night  of  the  30th  and  31st  there  was  a  storm  of 
tropical  violence,  which  is  mentioned  in  all  the  reports.  It  is 
not  often  that  within  the  limits  of  the  stern  brevity  required 
by  a  military  report  that  any  allusion  is  made  such  as  the 
fury  of  this  storm  drew  from  General  Keyes,  who  in  speak- 
ing of  it,  says  :  "  From  their  beds  of  mud  and  the  peltings  of 
this  storm  the  Fourth  Corps  rose  to  fight  the  battle  of  May 
31,  1862."  At  about  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning.  Lieutenant 
Washington,  an  aide-de-camp  of  General  Johnston's,  was 
captured  by  the  Federal  pickets  in  an  open  field  to  the  right 
of  Fair  Oaks,  which  was  the  extremity  of  General  Casey's 
line,  and  brought  before  General  Keyes.    As  the  enemy 


BATTLE  OP  FAIR  OAKS.  103 

appeared  to  be  in  force  on  the  right,  Keyes  anticipated  the 
weight  of  attack  from  that  quarter.  He  gave  orders  to  have 
the  troops  under  arms  at  eleven  o'clock  and  rode  over  to 
Fair  Oaks  Station,  meeting  on  the  way  Colonel  Bailey,  chief 
of  artillery,  whom  he  ordered  to  put  his  guns  in  readiness 
for  action.  Finding  nothing  unusual  at  Fair  Oaks  he  re- 
turned toward  Seven  Pines,  and  as  the  firing  in  front  of  Casey 
grew  more  brisk,  as  a  precaution,  he  ordered  Couch  to  send 
Peck's  Brigade  to  his  support. 

At  about  12.30  p.m.  it  became  suddenly  manifest  that  the 
attack  was  made  in  great  force  and  General  Keyes  sent  at 
once  to  General  Heintzelman  for  reinforcements.  His  mes- 
sage was  delayed  and  it  was  not  until  3  p  m.  that  Berry's  and 
Jamieson's  brigades  of  Kearny's  division  reached  the  scene 
of  action.  Casey's  division  was  in  front  of  the  abatis  and  his 
pickets  about  one  thousand  yards  beyond,  it  being  impossi- 
ble to  extend  them  farther  because  the  ground  immediately 
in  front  of  that  point  was  held  by  the  enemy  in  force.  The 
pickets,  reinforced  by  the  One  Hundred  and  Third  Pennsyl- 
vania, soon  broke  and,  joined  by  a  large  number  of  sick,  camp 
followers  and  skulkers,  flowed  in  a  steady  stream  to  the 
rear,  thus  giving  the  impression  that  Casey's  division  had 
broken  in  a  panic,  and  left  the  field  without  making  any 
firm  or  prolonged  resistance.  So  strong  was  that  impres- 
sion, that  General  McClellan,  who  did  not  make  his  appear- 
ance on  the  ground  until  the  next  day,  telegraphed  to  Mr. 
Stanton :  "  Casey's  division,  which  was  the  first  line,  gave  way 
unaccountably  and  discreditably."  In  his  report,  made  at  a 
later  day,  he  retracted  this  injurious  expression,  but  for  some 
time  this  division,  which,  as  will  be  shown,  fought  well  and 
lost  heavily,  remained  under  the  gravest  accusations  of 
cowardice.  An  examination  in  detail  of  the  reports  of  the 
brigade  commanders,  will  show  the  facts.    Palmer  reports 


104 


THE  PENINSULA. 


tliat  the  Third  Brigade,  composed  of  new  troops,  was  in  a 
poor  state  of  discipline,  not  controlled  by  the  officers. 
About  400  were  detailed  on  picket  duty,  and  were  strag- 
glers ;  the  remainder,  about  1,000  strong,  were  attacked  in 
front  and  on  both  flanks,  and  after  returning  the  enemy's 
fire  with  spirit,  fell  back  to  the  woods  in  their  rear.  The 
Eighty -first  New  York  lost  its  colonel,  major,  one  captain, 
and  many  men  killed.  Colonel  Hunt  of  the  Ninety-second 
was  wounded  and  obliged  to  leave  the  field.  The  regiments 
were  scattered  ;  the  smoke  made  it  impossible  to  observe 
more  than  one  regiment  at  a  time,  and  when  Palmer  applied 
for  reinforcements  he  was  told  to  fall  back  on  the  new  line 
formed  in  the  rear.  He  claims  his  loss  to  have  been  about 
one-fourth  of  the  number  engaged,  and  blames  those  who 
placed  a  small  force  of  the  rawest  men  in  the  army  in  the 
most  exposed  position  to  bear  the  brunt  of  an  attack. 

General  Wessels  reports  that  of  an  actual  effective  force  in 
his  brigade  of  1,500  men,  34  were  killed,  271  wounded,  and 
55  missing,  and  tells  the  same  story  of  stubborn  resistance, 
that  regiment  after  regiment,  enveloped  by  superior  numbers 
and  enfiladed  on  both  flanks,  fell  back  from  position  to 
l^osition,  until  at  nightfall,  having  been  driven  from  the  last 
post  to  which  he  had  been  assigned  on  the  right  of  Devens, 
he  encam]^ed  near  Savage's  Station. 

General  Naglee  was  more  fortunate  in  two  respects,  the 
quality  of  his  men  and  the  result  of  the  action ;  for  although 
he  with  the  others  was  compelled  to  fall  back,  it  would  seem 
that  they  made  a  more  stubborn  resistance,  favored  in  some 
respects  by  the  nature  of  the  ground,  and  by  the  fact  that 
they  were  enabled  to  forma  junction  with  the  reinforcements 
brought  up  on  the  right.  At  about  one  o'clock,  by  order  of 
General  Casey,  the  One  Hundredth  New  York,  One  Hundred 
and  Fourth  Pennsylvania,  and  Eleventh  Maine,  made  a  • 


BATTLE  OF  FAIR  OAKS.  105 

charge  on  the  enemy  in  their  front.  Passing  over  a  rail 
fence  they  came  into  the  open  held  by  the  rebels,  where  the 
fire  became  hotter  than  before,  Spratt's  battery  taking  an 
active  part.  By  this  time  the  left  of  Casey's  command  had 
been  forced  back  upon  the  position  of  Couch,  the  colonel 
of  the  One  Hundredth  New  York  was  killed,  that  of  the  One 
Hundred  and  Fourth  was  wounded,  half  the  men  were  killed 
and  wounded,  and  the  enemy,  constantly  reinforced,  pressed 
them  so  closely  that  Sergeant  Porter,  left  guide  of  the  One 
Hundred  and  Fourth,  was  struck  over  the  neck  with  a  mus- 
ket. Orders  were  given  to  retire.  The  horses  of  one  of 
Spratt's  guns  being  killed,  the  piece  was  abandoned.  All 
this  time  the  men  had  been  fighting  in  front  of  the  intrench- 
ment.  Now,  as  they  fell  back,  an  opportunity  was  afforded 
to  Colonel  Bailey,  of  the  First  New  York  artillery,  who 
promptly  ordered  the  batteries  of  Fitch  and  Bates  to  open 
on  the  rebels  as  they  pressed  forward  in  pursuit.  The  order 
was  obeyed  with  so  good  effect  of  grape  and  canister,  that 
although  repeatedly  urged  to  the  assault  and  coming  up  with 
courage,  such  was  their  loss  that  the  enemy  fell  back  from 
this  point. 

A  little  later  the  rebels  advanced  on  the  left  and  in  the 
rear  of  the  redoubt,  and  stationed  sharpshooters  in  the  trees 
in  such  position  as  to  command  that  point  and  the  rifle-pits. 
Here  their  fire  at  short  range  was  most  fatal  and  effective. 
Colonel  Bailey  was  shot  through  the  head  while  directing 
the  batteries  in  the  redoubt  and  giving  instructions  as 
to  spiking  the  guns  if  they  must  be  abandoned.  Major  Van 
Valkenberg  and  Adjutant  Eumsey,  of  the  same  regiment, 
were  killed  shortly  after,  and  the  battery  left  without  officers, 
and  in  the  course  of  the  next  hour  it  was  necessary  to  leave 
the  guns,  most  of  the  horses  having  been  killed,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  a  part  of  Eegan's  battery,  which  was  brought  off, 
5* 


106 


THE  PENINSULA. 


the  men  supporting  the  wounded  liorses  to  keep  them  from 
falling  in  the  traces.  The  rebels  now  turned  the  guns  left  in 
the  redoubt  upon  the  left  flank  of  the  Fifty-sixth  New  York, 
Eleventh  Maine,  and  Fifty-second  Pennsylvania.  This  with 
the  fire  in  front  was  not  to  be  endured,  and  they  were  with- 
drawn and  put  in  position  in  the  rear  of  the  Nine  Mile  road, 
about  three  hundred  yards  from  the  Seven  Pines.  This  line 
was  held  till  toward  dark,  when  the  enemy,  advancing  in 
masses  down  the  rear  of  the  Nine  Mile  road,  compelled  a 
general  retrograde  movement,  which  did  not  stop  till  all  ar- 
rived at  a  new  line  of  defence,  one  mile  in  the  rear. 

The  report  of  General  Keyes  shows  that  he  was  called  upon 
early  in  the  action  to  reinforce  the  first  line,  and  did  so  un- 
til he  had  so  far  depleted  the  second  that  he  could  not  with 
safety  weaken  it  farther.  He  bears  testimony  to  the  deter- 
mined gallantry  with  which  the  majority  of  Casey's  division 
held  its  ground,  only  giving  way  when  overwhelmed  by 
masses  of  the  enemy.  Under  his  direction,  with  the  assist- 
ance of  Generals  Naglee  and  Devens,  a  change  of  front  of 
the  troops  on  the  Williamsburg  road  was  effected,  by  which 
a  line  in  the  rear  of  the  Nine  Mile  road  was  formed,  which 
proved  so  firm  a  barrier  to  the  advance  of  the  rebels,  and 
which  finally  fell  back  in  good  order  to  the  line  near  Sav- 
age's Station. 

About  4.12  P.M.,  seeing  the  enemy  advancing  in  overwhelm- 
ing numbers  on  the  right.  General  Keyes  himself  has- 
tened to  the  left  to  bring  up  reinforcements,  and  with  the 
assent  of  General  Heintzelman  sent  forward  General  Peck 
with  the  One  Hundred  and  Second,  and  Ninety-third  Penn- 
sylvania regiments.  Colonels  Eowley  and  McCarter  were 
ordered  to  advance  across  the  open  space  to  attack.  They  ad- 
vanced under  a  heavy  fire,  and  formed  in  a  line  oblique  to 
the  Nine  Mile  road,  where  they  maintained  their  position 


0^ 


BATTLE  OF  FAIR  OAKS. 


107 


for  half  an  hour,  doing  great  execution.  Compelled  at 
length  to  give  way,  Peck  and  the  One  Hundred  and  Second 
crossed  the  Williamsburg  road  to  the  wood,  and  McCarter, 
with  the  bulk  of  the  Ninety-second,  passed  to  the  right,  where 
they  took  part  in  the  last  line  of  battle,  formed  about  6  p.m. 
Colonel  Briggs,  of  the  Tenth  Massachusetts,  under  orders 
from  General  Keyes,  led  his  regiment  in  face  of  a  heavy  fire 
and  formed  with  the  precision  of  parade  on  the  right  of  this 
last  mentioned  line.  It  was  a  most  favorable  position,  being 
in  a  wood  without  much  undergrowth,  where  the  ground 
sloped  somewhat  abruptly  to  the  rear.  Had  the  regiment 
been  two  minutes  later,  this  fine  position  would  have  been 
lost,  and  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  form  the  last  line 
which  stemmed  the  tide  of  defeat  and  made  victory  possible. 
This  success  was  begun  here  by  the  Fourth  Corps  and  the 
two  brigades  of  Kearny's  division.  When  this  position  was 
taken,  it  was  observed  that  the  left  of  the  line  was  dwindling 
away,  that  the  artillery  had  withdrawn,  that  the  centre  was 
weakening,  and  large  bodies  of  rebels  were  pouring  down 
the  Williamsburg  road  to  the  rear.  Generals  Keyes,  Heintz- 
elman,  and  others  passed  through  the  opening  of  the  en- 
trenchments of  the  28th,  and  by  strenuous  efforts  rallied  a 
number  of  men,  and  induced  them  to  turn  about  and  join  a 
line  better  organized,  posted  in  the  woods,  and  formed  -pei- 
pendicular  to  the  road,  and  advanced  some  sixty  yards  to 
the  left  of  the  road  toward  the  field  where  the  battle  had 
been  confined  for  more  than  two  hours  against  vastly  suiie- 
rior  numbers.  The  line  was  formed  of  companies,  regiments, 
and  parts  of  regiments,  fragments  of  divisions  and  brigades 
which  had  lost  their  integrity  in  the  fierce  fight  of  the  after- 
noon. Casey,  Couch,  Kearny,  Birney  were  all  represented, 
and  the  men  stood  firm,  shoulder  to  shoulder,  in  the  fading 
light. 

r 


108 


THE  PENINSULA. 


In  the  course  of  the  two  hours  preceding  these  events, 
three  Pennsylvania  batteries  under  Major  Koberts  (Hood's, 
McCartv's  and  Miller's)  of  Couch's  division,  did  admirable 
service.  Miller's  in  particular,  from  its  central  position, 
threw  shell  with  great  precision  over  the  heads  of  our  troojDS, 
which  fell  into  the  masses  of  the  enemy,  and  later,  when 
the  enemy  were  rushing  in  upon  the  right,  he  threw  case 
and  canister  among  them,  doing  frightful  execution.  This 
substantially  closes  the  action  of  May  31st,  as  to  that  por- 
tion of  it  which  was  fought  in  front  of  Casey's  division, 
and  in  which  the  troops  of  Keyes'  and  Heintzelman's  corps 
participated.  Of  these,  every  division  except  the  Second 
Division  of  Hooker  was  heavily  engaged  during  the  long 
hours  from  12.30  to  6.30  p.m.  Early  in  the  afternoon,  when 
the  first  weight  of  the  rebel  assault  was  thrown  upon  Casey's 
right,  which  had  been  driven  back  upon  Couch's  division, 
the  latter,  by  the  weight  and  impetus  of  the  charge,  was  cut 
off  from  his  command  with  Abercrombie  and  four  regiments 
with  a  battery  and  xmsoners.  After  endeavoring  to  cut  his 
way  back  to  his  main  force  and  finding  the  odds  against 
him  too  great,  he  withdrew  toward  the  Grape  Vine  Bridge 
on  the  Chickahominy,  and  took  a  position  facing  Fair  Oaks. 

So  McClellan's  promising  advance  toward  Eichmond  re- 
ceived an  unexpected  repulse.  Keyes'  Corps  and  half  of 
Heintzelman's,  which  had  reinforced  him,  had  been  driven 
back  a  mile. 

Let  us  return  for  a  moment  to  the  rebel  side  and  see  what 
were  the  reasons  for  the  joartial  failure  of  their  admirably 
formed  plan  of  attack  uiDon  two  comparatively  weak  corps  of 
McClellan's  army,  separated  from  their  comrades  by  the 
treacherous  Chickahominy.  Their  order  of  battle,  it  will 
be  remembered,  put  G.  W.  Smith  on  the  right,  Johnston 
being  with  him,  Longstreet  and  D.  H.  Hill  in  the  centre, 


BATTLE  OF  FAIR  OAKS. 


109 


and  Huger  on  the  left,  with  orders  to  move  on  the  left  flank 
and  rear  of  the  Federals.  Some  recrimination  was  indulged 
in  by  the  commanding  officers,  on  account  of  the  delay  on 
Longstreet's  part  in  making  the  attack,  and  the  alleged  total 
failure  of  Huger  to  co-operate  at  all. 

V  While  the  long  time  which  elapsed,  after  the  attack  was 
begun  by  Hill  and  before  Smith  co-operated,  formed  the  sub- 
ject of  criticism,  it  is  urged  on  behalf  of  Huger  that  his 
troops  were  unaccustomed  to  marching,  having  been  in  gar- 
rison duty  so  long  at  Norfolk,  and  that  finding  the  road 
heavy  and  the  swamp  overflowed,  they  were  unable  to  take 
X^osition  in  time  to  be  of  any  service.  Huger  for  himself 
says  that  his  instructions  were  not  positive,  and  that  he  was 
not  informed  of  the  place  of  attack.  General  Johnston  has 
charged  as  follows:  *^Had  General  Huger's  division  been 
in  position  and  ready  for  action  when  those  of  Smith,  Long- 
street,  and  Hill  moved,  I  am  satisfied  that  Keyes'  corps  would 
have  been  destroyed  instead  of  merely  defeated.  Had  it  gone 
into  action  at  even  four  o'clock  the  victory  would  have  been 
much  more  complete."  Huger  replied  in  his  demand  for  a 
court  of  inquiry:  "  To  the  last  paragraph  I  have  only  to  say 
that  if  it  did  not  go  into  action  by  four  o'clock,  it  was  because 
General  Longstreet  did  not  require  it,  as  it  was  in  position 
and  awaiting  his  orders.  Four  of  the  brigades  had  been  sent 
for  and  did  go  into  action  on  Saturday  afternoon — three  of 
Longstreet's  and  one  of  Huger's — the  other  two  were  in 
position  and  could  have  gone  if  ordered."  Johnston's  re- 
port ignores  the  presence  of  Huger's  division  at  any  part  of 
the  action.  This  request  for  a  Court  of  Inquiry  by  Huger, 
addressed  to  Jefferson  Davis,  as  President,  through  George 
W.  Eandolph,  Secretary  of  War,  was  referred  to  General 
Johnston  and  indorsed  by  Davis  favorably,  unless  General 
Longstreet's  reply  "  will  enable  Johnston  to  relieve  Huger 


110 


THE  PENINSULA. 


of  his  grievance."  Huger  seems  to  have  defended  himself 
f  successfully. 

As  to  Smith,  on  the  other  hand,  a  cause  for  the  delay  in 
his  attack  is  found  in  a  peculiar  condition  of  the  elements. 
Although  General  Johnston  was  only  separated  from  General 
Longstreet  at  the  centre  by  a  brief  interval  of  three  miles 
or  more,  he  left  the  time  of  the  commencement  of  the  ac- 
tion by  the  latter  to  be  determined  by  the  sound  of  the 
musketry  which  he  supposed  would  be  distinctly  audible  at 
his  position,  instead  of  making  certain  of  the  fact  by  mieans 
of  an  aide  who  could  have  brought  him  the  news  of  Hill's 
advance  the  moment  the  order  was  given.  The  wind  proved 
an  unreliable  courier ;  it  took  up  the  sound  of  the  cannon 
and  carried  that  only  to  Johnston  and  Smith.  It  was  not 
until  Hill's  movement  had  resulted  in  a  heavy  engagement 
which  had  lasted  for  some  hours  that,  about  three  o'clock 
P.M.,  Smith  was  informed  of  the  state  of  affairs  and  pushed 
in  on  Couch's  right,  cutting  the  latter  off  from  the  remainder 
of  his  division.  These  mistakes  on  the  part  of  the  enemy 
saved  us  from  a  more  serious  disaster  than  we  suffered. 

Upon  the  Union  side  there  are  other  and  more  satisfac- 
tory incidents  of  the  day  to  be  noticed. 

General  McClellan's  headquarters  at  this  time  were  at 
Gaines'  Mill,  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  Chickahominy. 
Hearing  the  firing  at  Keyes'  front,  he  ordered  Sumner,  then 
encamped  with  his  corps  near  Tyler's  house,  on  the  same 
side  of  the  stream,  to  be  in  readiness  to  march  at  a  mo- 
ment's warning.  Sumner  instantly  put  his  men  under  arms, 
and,  at  two  o'clock,  General  Sedgwick's  division  left  camp 
and  advanced  to  the  upper  bridge,  where  they  halted  to  await 
further  orders.  At  half -past  two  orders  to  march  to  the  sup- 
port of  Heintzelman  were  received,  and  the  column  was  at 
once  pushed  forward,  Gorman's  brigade  in  advance,  followed 


BATTLE  OF  FAIR  OAKS. 


Ill 


by  Kirbj's  battery;  then  Burns'  and  Dana's  brigades,  fol- 
lowed by  Tompkins',  Bartlett's,  and  Devens'  batteries.  The 
river  had  risen  during  the  night  and  morning,  the  causeways 
approaching  the  bridge  on  either  side  were  overflowed,  and 
the  bridges,  trembling  under  the  strong  current  which  cov- 
ered the  planking,  were  in  momentary  danger  of  destruc- 
tion ;  and  it  was  not  till  the  weight  of  the  marching  column 
steadied  Sumner's  upper  bridge  that  confidence  was  felt  that 
the  structure  would  stand.  The  utmost  difficulty  was  ex- 
perienced in  getting  the  guns  along ;  it  was  necessary  to  un- 
limber  and  use  the  prolongs,  the  men  tugging  at  the  mired 
pieces  up  to  their  waists  in  water.  Of  Kichardson's  division, 
French's  brigade  only  was  able  to  cross  at  the  lower  bridge, 
and  Howard's  and  Meagher's  brigades  were  obliged  to  cross 
by  the  upper  bridge,  opposite  General  Sedgwick's  camp. 
Sedgwick's  advance — the  First  Minnesota,  Colonel  Sully, 
leading — arrived  on  the  field  about  4.30  p.m.,  and  found 
Abercrombie's  brigade,  of  Couch's  division,  southwest  of 
Courtney's  house,  hard  pressed  by  the  enemy.  Colonel  Sully 
formed  his  regiment  on  his  right.  Gorman's  brigade  formed 
on  Abercrombie's  left,  becoming  hotly  engaged;  it  was 
charged  by  the  enemy,  who  were  re^Dulsed  ;  when  charging 
in  turn,  it  drove  them  from  their  position.  Kirby's  battery 
arrived  on  the  field,  and,  with  three  pieces  and  one  caisson, 
was  put  into  action  on  the  left.  Soon  Lieutenants  French 
and  "Woodruff  arrived  with  three  more  pieces ;  the  caisson 
was  in  the  rear,  buried  in  the  mud ;  the  trail  of  one  gun 
broke  at  the  fourth  discharge.  The  enemy  prepared  to 
charge  on  Kirby's  right,  but  he  changed  front  to  the  right, 
and  sent  back  two  limbers  to  the  caisson  for  ammunition, 
firing  round  shot  in  the  meantime.  The  enemy  came  down 
a  road,  and  found  themselves  in  front  instead  of  to  right  of 
Kirby's  guns,  and  exposed  to  a  fire  of  canister  from  five 


112 


THE  PENINSULA. 


light  12-pounders,  and  were  compelled  to  retreat  to  the 
woods  in  disorder;  the  recoil  buried  the  guns  to  their 
axles  in  the  mud ;  at  one  time  three  pieces  were  in  that 
condition,  and  were  only  extricated  with  the  aid  of  the 
Fifteenth  Massachusetts  Volunteers.  This  battery  was  the 
only  one  which  arrived  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  action 
at  this  point.  Generals  Burns  and  Dana  were  promx3t  to 
arrive,  the  latter  with  only  two  regiments,  the  Twentieth 
Massachusetts  and  Seventh  Michigan,  the  other  two,  the 
Nineteenth  Massachusetts  and  Forty-second  New  York,  hav- 
ing been  left  behind,  the  one  on  picket,  the  other  to  pro- 
tect the  crossing  and  assist  the  passage  of  the  artillery. 
General  Dana  soon  after  went  into  action  on  the  left  of 
Gorman's  brigade,  and  took  part  in  a  brilliant  charge. 
Colonel  Burns  took  post  on  the  right  of  Colonel  Sully  with 
two  regiments,  holding  two  in  reserve — the  Seventy-second 
Pennsylvania,  Colonel  Baxter,  overlapping  Colonel  Sully's 
right,  and  the  Sixty-ninth  Pennsylvania,  Colonel  Owens,  on 
his  right  and  rear,  covering  the  right  of  the  road  from  Court- 
ney's to  Gelding's  house.  During  the  night  the  Seventy-first 
Pennsylvania,  and  First  California  of  this  division,  with 
the  Nineteenth  Massachusetts,  Sixty-third  and  Forty-second 
New  York  were  ordered  back  toward  the  Chickahominy,  to 
hold  the  line  of  communication  and  protect  the  ammunition 
and  artillery,  nearly  all  of  which  was  mired  on  the  south 
side  of  the  river. 

The  troops  to  whom  this  line  was  opposed  during  the  lat- 
ter part  of  the  day  were  Hood's  brigade.  Whiting's,  Petti- 
grew's,  Hampton's,  and  Hatton's,  and  the  attacks  upon  Kirby's 
battery  were  made  successively  by  Whiting,  Pefctigrew,  and 
Hampton.  General  Hampton  reports  that  after  driving  the 
enemy  a  short  distance  through  the  woods,  he  found  that 
they  were  being  rapidly  reinforced  and  held  a  strong  posi- 


BATTLE  OF  FAIR  OAKS. 


113 


tion  either  fortified  or  affording  natural  shelter,  and  even 
fast  extending  beyond  Ms  (Hampton's)  left.  Upon  being- 
informed  of  the  state  of  affairs  by  Colonel  Lee  (rebel)  of  the 
artillery,  General  G.  W.  Smith,  in  his  report  says,  that  he 
immediately  ordered  up  Hatton's  brigade  and  Colonel  Light- 
foot's  regiment  of  Pettigrew's,  until  then  held  in  reserve,  into 
action  upon  Hampton's  left,  where  the  whole  line  came  within 
fifteen  or  twenty  yards  of  the  line  of  the  enemy's  (Federal) 
"  fire,  which  apparently  came  from  the  low  bank  of  an  old 
ditch,  either  a  drain  or  the  foundation  of  a  fence  very  near  the 
surface  of  the  ground.  Various  attempts  were  made  to  charge 
the  enemy,but  for  want  of  concert  all  failed.  In  this  engage- 
ment the  rebel  loss  as  reported  by  General  Smith,  was  1,283, 
killed,  wounded,  and  missing.  General  Pettigrew  was 
wounded  and  taken  prisoner.  General  Hampton  wounded, 
and  General  Hatton  killed.  General  Smith  expresses  tho 
rather  sanguine  opinion  that  if  he  could  have  had  an  hour 
more  of  daylight,  with  the  assistance  of  Hood's  brigade  of 
Texans  on  the  right,  supported  by  Griffith's  of  Mississippi  on 
the  left,  as  well  as  by  the  brigade  of  General  Simms,  all  fresh 
troojjs,  the  enemy  would  have  been  driven  into  the  swamps 
of  the  Chickahominy.  As  it  was,  darkness  compelled  him 
to  relinquish  an  unfinished  task,"  a  task,  it  may  be  here 
said,  which  was  still  unfinished  the  next  day,  when  he  had 
all  the  advantages  to  be  derived  from  daylight  and  opportu- 
nity. 

Three  times  in  his  report  of  this  day's  action  General 
Smith  speaks  of  the  enemy's  (Federal)  strong  position, 
as  "  either  fortified  or  offering  natural  shelter  " ;  again  the 

strong  position  of  the  enemy  is  better  understood" ;  again, 
"  reconnoisance  made  during  the  morning  developed  the 
fact  that  the  enemy  (Federal)  were  strongly  fortified  in  the 
position  attacked  by  my  division  on  the  previous  evening." 


114  THE  PENINSULA. 

i 

There  was  no  fortification,  or  the  semblance  of  one,  on  anj 
part  of  the  line  held  by  the  fragment  of  Conch's  division 
nnder  General  Abercrombie  and  the  troops  of  Sumner's 
corps  as  they  arrived  on  the  field  in  the  afternoon;  the 
only  artillery  on  the  ground  was  a  section  of  Brady's  battery 
and  Kirby's  First  Artillery,  which  was  posted  in  the  o^Den 
field  near  Adams'  house ;  the  remainder  of  the  artillery  of 
Sumner's  corps  came  on  the  ground  only  in  time  to  be 
used  in  the  action  of  the  next  morning.  The  imaginary 
fortified  position  which  Smith  encountered  was,  in  fact,  the 
living  wall  of  brave  men  who  withstood  his  advance  and 
compelled  him  finally  to  retreat.  The  First  Division  of 
Sumner's  Corps,  General  Eichardson's,  did  not  arrive  on  the 
field  until  the  firing  in  Couch's  and  Sedgwick's  division  had 
ceased,  it  being  then  dark. 

On  reporting  to  Sumner,  Eichardson  was  ordered  to  take 
position  on  the  line  of  the  railroad,  on  the  left  of  General 
Sedgwick,  and  to  communicate  with  the  pickets  of  General 
Birney  on  the  left.  The  brigade  of  General  French  was 
placed  on  the  railroad,  three  regiments  of  General  Howard 
in  second  line,  three  regiments  of  General  Meagher  in  third 
line,  and  one  of  General  Howard's,  the  Fifth  New  Hampshire, 
as  the  advance  guard  to  General  French.  The  men  bivou- 
acked under  arms,  and  one  regiment  of  General  Meagher's 
command,  the  Sixty -third  New  York,  was  sent  back,  with 
General  Sumner's  permission,  to  try  and  get  up  at  least  two 
pieces  of  artillery  before  morning.  The  Fifth  New  Hamp- 
shire during  the  night  were  within  half  musket  shot  of  the 
Second  and  Fifth  Texas ;  the  Second  Mississippi,  upon 
whom  General  Smith  relied  to  take  the  enemy's  (Federal) 
fortifications  the  next  morning,  were  withdrawn  before  day- 
light. At  two  o'clock  of  the  morning  of  June  1st,  a  council 
of  war  was  held  in  General  Sumner's  tent,  and  it  was  re- 


BATTLE  OF  FAIR  OAKS. 


115 


solved  to  attack  the  enemy  as  soon  as  disposition  for  that 
purpose  could  be  made. 

Again  glancing  at  the  entire  operations  of  the  day,  we 
find  the  situation  relieved  by  the  conduct  of  Sumner,  who 
came  on  the  field  in  time  to  restore  our  line  on  the  right, 
and  check  the  further  progress  of  the  enemy.  The  exertions 
of  Keyes,  Heintzelman,  and  their  officers  and  men  were 
thus  prevented  from  proving  futile.  The  rebels  jDouring 
down  in  great  numbers  to  drive  us  into  the  Chickahominy 
had  failed  of  their  object. 

On  the  following  morning,  June  1st,  the  battle  was  re- 
newed, and  ended  with  success  of  the  Union  troops  and  the 
re-establishment  of  the  lines  lost  the  previous  day. 

About  sunset  on  May  31st,  General  J.  E.  Johnston,  Com- 
mander-in-Chief of  the  rebel  army,  who  had  been  shortly 
before  wounded  by  a  bullet  in  the  shoulder,  was  struck  from 
his  horse  by  a  shell,  and  severely  injured  and  carried  from 
the  field.  The  command  devolved  upon  General  G.  W. 
Smith,  second  in  rank,  who  directed  operations  until  June 
2d,  when  General  K.  E.  Lee  was  placed  in  command  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  a  position  which  he  held  with 
honor  until  April,  1865.  On  the  morning  of  June  1st,  the 
rebels  took  the  initiative,  and  about  5  o'clock  a.m.  a  column 
of  cavalry  and  a  line  of  infantry  pickets  were  seen  deploying 
in  an  open  field  on  the  right  of  the  position  held  by  Gen- 
eral Eichardson.  If  this  was  intended,  as  he  thinks,  for  the 
head  of  a  real  attack,  it  was  broken  up  and  driven  back  by 
Captain  Pettit's  battery,  which  had  just  come  on  the  field, 
and  no  further  attempt  was  made  from  that  direction. 
Finding  that  a  gap  existed  between  General  French's  left 
and  the  right  of  General  Birney,  which  was  unoccupied, 
and  exposed  the  line  to  be  cut  at  this  point.  General  Eich- 
ardson moved  General  French  three  battalions'  length  to  the 


116 


THE  PENINSULA. 


left,  and  pnt  in  a  regiment  of  General  Howard's  still  farther 
to  tlie  left,  and  the  Fifth  New  Hampshire  in  second  line. 
Hardly  had  these  arrangements  been  completed,  when  abont 
6.30  A.M.  a  furious  fire  of  musketry  began  from  a  distance  of 
about  fifty  yards.  Near  our -left  two  roads  crossed  the  rail- 
road, and  up  these  the  enemy  moved  his  column  of  attack, 
supported  on  his  left  by  battalions  deployed  in  line  of  battle 
in  the  woods,  the  whole  line  coming  up  at  once  without  any 
skirmishers  in  advance.  Our  men  returned  the  fire  with 
vivacity,  and  the  fire  soon  became  the  heaviest  yet  experi- 
enced, the  enemy  putting  in  fresh  regiments  five  times  to 
allow  their  men  to  re]olenish  ammunition.  This  lasted  for 
an  hour  and  a  half,  when  the  enemy,  unable  any  longer  to 
bear  the  fire,  fell  back,  but  in  the  course  of  half  an  hour 
renewed  the  contest  with  reinforcements,  when  an  action  of 
about  one  hour's  duration  ensued,  at  the  end  of  which  time 
the  division  charged  on  the  enemy  in  their  front,  sup- 
ported at  the  moment  by  a  charge  upon  their  left  and  rear, 
led  by  General  French  in  person,  and  compelled  them  to  fall 
back,  their  retreat  being  precipitated  by  the  fire  of  four 
guns  of  Pettit's  battery.  The  division  lost  about  900  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing. 

General  Sickles,  in  his  report  of  the  advance  on  June  1st, 
says  the  fields  were  strewn  with  Enfield  rifles  marked 
''Tower,  1862,"  and  muskets  marked  "  Virginia  "  thrown  away 
by  the  enemy  in  his  sudden  retreat.  In  the  camp  occupied  by 
Generals  Casey  and  Couch  were  found  rebel  caissons  filled 
with  ammunition,  a  large  number  of  small  arms,  and  several 
baggage  wagons,  besides  two  barns  filled  with  subsistence 
and  forage. 

The  attempt  of  the  rebels  to  drive  the  left  wing  into  the 
Chickahominy,  and  cut  McClellan's  line  of  supply  from 
White  House,  which  opened  with  every  prospect  of  success. 


BATTLE  OF  FAIR  OAKS. 


117 


was  turned  first  into  failure  and  then  into  disaster,  which 
sent  them  back  to  Kichmond  in  a  panic  on  the  night  of 
June  1st. 

General  Johnston,  who  refers  in  his  report  to  the  en- 
trenchments which  prevented  General  G.  W.  Smith  from  at- 
tacking the  right  of  Sumner's  line  on  June  1st,  claims  a 
victory  on  that  day,  when  he  was  not  on  the  field,  and  on  the 
31st,  he  alleges  that  his  forces  took  10  guns,  6,000  muskets, 
1  garrison  flag,  and  4  regimental  colors,  and  many  hundred 
prisoners,  and  states  his  total  loss  to  have  been  4,283. 

D.  H.  Hill,  who  led  the  advance  on  Casey's  camp,  claims  to 
have  driven  the  Union  troops  first  a  mile  and  a  half,  and  sub- 
sequently a  mile  further,  meeting  with  a  constant  series  of 
successes  on  May  31st  and  June  1st,  until,  by  reason  of  the 

Yankees"  occupying  ground  in  his  rear  on  the  Nine  Mile 
road  (a  strange  place  for  a  beaten  enemy  to  be  in),  it  was 
deemed  best  to  withdraw  to  Eichmond. 


CHAPTEK  m 

WITHDRAWAL  TO   THE   JAMES.— THE    "SEVEK  DAYS' 
BATTLE.'^ 

After  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks  there  was  a  pause  in  active 
operations  in  front  of  Eichmond,  partly  owing  to  the  ex- 
haustion consequent  upon  that  event,  and  partly  to  the 
weather,  which  for  the  next  two  weeks  was  unfavorable  to 
such  a  degree  as  to  render  any  advance  almost  impossible. 
All  the  bridges  had  been  carried  away ;  the  wings  of  the 
Union  army  were  separated  by  the  river,  and  on  the  only 
avenue  of  supply  for  the  three  corps  on  the  right  bank, 
the  railroad  bridge  and  trestlework  were  threatened  with 
momentary  destruction ;  the  ground,  which  consisted  of  alter- 
nate layers  of  reddish  clay  and  quicksand,  had  turned  into 
a  vast  swamp,  and  the  guns  in  battery  sank  into  the  earth 
by  their  own  weight.  That  most  arduous  of  tasks  in  in- 
clement weather,  entrenching,  occupied  the  interval.  The 
line  laid  out  beyond  Seven  Pines  by  the  Engineer  Corps 
was  strengthened  and  completed  from  Gelding's  to  White 
Oak  Swamp. 

Changes  were  made  in  the  disposition  of  the  troops. 
The  front  at  Seven  Pines  was  heavily  reinforced.  Franklin's 
corps  was  brought  over  from  the  other  bank  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy  and  posted  on  the  right  of  the  line  ;  on  his  left  was 
Sumner,  and  Heintzelman  on  his  left  extending  toward  the 
White  Oak  Swamp,  with  Keyes'  corps  in  reserve.    The  as- 


WITHDRAWAL  TO  THE  JAMES.  119 


signment  of  General  Casey  to  the  command  of  the  supply- 
depot  at  the  White  House  occasioned  some  changes  in  the 
latter  corps,  Peck  being  given  Casey's  division,  now  com- 
posed of  Naglee's  and  Wessel's  brigades.  Porter's  corps  alone 
remained  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Chickahominy  in  the 
vicinity  of  Gaines'  Mill,  with  McCall's  division  of  Pennsyl- 
vania reserves,  which  had  come  by  water  from  McDowell's 
corps,  posted  farther  on  at  Mechanicsville  and  Beaver  Dam 
Creek. 

The  rebel  force,  under  command  of  E.  E.  Lee,  augmented 
in  numbers  by  drafts  on  their  resources  in  every  direction, 
was  now  composed  as  follows:  Longstreet's  division — six 
brigades  :  Pickett's,  Anderson's,  Wilcox's,  Kemper's,  Pryor's, 
and  Featherstone's.  A.  P.  Hill's  division — six  brigades : 
Anderson's,  Gregg's,  Field's,  Pender's,  Branch's,  and  Arch- 
er's. D.  H.  Hill — five  brigades  :  Ehodes',  Garland's,  Ander- 
son's, Colquitt's,  and  Eipley's.  McGruder's  command — six 
brigades :  Sumner's,  Kershaw's,  Griffiths',  Cobb's,  Toombs', 
and  D.  E.  Jones'.  Huger's  division — three  brigades : 
Mahone's,  Armistead's,  and  Wright's.  Whiting's  division — 
two  brigades  :  his  own  and  Hood's.  Jackson's  division — 
three  brigades :  Winder's,  Cunningham's,  and  Fulkerson's. 
Ewell's  division — three  brigades:  Elzey's,  Trimble's,  and 
Seymour's.  Holmes'  command — four  brigades  :  Walker's, 
Eansom's,  Daniels',  and  Wise's.  Lawton's  brigade,  un- 
attached, under  General  Jackson's  command.  Total  effec- 
tive, Lee's  army,  in  seven  days'  battle  before  Eichmond,  by 
one  official  estimate,  80,762  men. 

McClellan's  army  in  the  last  week  of  June  stood  as  follows  : 
Five  corps — Porter's  on  the  right  of  the  general  line  facing 
Eichmond,  composed  of  Morell's  and  Sykes'  divisions,  with 
McCall's  temporarily  attached.  Next  across  the  Chickahom- 
iny, we  have  Franklin  with  the  divisions  of  Smith  and  Slocum ; 


120 


THE  PENINSULA. 


then  Sumner  with  the  divisions  of  Eichardson  and  Sedgwick  ; 
then  Heintzelman  with  Kearney's  and  Hooker's  divisions, 
and  lastly  Keyes  in  reserve  with  Couch's  and  Peck's  divi- 
sions.   Total  effectives,  92,500. 

There  were  now  to  come  seven  days  of  almost  continuous 
fighting — a  great  struggle  for  the  mastery  of  the  situation 
around  Eichmond.  McClellan  foresaw  that  the  crisis  was  at 
hand,  and  he  continued  to  apply  for  reinforcements.  McCall 
had  arrived,  and,  in  addition,  some  scattering  regiments ; 
but  the  bulk  of  McDowell's  corps,  which  he  still  hoped  to 
have  with  him,  was  detained  in  Northern  Virginia. 

With  Eichmond  less  than  five  miles  distant,  the  Com- 
mander-in-chief now  prepared  to  push  still  nearer. 

On  June  25th  it  was  determined  by  McClellan  to  move 
the  line  in  front  of  Seven  Pines  forward  to  a  large  clearing 
on  the  other  side  of  a  heavily  timbered  piece  of  ground, 
through  the  middle  of  which  ran  a  small  stream,  whose 
swampy  borders  had  until  that  time  formed  the  extreme 
picket  line  of  the  oi3i30sing  forces  in  that  direction.  This  was 
known  as  the  affair  of  Oak  Grove.  Heintzelman's  corps, 
part  of  Sumner's,  and  Palmer's  brigade  of  Keyes'  corps,  ad- 
vanced in  good  order  through  the  timber,  met  and  repulsed 
a  strong  force  of  the  enemy,  and  occupied  the  position,  throw- 
ing out  pickets  within  four  miles  of  Eichmond.  This  ad- 
vance makes  manifest  the  fact  that  while  General  McClellan 
may,  and  doubtless  did,  entertain  the  plan  of  moving  his 
base  of  supplies  from  White  House  to  the  James,  he  was  in- 
duced to  make  this  latter  move  by  Stewart's  cavalry  raid  on 
the  11th  rather  than  with  any  intention  of  changing  his  line 
of  attack  or  transferring  his  army  to  that  point. 

It  is  at  this  point  that  we  reach  the  crisis  of  the  Peninsula 
campaign.  Despite  delays,  drawn  battles,  losses,  and  un- 
looked-for natural  obstacles,  McClellan  had  succeeded,  as 


WITHDRAWAL  TO  THE  JAMES. 


121 


he  had  promised,  in  reaching  the  vicinity  of  the  rebel  capi- 
tal— thus  relieving  Washington,  alarming  the  Southern  lead- 
ers, and  raising  the  anticipations  of  the  North.  It  would 
seem  that  under  this  favorable  outlook  the  Government 
would  have  strained  every  nerve  to  carry  the  campaign  suc- 
cessfully through  by  reinforcing  the  army.  That  its  dispo- 
sition was  to  do  so  and  reap  the  advantages  of  the  situation, 
we  believe  to  be  beyond  question.  It  was  the  fear  for  the 
safety  of  Washington  that  had  caused  it  to  change  its 
strategy  at  every  move  of  the  enemy  and  produce  confusion 
where  system  and  plan  were  necessary.  It  was  this  fear  that 
retained  McDowell  at  the  capital  at  the  opening  of  the  cam- 
paign, and  it  was  this  fear  that  withheld  him  again  as  he 
was  about  to  move  down  from  Fredericksburg.  And  now, 
once  more  on  June  11th,  as  Jackson  seemed  to  have  ceased 
his  operations  in  the  Shenandoah,  McDowell  was  jDromised 
to  McClellan,  one  of  whose  divisions,  under  McCall,  soon 
reached  the  latter. 

This  promise  and  expectation  of  reinforcements  in  reality 
proved  a  hinderance  to  our  success.  McClellan  called  for 
them,  depended  upon  them,  and  waited  for  their  arrival.  It 
was  so  at  Yorktown  when  Franklin  joined  ;  it  was  so  again 
now  after  Fair  Oaks,  when  McClellan  wrote,  June  7th,  "I 
shall  be  in  perfect  readiness  to  move  forward  and  take  Eicli- 
mond  the  moment  McCall  reaches  here  and  the  ground  will 
admit  the  passage  of  artillery."  That  the  reinforcements 
were  needed  is  clear  enough ;  but  on  the  other  hand  the 
delay  and  indecision  caused  by  a  dependence  upon  them 
gave  the  enemy  the  opportunity  of  forming  plans  of  their 
own  and  anticipating  those  of  McClellan.  This  was  obvious 
now  when  matters  were  nearing  a  crisis  :  for  while  McClel- 
lan was  preparing  to  strike  with  his  reinforced  army  (if, 
indeed,  he  was  not  waiting  for  McDowell  and  his  entire 
6 


122 


THE  PENINSULA. 


command),  Lee  and  Jackson  were  devising  and  executing  a 
scheme  which  was  to  put  an  entirely  new  face  upon  the  situ- 
ation. 

It  is  here  we  encounter  the  turning-point  of  the  cam- 
]Daign. 

Stonewall  Jackson  was  the  disturbing  factor  again.  The 
first  suggestion  that  he  might  be  of  use  in  the  immediate 
operations  around  Richmond,  after  the  termination  of  his 
Valley  movements,  seems  to  have  come  from  this  officer 
himself.  From  Port  Eepublic  he  wrote  to  General  John- 
ston as  early  as  June  6th  :  "  Should  my  command  be  re- 
quired at  E-ichmond  I  can  be  at  Mechanics'  Run  Depot,  on 
the  Central  Railroad,  the  second  day's  march."  Two  days 
later,  General  Lee  noticed  the  hint  and  replied  to  Jackson : 

Should  there  be  nothing  requiring  your  attention  in  the 
Valley  so  as  to  prevent  your  leaving  it  for  a  few  days,  and 
you  can  make  arrangements  to  deceive  the  enemy  and  im- 
press him  with  the  idea  of  your  j)resence,  please  let  me 
know,  that  you  may  unite  at  the  decisive  moment  with  the 
army  near  Richmond."  On  the  11th  he  wrote  again,  and  on 
the  16th  a  final  decision  was  reached,  as  appears  from  the 
following  letter,  which,  on  account  of  its  interest  and  im- 
portance, is  here  inserted  in  full : 

Headquarters,  near  Richmond,  Va., 
June  16,  1862. 

M.vjor-General  T.  J.  Jackson, 

Commanding  Valley  District  : 

General — I  have  received  your  letter  by  the  Hon.  Mr.  Boteler.  I 
hope  you  will  be  able  to  recruit  and  refresh  your  troops  sufficiently  for 
the  movement  proposed  in  my  letter  of  the  11th.  You  have  only  ac- 
knowledged my  letter  of  the  8th.  I  am  therefore  ignorant  whether 
that  of  the  11th  has  reache,d  you.    From  your  account  of  the  position 


WITHDRAWAL  TO  THE  JAMES. 


123 


of  the  enemy,  I  think  it  would  be  difficult  for  you  to  engage  him  in 
time  to  unite  with  this  army  in  the  battle  for  Richmond.  Fremont 
and  Shields  are  apparently  retrograding,  their  troops  shaken  and  disor- 
ganized, and  some  time  will  be  required  to  set  them  again  in  the  field. 
If  this  is  so,  the  sooner  you  unite  with  this  army  the  better.  McClel- 
lan  is  being  strengthened ;  Burnside  is  with  him,  and  some  of  Mc- 
Dowell's troops  are  also  reported  to  have  joined  him.  There  is  much 
sickness  in  his  ranks,  but  his  reinforcements  by  far  exceed  his  losses. 
The  present,  therefore,  seems  favorable  for  a  junction  of  your  army 
and  this.  If  you  agree  with  me,  the  sooner  you  can  make  arrangements 
to  do  so  the  better.  In  moving  your  troops,  you  could  let  it  be  under- 
stood that  it  was  to  pursue  the  enemy  in  your  front.  Dispose  those  -to 
hold  the  Valley,  so  as  to  deceive  the  enemy,  keeping  your  cavalry  well 
in  their  front,  and  at  the  proper  time  suddenly  descending  upon  the  Pa- 
munkey.  To  be  efficacious,  the  movement  must  be  secret.  Let  me  know 
the  force  you  can  bring,  and  be  careful  to  guard  from  friends  and  foes 
your  purpose  and  your  intention  of  personally  leaving  the  Valley.  The 
country  is  full  of  spies,  and  our  plans  are  immediately  carried  to  the 
enemy.  Please  inform  me  what  arrangements  you  can  make  for  sub- 
si:^ting  your  troops.  Beef  cattle  could  at  least  be  driven,  and,  if  neces- 
sary, we  can  subsist  on  meat  alone. 

Unless  McClellan  can  be  driven  out  of  his  intrenchments,  he  will 
move  by  positions,  under  cover  of  his  heavy  guns,  within  shelling  dis- 
tance of  Richmond.  I  know  of  no  surer  way  of  thwarting  him  than 
that  proposed.  I  should  like  to  have  the  advantage  of  your  views  and 
be  able  to  confer  with  you.  Will  meet  you  at  some  point  on  your 
approach  to  the  Chickahominy.  I  enclose  a  copy  of  my  letter  of  the 
11th,  lest  the  original  should  not  have  reached  you. 

1  am,  with  great  respect,  your  obedient  servant, 

R.  E.  LEE, 

Ge7Leral. 

To  convey  tlie  impression  that  Jackson  was  to  continue  his 
operations  on  the  Shenandoah,  Lee  sent  him  Whiting's  and 
Lawton's  brigades  from  in  front  of  Richmond  as  reinforce- 
ments, and  contrived  to  have  the  fact  reach  the  Union  head- 


124 


THE  PEirasrsuLA. 


quarters.  In  reality,  Jackson  took  these  brigades  and 
E\yeirs  division  of  his  own  command,  and,  leaving  Harri- 
sonburg on  the  17th,  faced  toward  Eichmond.  On  the 
25th  he  reached  Ashland  Station,  twelve  miles  north  of  the 
city,  having  previously  met  Lee  in  person  and  arranged 
for  an  immediate,  simultaneous,  and  heavy  attack  upon 
McClellan's  right  wing  on  the  north  side  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy. 

Xow  upon  this  same  date,  the  25th,  McClellan  and  Stan- 
ton were  telegrajDhing  to  each  other  respecting  Jackson's 
position,  the  Secretary  stating  that  neither  McDowell, 
Banks,  nor  Fremont  had  "  any  accurate  knowledge  "  in  the 
case,  and  that  among  the  mass  of  conflicting  rumors  his 
own  belief  was  that  Jackson's  "  real  movement "  looked 
toward  Eichmond.  McClellan  replied  that  contrabands 
coming  in  on  that  day  reported  Jackson's  advance  at  or  near 
Hanover  Court  House,  which  confirmed  the  previously 
doubted  statement  of  a  rebel  deserter,  that  he  was  certainly 
moving  to  take  part  in  a  general  attack  on  the  Union  forces. 
The  doubt  remained  until  the  afternoon  of  the  26th,  vvhen 
McClellan  reported  that  Jackson  was  driving  in  his  pickets 
"  on  the  other  side  of  the  Chickahominy." 

Thus,  suddenly,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  which  was 
actually  pressing  toward  Eichmond,  as  shown  by  the  affair 
of  Oak  Grove  on  the  25th,  found  itself  thrown  again  upon 
the  defensive,  in  the  midst  of  its  offensive  operations,  by 
Jackson's  preconcerted  and  timely  reinforcement  of  Lee. 
From  this  moment  we  have  to  follow  the  fortunes  of  that 
army  on  its  retreat. 

On  the  other  side  of  the  Chickahominy,  on  the  extreme 
right  of  the  Union  line.  General  McCall  had  taken  position  at 
Mechanicsville  on  June  19th,  with  his  division,  consisting  of 
the  brigades  of  Seymour,  Eeynolds,  and  Meade,  Cooper's 


WITHDRAWAL  TO  THE  JAMES. 


125 


battery  of  10-pounder  Parrotts,  Smead's  (regular)  four  12- 
pounders,  De  Hart's  (regular)  six  12-pounders,  Easton's  of 
four  and  Kerns'  of  six  12-pounders,  both  of  Pennsylvania. 
On  tlie  26tli,  one  of  his  regiments,  the  Sixth  Pennsylvania 
Eeserves,  Colonel  McKean,  was  at  Tunstall  Station,  and  the 
Eleventh,  Colonel  Gallagher,  on  picket  on  the  lower  Chicka- 
liominy.  On  the  morning  of  the  26th,  Jackson's  advance, 
"Whiting's  division,  was  detained  by  some  Union  skirmishers, 
v/ho  destroyed  the  bridge  over  Tolopotomoy  Creek ;  but,  driv- 
ing these  in,  the  bridge  was  repaired,  and  he  pushed  on 
toward  McClellan's  right  and  rear. 

The  position  occupied  by  McCall  was  naturally  strong : 
its  front  on  the  left  bank  of  Beaver  Dam  Creek,  the  left 
on  the  Chickahominy,  the  right  extending  to  the  thick 
woods  beyond  Mechanicsville,  w^hich  were  occupied ;  on  the 
right  of  the  road  crossing  at  Ellison's  Mill,  an  epaulment  for 
four  pieces  of  field  artillery  was  thrown  up,  rifle-x)its  were 
dug  in  front  of  each  regiment,  and  a  strong  picket-line  was 
maintained  from  Mechanicsville  Bridge  to  Meadow  Bridge. 
Cooper's  and  Smead's  batteries  commanded  the  right  and 
left  approaches  of  the  upper  road,  and  De  Hart's  battery 
near  the  front  centre,  the  same  road  at  a  distance,  and  also 
the  lower  road  direct  to  Mechanicsville.  The  Second  Bri- 
gade (Meade's)  was  held  in  reserve  ready  to  support  Eey- 
nolds  and  Seymour,  or  prevent  the  enemy  from  crossing  at 
New  Bridge.  In  view  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy were  encamped  A.  P.  Hill's  division  and  Cobb's 
legion  of  the  rebel  army,  holding  strong  lines  of  rifle-pits 
and  two  redoubts  overlooking  the  river.  About  noon  on  the 
26th  the  enemy  was  seen  to  be  in  motion ;  at  12.30  the  Union 
pickets  at  Meadow  Bridge  were  driven  in,  and  line  of  battle 
was  at  once  formed,  Eeynolds,  on  the  right,  Seymour  on  the 
left,  Meade  with  Easton's  and  Kerns'  batteries  in  reserve.  . 


126 


THE  PENINSULA. 


The  rebel  General  A.  P.  Hill,  whose  division,  14,000 
strong,  was  in  front  of  McCall,  had,  in  pursuance  of  orders, 
concentrated  his  division  near  Meadow  Bridge  on  June  25th. 
Branch's  brigade,  with  J ohnson's  battery,  was  sent  to  a  bridge 
some  seven  miles  above,  where  the  Brook  turnpike  crosses  the 
Chickahominy,  with  orders  to  communicate  with  Jackson's 
advance ;  and  as  soon  as  it  had  crossed  the  Central  Eailroad 
he  was  to  cross  the  Chickahominy,  take  the  river  road,  push 
on  and  clear  Meadow  Bridge,  when  Hill  was  at  once  to  cross 
the  bridge,  and  sweep  down  to  Mechanicsville.  Jackson 
was  exj^ected  at  dawn,  but  it  was  ten  o'clock  before  he  and 
Branch  communicated,  and  Branch's  advance  was  delayed  by 
the  Union  skirmishers.  At  3  p.m.  General  Hill  became  im- 
patient lest  the  whole  plan  should  fail,  and  put  his  force  in 
motion  with  six  batteries,  with  four  extra  horses  to  each  gun. 
General  Field  seized  the  bridge  and  crossed,  meeting  but 
slight  opposition;  Anderson  and  Archer  followed.  Gregg 
and  Pender  turned  short  to  the  right  and  moved  through 
the  fields  to  co-operate  on  the  right  of  the  first  column. 
Field's  advance  was  met  by  a  concentric  fire  of  artillery,  and 
V  forming  in  line  of  battle,  with  Pegram's  guns  in  the  centre, 
forced  the  Union  troops  from  Mechanicsville,  upon  their 
stronghold  on  the  other  side  of  Beaver  Dam  Creek.  Mcintosh 
and  Anderson  endeavored  by  a  movement  to  the  left  to  cap- 
ture a  Union  battery.  Archer,  Field,  Gregg,  and  Pender, 
came  into  line,  but  met  a  terrific  artillery  fire  from  the  Union 
line.  A  direct  assault  on  the  position  was,  as  the  rebel  com- 
manders assert,  sure  to  result  in  heavy  loss,  and  none  was 
ordered.  At  this  time  General  Branch  came  up,  and  was 
put  in  support  of  those  already  engaged.  An  attempt  was 
made  to  turn  our  left  lower  down  the  creek,  which  failed 
disastrously.  Two  regiments  of  Eipley's  brigade,  with  Pen- 
der's brigade,  endeavored  to  flank  the  position  at  Ellicott's 


WITHDRAWAL  TO  THE  JAMES. 


127 


Mills,  but  being  exposed  to  the  magnificent  Union  artillery, 
were  repulsed  v/itli  heavy  loss.  In  the  attempt  at  the  Mills 
there  was  prolonged  fighting.  Hour  after  hour  passed,  the 
enemy  constantly  putting  in  fresh  men  from  his  superior 
force.  General  Morell  with  Griffin's  and  Martindale's  bri- 
gades of  his  division,  and  two  batteries,  came  to  the  support 
of  the  right  of  McCall,  and  at  about  sunset  Griffin  went  into 
action  and  assisted  in  compelling  the  enemy  to  retire.  The 
latter  suffered  heavy  loss,  the  Union  troops  losing  not  over 
three  hundred  men. 

The  force  under  General  McOall  was  stationed  to  observe 
the  bridges  over  the  Chickahominy.  The  position  selected 
was  of  great  natural  and  artificial  strength,  and  the  turn  of 
the  road  from  Meclianicsville  to  Meadow  Creek  Valley,  where 
it  runs  nearly  parallel  to  it,  presented  the  flank  of  the  enemy 
to  the  Union  troops,  who,  upon  the  advance  of  the  hostile 
column  in  heavy  force,  reserved  its  fire  until  the  head  of  the 
column  was  nearly  across,  and  then  poured  it  in  with  such 
close  and  destructive  effect  that  the  enemy  made  no  further 
attempt  to  cross  the  road.  That  they  held  their  position  so 
long  against  superior  numbers  is  proof  of  the  discipline  and 
steady  valor  of  our  men.  After  the  firing  ceased  they  lay 
on  their  arms,  replenishing  empty  cartridge-boxes,  refilling 
haversacks,  and  caring  for  the  wounded.  The  General-in- 
Chief  was  with  General  Porter  until  one  o'clock  a.m.  Eeports 
from  scouts  and  outposts  poured  in  constantly,  all  of  which 
corroborated  the  stories  in  regard  to  Jackson's  movements, 
which  had  been  the  subject  of  so  much  mystery  in  the  army 
and  at  Washington.  Jackson  had  been  delayed  this  day 
and  took  no  part  in  the  action ;  but  his  presence  was  ascer- 
tained, and  on  the  next  morning  McCall  was  ordered  to  fall 
back  on  Gaines'  Mill. 


128 


THE  PEOTPTSULA. 


It  is  to  be  noticed  here  that  McClellan's  base  of  supplies 
at  the  White  House  had  become  a  source  of  anxiety,  since  he 
seemed  to  doubt  his  ability  to  keep  his  connection  with  it 
secui-e,  and  because  the  rain  and  mud  had  rendered  the 
roads  almost  impassable  for  wagons.  Some  time  in  June,  the 
General  called  General  Porter  to  a  meeting  with  himself 
alone,  half-way  between  their  respective  headquarters,  to 
discuss  the  advantages  of  the  James  E-iver  as  a  base.  The 
conclusion  reached  was  that  necessity,  and  necessity  only, 
would  warrant  such  a  movement;  that  it  was  dangerous  and 
difficult  in  the  face  of  such  a  vigilant  foe  as  General  Lee, 
and  a  disaster  would  endanger  our  cause  at  home  and  abroad. 
The  necessity  of  keeping  up  a  constant  threat  upon  Rich- 
mond itself  for  the  purpose  of  showmg  our  confidence  in  our 
strength,  was  then  felt.  However,  it  was  considered  that 
the  necessity  might  come,  and  it  was  determined  that  w^e 
should  be  prepared  for  the  emergency. 

At  this  time  the  enemy  had  begun  to  show  renewed  activity 
in  their  field  works,  portending  some  movement  of  impor- 
tance on  their  part.  For  security.  General  McClellan  there- 
upon determined  to  send  General  Averill  to  the  J ames  Biver 
with  a  proper  force  of  topographical  engineer  officers  for  the 
purpose  of  mapping  the  country  from  White  Oak  Swamp  to 
the  James,  and  for  obtaining  all  information  necessary  to 
enable  him  to  make  a  change  of  base. 

BATTLE  OF  GAINES'  MILIj. 

The  morning  of  June  27th  found  the  Fifth  (Porter's)  Corps, 
composed  of  Sykes'  and  Morell's  divisions  of  three  brigades 
each,  and  Berdan's  First  United  States  Sharpshooters  armed 
with  breech-loading  rifles  and  supported  by  several  batteries 
of  artillery,  with  McCalFs  division  withdrawn  from  Mechan- 
icsville,  preparing  for  battle  in  the  vicinity  of  Games'  Mill. 


WITHDRAWAL  TO  THE  JAMES. 


129 


Stories  of  deserters  and  natives  all  agreed  that  Jackson 
with  an  overwhelming  force  was  near  by,  and  that  with 
Longstreet  and  the  two  Hills  he  was  about  to  make  an  effort 
to  destroy  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  The  past  two  weeks 
had  been  dry  and  warm  ;  the  soil  had  been  changed  from 
clinging  mnd  to  dnst,  which,  rising  from  the  advancing 
columns  of  the  enemy  betrayed  their  line  of  march  for 
miles.  Scouts  confirmed  the  rumors.  Porter's  force  con- 
sisted of  Morell's  division — Griffin's,  Martindale's,  and  But- 
terfield's  brigades ;  McCall's  division — Eeynolds',  Seymour's, 
and  Meade's ;  Sykes'  division — Buchanan's,  Lovell's,  and  War- 
ren's, in  all  17,330  infantry  for  duty.  There  were  present  with 
him  2,534  artillery,  of  which,  from  the  very  nature  of  the 
ground,  but  a  very  small  portion  could  be  used.  Six  hun- 
dred and  seventy-one  of  the  regular  cavalry  under  General 
Emory  were  put  in  position  covering  the  bridges  across 
the  Chickahominy  and  the  communications  with  the  rest  of 
the  army  on  the  right  bank.  The  line  occupied  by  Porter 
under  orders  of  the  General-in-Chief,  lay  to  the  east  of 
Powhite  Creek,  and  was  well  chosen  for  defence,  but  the 
extent  of  ground  to  be  held  was  greater  than  the  disposable 
force  at  hand.  Further,  the  men  of  McCall's  and  a  part  of 
those  of  Morell's  divisions  had  been  engaged  with  the  army 
for  hours  on  the  previous  day,  and  were  wearied  with  the 
battle  and  retreat  from  Mechanicsville.  The  new  line  of 
Porter's  troops  extended  from  the  extreme  right,  covering 
the  roads  leading  from  Old  and  New  Cold  Harbor  to  De- 
spatch Station  with  the  McGee  house  in  the  rear  of  the  right, 
the  troops  here  being  the  division  under  General  Sykes. 
General  Cooke  with  parts  of  the  First  and  Fifth  Eegular 
Cavalry  and  Eush's  Pennsylvania  Lancers  watched  our  left.* 


*  During  the  night  of  the  '26th,  Sykes'  division  and  Butterfield's  brigade  of  Mo- 
rell's division  retired  to  what  became  the  battle-field  of  Gaines'  Mill.  Butterfield 

6* 


130 


THE  PENINSULA. 


In  front  of  Morell's  right  was  a  small  stream  flowing  south- 
erly toward  the  Chickahominy — between  oteep  banks — some 
two  hundred  yards  west  of  the  Watt  house,  its  borders 
fringed  by  a  growth  of  heavy  timber  which  disappears  as  it 
nears  the  low  land  about  the  river.  From  the  stream  the 
land  rises  for  about  three-quarters  of  a  mile  to  the  Adams 
house,  whence  it  falls  off  sharply  to  the  river ;  toward  the 
west  it  was  open  and  rolling  to  the  Gaines  house.  On  the 
left  front  of  Morell's  position  was  Boatswain's  Swamp.  The 
approaches  were  covered  by  dense  woods,  which  furnished 
cover  for  the  enemy's  advance.  In  anticipation  of  a  retreat 
many  of  the  wagons  had  already  been  sent  to  the  rear  and 
some  stores  destroyed.     The  position  occupied  by  Sykes' 

was  posted  on  the  extreme  left  near  the  Watt  house  ;  Sykes'  division  on  the  ex- 
treme right,  leaving  an  interval  to  be  filled  by  the  two  brigades  returning  with 
Morell  from  Mechanicsville,  which  they  occupied.  Martinis  Battery  "  C,"  Massa- 
chusetts Artillery,  was  posted  between  Morell  and  Sykes ;  a  section  of  Weedon's 
Rhode  Island  Battery,  under  Lieutenant  Buckley,  occupied  an  opening  through 
the  timber  in  Martindale's  brigade,  and  a  section  of  Allen's  Massachusetts  in  a 
like  position  in  General  Butterfield's.  The  rest  of  the  artillery  from  the  nature 
of  the  ground  could  not  be  brought  into  aclion.  Kingsbury's  regular  battery  was 
on  the  high  ground  some  distance  in  rear  of  Morell's  left,  to  command  the  low 
ground  toward  the  valley  of  the  Chickahorainy.  Sykes'  batteries  were  those  of 
Tidball  and  Weed. 

On  the  morning  of  the  25th,  General  Porter  ordered  General  Morell  to  detail 
two  regiments  of  not  less  than  500  men  each,  to  serve  under  General  Stoneman 
with  the  cavalry.  He  detailed  the  Eighteenth  Massachusetts,  Colonel  Barnes, 
and  Seventeenth  New  York,  Colonel  Lansing,  who  reported  to  Stoneman  imme- 
diately, marched  with  him  to  the  White  House— were  transported  by  water  to  the 
James  River  and  rejoined  Morrell  at  Westover,  and  thus  were  not  engaged  in 
the  six  days'  battles.    Porter  thus  had  less  than  18,000  infantry  at  Gaines'  Mill. 

General  McClellan  and  some  of  his  staff  remained  with  General  Porter  at  his 
headquarters,  just  in  rear  of  the  troops  engaged  at  Beaver  Dam,  until  after  mid- 
night of  the  26th  ;  all  the  plans  for  the  27th  were  then  and  there  arranged,  and 
the  position  to  be  held  behind  Boatswain  Swamp  Run  was  then  selected,  but  Mc- 
Clellan did  not  give  the  positive  order  until  after  he  had  returned  to  his  own 
headquarters,  where  he  hoped  to  hear  something  further  of  Jackson's  force. 
The  General  was  also  at  this  time  considering  the  proposition  made  by  General 
Porter  to  hold  his  own  at  the  Beaver  Dam  line,  slightly  reinforced,  while  General 
McClellan  moved  the  main  body  of  the  army  upon  Richmond.  Thus  the  final 
order  did  not  reach  Porter  until  three  or  four  o'clock  in  the  morning. 


WITHDRAWAL  TO  THE  JAMES. 


131 


division  was  known  to  the  enemy  as  Turkey  Hill,  the 
crest  of  which  is  some  sixty  feet  higher  than  the  plain,  over 
which  the  troops  of  Longstreet  were  obliged  to  advance  for 
about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  in  face  of  a  fire  of  sharpshooters. 


Battle-field  of  Gaines'  Mill. 


The  infantry  line  was  formed  on  the  slope  of  the  hill,  behind 
a  line  of  light  barricades,  formed  in  some  parts  of  felled 
trees,  and  in  others  of  rails,  kna^^sacks,  and  such  material  as 
lay  at  hand. 

About  two  o'clock  the  enemy's  pressure  was  felt.  Jack- 


132 


THE  PENINSULA. 


son's  march  was  more  circuitous  than  that  of  Hill  and  Long- 
street.  The  latter  had  crossed  the  Cliickahominy  the  pre- 
vious night,  after  the  battle  at  Mechanicsville.  A.  P.  Hill, 
who  was  in  the  advance,  came  upon  the  Union  line  near 
Gaines'  Mills.  Gregg's  division  in  advance,  came  up  with 
the  Union  line  and  was  eager  to  attack  at  once,  but  was 
wisely  restrained.  Branch  came  next  and  was  put  in  on 
the  right  of  Gregg;  Anderson,  Field,  and  Archer  in  the 
order  named  on  Branch's  right,  with  Crenshaw's  and  John- 
son's guns  in  battery  on  the  left  of  the  road  in  Gregg's 
rear. 

At  half  past  two  o'clock  p.m.,  having  communicated  with 
General  Longstreet,  A.  P.  Hill  sent  in  his  division  to  the  at- 
tack, and  w^as  soon  of  the  opinion  that  he  had  the  whole 
Army  of  the  Potomac  in  his  front ;  at  least  he  formed  that 
opinion,  and  expressed  it  in  his  report,  from  the  incessant 
roar  of  musketry  and  the  continued  artillery  fire  which  his 
attack  provoked.  The  men  who  held  that  line  were  Sykes' 
and  Morell's  divisions.  For  two  long  hours  the  struggle 
lasted  and  then  at  length  aid  came  from  Longstreet  and 
Jackson.  The  latter,  who  had  been  detained  on  his  march 
by  broken  bridges  and  skirmishers,  now  came  on  the  ground 
and  at  once  put  his  entire  force  into  action.  Longstreet, 
who  with  his  division  drawn  up  in  lines,  massed  behind  a 
crest  of  a  hill,  had  been  held  in  reserve,  was  now  ordered 
to  Hill's  support.  Pickett's  brigade  developed  the  Union 
position,  and  Longstreet  with  a  soldier's  instinct  saw  that  a 
mere  feint  v\rould  not  relieve  A.  P.  Hill,  and  gave  orders  for 
a  general  advance,  Anderson's  and  Pickett's  brigades  join- 
ing in  the  direct  assault  with  the  exception  of  a  portion 
guarding  the  right  flank  of  the  brigades  under  Wilcox. 
Whiting's  division  coming  on  the  field  at  this  moment,  made 
the  rebel  line  complete,  and  it  was  hurled  with  fury  against 


WITHDRAWAL  TO  THE  JAMES. 


133 


Porter's  small  but  compact  and  determined  line.  In  the 
general  charge  now  made  a  Union  battery  which  enfiladed  the 
line  of  D.  H.  Hill's  advance  was  taken  and  held  for  a  short 
time,  when  it  was  recovered.  General  Ewell  pushed  forward 
on  the  road  from  Gaines'  Mill  to  McGee's  honse,  but  found 
so  stubborn  a  resistance  that  after  four  hours  of  effort  he  relin- 
quished the  task  of  proceeding  farther,  and  withdrew  about 
dusk.  Some  of  Winder's  brigade  essayed  a  like  advance,  but, 
not  successful  in  so  great  measure  as  they  desired,  were  pre- 
vented by  night  from  proceeding  more  than  a  few  yards  be- 
yond McGee's  house. 

Later  in  the  afternoon,  Slocum's  division  of  Franklin's 
corps  crossed  the  river,  and  came  to  the  rescue  of  Porter's 
hard  pressed  men,  and  for  a  time  the  tide  of  battle  was  more 
decidedly  in  the  Union  favor.  So  far  no  impression  had  been 
made  on  the  stubborn  line.  Hard  pushed  as  our  men  had 
been  since  noon,  there  had  not  been  a  sign  of  wavering  at 
any  point.  If  victory  were  not  in  their  grasp,  it  seemed  at 
least  that  night  would  put  an  end  to  the  conflict,  and  leave 
them  in  possession  of  the  hill.  They  answered  the  yell  of 
the  advancing  rebels  as  they  swarmed  out  of  the  woods  and 
across  the  ravine  and  over  the  open,  with  defiant  cheers. 
On  they  came.  Whiting's  division  hot  and  eager ;  Hood's 
and  McLaws'  Texan  brigades  rushed  on,  x^i^shing  their 
way  through  hordes  of  their  own  disordered  and  retreating 
regiments,  which  had  faltered  at  the  line  of  fire,  which  had 
so  far  marked  the  1  nit  of  their  progress.  Would  they  pass  it, 
or  recoil  as  had  all  the  others  who  had  penetrated  so  far? 
As  Whiting's  brigade  made  its  last  rush  up  the  slope,  at  about 
7  P.M.,  the  enemy  came  on  in  deployed  lines  and  columns  by 
battalions  closed  in  mass,  one  battalion  immediately  behind 
the  other.    Each  line  fired  as  they  came  down  the  hill,  as 


134  THE  PENINSULA. 

soon  as  it  was  unmasked  bj  tlie  line  in  front.  They  stinick 
us  in  that  manner. 

The  line  was  broken  after  sundown  in  or  near  the  centre 
of  Morell's  division,  and  one  or  two  brigades  of  the  Pennsyl- 
vania reserves  and  some  New  J ersey  regiments  of  Slocum'o 
division  ;  and  at  the  point  General  Porter  considered  strong 
est,  two  regiments,  presumably  taken  in  the  rear,  were  cap- 
tured. The  regulars  and  zouaves  did  not  break,  but  brought 
up  the  rear  in  excellent  order,  quietly  moving  off  the  field.- 
They  had  resisted  Jackson's  onslaught.  A  desperate  charge 
was  made  by  five  companies  of  the  Fifth  U.  S.  Cavalry, 
which  only  served  to  add  to  the  confusion.  The  beaten 
Union  troops  fell  back  slowly  and  in  good  order.  Jackson 
reports  that  there  was  apprehension  of  a  rally,  and  Whiting 
sent  back  to  Longstreet  for  reinforcements.  French  and 
Meagher,  of  Eichardson's  division,  arrived  on  the  field  near 
dark.  Their  steady  front  restored  the  broken  Union  line, 
which  fell  back  under  the  fire  of  its  own  guns,  supported  by 
the  heavy  battery  south  of  the  river,  to  the  bridges,  which 
they  crossed  that  night. 

Two  regiments— one  the  Second  New  Jersey,  of  Slocum's, 
and  the  Eleventh  Pennsylvania,  of  McCall's,  were  captured ; 
having  continued  on  the  field  after  their  comrades  on  either 
flank  had  retired,  they  found  themselves  surrounded,  and 
were  obliged  to  surrender.  The  loss  in  guns  was  heavy ;  the 
horses,  in  many  instances,  having  been  killed,  and  the  in- 
fantry supports  having  broken,  many  were  necessarily  aban- 
doned to  the  enemy ;  others  were  captured  by  Whitney's 
charge,  the  gunners  standing  to  their  pieces  to  the  last,  and 
falling  among  them.  The  total  loss  in  artillery  was  22  pieces. 

The  precise  number  of  the  attacking  force  cannot  be 
ascertained.    General  Magruder  says  he  was  on  the  south 


WITHDRAWAL  TO  THE  JAMES. 


135 


bank  of  the  Chickahominy  with  25,000  men  on  the  27th.  If 
the  number  of  Lee's  army,  as  given  by  Taylor — 80,762 — be 
assumed  as  correct,  Jackson  had  for  the  attack  55,000 
men,  a  number  more  than  sufficient  to  equalize  Porter's  ad- 
vantage of  position.  Jackson  claims  the  capture  of  14  pieces 
of  artillery,  and  admits  a  loss  of  1,000  men  in  Whiting's  suc- 
cessful charge,  and  gives  an  estimate  of  loss — which  he  ad- 
mits is  based  on  incomplete  returns — at  3,284.  The  total 
loss  in  Porter's  corps,  as  reported  by  the  division  command- 
ers, was  6,000  men.  While  the  battle  of  Gaines'  Mill  was  in 
progress,  the  enemy's  force — 25,000  strong — under  Magru- 
der,  by  a  succession  of  feints,  advanced  along  different  por- 
tions of  the  Union  line  south  of  the  Chickahominy.  Furi- 
ous outbursts  of  artillery  fire,  and  a  resort  to  every  device 
known  which  could  lead  to  the  belief  that  an  attack  in 
force  was  imminent,  so  engaged  the  Union  generals  that, 
when  they  were  appealed  to  for  reinforcements  for  Porter, 
General  Franklin  answered,  do  not  think  it  prudent  to 
send  any  more  troops  from  here  at  present."  Sumner  sent 
French  and  Meagher,  but,  in  announcing  the  fact,  adds. 
Everything  is  so  uncertain,  that  I  think  it  would  be  hazard- 
ous to  do  it." 

Magruder  was  repeating  the  tactics  of  Yorktown,  and  was 
in  momentary  apprehension  that  the  small  force  would  be 
swept  away  by  the  advance  of  McOlellan's  left,  and  that  the 
city  would  fall  in  i  his  hands.  Magruder  says  :  "I  received 
instructions  enjoining  the  utmost  vigilance.  I  passed  the 
night  without  sleep.  Had  McClellan  massed  his  whole 
force  in  column  and  advanced  it  against  any  j)oint  in  our 
line  of  battle — as  was  done  at  Austerlitz,  under  similar  cir- 
cumstances, by  the  greatest  captain  of  any  age — though  the 
head  of  his  column  would  have  suffered  greatly,  its  momen- 
tum would  have  insured  him  success,  and  the  occupation  of 


136 


THE  PENINSULA. 


our  works  about  Eichmond,  and,  conseqiientlv,  of  the  city, 
might  liavG  been  liis  reward." 

General  McClellan  had  fought  an  army  with  one  corps ; 
yet  so  stubborn  had  been  the  resistance  of  that  corps  that 
Lee  and  Jackson  both  believed,  and  so  rejDorted  to  Eich- 
mond, that  they  had  encountered  the  bulk  of  McClellan's 
force.  In  addition  Jackson  says  (p.  41,  Confederate  Eeports, 
Yol.  iv.) :  "Although  swept  from  theii'  defences  by  this  rapid 
and  almost  matchless  display  of  daring  and  valor,  the  well- 
disciplined  Federals  continued  in  retreat  to  fight  with  stub- 
born resistance;"  and  General  ^\~hiting  (pagj  47)  adds: 
"The  enemy  continued  to  fight  in  retreat  with  stubborn 
resistance,  and  it  soon  appeared  that  we  had  to  do  with  his 
best  troox^s." 

Lee  and  Jackson  were  convinced  that  McClellan  would 
endeavor  to  hold  his  line  of  supi:)ly  by  the  AYhite  House, 
and  that  if  he  fell  back  it  would  be  by  way  of  the  Peninsula, 
as  he  had  advanced,  and  acting  under  this  belief,  General 
Ewell,  x^receded  by  a  cavalry  force,  advanced  down  the 
north  side  of  the  Chickahominy  to  Despatch  Station  and 
destroyed  a  portion  of  the  railroad  track  on  the  28th,  and 
on  the  29th  moved  to  Bottom's  Bridge,  when  he  was  recalled 
to  join  in  the  oi^erations  above.  In  the  interval  the  move- 
ment on  the  James,  determined  on  after  the  battle  of  Me- 
chanicsville  and  when  the  close  x^roximity  of  Jackson  on  our 
right  flank  was  known,  had  been  x^ut  into  execution.  Casey's 
troops  at  "W^hite  House  had  been  ordered  down  the  Pamun- 
key,  via  the  York  and  James,  to  the  new  base  on  the  latter 
river.  All  the  material  that  could  not  be  put  on  board  the 
transports  was  burned ;  the  engines  and  cars,  some  of  the 
latter  loaded  with  supplies,  were  put  under  a  full  head  of 
steam  and  were  run  into  the  liver.  The  wagons,  to  the  num- 
ber of  five  thousand,  loaded  with  everything  that  could  be 


WITHDRAVfAL  TO  THE  JAMES. 


137 


carried,  were  set  on  their  way  across  White  Oak  Swamx:> : 
the  reserve  artillery  took  the  same  road.  Twenty-five  hun- 
dred head  of  cattle  on  the  hoof  were  added  to  this  long  col- 
umn. There  were  few  stragglers  on  that  march.  What 
could  not  be  carried  away  was  destroyed.  Lines  of  fire 
marked  the  camps  and  depots  of  the  Union  troops.  Mil- 
lions of  rations,  hundreds  of  tons  of  fixed  ammunition  and 
shells  for  the  siege  guns  were  thus  lost.  Lee's  uncertainty 
as  to  the  movements  of  McClellan,  gave  the  latter  twenty- 
four  hours  to  perfect  and  carry  out  his  arrangem_ents,  and 
when  Lee  saw  the  intentions  of  the  Union  General,  the  re- 
treat was  well  advanced,  and  the  roads  across  the  swamps 
guarded  to  protect  the  passage  of  the  trains  from  attack  by 
way  of  the  New  Market  and  Charles  City  and  Williamsburg 
roads.  On  the  29th,  headquarters  were  moved  from  Savage's 
Station  across  White  Oak  Swamp,  and  on  the  same  day  at 
daylight,  Sumner  abandoned  the  works  at  Fair  Oaks  and 
fell  back  to  Orchard  Station,  where  the  mass  of  stores  ac- 
cumulated for  the  army  was  destroyed. 

BATTLE  OF  ALLEN'S  FAEM. 

Sumner's  and  Heintzelman's  corps  bivouacked  on  the  morn- 
ing of  June  29th  at  the  Allen  farm,  their  forces  being  dis- 
posed fronting  Eichmond,  across  the  railroad.  Bichard- 
son,  Sedgwick,  and  Heintzelman  from  right  to  left  in  the 
order  namedv  General  French  of  Richardson's  division 
held  the  first  line,  Caldwell  in  his  rear ;  a  log  house  in  front 
of  Eichardson  was  occupied  by  Colonel  Brooks  of  the  Thir- 
ty-seventh Pennsylvania,  and  immediately  in  the  rear,  on  a 
rising  piece  of  ground,  four  pieces  of  Hazzard's  battery  were 
posted. 

Pettit's  battery  of  this  division  had  been  sent  in  advance 
to  Savage's  Station  with  their  own  and  Hazzard's  caissons. 


138 


THE  PENINSULA. 


These  were  soon  brought  back,  before  Hazzard's  limbers 
were  empty,  and  aided  materially  in  repelling  the  enemy's 
attack,  which  was  made  with  infantry  and  a  battery  of  artil- 
leiy,  their  principal  efforts  being  directed  against  the  posi- 
tion held  by  Colonel  Brooks,  who,  reinforced  by  the  Seventy- 
first  New  York  of  Sedgwick's  division,  held  his  own.  This 
attack  was  made  by  Griffiths'  brigade  of  Magrnder's  division 
and  Jones'  division,  marching  from  Golding's  across  the 
swamp.  Skirmishers  were  thrown  out  in  front  of  the  rebel 
divisions,  and  Jones'  men  reported  the  enemy  in  his  front 
and  fortified.  Magrnder  gave  orders  to  remove  an  obstruc- 
tion on  the  railroad  so  as  to  permit  the  passage  of  a  heavy 
rifled  gnn,  mounted  on  a  railway  carriage.  Magruder  found 
his  reception  a  warm  one,  and  went  in  person  to  bring 
up  reinforcements.  But  Generals  Jackson  and  Huger  had 
been  ordered  elsewhere  by  General  Lee.  Magruder  states 
that  he  was  suddenly  reduced  from  an  expected  force  of 
thirty-five  thousand  to  thirteen  thousand  men,  and  was  thus 
deprived  of  the  force  upon  which  he  had  relied  to  capture 

a  large  portion  of  the  enemy."  His  command  was  three 
times  repulsed. 

As  soon  as  the  attack  of  Magruder  ceased,  Sumner  fell 
back  on  Savage's  Station.  Lee  had  at  this  time  divined 
McClellan's  retreat,  and  was  i)i'essing  forward  in  pursuit. 
His  plan  was  as  follows  :  Longstreet's  division  was  to  cross 
the  New  Bridge  and  take  position  on  the  extreme  right  so 
as  to  intercept  McClellan  in  his  attempt  to  reach  James 
River,  Huger' s  division  to  march  down  the  Williamsburg 
road  on  Magruder's  right  flank,  and  Jackson's  division  to 
cross  the  Chickahominy  at  Grape  Vine  Bridge,  and  oper- 
ate down  that  river  on  its  right  bank,  while  Magruder 
pressed  in  front.  When  McClellan's  army  fell  back,  it  de- 
stroyed all  the  bridges  over  the  Chickahominy,  and  thus 


WITHDRAWAL  TO  THE  JAMES. 


139 


retarded  Jackson's  advance,  and  detained  him  during  the 
28th  and  29th  in  building  the  Grape  Vine  Bridge.  Mean- 
time the  Union  troops  were  urging  their  retreat  across  the 
White  Oak  Swamp,  a  region  which  had  become  familiar 
through  reconnoissances  made  under  direction  of  General 
Casey. 

BATTLE  OF  SAVAGE's  STATION. 

On  the  29th  Franklin's  corps,  whicii  had  been  obliged  to 
abandon  its  camp  at  Golding's  farm  on  account  of  the  heavy 
artillery  fire  kept  up  by  the  enemy  from  the  positions  which 
they  had  secured  after  the  battle  on  the  27th,  had  moved  by 
orders  of  the  General-in-Chief  to  a  position  in  the  vicinity 
of  the  railroad  at  Savage's  Station,  Slocum's  division  at 
the  station  in  reserve.  Smith  to  a  point  between  the  river 
and  the  station,  joining  on  the  right  with  McCall's  division, 
and  on  the  left  with  Sumner's  corps.  Slocum  was  ordered 
by  General  McClellan  to  cross  "White  Oak  Swamp.  When 
General  Smith  arrived  on  the  ground  about  seven  a.m., 
neither  Sumner  nor  McCall  could  be  found. 

Learning  from  the  report  of  a  staff  officer  that  General 
Sumner  was  in  front  and  that  there  was  a  break  of  a  mile 
between  his  right  and  Franklin's  left ;  that  General  Sumner 
was  warmly  engaged,  and  that  the  enemy  was  crossing  in 
force  by  a  bridge  nearly  in  his  own  front,  and  that  both  his 
flanks  were  unsupported.  Franklin  directed  General  Smith 
to  fall  back  to  Savage's  Station,  and  sent  word  to  General 
Sumner  and  requested  him  to  fall  back  to  the  same  place, 
which  Sumner  immediately  did,  having  kept  back  Magru- 
der's  advance  so  that  his  movement  was  undisturbed. 

Line  of  battle  was  formed.  Franklin  on  the  right,  with 
Hancock  of  Smith's  division  thrown  on  the  right  into  the 
woods  to  hold  the  railroad ;  Second  Brigade,  Brooks,  in  the 


140 


THE  PENINSULA. 


woods  on  the  left ;  Third,  Colonel  Taylor  (General  Davidson 
of  this  brigade  being  disabled  by  sunstroke),  in  reserve. 
Smith  was  supported  by  Osborn's  First  New  York  Artillery, 
which  did  good  service.  Sumner's  corps  joined  on  Frank- 
lin's left,  Eichardson  on  the  right,  Sedgwick  on  the  left. 
Heintzelman  had  withdrawn  his  corps,  15,000  strong,  much 
to  the  astonishment  of  Sumner,  who  had  ordered  him  to 
take  position  on  his  own  left.  His  reason  for  so  doing  is 
that  he  saw  that  the  open  space  about  Savage's  Station  was 
so  crowded  with  troops  that  there  was  no  room  for  more  to 
be  usefully  employed,  and  that  as  there  was  but  one  road 
through  the  swamp  direct  from  Savage's,  he  judged  it  wise 
to  retire  by  that,  after  destroying  the  cars  and  supplies  col- 
lected at  Savage's  Station.  The  force  of  the  enemy  which 
attacked  at  this  point  was  that  of  Magruder,  which  had  been 
in  Sumner's  front  in  the  morning,  and  the  same  rifled  gun 
on  car-wheels  figures  in  this  battle.  The  rebels  advanced 
under  cover  of  the  woods,  and  were  several  times  held  in 
check  by  the  vigorous  artillery  fire  from  our  side.  General 
Sumner  in  his  report  states,  The  assault  was  met  by  Burns' 
brigade  in  the  most  gallant  manner."  Hazzard's,  Kirby's, 
Tompkins',  Petit's,  Osborn's,  and  Bramhall's  batteries  were 
all  engaged.  A  short  time  before  sunset  the  enemy  made  an 
advance  along  our  whole  line,  coming  up  with  a  rush  in  the 
face  of  the  heavy  fire  which  was  poured  into  them.  The  roar  of 
musketry  now  became  steady  and  continuous,  and  was  main- 
tained for  about  half  an  hour,  when  our  troops  made  several 
charges  and  pressed  them  so  hard  that  their  line  at  length 
gave  way  and  left  the  road  to  the  swamp  open.  Our  men,  as 
soon  as  their  officers  had  restored  order  and  the  wounded 
had  been  properly  cared  for,  moved  out  on  the  retreat.  The 
rebels  admit  a  loss  of  4,000,  and  give  that  of  the  Union 
troops  as  3,000. 


WITHDRAWAL  TO  THE  JAMES. 


141 


At  this  point  was  situated  the  great  hospital,  containing 
2,500  sick  and  wounded,  with  vast  supplies  of  hospital  stores, 
which  was  abandoned,  and,  with  the  medical  men,  surgeons, 
and  attendants,  wdio  remained  behind,  to  the  number  of  500, 
fell  into  the  hands  of  Jackson,  who  arrived  the  next  morning, 
having  repaired  the  bridges  across  the  Chickahominy  the 
previous  night,  and  who  now  pressed  forward  in  pursuit  of 
the  retiring  Union  men.  General  Magruder  passed  by 
way  of  the  Darbytown  road  and  is  next  heard  of  at  Malvern 
Hill. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  29th  the  Commander-in-Chief  or- 
dered Keyes'  to  move  during  the  night  to  the  James  River,  to 
occupy  a  defensive  jDOsition  near  Malvern  Hill,  communicate 
with  the  gunboats,  and  cover  Turkey  Bridge,  Porter  to 
follow  and  form  on  his  right.  Keyes  fortunately  discovered 
an  abandoned  road  running  parallel  with  the  Quaker  road, 
which  he  easily  opened,  and  which  furnished  another  way  for 
the  trains  to  pass  under  cover  of  the  whole  line  of  the 
army. 

The  General-in-Chief  had  passed  the  day  in  examining 
the  ground,  keeping  the  trains  in  motion,  and  ]3osting 
troops  in  such  position  as  to  cover  their  passage  from  attacks 
by  way  of  the  New  Market  and  Eichmond  roads.  Early 
in  the  day  there  was  a  sharp  skirmish  with  the  rebel  cavalry 
on  the  Quaker  road.  This  affair  is  called  the  skirmish  near 
Willis  Church,  and  showed  the  danger  to  which  the  retreat 
was  exposed,  as  well  as  the  fact  that  our  line  of  movement 
had  become  known  to  the  enemy.  The  position  of  affairs  was 
critical.  Longstreet  and  Hill  were  almost  in  contact  with 
Sumner  and  Franklin  by  way  of  the  Williamsburg  road.  Ma- 
gruder and  Huger  were  coming  in  on  the  flank  on  the  New 
Market  road,  and  Jackson  was  pressing  hard  on  the  rear  by 
way  of  the  Chickahominy  and  the  White  Oak  Swamp.  For- 


142 


THE  PENINSULA. 


tunately  for  the  success  of  the  retreat,  Stuart's  cavalry,  owing 
to  Lee's  misapprehension  of  McClellan's  movements  after 
the  battle  of  Gaines'  Mill,  was  all  on  the  north  side  of  the 
Chickahominy,  pressing  Stoneman's  cavalry  toward  "White 
House,  and  thus  the  march  along  the  narrow  blockaded  roads 
of  the  swamp  was  not  impeded.  Heintzelman  had  crossed  at 
Brackett's  Ford  on  the  evening  of  the  29th,  and  occupied  the 
position  on  the  southerly  part  of  the  great  clearing  called 
there  Glendale,  lately  vacated  by  Porter's  corps,  which  had 
followed  Keyes  toward  the  James.  The  cleared  tract  near 
White  Oak  Bridge  was  held  by  Franklin. 

On  the  morning  of  June  30th,  by  order  of  the  General-in- 
Chief,  Franklin  posted  Slocum's  division  on  the  right  of  the 
Charles  City  cross-roads.  The  divisions  of  Smith  and  Eich- 
ardson,  together  with  that  of  Naglee,  who  had  been  put 
under  General  Franklin's  orders,  were  stationed  in  the  woods 
in  a  position  to  command  the  White  Oak  Swamp  bridge. 
The  artillery  of  the  Second  Division,  commanded  by  Captain 
E.  B.  Ayres,  Fifth  Artillery,  composed  of  his  own,  Mott's, 
and  Wheeler's  batteries — the  latter  so  reduced  that  he  had 
but  two  guns  available  for  service — was  placed  in  position  to 
cover  the  crossing.  About  noon  the  enemy  opened  so  heavy 
a  fire  upon  this  position,  that  the  artillery  was  compelled  to 
withdraw,  abandoning  one  gun  of  Mott's  battery — which  was 
left  on  the  field — in  direct  disobedience  of  Ayres'  orders.  It 
was  from  this  direction  that  Jackson  was  approaching,  and  the 
furious  fire  of  artillery  opened  on  Franklin  was  from  a  battery 
of  28  guns,  posted  under  cover  on  the  north  side  of  the 
swamp,  which  compelled  the  Union  batteries  to  retire.  A  cav- 
alry force  took  advantage  of  this  to  cross  the  creek,  but  was 
soon  driven  back.  Wooding's  battery,  of  Jackson's  corps,  was 
unable  to  keep  its  position  in  face  of  the  fire  of  the  Union 
sharpshooters;  and  Jackson,  finding  that  the  crossing  was 


WITHDRAWAL  TO  THE  JAMES. 


143 


controlled  by  our  fire,  bivouacked  that  night  in  hearing  of 
the  heavy  firing  at  Glendale,  which  told  him  that  Long- 
street's  men  were  engaged ;  but  the  character  of  the  soil, 
the  destruction  of  the  bridge  over  the  marsh  and  creek,  and 
the  strong  position  of  our  troops  prevented  his  advance 
until  the  following  morning.  After  our  troops  retired,  the 
bridge  was  rebuilt,  and  Jackson  pressed  on  in  pursuit.^' 

BATTLE  OF  GLENDALE,  OR  NBLSON's  FARM. 

Longstreet  and  A.  P.  Hill,  as  soon  as  they  were  informed 
of  the  direction  of  McClellan's  retreat,  in  pursuance  of  Lee's 
orders  crossed  the  New  Bridge,  and  moved  by  the  Darby- 
town  road  to  the  Long  Bridge  road,  and  came  upon  our 
men  strongly  posted  across  the  Long  Bridge  road,  about  a 
mile  from  its  intersection  with  the  Charles  City  road,  on 
June  30th.  By  order  of  General  McClellan,  McCall's  divi- 
sion halted  on  the  New  Market  road,  near  where  it  turns  off 
to  Quaker  Church,  with  Meade's  brigade  on  the  right,  Sey- 
mour's on  the  lef  fc,  and  Eeynolds'  (captured  at  Gaines'  Mill) 
in  command  of  Colonel  Simmons,  Fifth  Pennsylvania,  in  re- 
serve, Eandol's  regular  battery  on  the  right  and  front.  Kerns' 
and  Cooper's  in  the  centre,  and  Dietrich's  and  Knierim's  bat- 
teries of  the  reserve  artillery  all  in  front  of  the  infantry  line. 
Slocum's  line,  composed  of  Generals  Newton's,  Taylor's,  and 
Bartlett's  brigades,  extended  to  the  right  from  Charles  City 
road.  He  had  with  him  Upton's,  Porter's,  and  Hexamer's 
batteries.  General  Kearney's  division  was  ]posted  so  as  to 
guard  the  space  between  the  Charles  City  and  the  NeWj 
Market  roads,  Robinson  on  the  left  suxjporting  Thompson's 
battery.  General  Birney  on  his  right,  and  General  Berry  in 
reserve.    General  McCall  w^as  on  Kearney's  left  and  front. 

*  Jackson's  Report,  iv.,  p.  42, 


144 


THE  PENINSULA. 


Hooker's  division  of  Heintzelman's  corps  on  the  right  of 
Sumner's  corps,  with  Thompson's  and  Kirby's  batteries, 
were  in  the  rear  of  McCall's  line,  which  was  formed  with  the 
left  refused.  This  irregular  formation  of  the  line  of  battle 
was  in  part  due  to  the  irregularities  of  the  ground  and  the 
thick  woods.  The  line  of  battle  not  being  perfectly  true, 
the  artillery  of  the  several  divisions  was  in  position  in  most 
cases  in  front  of  the  covering  infantry.  The  attack  began 
about  2.30  p.m.,  in  great  force,  and  with  furious  violence, 
and  was  directed  mainly  against  General  McCall,  whose 
division  suffered  so  severely  at  Gaines'  Mills,  and  w^hich 
now  numbered  but  6,000  men. 

The  battle  began  on  his  front  at  2.30  o'clock  p.m.,  and 
soon  after  3  p.m.  his  left  was  threatened  by  a  heavy  column 
of  the  enemy  which  passed  through  the  woods  and  fell 
upon  General  Seymour,  who  was  x^i'omptly  reinforced  by 
Colonel  Simmons,  sent  to  his  aid  by  General  McCall  just  in 
time  to  repel  a  furious  attack  with  infantry  and  artillery  on 
that  flank ;  the  fight  lasted  here  for  about  two  hours,  when 
the  enemy  retired.  The  two  German  batteries,  Diedrich's 
and  Knierim's,  were  driven  to  the  rear.  General  McCall 
sent  them  back  to  their  position,  but  with  little  avail — as 
the  guns  were  soon  after  abandoned  by  the  cannoneers. 

Six  companies  of  the  Twelfth  Pennsylvania  Regiment, 
Colonel  Taggart,  had  been  posted  at  two  log-houses  and 
bi-eastwork  of  logs  two  hundred  yards  in  advance  of  the  ex- 
treme left  of  the  Third  Brigade,  and  the  remaining  four 
companies  of  the  regiment  were  posted  to  cover  two  pieces 
of  artillery  on  a  hill  in  rear  of  the  regiment.  The  enemy 
advanced  in  heavy  columns  from  the  road  in  front  and 
Oldened  with  artillery  on  the  six  companies.  These,  seeing 
themselves  in  danger  of  being  cut  off  by  a  party  advancing 
up  a  ravine  to  their  rear,  broke  and  fled;  the  remainder 


WITHDRAWAL  TO  THE  JAMES. 


145 


supporting  the  two-gun  battery  was  also  driven  back.  The 
regiment  did  not  appear  on  the  field  again  that  day  as  an 
organized  body.  The  fugitives  from  this  part  of  Seymour's 
line  are  those  referred  to  in  Hooker's  report  (p.  490)  as  rush- 
ing down  the  road  and  over  the  fields,  breaking  through  his 
lines  and  firing  on  his  men  as  they  passed.  Colonel  Taggart 
gives  his  loss  in  this  action  as  6  killed,  36  wounded,  and  23 
missing. 

Meantime  a  steady  pressure  had  been  kept  up  along  the 
whole  of  McCall's  line. 

In  the  charges  of  the  enemy  which  were  repulsed  three 
stand  of  colors  were  captured ;  one  by  Private  W.  F.  Galla- 
gher, of  the  Ninth  Eegiment,  who  killed  the  rebel  color- 
bearer  in  a  bayonet  charge.  The  Third  and  Tenth  charged  a 
rebel  battery  and  routed  its  infantry  support,  capturing  100 
prisoners,  but  being  suddenly  assailed  by  a  large  force  of  the 
enemy  were  forced  to  retire,  bringing  their  prisoners  with 
them.  The  six  companies  of  the  Twelfth  Eegiment  which 
had  been  sent  to  the  support  of  General  Seymour,  and  de- 
tached from  the  line  by  this  countercharge  of  the  rebels, 
were  cut  off,  and  at  the  same  moment  the  section  of  a 

Dutch"  battery  belonging  to  Porter  was  abandoned  by  the 
artillerymen,  who  cut  loose  their  horses  and  broke  through 
the  cavalry  and  the  infantry,  bringing  the  prisoners  to  the 
rear.  This  separation  of  the  Twelfth  Eegiment  General 
McCall  considers  the  one  injudicious  or  unfortunate  move- 
ment on  his  part  of  the  line  during  the  day. 

Soon  after  this  a  charge  was  made  on  Eandol's  battery  of 
a  peculiar  and  most  determined  character.  A  brigade  of 
rebels  in  wedge  shape,  without  order,  trailing  arms,  made  a 
dash  at  the  battery.  Like  charges  by  single  regiments  had 
been  previously  repulsed  by  the  artillery,  and  in  this  instance 
so  confident  was  Captain  Eandol  of  his  ability  to  hold  the 
7 


146  THE  PENINSULA. 

gronnd  that  the  Fourth  Eegiment  was  requested  to  withhold 
its  fire.  The  guns  tore  great  gaps  in  the  advancing  host,  but 
the  gaps  were  closed  up,  the  mass  moved  on  swiftly,  steadily, 
with  wild  yells.  Before  its  momentum  could  be  checked  or 
the  guns  limbered  up  it  was  upon  them,  among  them,  over 
them ;  the  limbered  guns  were  overturned,  the  horses  killed, 
and  the  great  surge  of  rebels  sweeping  onward  drove  all  of 
the  Fourth  Regiment,  except  Company  B,  before  it.  This 
company,  with  men  of  other  commands,  stood  their  ground, 
and  presented  a  brave  front.  General  McCall  rode  in- 
among  the  men,  endeavoring  to  rally  them,  with  partial  suc- 
cess. A  fierce  bayonet  fight  under  his  own  eye  followed — it 
was  a  melee  in  which  point  or  butt  was  used ;  the  gallant 
company  was  carried  to  the  rear  surrounded  by  the  yelling 
rebels,  who  were  so  intent  on  pursuing  those  in  front  that 
they  walked  through  a  gap  in  a  fence  which  they  passed, 
and  escaped  capture.  McCall's  right  was  now  broken,  and 
his  entire  line  borne  to  the  rear,  with  the  loss  of  some  guns. 
Falling  back  with  two  men  of  his  cavalry  escort,  General 
McCall  about  two  hundred  yards  in  rear  of  his  own  line 
came  upon  two  regiments  of  Berry's  brigade,  Kearney's  di- 
vision. Shortly  after,  General  Kearney  came  up  and  formed 
two  lines  in  the  wood  on  the  right  of  the  road,  saying  as 
he  did  so,  If  you  (General  McCall)  can  bring  on  another 
line  in  a  few  minutes  I  think  we  can  stop  them,"  and  in  the 
gathering  darkness  General  McCall  rode  forward  for  this 
purpose,  but  fell  into  the  lines  of  the  Forty-seventh  Virginia, 
by  whom  he  was  taken  prisoner.  General  Kearney  took 
measures  at  once  to  fill  up  the  break  in  the  line  caused 
by  the  defeat  of  McCall.  He  posted  the  First  New  Jersey 
Brigade  in  that  place  and  moved  forward  to  where  General 
Caldwell  was  putting  two  regiments  into  line  on  the  right  of 
the  road,  a  quarter  of  a  mile  in  the  rear  of  breastworks  then 


WITHDRA.WAL  TO  THE  JAMES. 


147 


unoccupied,  toward  which  the  rebel  skirmishers  were  dis- 
trustfully approaching.  Kearney  led  a  regiment  to  take  pos- 
session of  this  work,  and  these  misapprehending  orders,  fired 
at  the  rebels  and  at  a  part  of  Kearney's  line  ;  thus,  while  the 
rebels  were  driven  off,  for  a  time  our  own  men  were  firing 
into  each  other,  and  in  this  fire  General  Kearney  supposed, 
and  so  reported.  General  McCall  as  killed. 

This  attack  at  4  p.m.  struck  Kearney  also,  and  he  states  in  * 
his  report  that  he  was  astonished  at  the  vigor  and  deter- 
mination of  the  assault  in  mass  on  his  line.  The  slightly 
sloping  ground  in  his  front  was  swept  by  the  fire  of  Thomp- 
son's battery,  with  such  execution  upon  the  advancing  host 
that  they  were  mowed  down  by  ranks.  The  survivors  halted 
for  a  moment,  the  gaps  were  filled,  and  the  wave  swept  on, 
across  the  open  -ground  in  Kearney's  front,  advancing  at  a  run 
over  the  two  hundred  paces  which  separated  the  hostile 
forces.  Notwithstanding  the  loss  caused  in  their  heavy 
masses  by  this  terrible  fire,  they  still  pressed  on  with  a  for- 
titude and  persistency  that,  as  Kearney  says,  put  artillery  out 
of  the  "  calculation."  Then  the  Sixty-third  Pennsylvania, 
Colonel  Hayes,  and  half  the  Thirty-seventh  New  York  Vol- 
unteers moved  up  to  the  line  of  the  guns  and  charged  the 
enemy  and  opened  on  them  such  rapid  and  well-sustained 
volleys  that  what  grape  and  canister  had  failed  to  accom- 
plish, musketry  effected.  The  artillery  recommenced  its 
fire  ;  three  times  during  the  afternoon  was  this  advance  on 
the  guns  repeated,  and  as  often  was  it  driven  back. 

About  the  time  General  McCall's  division  gave  way.  Gen- 
eral Heintzelman  had  become  assured  that  the  attack  on  the 
Charles  City  road  was  not  the  serious  one,  and  rode  over  to 
General  Sumner's  headquarters  in  front  of  Nelson's  farm- 
house, to  make  preparations  to  meet  the  enemy  who  had 
turned  the  left.    De  Eussy's  battery,  with  several  other  bat- 


148 


THE  PENINSULA. 


teries  which  were  already  put  in  position,  were  firing  over 
the  heads  of  the  retreating  troops.  General  Burns'  brigade 
was  advanced  to  meet  the  enemy  and  it  soon  drove  them 
back.  At  this  time  the  troops  from  White  Oak  Swamp  were 
coming  on  the  field,  and  Heintzelman,  knowing  that  Sumner's 
troops  were  all  engaged,  sent  General  Slocum's  New  Jersey 
brigade,  under  General  Taylor,  with  a  battery  to  General 
Kearney,  who  had  called  for  aid.  These  soon  drove  back  the 
enemy.  Heintzelman  rode  out  on  the  Charles  City  road  far 
enough  to  learn  that  there  was  nothing  to  fear  from  the 
enemy  in  that  quarter.  He  apprehended  that  they  might 
bring  up  fresh  men  against  our  worn-out  ones,  and  learning 
that  General  Franklin's  men  had  already  begun  the  retreat, 
arrangements  were  speedily  made  for  the  whole  force  to  fol- 
low, which  it  did.  Heintzelman  reached  headquarters  at 
1.30  A.M.,  and  soon  after  daylight  his  divisions  were  in  posi- 
tion on  Malvern  Hill. 

General  Sumner  receiving  intelligence  that  General 
Franklin  had  retreated  and  that  General  Heintzelman  was 
about  to  do  so,  at  9  p.m.  fell  back  with  reluctance.  He 
knew  he  had  won  a  victory  and  did  not  wish  to  leave  the 
field.  The  object  of  the  rebels  in  this  attack  on  the  retreat- 
ing column  was  to  cut  it  in  two  at  the  Charles  City  cross- 
roads and  gain  possession  of  the  Quaker  road.  Had  this 
attempt  been  successful,  or  had  they  been  able  to  detain  the 
Union  troops  long  enough  to  enable  Jackson  to  gain  the 
rear  at  White  Oak  Swamp,  the  result  might  have  been 
disastrous.  As  it  was,  they  were  baffled  in  their  attempts 
either  to  break  our  line  or  delay  the  march.  Franklin  kept 
Jackson  at  bay  and  prevented  him  from  crossing  at  White 
Oak  Bridge,  while  Sumner  and  Heintzelman  with  Slocum 
and  McCall  repulsed  the  attacks  of  Longstreet  and  Hill. 
The  only  reverse  suffered  was  that  on  McCall's  line,  where  we 


Field  of  the    Seven  Days' "  Battle. 


IjO 


THE  PENINSULA. 


lost  ten  pieces  of  artillery,  and  some  of  these  were  abandoned 
on  the  field  and  not  secured  by  the  enemy  until  the  next 
day.  The  retreat  was  resumed  at  night,  and  by  morning  of 
the  next  day  all  were  posted  on  the  slopes  of  Malvern  Hill. 
The  rebels  did  not  make  any  extravagant  claims  to  success. 
Longstreet  says  :  "  Owing  to  the  nature  of  the  ground — that 
concert  of  action  so  essential  to  complete  success  could  not 
obtain — particularly  attacking  such  odds  against  us  in  posi- 
tion. The  enemy,  however,  was  driven  back  slowly  and 
steadily,  contesting  the  ground  inch  by  inch.  He  succeeded 
in  getting  some  of  his  batteries  off  the  field  and,  by  holding 
his  last  position  until  dark,  in  withdrawing  his  forces  under 
cover  of  night."  General  A.  P.  Hill  states:  **The  charge 
which  broke  McCall's  line  was  made  by  Field  and  Pender's 
divisions;  the  Sixtieth  and  Fifty -fifth  Virginia  captured  two 
batteries  of  Napoleon  guns,  and  the  Sixtieth  crossed  bayonets 
with  the  enemy,  who  obstinately  contested  their  possession. 
About  dark  the  enemy  pressed  us  so  hard  along  the  whole 
line — that  my  last  reserve  was  directed  to  advance  cautiously  : 
it  seemed  that  a  tremendous  effort  was  being  made  to  turn 
the  fortune  of  the  battle.  The  volume  of  fire  that,  approach- 
ing, rolled  along  the  line,  was  terrific ;  in  five  minutes  all 
firing  ceased." 

Longstreet  reports  his  loss  from  June  27th  to  30th,  aggre- 
gate, 4,429  ;  A.  P.  Hill  from  June  26th  to  30th,  aggregate, 
4,074 ;  D.  Hill,  aggregate,  3,955,  Total,  12,458.  Hill  cap- 
tured 14  guns  and  two  stand  of  colors.  In  all  this  there  is 
nothing  of  the  exultation  of  victory. 

General  George  G.  Meade,  afterward  famous  as  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  the  battle 
of  Gettysburg,  was  badly  wounded  at  this  battle  and  was 
obliged  to  retire  from  the  field. 

On  this  date  also,  the  30th,  still  another  affair  occurred 


WITHDRAWAL  TO  THE  JAMES. 


151 


which  calls  for  a  brief  reference.  While  one  i^art  of  the 
army  was  holding  Jackson  in  check  at  White  Oak  Bridge, 
and  another  saved  our  line  of  retreat  at  Glendale,  a  portion 
of  Hunt's  reserve  artillery,  supported  by  Sykes'  regulars, 
prevented  a  third  body  of  rebels  from  intercepting  our 
march. 

General  Sykes  reached  the  plateau  of  Malvern  Hill  about 
11  o'clock  A.M.  on  the  30th,  where,  by  order  of  General 
Porter,  the  artillery  was  posted  so  as  to  control  the  ap- 
proaches in  front.  Part  of  Colonel  Buchanan's  brigade  was 
on  the  right  in  a  pine  grove,  the  other  two  regiments  in  sup- 
port of  Weed's  regular  battery,  the  Tenth  Infantry,  Major 
Lovell,  to  the  left,  covering  the  regular  batteries  of  Edwards, 
Carlisle,  and  Smead,  and  a  New  York  battery  of  the  reserve. 
Warren's  brigade  on  the  extreme  left  covered  the  river  road 
to  Eichmond,  supported  by  the  Eleventh  Infantry  and  Mar- 
tin's battery  of  Napoleon  guns,  and  a  detachment  of  cavalry 
for  outpost  duty.  Sykes  says,  Nothing  could  be  more 
commanding  than  the  line  I  held."  The  rebel  Generals 
Holmes  and  Wise,  in  the  afternoon  saw  the  troops  mov- 
ing along  the  Quaker  road,  as  they  say  in  their  reiDorts,  in 
great  haste  and  disorder  toward  Malvern  Hill,  and,  feeling- 
strong  with  their  detachment  of  7,000  men  and  6  batteries, 
were  eager  to  attack.  They  pushed  down  the  river  road, 
where  they  met  General  Lee,  and  by  his  advice  put  their 
infantry  into  position  to  support  their  guns,  of  which  they 
had  sent  forward  six  rifled  pieces  to  within  eight  hundred 
yards  of  Malvern  Cliff,  that  being  the  name  given  by  them 
to  this  affair.  Before  they  could  get  their  guns  to  work, 
they  were  astonished  to  find  our  troops  opening  on  them 
from  the  hill  with  twenty-five  or  thirty  pieces,  while  a  gun- 
boat in  the  river  began  dropping  huge  shells  among  the 
infantry  supports.    Their  battery  of  six  rifles  was  destroyed, 


152 


THE  PENINSULA. 


two  caissons  were  blown  up,  and  the  artillerists  and  some 
cavalry  rushed  in  wild  flight  to  the  rear,  riding  over  the 
infantry,  who  wei^e  not  slow  to  follow  the  example  set  them. 
General  Holmes  declared  that  to  attack  an  enemy  so  strongly 
posted  would  be  madness,  in  which  opinion  General  Wise 
concurred,  and  they  retired,  to  take  no  part  even  in  the  bat- 
tle of  the  following  day. 

Thus  the  Union  troops  had  successfully  resisted  three 
separate  attacks  on  flank  and  rear  on  this  eventful  30th  of 
June.  There  was  no  more  critical  day  in  the  campaign ;  and 
that  the  crisis  was  safely  passed  was  due  mainl}^  to  the  cour- 
age and  discipline  of  our  men,  and  the  alertness  and  skill  of 
corps,  division,  and  brigade  commanders,  whose  best  ener- 
gies were  exerted  to  take  the  army  intact  to  the  James. 

It  now  remains  to  notice  the  closing  scenes  of  the  cam- 
paign. 


CHAPTER  Vm. 

BATTLE  OF  MALVERN  HILL. 

It  will  be  remembered  that,  by  orders  of  the  Commander- 
in-Chief,  General  Keyes  had  crossed  White  Oak  Swamp 
with  his  corps,  and  on  the  afternoon  of  the  29th  had  put 
the  trains  in  motion  from  Tnrkey  Bridge  for  the  James 
Eiver.  He  had  become  familiar  with  this  region  through 
scouting  parties  of  the  Eighth  Illinois  and  Eighth  Pennsyl- 
vania Cavalry.  Captain  Kernan,  of  the  latter  regiment,  an 
excellent  officer,  and  as  skilful  as  an  Indian  in  woodcraft, 
who  lost  his  life  in  a  grand  charge  which  stayed  the  rush  of 
Jackson's  men  on  the  Eleventh  Corps  at  Chancellorsville, 
in  1863,  is  mentioned  by  Keyes  as  of  special  aid  to  him  in 
finding  out  the  roads  in  this  unknown  region.  Fitz  John 
Porter's  corps  was  in  support  of  Keyes,  and  both  were 
ordered  to  occupy  a  position  resting  on  the  James,  at  or 
near  Turkey  Bend,  perpendicular  to  the  river  and  covering 
Charles  City  road,  and  to  open  communication  with  the 
gunboats,  while  the  wagon-train  was  pushed  on  to  Hax- 
all's  and  Harrison's  plantations.  Harrison's  Landing  was 
afterward  selected  as  the  base  by  General  McClellan,  after 
consultation  with  Commodore  Kodgers  on  board  the  gun- 
boat Galena,  as  from  that  position  better  protection  could 
be  given  to  the  camps  by  the  fire  of  the  gunboats. 

After  the  close  of  the  several  engagements  on  the  30th, 
the  whole  army  was  put  in  position  on  Malvern  Hill. 
7* 


154 


THE  PENINSULA. 


Malvern  Hill  is  an  eminence  near  the  north  or  left  bank 
of  the  James  Eiver,  sixty  feet  in  height,  its  summit  present- 
ing an  open  plateau  of  some  extent.  It  rises  somewhat 
abruptly  at  its  northern  side,  and  on  the  south  and  east  is 
guarded  by  Western  Kiver  and  thick  underwood ;  its  western 
edge  is  also  protected  by  forests  and  swamp,  difficult  for 
horse  or  artillery.  Between  the  two  rivers  is  the  approach 
to  the  northern  front,  up  which  the  Quaker  road  passes,  in 
front  of  the  Crew  house,  where  it  divides.  The  western 
foot  of  the  hill  is  traversed  by  the  New  Market  road.  The 
slopes  of  the  hill  formed  an  admirable  position  to  post  or 
manoeuvre  troops  ;  and  either  flank,  if  threatened,  could  be 
supported  across  the  plateau  on  the  top.  General  McClellan 
had  given  orders  for  placing  the  troops,  before  they  had  all 
arrived  upon  the  spot,  and  had  assigned  positions  to  Porter's 
corps  and  Couch's  division  of  Keyes';  the  other  corps,  as 
they  came  on  the  ground,  were  put  in  position  by  General 
A.  A.  Humphreys,  who  had  examined  the  ground  thoroughly 
the  day  before.  The  army  was  disposed  in  the  form  of  a 
huge  semicircle,  its  wings  resting  on  the  river,  with  the  right 
at  Haxall,  where  it  was  protected  by  the  fire  of  the  gun- 
boats. General  Morell  was  posted  on  the  extreme  left,  with 
his  headquarters  at  the  Crew  house,  the  brigade  of  Griffin  in 
advance  ;  Martindale's  brigade  in  the  Crew  field  immediate- 
ly north  of  the  Eichmond  road,  Butterfield's  in  its  rear  on 
the  south  side  of  the  Eichmond  road,  both  in  close  order, 
the  men  lying  down,  and  ready  to  support  Grifiin's  brigade 
or  meet  an  attack  on  the  left.  General  Grifiin  had  command 
of  all  the  artillery  on  the  left,  and  Colonel  McQuade's  Four- 
teenth New  York  /Volunteers,  with  a  section  of  Weeden's 
battery,  was  watching  that  flank.  Buchanan's  and  Lovell's 
brigades  of  Sykes'  division  was  near  and  in  rear  of  Morell, 
Warren's  brigade  having  been  thrown  into  the  valley  below 


BATTLE  OF  MALVERN  HILL. 


155 


the  plateau,  watching  the  river  road.  McCairs  division  was 
in  rear  of  Porter  and  Couch.  Couch's  division,  with  its  left 
near  Morell,  was  deployed  half  way  to  the  woods  at  the  foot 
of  the  hill,  its  right  on  a  ravine,  wliich  extended  almost  as  far 
as  the  West  house,  and  separated  the  left  from  the  centre ; 
Heintzelman,  from  the  ravine  to  the  wood  at  the  West  house 
in  the  centre,  across  the  Quaker  road,  Kearney  on  the  left, 
Hooker  on  the  right.  Between  Hooker  and  the  Binford 
house  was  Sumner's  corps,  prolonged  until  it  met  the  divi- 
sions of  Smith  and  Slocum,  of  Franklin's  corps.  The  bridge 
at  Carter's  Mill  and  the  approach  to  Haxa]rs,  where  several 
roads  converge,  were  guarded  by  Keyes,  with  Peck's  division. 
The  position  was  most  favorable  for  the  use  of  cannon.  The 
reserve  artillery,  under  General  Hunt,  was  posted  by  that 
able  officer  on  the  height  on  the  west  of  the  plateau  and  in 
front  of  the  brick  house.  Batteries  of  20-  and  32-pounders, 
with  rifled  and  Napoleon  guns,  formed  a  terrible  array ;  be- 
low them  were  the  infantry  awaiting  attack  with  firm  confi- 
dence. Sixty  pieces  had  a  converging  fire  from  Porter's 
line,  and  all  along  the  crest  of  the  hill,  wherever  one  was 
needed,  a  battery  made  its  appearance  at  the  moment.  Those 
who  had  toiled  to  drag  the  guns  across  the  swamp  and  up 
the  hill  were  rewarded  for  their  labor — the  First  Connecti- 
cut Heavy  Artillery  distinguishing  itself  among  volunteers 
in  this  branch  of  the  service.* 

The  artillery  reserve  under  General  Hunt,  with  Colonels 
Wm.  Hays  and  Getty  as  brigade  commanders,  together  with 
the  horse-batteries  of  Tidball,  Benson,  and  Eobertson,  also 
contributed  to  the  success  of  this  movement  to  a  degree 
which  entitles  them  to  a  special  mention  in  this  connection. 

On  the  right  of   General  Couch's  position,  extending 


*  An  examination  of  the  reports  of  nearly  all  the  Union  generals  discloses 
many  details  of  Malvern  Hill  which  cannot  be  introduced  here  for  lack  of  space. 


156 


THE  PENINSULA. 


down  toward  the  enemy,  was  a  grove  which.  General  Hum- 
phreys desired  to  have  slashed,  that  it  might  not  afford  a 
cover  for  attack ;  bnt  he  was  unable  to  secnre  the  men  neces- 
sary for  the  work.  Though  a  part  of  it  nearest  his  lines  was 
occupied  by  Couch,  the  enemy  found  opportunity  to  use  it, 
but  were  driven  out  later  in  the  day  by  Abercrombie,  so  that 
Couch  was  able  to  advance  his  line  for  some  distance,  so  as 
to  effectually  command  the  ravine  on  his  left.  The  foot 
of  the  hill  was  densely  wooded ;  in  front  of  Crew's  house  at 
the  base  of  the  hill,  and  one  mile  distant,  about  one  hundred 
yards  from  the  farm  fence,  was  a  deep  ravine  running  parallel 
to  it.    Here  Armistead's  rebel  division  formed. 

During  the  battle  of  Glendale,  when  McCall's  division 
broke,  many  fugitives  did  not  rejoin  their  command,  bufc 
passed  to  the  rear  as  rapidly  as  possible,  joining  the  ever- 
increasing  column  that  led  the  way  to  the  river  and  the  shel- 
ter of  the  gunboats.  These  cast  away  everything  that  might 
imi^ede  their  flight,  save  their  arms  and  ammunition,  and 
while  intent  on  safety,  were  not  unprepared  for  resistance. 
When  they  reached  a  point  from  which  the  waters  of  the 
James  were  brought  into  view,  and  they  saw  the  gunboats 
swinging  at  anchor,  their  sx3irits  revived,  discipline  asserted 
its  power,  and  they  sought  to  join  their  commands.  All 
through  the  long  morning,  dusty  and  powder-stained  men  in 
close  column  climbed  the  steep  Quaker  road,  under  direc- 
tion of  staff  officers  who  had  carefully  examined  the  ground. 
In  front  of  some  parts  of  the  line  were  slight  trenches,  barely 
deep  enough  to  be  called  rifle-pits.  Of  entrenchments  there 
were  none  ;  the  crests  and  inequalities  of  the  ground  served 
as  sufficient  cover  to  the  artillery,  and  the  men  below  and 
between  the  guns  looked  out  over  the  wide  sweep  of  open 
ground  between  them  and  the  forest  which  hid  the  enemy 
from  view.    From  the  Crew  house  McClellan  could  overlook 


BATTLE  OF  MALVERN  HILL. 


157 


the  movements  of  the  enemy,  and  see  the  divisions  of  Long- 
street  and  Hill  filing  into  position  in  the  rear  of  Jackson. 
These  troops  had  been  so  roughly  handled  the  day  before, 
and  their  numbers  so  diminished,  that  they  required  rest, 
and  took  no  active  part  in  the  movements  of  the  first  day. 
Lee,  whose  army  was  as  weary  with  the  labor  of  the  past 
week  as  our  own,  felt  it  a  necessity  incumbent  upon  him  to 
attack,  although  he  was  urged  by  some  of  his  best  o£fi.cers 
not  to  press  McClellan  further.  He  and  his  staff  were  more 
ignorant  of  the  roads  and  the  approaches  to  the  hill  than  our 
own  men,  who  had  studied  the  topography  of  the  region  as- 
siduously with  a  view  to  this  movement.  Magruder,  for  in- 
stance, who  cannot  be  accused  of  lack  of  zeal  in  his  cause, 
pressed  forward  to  the  Quaker  road  with  his  own  division 
and  that  of  the  veteran  General  Huger ;  but  both  lost  their 
way,  and  their  failure  to  reach  Glendale  in  time  to  take  part 
was  most  disastrous  to  the  rebels. 

Lee  marshalled  his  forces,  J ackson's  command  with  D.  H. 
Hill  on  his  right,  Whiting  on  his  left,  with  one  of  Ewell's  bri- 
gades occupying  the  interval,  the  rest  of  Ewell's  and  Jack- 
son's own  division  in  reserve.  Two  of  Huger's  brigades  were 
formed  next  to  Hill ;  Magruder  was  on  the  right  with  his  own 
and  one  of  Huger's  brigades.  Ignorance  of  the  country,  the 
difficulty  of  communication,  the  density  of  the  forests,  which 
hindered  the  movement  of  artillery  and  made  it  impossible 
to  bring  up  a  sufficient  force  of  that  arm  to  oppose  success- 
fully the  extraordinary  strength  in  that  regard  opposed,  are 
among  the  reasons  advanced  by  General  Lee  why  this  final 
effort  of  his  army  was  not  a  success.  His  rei)ort,  and  those  of 
all  the  other  rebel  commanders  who  took  part  in  the  action, 
are  meagre. 

On  the  rebel  side  the  orders  were  to  advance  at  a  given 
signal,  which  was  to  be  a  yell,  cheer,  or  shout,  to  be  uttered 


158 


THE  PENINSULA. 


by  Armistead's  brigade  as  it  took  the  lead.  But  Armistead's 
brigade  was  cut  off  by  part  of  Huger's  division  and  by  Ma- 
^  gruder's,  and  the  sound  of  a  shout  when  a  shout  was  raised 
w^as  not  heard  all  along  the  line,  being  lost  in  the  sound  of 
the  guns  on  the  hill. 

About  1  o'clock  P.M.  Whiting's  and  D.  H.  Hill's  advance 
appeared  in  the  plain  beyond  the  belt  of  woods  at  the  foot 
of  the  hill,  and  were  immediately  fired  on  by  our  artillery, 
which  inflicted  a  heavy  loss  while  they  were  crossing  an 
open  field  and  fording  a  stream  to  get  under  cover.  Here 
they  were  halted  for  a  while  to  examine  the  Union  position. 
When  the  examination  was  completed,  D.  H.  Hill  was  con- 
firmed in  his  opinion,  previously  expressed,  that  the  at- 
tack could  not  but  be  hazardous  to  their  arms.  While  this 
portion  of  the  rebel  army  was  halting  here,  awaiting  the 
proper  disposition  of  their  artillery,  so  as  to  distract  and  crush 
the  fire  of  the  Union  guns,  the  division  of  General  Hill  was 
put  in  motion,  that  of  General  Whiting  being  held  on  the 
road  near  Poindexter's  house,  covering  batteries  which  were 
exposed  to  a  concentrated  fire  from  the  hill,  and  which  were 
disabled  and  retired  almost  as  fast  as  they  were  brought  up, 
until  the  weight  of  the  attack  upon  the  left  was  developed, 
when  these  guns  were  turned  so  as  to  command  the  rebel 
approach. 

During  the  whole  morning  there  had  been  a  constant  ar- 
tillery fire  ;  occasionally  small  bodies  of  the  enemy  emerged 
from  the  woods  and  approached  near  enough  to  open  mus- 
ketry fire  upon  the  gunners,  but  as  often  as  they  appeared 
the  concentrated  fire  of  four  batteries  drove  them  away  with 
loss.  In  front  of  Couch  this  was  repeated  three  times,  twice 
on  his  right  and  once  on  his  left ;  the  last,  at  three  o'clock,  was 
made  on  Palmer  and  Abercrombie  on  the  right  of  Couch,  in 
which  a  stand  of  colors  of  the  Fourteenth  Virginia,  of 


BATTLE  OF  MALVERN  HILL. 


159 


Armistead's  brigade,  was  captured.  The  division  of  D.  H. 
Hill  waited  for  the  signal.  Huger  and  Magruder  on  his 
right  did  not  wait.  As  soon  as  Magruder  could  get  a  bat- 
tery in  position  he  opened  fire,  and  sent  a  regiment  to  charge 
up  the  hill  in  front  on  Couch's  left.  The  battery  was  crushed 
by  the  fire  brought  on  it,  and  the  charging  regiment  hurled 
back  with  loss.  Three  times  he  tried  the  same  experiment, 
and  three  times  met  with  a  like  repulse.  General  Ma- 
gruder's  report  is  very  like  a  romance ;  but  bold  as  his  final 
charge  was,  and  far  as  it  was  pushed,  his  determined  men 
were  never  near  enough  to  threaten  seriously  the  safety  of 
the  main  Union  batteries.  Some  of  the  field  batteries  which 
were  in  exposed  positions  were  limbered  up  and  withdrawn 
to  more  favorable  ones,  and  again  opened  fire  on  his  advance. 
As  to  the  signal  for  the  rebel  attack,  it  is  enough  of  a  mili- 
tary curiosity  to  be  given  in  full.  It  is  appended  to  Ma- 
gruder's  report  as  Inclosure  No.  5,  July  1,  1862  : 

Batteries  have  been  estabUshed  to  rake  the  enemy's  line.  If  it  is 
broken,  as  is  probable,  Armistead,  who  can  witness  the  effect  of  the  fire, 
has  been  ordered  to  charge  with  a  yell.    Do  the  same. 

By  order  General  Lee. 

R.  H.  CHILTON, 

Assistant  Adjutant-  Genei'al, 

General  Armistead,  to  whom  the  duty  of  shouting  was  pre- 
scribed, advanced  three  regiments  to  drive  off  some  skir- 
mishers, which  he  says  were  repulsed,  but  went  so  far 
that  one  regiment,  mentioned  above,  lost  its  colors,  and 
neither  of  them  could  either  advance  or  recede.  They  were 
obliged  to  take  advantage  of  an  inequality  of  the  ground 
and  lie  down  to  escape  from  the  fire  of  the  artillery.  They 
were  not  relieved  until  after  nightfall.  Armistead  also 
begged  for  more  artillery,  but  failed  to  have  his  wants  sup- 
plied, although  Longstreet  promised  to  do  so.  Magruder 


160 


THE  PENINSULA. 


wanted  thirty  pieces  of  rifled  artillery,  but  it  did  not  come. 
D.  H.  Hill  sent  Jackson  a  message  stating  that  the  fire  of 
isolated  batteries  was  worse  than  useless,  only  exposing  the 
batteries  to  be  destroyed  in  detail,  and  insisted  that  one 
hundred  guns  should  be  concentrated  upon  the  Union  line. 
Jackson  replied  by  repeating  the  order  to  advance  at  the 
signal.  Later  in  the  afternoon,  about  5.30  o'clock.  Hill 
heard  the  sound  of  loud  shouting  on  his  right,  followed  by 
heavy  musketry  fire  ;  this  he  supposed  to  be  the  appointed 
signal,  and  gave  orders  for  his  men  to  advance.  Garland  in 
front  attacked  the  hill  with  impetuous  courage,  but  soon 
sent  for  reinforcements.  The  Sixth  Georgia,  and  the  bri- 
gade of  General  Toombs,  which  was  under  partial  shelter  in 
the  rear,  were  sent  to  his  assistance.  General  Hill  in  per- 
son accompanied  the  column.  They  approached  the  crest  in 
handsome  order,  but  discipline  was  of  no  avail  to  hold  them 
there,  much  less  to  make  them  advance  farther.  They  soon 
retreated  in  disorder.  Gordon,  commanding  Ehodes'  bri- 
gade, had  made  a  gallant  advance  and  some  j)rogress,  as  had 
also  Eipley  and  Colquitt's  and  Anderson's  brigades ;  all  these 
were  now  streaming  wildly  to  the  rear.  Heedless  of  com- 
mand and  deaf  to  entreaty  they  sought  the  woods  near 
"Willis  church  on  the  Quaker  road.  Kansom's  brigade  of 
Huger's  division  was  sent  to  the  aid  of  Hill,  but  these  mani- 
fested no  eagerness  to  tempt  fate  in  front  of  those  batteries. 
Winder,  of  Jackson's  division,  and  later  Early  came  to  the 
rescue,  but  both  these  brigades  were  soon  huddled  together 
wdth  the  same  disorganized  mass  of  troops.  They  suffered 
from  the  fire,  but  accomplished  nothing.  A  careful  reading 
of  D.  H.  Hill's  report  of  his  part  of  the  battle,  shows  plainly 
the  loss  and  demoralization  of  his  division,  and  gives  a 
glimpse  of  the  disorder  hidden  by  the  woods  about  the  little 
X^arsonage. 


BATTLE  OF  MALVERN  HILL.  161 

No  more  positive  admission  of  defeat  with  loss  and  disor- 
der can  be  looked  for.  Hill  npbraids  everybody,  from  the 
Commander-in-Chief  down  to  "Whiting  and  Holmes,  whom  he 
asserts  were  not  engaged  at  all.  He  complains  of  want  of 
concert  and  nnity  of  action,  and  is  eager  to  assert  and  prob- 
ably believes  that  he  did,  as  he  says,  engage  the  whole  "Yan- 
kee "  force  with  his  single  division. 

The  plain  truth  is  Hill  attacked  on  Couch's  right.  What  he 
describes  as  the  breaking  and  retreat  of  the  whole  line 
was  only  that  of  some  of  Sedgwick's  men,  who  had  been 
sent  to  act  as  supports  when  the  attack  was  heaviest, 
changing  places  with  those  of  the  infantry  in  front  of  the 
line  whose  cartridge-boxes  were  empty,  that  they  might  go 
to  the  rear  and  replenish — a  movement  which  was  made  in 
good  order  without  confusion,  and  which  no  doubt  tended  to 
accelerate  the  withdrawal  of  Hill's  men  to  the  grove  about 
the  parsonage.  He  further  says  that,  so  far  as  he  can  learn, 
no  one  of  the  rebels  drew  trigger  except  McLaw's  division, 

his  own,  and  a  part  of  Huger's.    His  report  is  dated  

1862,  and  written,  as  it  must  have  been,  long  after  the  battle. 
Hill  betrays  at  least  great  ignorance  of  the  actions  of  his 
brother  officers.  Nevertheless  it  is  true  that  the  rebel  force 
was  not  handled  as  a  whole  in  concert  of  action.  After  giving 
the  final  orders  for  battle.  General  Lee  apparently  left  the 
execution  to  the  division  commanders.  The  signal  for  onset 
was  inadequate  for  fighting  in  thick  woods.  But  while 
there  was  a  want  of  absolute  coincidence  in  the  move- 
ments of  the  rebel  generals.  Hill  is  inaccurate  in  saying 
that  there  was  no  attack  made  at  the  same  time  as  his 
own.  Magruder  had  placed  his  three  divisions  on  the  right 
of  Huger's  en  echelon  to  the  right  and  rear.  Magruder, 
who  was  ordered  to  support  Armistead,  went  forward  to 
reconnoitre  the  position.     He  found  part  of  Armistead's 


162 


THE  PEJilNSULA. 


brigade  in  line  of  battle  nnder  the  brow  of  a  wooded  liill, 
along  the  crown  of  which  passed  a  road  which  was  parallel 
to  a  field  occupied  by  the  Union  troops.  Here  he  selected 
his  own  line,  taking  the  road  as*  a  good  position  on  which 
to  form  troops. . 

The  field  in  which  the  batteries  nearest  to  him  were  placed 
was  the  Crew  farm,  and  the  nearest  and  best  line  was  that 
which  led  up  to  it  from  the  meadow  on  the  extreme  right  of 
his  line,  where  the  advance  would  be  in  a  measure  protected 
by  the  natural  cover  of  the  hill.  Crew's  house  was  the  key 
to  the  position  ;  about  it  were  grouped  the  heavy  siege-gunsj 
while  battery  above  battery,  with  long  lines  of  infantry, 
sometimes  protected  by  slashing  and  sometimes  by  rifle  pits, 
which  Kearney  had  dug  in  front  of  his  division,  held  the 
salient  points  of  the  position.  As  Magruder  got  his  men 
in  i)lace,  the  fire  from  these  batteries  became,  as  stated, 
intense.  His  plan  was  to  put  15,000  men  in  line  and  charge 
the  batteries  and  supporting  infantry,  to  follow  up  success 
with  fresh  troops,  and  if  repulsed  to  hold  the  line  where 
he  then  was  on  the  hill.  His  caution  as  to  repulse  was 
one  that  did  credit  to  his  military  sagacity  and  was  fully  jus- 
tified by  events. 

Although  the  batteries  were  not  carried,  the  assault  con- 
tiibuted  much  to  the  rout,  panic,  and  demoralization  which 
marked  the  enemy's  escape  from  the  field  early  in  the 
night.  Darkness  set  in  and  he  concluded  to  let  the  battle 
subside  and  occupy  the  field;  pickets  were  set  and  a 
part  of  Armistead's  brigade  encamped  within  one  hundred 
yards  of  the  Union  guns.  Lee  is  satisfied  that  the  Union 
loss  w^as  far  greater  than  his  own,  and  winds  up  with  the 
remark  that  there  was  no  attack  so  far  as  he  knows  by 
General  Holmes  on  his  right.  Holmes  and  Huger  seem  to 
be  impediments  in  the  way  of  the  rebel  commanders  in  this 


BATTLE  OF  MALVERN  HILL. 


163 


campaign,  and  are  made  the  scapegoats  of  rebel  reports. 
Having  seen  what  General  Magrnder  claims,  let  us  look 
further  at  what  he  did  on  the  field. 

About  the  same  time  that  D.  H.  Hill  advanced  to  make 
his  attack — say  about  5.30  p.m. — Magruder,  who  waited  in 
vain  for  the  thirty  pieces  of  rifled  artillery  for  which  he 
had  sent  to  silence  the  Union  fire,  became  impatient  at  the 
delay,  and  ordered  General  Armistead's  brigade  to  ad- 
vance, and  at  the  same  time  put  his  own  division  in 
motion.  He  sent  forward  Wright's  brigade  first,  Mahone's 
next,  substituted  three  regiments  of  Cobb's  for  the  remain- 
der of  Armistead's  raw  troops,  sent  in  General  Eansom  to 
his  lef  fc,  in  person  superintended  the  advance  of  Barksdale's 
brigade  of  his  own  division,  and  sent  staff  officers  in  quick 
succession  to  urge  an  attack  by  Huger  on  his  left.  As  they 
emerged  from  the  cover  of  the  woods  in  which  their  line 
was  formed  and  breasted  the  slope  of  the  hill,  now  swejjt 
by  the  converging  fire  of  the  heavy  batteries  at  the  Crew 
house,  the  advance  was  checked,  but  they  were  easily  rallied 
and  led  again  with  fury  to  the  attack ;  but  the  line  made  no 
further  progress,  even  in  Magruder's  report.  Kansom  and 
J  ones,  with  the  remainder  of  Armistead's  men,  were  urged 
forward  to  the  support  of  their  faltering  comrades.  Mc- 
Law's  division  was  also  sent  in  by  order  of  General  Lee, 
and  Magruder  was  urged  to  press  the  enemy  on  the 
right.  They  advanced  bravely  all  along  the  line,  but  only 
to  recoil  before  the  storm  of  missiles  which  each  fresh 
effort  on  their  part  drew  from  the  heavy  guns.  The  day 
was  drawing  to  an  end  and  Magruder  gave  his  attention  to 
securing  the  ravine  and  woods  where  he  had  formed  his  line, 
and  to  procuring  reinforcements  to  guard  against  any  re- 
verse. All  the  rebel  generals  ascribe  their  failure  to  reach 
the  hill  to  the  preponderance  of  the  artillery  fire  on  the 


164 


THE  PENINSULA. 


Union  side,  their  own  inefficiency  in  that  arm,  and  to  want 
of  sujDport  and  co-operation  in  attack.  In  truth  there  seems 
to  have  been  few  orders  issued  on  the  1st  by  the  rebel  gen- 
eral-in-chief. 

Magruder  claims  to  have  had  under  his  command  that  day 
between  twenty-six  and  twenty-eight  thousand  men,  and  es- 
timates his  loss  at  2,900,  and  that  of  the  Union  troops  at 
6,000  or  7,000  from  his  fire  alone  ! 

The  battle  began  by  an  advance  against  Porter's  and 
Couch's  position  on  the  left  and  centre  of  the  line  by  an  ad- 
vance by  skirmishers  which  drove  in  Berdan's  sharpshooters. 
The  rebels  were  speedily  repulsed  by  artillery  alone.  Along 
other  parts  of  the  line  there  was  a  desultory  artillery  fire 
kept  up  with  no  material  result,  save  the  annoyance  it  caused 
to  the  men  who  were  under  fire  and  obliged  to  be  passive.  On 
the  extreme  right  Smith  and  Slocum  of  Franklin's  corps  were 
not  engaged  during  the  day.  Between  the  left  of  Smith  and 
the  right  of  Sumner  was  a  point  which  w^as  deemed  weak,  as 
it  was  here  that  the  main  road  from  the  crossing  at  White 
Oak  Swamp  came  in  ;  near  the  mill  pond  on  Smith's  right 
the  trees  had  been  slashed  by  Duane,  of  the  Engineers,  by 
order  of  General  Humphreys,  who  remained  on  the  front  of 
Sumner  and  Heintzelman  during  the  greater  part  of  the  day, 
as  there  were  indications  of  an  attack  in  that  quarter,  but  no 
attempt  was  made  here  save  a  slight  one  on  Sumner's  right, 
of  which  that  General  made  no  report,  as  he  says  that  dur- 
ing the  action  the  commanding  general  came  on  the  field 
and  he  (Sumner)  ceased  to  command. 

The  weight  of  the  battle,  it  will  be  seen,  fell  upon  Morell 
of  Porter's  corps,  and  Couch  of  Keyes'.  About  3  p.m.,  An- 
derson, of  Huger's  division,  charged  against  the  right  of 
Couch  and  became  engaged  with  Palmer's  brigade.  They 
were  met  by  a  sharp  musketry  fire,  and  as  soon  as  a  battery 


BATTLE  OF  MALVERK  HILL. 


165 


could  be  brought  to  bear  were  put  to  rout,  leaving  the  flag 
of  the  Fourteenth  Virginia  in  the  possession  of  the  Thirty- 
sixth  New  York  Eegiment.  An  assault,  which  was  made  by 
a  part  of  D.  H.  Hill's  division,  spread  along  the  centre,  also 
involving  the  left  of  Heintzelman,  and  was  speedily  re- 
]oulsed.  The  ravine  between  Couch's  right  and  the  left  of 
Heintzelman,  a  point  which  invited  attack,  was  held  by  a 
strong  detachment  from  Palmer's  and  Birney's  brigades, 
which  were  protected  by  intrenchments  along  their  front. 
In  the  furious  assault  made  on  this  portion  of  the  line  later 
in  the  day  these  regiments  assisted  in  repulsing  the  enemy. 

There  are  discrepancies  as  to  the  time  at  which  the  most 
fiercely  contested  encounters  of  the  day  took  place.  D.  H. 
Hill  gives  the  hour  of  his  order  advance  as  about  one  and  a 
half  hour  before  sunset;  Magruder  that  of  his  at  5.30  p.m.; 
Couch  says  that  about  4.30  p.m.  the  enemy  raj^idly  pushed 
forward  a  heavy  column  into  the  open  field  and  advanced 
boldly  from  their  right  and  opened  the  attack  upon  Griffin, 
of  Morell's  division,  whose  front  was  protected  by  fourteen 
rifled  Parrott  guns,  and  eleven  field  pieces,  supported  by  the 
Fourth  Michigan,  Ninth  Massachusetts,  and  Sixty-second 
Pennsylvania.  Here  was  the  pinch  of  this  fight.  The  ene- 
my advanced  steadily  until  it  came  within  range  of  the 
rifled  guns,  when  it  was  stopped  and  formed  line.  Kings- 
bury's battery  of  six  Parrott  guns,  having  exhausted  its 
ammunition,  was  withdrawn,  and  three  guns  of  Battery  C, 
Ehode  Island  Artillery,  and  two  of  the  Fifth  Massachusetts 
substituted. 

This  is  the  last  effort  of  D.  H.  Hill's  left,  and  the  next 
scene  in  the  drama  is  the  charge  of  Magruder,  the  most 
famous  of  any-made  that  day,  already  described. 

As  the  efforts  of  Hill's  men  relaxed,  there  was  still  a  heavy 
cannonade  kept  up  by  the  rebels.    Porter,  who  had  fathomed 


166 


THE  PENINSULA. 


the  design  of  the  enemy,  husbanded  his  ammunition  and 
reserved  his  musketry  fire.  His  men  were  for  the  most  part 
protected  by  the  inequalities  of  the  ground,  by  slight 
trenches  and  rifle  pits  in  their  front,  and  suffered  compara- 
tively little  from  the  rebel  fire.  As  soon  as  any  man  was 
wounded,  he  walked  if  able,  or  if  not,  was  carried  to  the 
shelter  of  a  bank  in  the  rear,  chosen  as  a  temporary  hospital ; 
the  bearers  returned  quietly  and  promptly  to  their  places  in 
the  ranks. 

In  Moreirs  division  they  were  disposed :  Martindale  in 
the  centre,  lying  down,  Grifiin  in  front,  Butterfield  in 
the  rear.  The  force  of  the  final  assault,  for  the  first  time 
that  day,  aroused  the  infantry  into  vigorous  action  along 
that  jjart  of  the  line,  from  Sykes'  right  to  Heintzelman's  left. 
The  advancing  rebel  columns  rushed  forward  upon  the  in- 
fantry line,  which  rose  up  to  repel  the  onset.  Morell  was 
advised  that  a  strong  body  of  the  enemy  were  availing  them- 
selves of  the  natural  advantages  to  pushup  a  valley  upon  his 
left  and  rear.  Arrangements  were  promptly  made  to  meet 
him,  and  were  hardly  completed  when  he  appeared  ascend- 
ing the  hill  near  the  Crew  house,  and  was  promptly  met 
by  the  Fourteenth  New  York,  and  after  three  attacks  was 
driven  off  and  did  not  renew  his  attempt  in  that  quarter.  At 
the  same  time  a  determined  and  powerful  attack  was  made 
upon  Morell's  left  front ;  the  first  assault  was  repulsed,  but  the 
enemy's  line  being  constantly  reinforced,  the  regiments  which 
had  advanced  to  support  the  batteries  were  compelled  to  fall 
back,  their  ammunition  exhausted.  These  were  regularly 
relieved  by  other  regiments,  who  continued  the  conflict 
against  superior  numbers  until  these  in  turn  were  relieved  by 
part  of  Sykes'  division  and  Meagher's  brigade  of  Eichardson's, 
who  came  on  the  field  led  by  General  Porter  in  person. 

In  front  of  Couch's  line  was  a  like  desperate  encounter, 


BATTLE  OF  MALVERN  HILL. 


167 


marked  by  tlie  violence  of  the  assault  and  the  steady  tena- 
city of  the  resistance  by  which  it  was  met  and  repelled. 
The  enemy  made  repeated  efforts  to  drive  in  his  right.  If 
but  once  the  rebels  could  only  pierce  that  line  and  get 
among  the  guns  which  had  held  them  at  bay  so  long,  the 
Union  centre  was  parted,  the  army  cut  in  two.  But  if  Ma- 
gruder  saw  the  importance  of  the  position,  so  did  the  Union 
commanders.  Sumner,  prompt  to  divine  the  place  of  dan- 
ger, sent  Caldwell's  brigade,  which  went  promptly  into  ac- 
tion. Heintzelman  sent  Seely's  battery,  which,  under  De 
Bussy,  Chief  of  Artillery,  was  put  in  position  in  front  of 
Howe,  and  did  its  duty  well.  Sickles,  with  three  regiments 
from  Hooker's  division,  took  an  effective  part,  relieving  some 
of  the  regiments  whose  ammunition  was  exhausted. 

The  struggle  continued  until  nine  o'clock  p.m.,  when  the 
rebels  withdrew.  The  author,  as  an  eye-witness,  can  assert 
that  never  for  one  instant  was  the  Union  line  broken  or  their 
guns  in  danger.  During  the  night  the  troops  were  with- 
drawn from  the  hill  and  put  in  motion  toward  Harrison's 
landing,  seven  miles  distant,  the  Navy  Department  having 
decided  that,  owing  to  the  narrowness  of  the  James  in  the  vi- 
cinity, it  would  be  impossible  for  it  to  cover  the  transports  and 
supplies  against  attack  from  the  opposite  bank.  The  post  at 
Harrison's  Landing  was  shelled  by  Stewart,  who  had  been  a 
week  on  his  chase  after  Stoneman,  but  before  Jackson,  whom 
Stewart  had  notified  of  the  opportunity,  could  come  up  to 
hold  the  hill  (Evlington  Heights),  which  commanded  our 
camp,  Stewait  was  driven  off.  The  camp  was  afterward 
bombarded  by  the  rebels  from  the  opposite  side  of  the 
James.  They  fired  from  heavy  rifled  guns  and  withdrew  at 
daylight.  This  position  was  also  occupied  to  guard  against 
a  repetition  of  the  attempt. 

Thus  ended  the  first  advance  upon  Richmond. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

TERMINATION  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN. 

If,  in  reviewing  the  history  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
as  narrated  in  the  foregoing  chapters,  Tve  are  to  derive  any 
great  lessons  from  our  experience,  it  mnst  obviously  be  from 
a  study  of  the  events  of  the  entu*e  twelve  months,  rather 
than  from  the  isolated  engagements.  In  giving  opinions  in 
regard  to  the  j^lans  and  movements,  we  have  been  governed 
by  the  documentary  evidence  now  brought  before  us  by 
both  sides.  We  have  not  differed  very  much  from  the  criti- 
cisms of  abler  writers,  who  came  to  the  same  conclusions 
years  ago  without  the  use  of  these  documents.  We  only  con- 
firm their  views. 

General  McClellan  was  correct  in  his  declaration,  made  to 
the  Secretary  of  War,  in  October,  1861,  that  the  object  of 
the  Government  should  be  to  "  cnish  the  army  under  John- 
ston, at  Manassas."  We  believe  that  he  could  have  done 
this,  and  that  he  failed  because  he  overestimated  the 
strength  of  the  enemy's  forces,  and  underestimated  the 
fighting  qualities  of  his  own  army.  He  had  made  a  jilan 
which  required  that  he  should  move  from  AYasliington  with 
110,000  men,  and  still  leave  the  city  secure.  From  the  mo- 
ment it  was  thought  that  he  was  determined  to  abide  by  his 
demand  for  this  large  body  of  men  with  which  to  take  the 
field,  and  he  was  considered  unmindful  of  the  requirements 
of  the  political  situation,  the  active  hostility  of  the  strongest 


TERMINATION  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN. 


169 


friends  and  advisers  of  the  Administration  was  aroused. 
These  men  considered  a  forward  movement  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  a  political  necessity,  and  demanded  it. 

Centreville  should  have  been  retaken  when  Johnston  held 
it  with  but  47,000  men.  At  that  period  General  McClellan 
had  180,000  men.  President  Lincoln  felt  this,  and  the  people 
were  with  him,  when,  relying  on  his  instincts  solely,  he  de- 
manded "action."  All  the  so-called  interference,  all  the 
real  interference  with  General  McClellan's  plans — all  the 
want  of  confidence  in  his  ability  as  the  leader  of  an  active 
army — all  the  want  of  faith  in  his  intentions  to  fully  support 
the  views  of  the  Government  in  regard  to  the  objects  of  the 
war,  and  as  to  the  means  to  carry  them  out,  arose  from  the 
belief  that  in  and  about  General  McClellan's  headquarters 
there  was  a  lack  of  faith  in  the  Government  itself  and  of 
sympathy  with  the  Administration.  McClellan  proceeded 
to  create,  equip  and  discipline  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
with  a  skill  and  persistency  which  will  be  the  admiration  of 
military  students  for  all  times.  He  inspired  the  army  with 
confidence ;  it  believed  him  to  be  right  in  all  his  measures, 
because  it  loved  and  respected  him,  and  because  he  was 
its  appointed  leader  and  guide.  It  was  prepared  to  do 
whatever  he  demanded.  He  did  not  display  the  dash  and 
brilliancy  necessary  to  obtain  from  it  the  best  service  of 
which  it  was  capable,  but  he  still  commanded  its  implicit 
confidence.  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  never  lost  the 
reputation  of  being  the  best  disciplined,  best  equipped, 
and  most  efiicient  army  on  this  continent ;  and  this  repu- 
tation was  due  solely  to  General  McClellan's  system  of 
organization. 

The  more  prominent  of  the  lessons  of  our  experiences  of 
these  three  months  worthy  of  the  study  and  discussion  of 
military  men,  are  based  ui3on  the  following  general  state- 
8 


170 


THE  PENINSULA. 


ments  of  the  main  facts  wMcli  relate  to  the  strategy  and 
movements  of  that  period. 

Manassas  was  not  taken,  but  was  abandoned  by  Johnston 
when  he  heard  of  the  order  of  the  President  requiring  the 
Assistant  Secretary  of  War  to  provide  the  necessary  trans- 
portation to  move  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  the  lower 
Chesapeake.  What  had  we  done  to  force  this  evacuation  of 
a  position  which  had  been  held  by  the  rebels  in  sight  of  the 
dome  of  the  Capitol  for  eight  long  months  ?  Nothing  but  to 
build  up  an  army  many  times  as  strong  as  that  of  our  foes. 
Not  a  single  effectual  reconnoissance,  not  a  successful  attempt 
to  discover  the  actual  strength  of  the  rebels,  had  been  made ; 
yet  General  McClellan  had  confidence  in  his  own  plans.  He 
believed  that  in  the  end  he  would  be  proved  to  be  right,  if 
his  own  propositions  were  kept  secret  and  carried  out ;  but 
still  the  Potomac  was  blockaded  for  months,  Norfolk  was 
used  to  build  Merrimacs,  and  gunboats,  and  we  remained  in 
front  of  Washington,  growing  ourselves  and  watching  the 
rebel  forces  grow,  until  we  saw  the  latter  fold  their  tents 
and  steal  away,  having  done  all  that  they  expected  to  do — 
having  been  able  to  keep  us  about  Washington  until  they 
became  able  to  meet  us  upon  battle-fields. 

Kead  the  letter  of  Admiral  Goldsborough  upon  the  tak- 
ing of  Norfolk — take  your  max3,  place  thereon  Burnside's 
forces.  Wool's  force  of  11,000  men,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
and  its  detachments,  and  pause  to  wonder  why  we  permitted 


* Inclosure. 

Navy  Department,  April  24, 1862. 

"Hon.  E.  M.  Stanton,  Secretary  of  War: 

"  Sir — I  have  the  honor  to  transmit  to  you  a  copy  of  despatch  No.  214  of  Flag- 
Officer  Groldsborough,  received  this  day  at  this  department.  The  views  expressed 
by  him  in  regard  to  the  possessioij  of  Norfolk  accord  so  fuUy  with  my  own  that  1 
deem  it  a  duty  to  communicate  them  to  you.  I  know  not  that  it  is  possible,  in 
the  existing  state  of  things,  to  re-enforce  General  Burnside  as  proposed ;  but  the 


TERMINATION  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN. 


171 


the  James  Eiver  to  be  lost  to  us,  with  such  forces  at  our  dis- 
posal. ♦ 

How  can  we  be  less  impatient  than  was  our  noble  Presi- 
dent at  that  hour  ?  how  less  anxious  and  demonstrative  than 

capture  of  Norfolk  would,  in  my  opinion,  next  after  New  Orleans,  be  the  most  de- 
cisive blow  that  could  be  struck  for  the  suppression  of  the  rebellion. 

''I  also  Bend  you  an  extract  from  a  despatch  of  Commander  Missroon,  of  the 
steamer  Wachusett,  York  River,  in  relation  to  the  works  of  Yorktown. 

"I  am,  very  respectfully, 

"  Your  obedient  servant, 

"  Gideon  Welles."" 

First  Inclosure. 

"  U.  S.  Flag  Ship  Minnesota, 

^'Hampton  Roads,  April  22,  1862. 
*'  Hon.  Gideon  Welles,  Secretary  of  the  Navy  : 

*'  Sir — Three  white  men — one  of  them  accompanied  by  his  wife  and  two  children 
— were  picked  up  last  night  by  the  Baltimore.  They  were  in  a  boat,  and  had,  as 
they  say,  escaped  from  Norfolk.  One  of  them  has  been  working  -for  a  long  time 
past  in  the  Gosport  Navy  Yard.  He  describes  the  Merrimac  as  being  off  the 
yard,  with  a  large  gang  of  men  working  upon  her  day  and  night,  fitting  shutters 
to  all  her  side  ports  ;  she  has  always  had  them,  he  says,  to  her  end  ports.  He  also 
informs  me  that  four  new  wooden  gunboats  have  been  completed  at  the  Norfolk 
yard,  and  a  fifth  over  in  Norfolk,  and  that  all  are  now  ready  for  service.  Further- 
more, that  at  the  Norfolk  yard  they  are  building  rapidly  a  vessel  to  be  just  like 
the  Merrimac  in  every  respect,  except  in  size,  which  is  only  to  be  about  a  thou- 
sand tons ;  that  she  is  already  far  advanced  toward  completion  in  her  wood-work, 
and  has  even  the  wood-work  of  her  covering  or  house  finished.  Neither  of  her 
engines,  nor  any  of  her  iron  plates,  have  yet  been  put  in  place.  It  is  expected 
that  she  will  be  ready  for  use  in  about  a  month  or  so.  This,  he  says,  is  the  only 
vessel  to  be  plated  that  the  enemy  is  preparing  at  Norfolk.  Besides  the  above 
five  gunboats,  they  are  now  building  there  four  more. 

*'  I  am  perfectly  satisfied  of  the  truth  of  all  these  statements. 

"  I  am,  respectfully, 

"  Your  obedient  servant, 

"L.  M,  GOLDSBOROUGH. 

"  Flag-Officer  commanding  North  Atlantic  Blockading  Squadron. 
"N.B. — By  a  late  Norfolk  paper,  which  I  forward  to  the  department  to-day, 
it  appears  that  a  fight  came  off  last  Friday,  near  Elizabeth  City,  between  some  oE 
Gen.  Burnside's  men  and  the  enemy,  and  that  the  latter  were  driven  half  way  to 
Norfolk.  The  object  of  the  attack  on  our  part  was,  I  know,  to  destroy  the  lock 
of  the  Dismal  Swamp  Canal  at  South  Mills,  which  I  have  no  doubt  has  been  ac- 
complished effectually.  With  this  lock  destroyed  and  the  Currituck  link  of  the 
Albemarle  and  Chesapeake  Canal  kept  choked,  no  iron-clad  or  other  gunboats  cau 
go  from  Norfolk  to  the  sounds  of  North  Carolina.    No  vessel  drawing  over  three, 


172 


THE  PENINSULA. 


were  tlie  people  shouting  "  On  to  Kiclimond."  On  to  Eich- 
mond  w£fs  only  a  phrase.  Had  we  gone  to  Norfolk,  that  de- 
mand would  have  been  satisfied.  But  a  nation  guided  by- 
minds  capable  of  perceiving  the  main  political  benefits  to  be 
derived  from  the  strife  thrust  upon  us,  was  dissatisfied  with 
the  want  of  action  on  the  part  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
and  the  people  felt  that  the  rebels  grew  faster  in  numbers 
and  in  confidence  than  did  our  own  army,  and  through  their 
representatives  they  demanded  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
should  try  its  strength  with  the  rebels.  The  only  man  who 
did  not  seem  to  feel  the  full  force  of  this  public  demand  was 
the  commander  of  the  army  himself. 

At  that  moment,  had  he  become  more  dis^DOsed  to  act  than 
to  secure  his  army  from  every  possible  chance  of  failure,  he 
could  have  silenced  all  his  enemies  and  have  placed  upon 
the  shoulders  of  those  who  were  antagonistic  to  him  the  full 
responsibility  for  any  want  of  success  which  might  have  at- 
tended his  movements.  At  this  period  General  McClellan 
could  have  led  the  whole  sentiment  of  the  country,  had  he 
either  moved  on  Manassas,  had  he  cleared  the  lower  Poto- 
mac of  rebel  batteries,  or  had  he  taken  Norfolk. 


or  three  and  a  half  feet  of  water,  can  pass  through  Currituck  Sound  from  Norfolk 
and  so  get  into  Croatan  and  Pamlico  Sounds.  I  speak  from  positive  information 
on  this  point,  for  I  h  id  the  experiment  tried  in  effect,  by  Lieut.  Jeffers,  when  he 
was  despatched  by  me  in  charge  of  an  army  stern-wheel  boat,  drawing  only  three 
feet  or  so  of  water,  to  destroy  some  salt-works  at  Old  Currituck  Inlet. 

Could  Gen.  Burnside  be  promptly  re-enforced  with  a  body  of  40,000  men,  I  am 
convinced  that  he  could  possess  himself  of  Norfolk  in  a  fortnight  after  their  ar- 
rival at  Roanoke  Island.  This  idea  I  have  entertained  ever  since  that  island  sur- 
rendered to  our  arms,  and  the  more  I  think  of  it,  the  more  I  am  confirmed  in  my 
belief.  With  the  force  the  G-eneral  would  then  have,  he  would  undoubtedly  use  the 
roads  leading  from  PowelPs  Point,  Winton,  and  Gatesville,  all  three  of  which  are 
good  and  practicable,  and  hold  Boanoke  Island  and  Winton  as  bases  of  operation. 

"  These  considerations  may  be  of  moment  before  a  great  while,  if  they  are  not 
so  now. 

"  Most  respectfully, 

"  L.  M.  G." 


TERMINATION  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN. 


173 


This  is,  then,  to  be  the  first  deduction  from  the  narrative 
of  the  events  of  1861  and  1862  :  General  McClellan  did  not 
give  to  the  will  of  the  President  and  the  demands  of  the 
people  that  weight  in  the  formation  of  his  plans  of  campaign 
to  which  they  were  entitled. 

When  Johnston  evacuated  Manassas  the  rebels  still  held 
their  position  at  Norfolk,  thus  securing  to  themselves  a 
navy  yard,  and  effectually  blockading  the  James  Eiver 
against  the  navy  and  the  United  States  transports.  The 
Army  of  the  Potomac  was  to  be  moved  under  new  plans  of 
campaign.  General  McClellan  could  no  longer  expect  to 
surprise  General  Johnston,  or  cut  his  lines  of  communica- 
tion with  Eichmond. 

President  Lincoln  had  assumed  command  of  all  the  armies. 
To  whom  was  he  to  turn  for  advice  and  assistance  ?  To  the 
general  who  had  determined  that  all  his  plans  as  com- 
mander-in-chief, thus  far  ordered  or  submitted,  were  faulty  ? 

President  Lincoln  was  commander-in-chief,  and  as  such, 
loved  and  respected  by  the  whole  people  as  a  pure,  earn- 
est, honest  ruler — brighter  and  quicker  in  perception  of 
right  and  wrong  than  was  any  member  of  his  cabinet.  He 
knew  the  history  of  past  wars.  He  shrank  from  no  duty, 
but  acted  as  his  predecessors  acted.  He  could  not  interfere ; 
he  could  order,  and  he  should  have  been  obeyed.  At  least, 
the  people  and  the  army  should  never  have  known  of  any 
disagreements  between  him  and  the  Commander  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac. 

From  the  records  of  the  War  Department  we  can  deter- 
mine the  relative  positions  occupied  by  the  President  and 
the  commanders  of  our  armies  during  the  War  of  1812  and 
the  Mexican  War. 

It  appears  that  on  November  25,  1846,  the  Secretary  of 


174 


THE  PENINSULA. 


T^ar  wrote  to  General  Taylor,  in  reply  to  the  General's  ani- 
madversions upon  a  despatch  of  the  Secretary's  in  relation 
to  the  Tampico  Expedition  under  General  E.  Patterson,  as 
follows : 

"  You  must  be  aware  that  in  my  official  communications  I  am  only 
the  medium  for  presenting  the  views  of  the  President,  and  you  will  not 
question  his  right,  as  Commander-in-chief,  to  make  suggestions  as  to  the 
movements  of  the  forces  under  your  command,  or  as  to  the  officers  to  be 
employed  in  these  movements.  Having,  in  this  mstance,  caref  ully  qual- 
ified his  suggestions  so  as  to  prevent  them  from  being  regarded  as  posi- 
tive directions  or  commands,  and  expressly  disclaimed  the  intention 
of  employing  any  part  of  the  troops  which  in  your  opinion  '  would  in- 
terfere with  your  operations,'  he  is  entirely  unconscious  of  having 
given  any  j  ust  cause  for  protest  and  complaint. " 

Again,  on  May  31,  1847,  the  Secretary  of  War  reviews 
General  Scott's  action  in  not  carrying  out  the  instructions  of 
the  President  respecting  peace  negotiations  with  which  Mr. 
Trist  was  charged,  and  concludes  as  follows  : 

"  Under  these  circumstances  can  you  conceive  that,  as  commanding 
general  of  the  force  in  Mexico,  you  have  the  right  to  raise  a  question 
upon  your  duty  to  obey  this  direction,  coming,  as  it  does,  through  a 
proper  channel  from  your  superior,  the  Commander-ui-chief  '^  In  my 
opinion  you  could  not  have  wandered  farther  from  the  true  view  of  the 
case  than  by  supposing  that  the  President  or  myself  has  placed  you  in  a 
condition  of  deferring  '  to  the  chief  clerk  of  the  Department  of  State  the 
question  of  continuing  or  discontinuing  hostilities.'  I  cannot  conceive 
that  any  well-founded  exception  can  be  taken  to  the  order  you  have 
received  in  relation  to  suspending  hostilities,  and  I  am  fully  persuaded 
that,  if  the  contingency  requiring  you  to  act  upon  it  shall  ever  occur, 
you  will  promptly  carry  it  into  full  effect. " 

On  June  15,  1847,  the  Secretary  of  War,  referring  to  the 
same  subject,  and  in  rei)ly  to  a  letter  from  General  Scott, 
says : 


TERMINATION  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN. 


175 


"  In  relation  to  the  direction  for  an  armistice  or  suspension  of  hos- 
tilities, the  President,  after  duly  considering  all  you  have  said  on  the 
subject,  does  not  doubt  that  it  was  an  order  proper  and  right  for  him 
to  give,  and  consequently  one  w^hich  you  were  bound  to  obey." 

Judging  from  the  actions  of  other  Presidents,  who,  for  rea- 
sons sound  or  otherwise,  relieved  other  generals  in  com- 
mand, President  Lincoln  should  have  relieved  General  Mc- 
Clellan,  as  was  done  on  January  13,  1848,  when  the  Secretary 
of  "War  informed  General  Winfield  Scott  that  the  President 
had  determined  to  relieve  him  from  further  duty  as  Com- 
manding General  in  Mexico,  and  ordered  that  he  turn  over 
the  command  of  the  army  to  the  senior  officer  present. 

Wherein  can  we  find  a  difference  between  the  position  of 
General  McClellan  with  President  Lincoln  and  that  of  the 
other  generals  who  had  commanded  our  armies,  with  their 
Presidents  ?  None,  except  that  General  McClellan  was 
nearer  the  President,  and  had  greater  facilities  for  explain- 
ing his  plans  and  views  to  him.  President  Lincoln's  orders 
and  wishes  should  have  been  obeyed  so  far  as  it  was  in  the 
power  of  the  General  commanding  the  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac to  obey  them,  and  the  records  do  not  show  that  any 
efforts  were  made  to  keep  in  accord  with  the  President,  or  to 
prepare  even  for  the  carrying  out  of  Ms  plans,  particularly 
that  embracing  an  overland  route  to  Eichmond.  No  direct 
and  earnest  effort,  such  as  the  President  had  directed,  was 
made.  Nothing  pointing  toward  a  bold  attack  upon  John- 
ston, or  the  turning  of  his  position  by  the  route  chosen  by 
the  President,  seemed  to  be  even  contemplated. 

Thus  was  the  confidence  of  the  Government  in  General 
McClellan  impaired,  if  not  destroyed. 

The  Army  left  Washington  for  Fortress  Monroe,  to  cany 
out  a  plan  of  campaign  which  w^e  may  describe  as  follows : 
The  base  w^as  to  be  the  Portress ;  the  James  River  was  to  be 


176 


THE  PENINSULA. 


useless,  being  closed  to  ns  by  the  Merrimac.  We  were  to 
move  up  the  Peninsula,  past  Yorktown,  and  invest  that  place 
while  McDowell  was  to  invest  and  reduce  Gloucester.  "We 
were  then  to  make  West  Point  the  new  base,  and  fight  a  bat- 
tle between  that  point  and  Eichmond.  To  do  all  this  it  was 
determined  that  we  would  require  about  140,000  men. 

This  was  the  plan  of  General  McClellan,  with  the  base 
changed  from  Urbana,  thus  involving  the  siege  and  reduc- 
tion of  Yorktown  and  Gloucester,  but  still  a  proposition  of 
his  own. 

The  Warwick  Eiver  was  supposed  to  run  from  north  to 
south;  the  road  to  Williamsburg  from  Newport  News  was 
supposed  to  run  past  Yorktown  and  not  across  the  Warwick. 
No  one  thought  of  a  line  of  works  from  Yorktown  and  down 
the  Warwick,  with  its  right  on  rebel  gunboats.  The  Army 
of  the  Potomac  was  fairly  bottled  up  unless  it  carried  those 
works  at  Yorktown  by  coup-de-main,  or  seized  Gloucester 
and  forced  the  evacuation  of  Yorktown  by  running  its  bat- 
teries. 

And  now  the  salient  features  of  the  first  and  second  plans 
of  General  McClellan  became  of  vital  importance.  They 
are,  in  brief,  the  co-operation  of  the  navy  and  the  seizure 
of  Gloucester  by  a  large  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
detailed  for  that  purpose,  and  the  holding  of  a  force  in  the 
valley  of  the  Shenandoah  subject  to  the  orders  of  the  Gen- 
eral himself. 

General  McClellan  dismisses  the  subject  with  these  few 
words : 

On  my  arrival  at  Fortress  Monroe  the  James  River  was  declared,  by 
the  naval  authorities,  closed  to  the  operations  of  their  vessels,  by  the 
combined  influence  of  the  enemy's  batteries  on  its  bank,  and  the  Con- 
federate steamers  Merrimac,  Yorktov^n,  Jamestown,  and  Teazer. 

**Flag-Officer  Goldsborough,  then  in  command  of  the  United  States 


TERMINATION  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN. 


177 


Bquadron  in  Hampton  Roads,  regarded  it  (and,  no  doubt,  justly)  as  his 
highest  and  most  imperative  duty  to  watch  and  neutraUze  the  Mer- 
rimac,  and,  as  he  designed  using  his  most  powerful  vessels  in  a  contest 
with  her,  he  did  not  feel  able  to  detach  for  the  assistance  of  the  army  a 
suitable  force  to  attack  the  water-batteries  at  Yorktown  and  Glouces- 
ter. All  this  was  contrary  to  what  had  been  previously  stated  to  me, 
and  materially  affected  my  plans. 

At  no  time  during  the  operations  against  Yorktown  was  the  navy 
prepared  to  lend  us  any  material  assistance  in  its  reduction  until  our 
land  batteries  had  partially  silenced  the  works."  ^ 

At  this  point  we  mnst  reiterate  our  assertion  made  in  the 
body  of  this  work  :  "  Co-operation  by  the  navy  was  not  and 
could  not  have  been  secured  at  that  date,  because  Norfolk  had 
not  been  taken  during  the  winter,  as  was  urged  by  Admiral 
Goldsborough." 

The  Navy  Department  had  not  been  impressed  with  the 
importance  of  this  co-operation.  Thus  was  the  first  step 
taken  without  proper  provision  for  carrying  out  the  main 
feature  of  a  water  approach  to  Richmond,  as  contrasted  with 
the  overland  or  direct  route  by  Fredericksburg,  which  re- 
quired no  material  aid  from  the  navy.  Truly  was  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  in  a  false  position. 

"What  was  to  be  done  ?  Here  was  an  army  of  invasion  con- 
fronting a  rebel  line  whose  flanks  rested  on  a  fortified  town 
and  on  gunboats,  whose  front  was  covered  by  a  marsh,  a 
river,  and  in  large  part  by  earthworks.  Since  McDowell's 
corps  had  been  detained  to  defend  Washington  on  the 
ground  that  General  McClellan  had  disregarded  the  orders 

*McC.  Report,  page  138.  "  I  had  no  expectation  of  being  relieved  from  the 
charge  of  the  operations  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  and  in  front  of  Washington, 
the  President's  War  Order  No.  3  giving  no  intimation  of  such  an  intention  ;  and 
that,  so  far  as  reference  was  made  to  final  operations  after  driving  Jackson  back 
and  taking  such  a  position  as  to  prevent  his  return,  no  positive  orders  were  given 
in  the  letter,  the  matter  being  left  for  future  consideration  when  the  proper  tim^e 
ai  rived  for  a  decision." 


178 


THE  PEOTNSULA. 


of  the  President,  and  had  not,  in  the  o^jinions  of  Generals 
Hitchcock  and  L.  Thomas,  complied  with  the  requirements 
of  the  recommendations  of  the  council  of  war,  no  assault 
upon  the  works  at  Gloucester  could  be  attem^Dted  with  any 
13robability  of  success. 

The  army  found  itself,  immediately  after  the  order  which 
removed  McDowell,  in  such  a  reduced  state  in  point  of  num- 
bers, and  in  such  a  false  position  in  regard  to  the  contem- 
plated movement  up  the  Peninsula,  that  it  was  absolutely  im- 
j)erative  upon  the  Commanding  General  to  do  something  to 
give  spirit  and  morale  to  his  troops,  however  hazardous  such 
a  course  might  apjDear  to  be.  Thus,  it  was  imperatively  de- 
manded of  him  to  assault  the  rifle-pits  in  front  of  the  enemy's 
centre  at  once.  Here  it  was  that  General  McClellan  failed  to 
seize  upon  the  only  opportunity  then  afforded  him  to  place 
himself  right  before  the  nation.  He  should  have  then  and 
there  taken  Yorktown.  Desperate  situations  require  des- 
j)erate  measui'es.  We  now  know  that  he  could  have  taken 
the  jDlace.    But  it  seems  to  have  been  ordered  otherwise. 

An  army  not  considered  fit  to  assault  new  and  not  well- 
built  field-works  was  to  be  used  for  a  regular  siege,  ordinari- 
ly requiring  a  desperate  final  assault. 

This  was  indeed  a  miserable  plight  in  which  to  place  an 
army  of  invasion.  The  Government  (for  it  was  not  President 
Lincoln  alone,  but  Secretaries  Chase  and  Stanton,  Generals 
Hitchcock  and  Thomas,  and  whoever  else  were  in  the  secret 
councils) — the  Government,  we  re^Dcat,  was  responsible  for 
this  state  of  things.  The  greatest  militaiy  eiTor  that  could 
possibly  have  been  committed  was  that  which  removed  so 
important  a  corps  from  an  army  ah'eady  in  motion  to  carry- 
out  what  was  a  well-digested  plan. 

It  was  the  President's  duty  to  secure  Washington,  if  Gen- 
eral McClellan  had  not  done  so  already,  but  it  never  was 


TERMINATION  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN. 


179 


his  duty  to  strip  General  McClellan  of  a  portion  of  his  army 
in  the  field,  in  order  to  do  this.  He  could  not  disregard  the 
advice  of  those  who  counselled  with  him  as  military  experts. 
It  would  have  been  better  had  he  chosen  men  of  more  even 
temper  and  well-balanced  mind.  The  resources  of  the  coun- 
try had  not  been  drained — Washington  was  not  in  danger ; 
if  McClellan  was  active  and  the  campaign  in  the  Shenan- 
doah had  been  under  his  direction,  the  works  around  Wash- 
ington could  have  been  held  by  bodies  of  militia  alone. 
But,  with  blind  indifference  to  whatever  might  result  from 
it,  these  men  persuaded  the  President  to  cripple  the  army 
sent  out  on  a  special  mission,  left  the  operations  in  the 
Shenandoah  Valley  under  a  thoroughly  incompetent  general, 
and  in  fact  did  everything  to  insure  disaster  to  the  Peninsula 
campaign. 

Believed  from  command  of  all  the  armies,  fatally  crippled 
after  he  was  committed  to  the  campaign  up  the  Peninsula, 
General  McClellan  was  fairly  in  the  hands  of  those  who  had 
learned  to  distrust  him  and  had  become  his  adversaries. 

Thus  the  army  lay  before  Yorktown,  prepared  to  consume 
weeks  in  conducting  a  siege  against  it.  Encamped,  and  dig- 
ging defences  and  approaches  to  field-works,  the  army  was 
daily  lowered  in  its  own  estimation  by  reading  the  mass  of 
abuse  which  was  found  in  the  public  press,  and  which  was  in- 
spired by  those  principally  active  in  the  orders,  recommenda- 
tions, and  investigations  which  led  to  this  disastrous  condi- 
tion of  affairs ;  abuse  which  was  mostly  personal  and  levelled 
against  the  commander  who  was  directing  the  work.  No 
wonder  General  Barnard  is  forced  to  say :  We  did  not  carry 
away  from  Yorktown  so  good  an  army  as  we  took  there."  Had 
General  McClellan  lost  6,000  men  in  making  a  single  strong 
reconnoissance,  no  blame  would  have  been  attached  to  the  at- 
tempt by  the  army  or  by  the  people.    It  was  the  only  way  out 


180 


THE  PEXrS'SULA. 


of  tlie  scrape,  and  we  believe  that  upon  the  arriral  of  Smith, 
of  Keves'  coi-jds,  -^ith  his  division  in  front  of  Lee's  ]Mills,  the 
captnre  of  the  rebel  breastworks  was  possible,  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  rebel  line  and  the  capture  of  Yorktown  following ; 
and  we  now  know  that  General  Smith,  njDon  his  second  re- 
coimoissance  on  April  16th,  proved  that  it  was  not  impossible 
to  force  the  rebel  line  at  any  period  before  that  date. 

The  removal  of  McDowell's  corps,  we  must  again  assert, 
was  an  act  nnwoi-thy  of  any  men  pretending  to  be  the  military 
advisers  of  the  Pi-esident.  They  either  knew  nothing  of  the 
nsnal  consequences  of  moving  an  aiTiiy  to  attack  the  capital 
of  a  nation,  or  for  partisan  political  pirqDOses  they  were  con- 
tented to  advise  the  crippling  of  McClellan.  They  pretended 
not  to  know  that  the  very  reason  they  assigned  for  moving 
more  troops  to  defend  TTashington  would  compel  the  rebels 
with  theii*  small  force  to  keep  all  theii*  troops  to  defend 
Richmond.  Xo  one  then  knew  how  little  General  McClellan 
was  adapted  to  x^ush  matters  after  the  aiToies  had  "locked 
horns " :  the  Government  had  the  light  to  suppose  that  he 
needed  but  the  opportunity,  to  attack  with  vigor,  especially 
as  the  plan  under  which  he  was  working  was  his  own. 

In  the  third  chapter  we  have  referred  to  the  shrewdness 
of  General  Johnston  in  evacuating  Yorktown  as  soon  as  he 
had  become  convinced  that  he  delayed  as  long  as  pmdence 
dictated.  Had  he  remained,  his  army  would  have  been  cap- 
tui-ed. 

General  McClellan  has  been  censured  by  many  critics  for 
remaining  behind  at  Yorktown ;  but  we  must  recall  that  it 
was  known  that  the  rebels  intended  to  make  the  narrow  por- 
tion of  the  Peninsula,  near  Williamsburg,  their  second  line 
of  defence  to  cover  their  retreat  to  Richmond.  On  page  7.1:  of 
his  report  General  McClellan  wiites  :  '"It  was  also  known  that 
there  were  strong  defensive  works  at  or  near  ^yilliamsburg." 


TERMINATION  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN. 


181 


Williamsburg  is  situated  about  one-third  of  the  distance 
from  Yorktown  to  the  new  base  which  was  to  be  established 
by  General  McClellan  at  West  Point,  and  from  Yorktown  to 
West  Point  is  about  thirty  miles  by  water.  It  was  not  at  all 
impassible,  but,  on  the  contrary,  it  was  highly  probable,  that 
any  strong  corps  sent  by  water  to  West  Point,  or  to  a  point 
near  it,  would,  under  ordinary  circumstances,  completely  cut 
off  Johnston's  retreat.  It  was  therefore  the  duty  of  the  Com- 
manding General  to  urge  on  such  troops  as  he  intended  should 
form  this  flanking^  column,  which  was  to  be  under  General 
Franklin.  He  had  been  distinctly  informed  by  Chief  Allen 
that,  on  May  3d,  the  rebels  had  had  present  in  Yorktown  from 
100,000  to  120,000  men,  and  this  chief  had  reported  that  he 
knew  this  because  119,000  rations  had  been  issued.  General 
McClellan  had  for  the  pursuit  109,335  men,  and  it  was  sub- 
sequently determined  that  the  rebels  withdrew  from  York- 
town  with  but  53,000  men.  This  false  estimate  of  the  rebel 
strength  must  always  be  an  element  in  any  discussion  of  the 
operations  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  on  the  Peninsula. 

This  strange  discrepancy  between  the  actual  numbers  of 
the  rebels  at  a  given  point  and  the  number  contained  in 
General  McClellan's  despatches  and  official  reports,  wher- 
ever found,  are  all  due  to  the  gross  miscalculations  made  by 
the  Secret  Service  Division  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
Thus,  March  8, 1862,  the  rebel  Army  of  the  Potomac  is  stated 
to  have  been  150,000  strong,  of  which  80,000  were  reported 
stationed  at  Centreville  and  vicinity ;  on  March  11th  there 
were  only  47,000  men  at  that  point.  On  March  17th,  Chief 
Allen  reports  again,  150,000  men  in  the  rebel  Army  of  the  Po- 
tomac— a  report  just  as  reliable  as  the  first.  May  3d,  from 
camp  at  Yorktown,  he  states  the  force  to  be  from  100,000  to 
120,000,  and  bases  this  information  upon  reports  of  persons 
connected  with  the  Commissary  Department  at  Yorktown. 


182 


THE  PEXIXSULA. 


He  finally  states  to  General  McClellan  that  these  state- 
ments are  "  under  rather  than  over  the  truth."  The  truth 
is,  there  were  not  over  53,000  effective  men  there.  From 
Camp  Lincoln,  June  26th,  he  reports  that  the  forces  at  that 
time  were  over  180,000  men.  "We  know  they  did  not  amount 
to  more  than  85,000,  while  their  official  returns  give  them 
but  80,000.  Finally,  on  August  14th,  he  reports  that  the 
rebel  army  about  Eichmond  contained  200,000  men,  and 
that  their  losses  in  the  seven  days'  battles  were  40,000  men. 
They  lost  18,000.^ 

General  McClellan  remained  behind  at  Yorktown,  to  push 
Franklin  and  Porter  to  a  point  twenty  miles  beyond  Wil- 
liamsburg, but  failed  to  do  so  in  time  to  render  their  flank 
movement  of  any  decided  effect. 

Now,  it  turned  out  that  the  battle  of  Williamsburg  was 
fought  without  any  plan,  and  General  McClellan  has  been 
censured  for  having  relied  too  much  upon  the  discretion  and 
ability  of  the  corps  commanders  present.  His  absence  from 
the  field  has  been  referred  to  somewhat  in  detail  by  the 
Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  and  in  his  testimony 
before  that  committee  the  General  stated  that  he  was  not  in- 
formed of  the  nature  of  the  contest,  but  distinctly  states 
that  he  considered  it  at  that  period  a  mere  affair  with  the 
rear-guard  of  the  enemy.  In  his  official  report  he  very  nat- 
urally places  some  blame  upon  the  members  of  his  staff  who 
failed  to  inform  him  of  the  operations  in  the  advance. f 

In  justice  to  General  McClellan  we  must  state  that  he  was 
exceedingly  kind-hearted  in  his  animadversions  upon  the  ac- 
tion of  his  staff  officers.  At  that  time  the  general  staff  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  did  not  and  could  not  assist  him 
as  a  General  Commanding  should  have  been  assisted.  There 


*  See  Taylor :  Four  Years  with  General  Lee.  1878. 

t  See  Allan's  Report,  p.  521.    Mil.  Repts.  War  Dept.,  vol.  iv. 


TERMINATION  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN. 


183 


was  a  good  organization  of  the  special  staff  departments  at 
the  army  headquarters,  but  there  was  not  a  large  personal 
staff  of  experienced  and  talented  officers,  capable  of  keep- 
ing the  General  fully  informed  of  the  operations  of  his  corps, 
and  of  the  necessity  for  his  presence  when  that  necessity  be- 
came obvious.  The  following  is  his  report  concerning  the 
battle  of  Williamsburg : 

"At  an  early  hour  of  the  morning  I  had  sent  two  of  my  aids  to  ob- 
serve the  operations  in  front,  with  instructions  to  report  to  me  every- 
thing of  importance  that  might  occur.  I  received  no  information  from 
them  leading  me  to  suppose  that  there  was  anything  occurring  of  more 
importance  than  a  simple  affair  of  a  rear-guard,  until  about  1  o'clock 
P.M.,  when  a  despatch  arrived  from  one  of  them  that  everything  was 
not  progressing  favorably." 

This  report  of  the  General  has  called  for  these  remarks  in 
regard  to  the  formation  of  his  general  staff,  and  we  find  good 
cause  for  this  condition  of  affairs.  From  the  Eeport  of  the 
Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  we  gather,  upon 
reading  the  testimony  of  General  Richardson,  and  the  char- 
acter of  the  questions  submitted  to  him,  that  there  had  been 
at  that  time  a  strong  adverse  feeling  in  regard  to  the  com- 
position and  number  of  the  staff  of  the  General  Commanding 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  It  was  but  natural,  therefore, 
that  General  McClellan  felt  that  the  Government  and  the 
public  were  not  ready  to  understand  the  necessities  of  his 
position  in  this  regard,  and  that  he  abstained  from  requiring 
the  necessary  details  from  the  army  and  appointments  at 
large  to  his  staff  in  deference  to  these  views.  General  Mc- 
Clellan's  field-work  was  therefore  restricted  by  this  unwill- 
ingness on  his  part  to  relieve  himself  from  the  burden  of  the 
details  which  afterward  crowded  upon  him. 

It  was  probably  the  duty  of  the  Government  to  appoint  to 


184 


THE  PENINSULA. 


the  general  staff  many  prominent  foreigners  wlio  desired  to 
observe  our  military  operations,  and,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
French  princes,  such  officers  might  at  times  render  brilliant 
services ;  but  their  presence  should  not  have  excluded  Ameri- 
can officers  of  ability  and  experience. 

Most  of  his  failures  were  due  to  these  causes.  No  one 
seemed  to  encourage  action  or  to  report  when  or  where  he 
could  act.  He  could  not  be  present  at  all  times  with  his  ad- 
vance, and  often  no  one  represented  him  at  this  point.  He 
endeavored  to  do  in  person  that  which  he  should  have  done 
through  a  proper  staff.  The  result  was  apparent  inefficiency 
on  his  part  and  want  of  unity  in  the  efforts  of  his  corps. 

After  the  evacuation  of  Yorktown,  the  main  body  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  had  a  plain  duty  to  perform,  i.e.,  to 
overtake  the  enemy — to  engage  him — to  capture  or  detain 
him  until  his  flank  should  be  gained  by  Franklin's  com- 
mand. The  performance  of  this  duty  was  very  naturally 
left  to  the  next  general  in  order  of  rank — the  commander  of 
the  first  corps — when  General  McClellan  deemed  it  to  be 
his  duty  to  remain  at  Yorktown  to  push  the  selected  force 
rapidly  to  Eltham.  But  unfortunately  the  troops  could  not 
be  pushed  rapidly  to  Eltham,  and  the  result  of  his  labors  at 
this  point  did  not  compensate  for  the  loss  of  his  presence 
at  Williamsburg.  He  could  not  know  it,  but  at  that  time 
it  is  stated  by  the  rebel  General  Hood  that  General  Johnston 
had  made  up  his  mind  to  retreat  beyond  Eichmond,  and  to 
detain  him  anywhere  was  of  the  greatest  importance. 

If  General  McClellan  could  have  been  informed  at  once  of 
what  was  occurring  at  Williamsburg,  he  would  have  gone 
there,  and,  by  his  presence  and  with  his  knowledge  of  his 
own  plans,  he  would  have  forced  the  rebels  to  have  aban- 
doned their  works  at  once,  or  he  would  have  detained  them 


TERMINATION  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN. 


185 


in  their  lines  nntil  lie  could  have  succeeded  in  placing  Gen- 
erals Franklin,  Porter,  Sedgwick,  and  Eichardson  on  their 
flank.  At  any  rate,  he  would  have  punished  them  more  se- 
verely, knowing  that  they  were  forced  to  fight  to  save  their 
trains,  and  also  forced  to  retreat  to  save  their  communications 
with  Eichmond.  Here,  by  reason  of  his  absence  and  by 
reason  of  the  want  of  knowledge  of  the  position  of  affairs  on 
the  part  of  his  staff  officers,  he  failed  in  all  his  plans  most 
signally,  and  the  failure  appeared  all  the  greater  because 
he  had  promised  rapid  marches  and  brilliant  operations. 
The  rain  and  the  mud  were  nearly  as  bad  for  the  rebels  as 
for  the  iJnited  States  troops.  Another  fatal  error  was  made, 
and  an  opportunity  to  inspirit  the  whole  army  and  the 
Government  was  lost  on  May  5,  1862. 

General  Johnston  reports  that  at  no  time  wlas  he  pressed 
or  uncertain.  Two-thirds  of  the  Union  army  under  its 
senior  corps  commander  could  have  both  ^'pressed"  him 
and  produced  uncertainty."  For  work  of  this  kind  no 
man  save  the  General  Commanding  himself  was  fitted  at 
that  time.  Johnston  actually  got  away  from  the  Union 
front  and  attacked  General  Franklin's  turning  or  flanking 
column  on  the  7th  inst.,  at  10  a.m.,  and  drove  a  portion  of 
it  out  of  his  way,  and  so  passed  on. 

However,  we  did  derive  some  benefits  from  the  battle  of 
Williamsburg.  Generals  Hancock,  Kearney,  and  Hooker 
then  and  there  gave  evidence  of  their  fitness  for  command 
on  such  occasions. 

The  reasons  assigned  for  not  following  Johnston  more 
rapidly  were  the  exhaustion  of  the  troops,  want  of  ammuni- 
tion, the  want  of  rations,  the  rain,  and  the  mud.  The  Army 
of  the  Potomac  was  hampered  by  the  necessity  for  establish- 
ing a  new  base,  and  the  result  was  that  it  was  not  until 
twelve  days  after  the  battle  of  Williamsburg  that  it  arrived 


186 


THE  PENINSULA. 


in  front  of  Eiclimond.  Concerning  the  events  following  the 
assumption  of  the  aclyanced  position  in  front  of  Eichmond, 
there  is  little  beyond  what  has  been  narrated  to  which  we 
would  desire  to  call  attention.  An  army  inexperienced  in 
field  operations  had  been  finally  brought  near  to  the  rebel 
capital.  It  was  enthusiastic  and  confident,  but  it  needed  an 
especial  training  to  carry  on  an  oflfensiye  campaign.  It  is 
therefore  impossible  for  us  to  agTee  with  General  Barnard 
in  regard  to  the  affair  of  Hanover  Court-House,  which  he 
calls  a  useless  battle.  In  point  of  fact  this  battle  was  ex- 
actly what  the  army  wanted.  If  there  was  to  be  a  junction 
made  with  McDowell,  it  was  well  to  drive  General  Branch 
out  of  the  way,  even  if  it  was  not  necessary  to  do  so.  But, 
beyond  all  this,  it  was  high  time  for  the  new  army  to  ex- 
hibit some  character  and  determination  in  its  operations ; 
and  all  successful  affairs  of  this  kind,  whether  on  its  flanks 
or  in  its  front,  would  have  been  of  importance  as  giving 
esprit  and  morale  to  the  forces  engaged ;  and  would  have 
assisted  in  developing  the  talents  and  increasing  the  experi- 
ence of  the  generals  taking  part  in  them.  To  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  for  these  reasons,  the  battle  of  Hanover  Court- 
House  was  of  great  service.  The  writer  made  the  prelimi- 
nary reconnoissance  with  the  cavalry,  and  guided  the  column 
of  General  Porter  when  he  moved  to  defeat  General  Branch, 
and  to  communicate  if  possible  with  General  McDowell. 
He  knows  the  effect  upon  the  troops  of  our  success  at  that 
point,  and  he  considers  the  moral  effects  of  that  success  to 
have  been  of  the  greatest  importance  in  the  subsequent  bat- 
tle of  Gaines'  Mill. 

The  story  of  Fair  Oaks  and  Seven  Pines  is  well  known  to 
all.  Since  the  war  we  have  discovered  that  we  could  have 
gone  to  Pvichmond.  General  McClellan  was  sick,  and  if  he 
believed  his  secret  sei-vice  report  he  was  probably  glad  to 


TERMINATION  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN.  187 


have  prevented  the  overwhelming  of  his  left  flank  by  150,000 
rebels  under  Johnston.  As  usual,  he  was  grossly  and  per- 
sistently deceived.  But  there  was  another  case  at  Gaines' 
Mill. 

At  the  battle  General  McClellan  found  70,000  of  the  enemy 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  Chickahominy,  desperately  contend- 
ing to  overwhelm  Fitz  John  Porter,  who  resolutely  defended 
himself  for  many  hours  from  being  driven  into  the  river,  or 
down  it,  by  this  overwhelming  force.  We  have  narrated  ex- 
actly what  occun-ed  on  both  banks  of  the  stream.  But  the 
WTiter  was  present  with  General  Porter  on  that  day,  having 
been  ordered  to  join  him,  and  having  left  the  general  head- 
quarters for  that  purpose.  He  carried  with  him  to  General 
Porter  the  distinct  impression  then  prevailing  at  the  head- 
quarters of  the  army,  that  he  was  to  hold  thisdarge  force  of 
the  enemy  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Chickahominy,  in  order 
that  General  McClellan,  with  the  main  army,  might  break 
through  and  take  Bichmond.  At  that  time  it  was  generally 
understood  that  this  was  the  plan  of  the  General  Command- 
ing, and  the  criticism  that  General  Porter  should  have  been 
taken  to  the  right  bank  of  the  river  before  the  battle,  is  in 
our  opinion  the  correct  one.  The  sacrifice  at  Gaines'  Mill 
of  7,000  men  was  warranted,  if  we  were  to  gain  Eichmond  by 
making  it,  and  the  troops  engaged  in  carrying  out  this  plan, 
conceiving  it  to  be  the  wish  of  the  General  Commanding,  were 
successful  in  holding  the  rebels  on  the  left  bank.  But  Gen- 
eral McClellan  had  made  up  his  mind  to  move  to  the  James 
Biver  to  a  new  base  before  this  battle,  and  he  had  made  every 
preparation  to  make  this  change  in  the  presence  of  the  army 
defending  Bichmond.  His  subsequent  movements  and  or- 
ders clearly  show  that  he  did  not  believe  that  the  entrance 
of  the  army  into  Bichmond  at  that  time,  leaving  the  major 
part  of  the  rebel  army  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Chickahominyj 


188 


THE  PENINSULA. 


was  a  proper  military  movement.  In  this  view  of  the  mili- 
tarj  position  lie  has  already  encountered,  as  he  will  always 
encounter,  a  strong  adverse  criticism  from  most  military  wri- 
ters. The  whole  strength  of  the  United  States  Government 
would  have  been  instantly  turned  toward  maintaining  his 
army  in  the  rebel  capital,  and  Generals  Lee  and  Jackson 
would  have  had  a  slight  chance  of  success  if  they  presumed 
to  cross  the  Chickahominy  to  its  right  bank  for  the  purpose 
of  regaining  Eichmond.  From  this  moment  until  the  taking 
of  the  army  from  the  Peninsula,  everything  seems  to  have 
been  subordinated  to  the  movements  necessary  to  defend 
the  Union  lines  from  the  repeated  attacks  from  the  rebels, 
who,  after  concentrating  their  forces  on  the  right  bank  of 
the  Chickahominy,  seemed  animated  by  the  hope  that  they 
would  ultimately  drive  our  army  from  the  Peninsula,  or 
carry  much  of  it  to  Eichmond  as  xDrisoners. 

Chief  Allen  about  this  time  reports  200,000  men  as  op- 
posed to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  General  McClellan  found 
Porter  opposed  to  about  70,000,  and  supposed  125,000  men 
were  in  position  between  him  and  Eichmond.  He  there- 
upon made  one  of  the  most  able  flank  movements  ever  made 
in  war.  It  may  be  called  "  retreat "  or  change  of  base,  as 
different  writers  may  prefer ;  the  army  certainly  did  not 
move  of  its  own  accord,  as  in  retreat,  but  it  was  directed  by 
General  McClellan  to  its  final  position  at  Malvern  Hill,  and 
there  it  fought  and  maintained  its  reputation.  The  lessons 
taught  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  during  the  past  three 
months  were  never  lost  to  it.  Inexperienced  officers  and 
men  became  veterans,  to  serve  under  other  commanders  in 
"  defending  the  constitution  of  the  country  and  the  nation- 
ality of  its  peo23le."'^ 


*  See  General  McClellan's  farewell  order. 


TERMIJTATION  OF  THE  CAMPAIGlsr.  189 


And  now,  wliat  saved  tlie  Army  of  the  Potomac  from  fur- 
ther disaster  than  that  consequent  upon  a  forced  change 
of  base?  It  was  the  perfection  of  its  organization,  which 
was  due  to  the  personal  affection  entertained  for  General 
McClellan  by  the  officers  and  men  of  his  army.  As  an  evi- 
dence of  the  influence  this  attachment  of  the  army  to  the 
General  Commanding  had  upon  the  authorities  at  Washing- 
ton, we  quote  the  following  from  a  letter  addressed  to  the 
writer  by  one  of  the  ablest  generals  of  the  regular  army, 
who  has  from  the  fall  of  Sumter  until  to-day  enjoyed  the 
respect  and  confidence  of  every  administration:  General 
Hitchcock  said  to  me,  I  presume  about  the  time  he  visited 
the  Peninsula,  *It  is  impossible  for  me  now  to  command 
that  army,'  referring,  I  understood,  to  its  training  by 
McClellan,  its  known  devotion  to  him,  to  the  fact  that  its 
corps  commanders  and  highest  officers  were  almost  entirely 
of  his  selection,  so  that  the  whole  army,  officers  and  men, 
were  in  a  special  manner  devoted  to  him,  and  would  thus 
be  with  difficulty  guided  and  controlled  by  a  general  new  to 
it  and  to  them,  and  whose  military  reputation  belonged  to 
a  long-passed  war — that  with  Mexico." 

These  officers  were  correct  in  their  estimate  of  the  in- 
fluence which  this  personal  affection  for  its  commander  had 
upon  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  It  was  so  strong  that  every 
one  naturally  shrank  from  interfering  between  General 
McClellan  and  his  men.  His  own  regard  for  his  troops  may 
have  at  times  made  him  unwilling  to  sacrifice  some  for  the 
good  of  the  whole.  It  is  but  charitable  to  consider  this 
feeling  on  his  part  to  have  been  one  cause  of  our  failure. 
We  must  write,  however,  in  regard  to  facts  of  history  just  as 
the  record  presents  these  facts  to  us.  There  was  failure, 
and  the  causes  of  that  failure  have  been  largely  hidden  from 
us.    We,  who  belonged  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  the 


190 


THE  PENINSULA. 


gi'andest  army  gathered  on  this  continent,  at  all  times  true 
to  its  commander-in-chief,  whoever  it  might  be,  hope  that 
he  who  organized  that  army  will  yet  deem  it  wise  and  proper 
to  give  some  fuller  vindication  of  the  policy  he  adopted,  no 
matter  whom  he  may  strike.  As  it  is,  his  friends  and  ad- 
mirers have  to  deplore  the  necessity  of  writing  in  general 
criticism  of  the  results  which  have  been  variously  attributed 
to  "want  of  support,"  "interference,"  or  "inaction." 


APPENDIX  A. 


The  original  organization  of  the  Army  of  tlie  Potomac 
was  of  a  temporary  character,  extending  no  farther  than 
the  formation  of  brigades  and  divisions,  in  which  sub- 
sequent changes  were  to  be  made,  as  their  efficiency  de- 
manded. The  final  composition,  on  April  1,  1862,  com- 
mencing with  the  portion  which  went  to  the  Peninsula, 
and  giving  afterward  the  regiments  and  batteries  left 
on  the  Potomac,  in  Maryland  and  Virginia,  was  as  fol- 
lows :  ^ 

TEOOPS  OF  THE  AKMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC  SENT  TO 
THE  PENINSULA  IN  MAECH  AND  APEIL,  1862. 

I. 

CAVALRY  RESERVE.    BRIGADIER-GENERAL  P,  ST.  G. 
COOKE, 

Emory- s  Brigade. 

5th  United  States  Cavalry. 
6th  " 

6th  Pennsylvania  '* 

Blake'^s  Brigade^ 

1st  TTnited  States  Cavalry. 

8th  Pennsylvania  " 

Barker's  Squadron  Illinois  Cavalry. 


*  This  Rost€r  is  taken  from  General  McClellan's  official  report,  as  published  by 
himself. 


192 


THE  PENINSULA. 


11. 

ARTILLERY  RESERVE.    COLONEL  HENRY  J.  HUNT. 


Graham's  Battery 

Randors  " 

Carlisle's  " 

Eobertson's  " 

Benson's  " 

Tidbairs  " 

Edwards'  " 

Gibson's  "  ' 

Livingston's  " 

Howe's  " 

De  Russy's  " 

Weed's  " 

Smead's  " 

Ames'  *' 

Diederick's  " 

Voegelie'R  " 
Knieriem's 

Grimm's  " 


'G" 


1st  V.  S., 
1st  " 


2d 


"M" 
"A" 

&  "M'' 
'  &  ''G" 
K" 


'G" 
'K" 
"I" 
'K" 


'A" 
'B" 
'  C  " 


2d 
3d 

3d  " 

3d  " 

4tli  " 

4th  " 

5th  " 

5th  " 

5th  " 

N.  Y.  Art.  Batt'n, 


6  Napoleon  guns. 
6 

6  20-pds.  Parrott  ^ns. 
6  3-inch  ordnance  guns. 
6  " 
6  " 

6  10-pds.  Parrott  " 
6  3-'nch  ordnance  " 
4  lO  pds.  Parrott  " 
6  Napoleon  '* 
6  " 

6  3-inch  ordnance  *' 
4  Napoleon  '* 
j  4  10-pds.  Parrott } 
^|2  Napoleon  f^""«- 
6  20-pds.  Parrott  guns. 
4  " 
4  " 

()  32-pds.  howitzers. 
100  guns. 


III. 

VOLUNTEER  ENGINEER  TROOPS.   GENERAL  WOODBURY. 

15th  New  York  Volunteers. 
50th 

REGULAR  ENGINEER  TROOPS.    CAPTAIN  DUANE. 

Companies  "A,"  "B,"  and  "  C,"  U.  S.  Engineers, 


ARTILLERY  TROOPS  WITH  SIEGE  TRAIN. 
1st  Connecticut  Heavy  Artillery.    Col.  Tyler. 


SECOND  CORPS.    GENERAL  SUMNER. 

Cavalry. 
8th  Illinois  Cavalry.    C  jL  Farnsioorth 
One  Squadron  6th  New  York  Cavalry. 


Clark's  Battery 
Frank's  " 
Pettit's  " 
Hogan's  " 


EICHARDSON-S  DIVISION. 

Artillery. 
"  A"  &  "  C  "  4th  U.  S  ,   6  Napoleon  guns. 

"  G  "        1st  N.  Y.,    6  10-pds.  Parrott  guns. 

*'B"        1st     "        6    "  " 

"A"        2d     "       6  " 


RowarcCs  Brigade. 
5th  N.  H.  Vols. 
81st  Penn.  " 
61st  N.  Y.  " 
64th  " 


Infantry. 

Meagher's  Brigade. 
69th  N.  Y.  Vols. 
63d 

88th  " 


French'' Si  Brigade. 
52d  N.  Y.  Vols. 
57th  " 
66th  " 
53d  Penn.  " 


APPENDiA  A. 


193 


Kirby's  Battery 
Tompkins  " 

Bartlett's  " 
Owen's  " 

Gorman'' s  Brigade. 
2d  N.  y.  S.  M. 
15th  Mass.  Vols. 
34th  N.  Y. 
1st  Minn,  " 


SEDGWICK'S  DIVISION. 
Artillery. 
'  I "  1st  U.  S.,  6  Napoleon  guns. 


"A"  Ist  R.  L, 

"  B  "  1st 
"G"   


g  i  4  10-pds.  Parrott 

1  2  12-pds.  Howitzer? 
n  j  4  10-pds.  Parrott 
^  (  2  12-pds.  Howitzers, 
6  3-inch  ordnance  guns.' 


guns. 


Infantry. 
Burns'  Brigade. 
69th  Penn.  Vols. 
71st     "  " 
72d  " 
106th  " 


Dana's  Brigade. 
19th  Mass.  Vols. 
7th  Mich.  " 
42d  N.  Y.  " 
20th  Mass.  " 


Note. — Blenker''s  t?/y/sfon  detached  and  assigned  to  the  Mountain  Department. 


THIRD  CORPS.   GENERAL  HEINTZELMAN. 

Cavalry. 

3d  Pennsylvania  Cavalry.    Col.  Averill. 
PORTER'S  DIVISION. 
Artillery. 

Griffin's  Battery  "  K  "  5th  U.  S.,  6  10-pds.  Parrot  guns.- 


Weeden's 
Martin's  " 
Allen's       "  ' 

MartindaWs  Brigade. 
2d  Maine  Vols. 
18th  Mass.  " 
22d  " 
25th  N.  Y.  " 
13th  " 

Ist  Berdan  Sharpshooters. 


'C-'  R.  L, 
'  C"'  Mass., 
'E" 

Infantry. 

MoreWs  Brigade. 

14i:hN.  Y.  Vols. 

4th  Mich. 

9th  Mass.  " 

62d  Penn. 


6  Napoleon  guns. 
6  3-in.  ordnance  guns. 


Butter fleW s  Brigad^ 
17th  N.  Y.  Vols. 
88d  Penn.  " 
44th  N.Y.  " 
Stockton's  Michigan. 
12th  N.  Y.  Vols. 


Hall's  Battery  "  H  "  1st  U.  S.. 

Smiths  " 
Bramh all's  ' 
Osborn's  * 


HOOKER'S  DIVISION. 
Artillery. 

ft  j  4  10-pds.  Parrott  ) 
"  /  2  12-pds.  Howitzers  f 
4th  N.  Y.  Battery,  6    10-pds.  Parrott  guns. 
6th  6    3-in.  ordnance  " 

'  D  ■' 1st  N.  Y.  Art'y,  4      "  " 


Si/^kles^  Brigade. 
1st  Excelsior  (N.  Y.) 
2d 
3d 
4th 
5tli 


Infantry. 

Ragle's  Brigade. 
1st  Mass.  Vols, 
nth 

26th  Penn.  " 
2d  N.  H.  " 


Col.  Starr's  Brigade. 
5th  N.  J.  Vols. 
6th  " 
7th  " 
8th  *' 


HA^IILTON'S  DI\^SION. 
Artillery. 

Thompson's  Battery  "G"  2d  U.  S.,    6   Napoleon  guns. 

Beam'.  "      "  B  "  N.  J.,       6  ]  1 I  ^,ns. 

u-riM  -D  T  «  <  4  10-pds.  Parrott  ) 

^    R.  i.,        t> o  Napoleon  )" 


Randolph's 


194 


THE  PENINSULA. 


JaxnesoiVs  Brigade. 
105th  Penn.  Vols. 

.57th 

STth  N.  Y. 


Infantry. 
Birney's  Brigade. 
38th  N.  Y.  Vols. 
40Ui     ^'  ^' 
3d  Maine    • ' 
4th  " 


 Brigade. 

2d  Mich.  Vols. 
3d 

5th  " 
37th  N.  Y. 


FOURTH  CORPS.    GENERAL  KEYES. 
Cavalry. 


COUCH'S  DIVISION. 


McCarthy's  Battery  ' 
Flood's  "  " 

Miller's  "  ' 

Brady's  "  * 

GrahaiyCs  Brigade. 
fi7th  N.  Y.  Vols.  (1st  L.  I.) 
65th    "       "  (1st  U.  S.  Chas.) 
23d  Penn. 
31st  " 
61st  *' 


Artillery. 
*C"  1st  Penn., 
'D"  1st  " 
'E''  1st  " 
'F"'lst  " 


4 10  pds.  Parrott  guns. 
6  " 

4  Napoleon  "  '* 
4  10-pds.  Parrott  " 


Infantry, 

Peck\s  Brigade. 
08th  Penn.  Vols. 
10.2d  " 
93d 

62dN.  Y. 
,55th  " 


 Brigade, 

2d  R.  I.  Vols. 
7th  Mass. 
10th  " 
S6th  N.  Y.  " 


SMITH'S  DIVISION. 
Artillery. 


Ayres'  Battery  *'  F  *'  5th  U.  S., 


Mott's  " 

Wheeler's  " 
Kennedy's  '* 


Hancock's  Brigade. 
5th  Wis.  Vols. 
49th  Penn. 
43d  N.  Y. 
6th  Maine  " 


3d  N.  Y.  Battery,  6  ^ 

"E"lstN.  Y.,  4 
IstN.  Y.  Battery,  6 


4  10-pds.  Parrott 

2  Napoleon 

4  10-pds.  Parrott 

2  Napoleon 

3  in.  ordnance 


Infantry. 
Brooks'  Brigade, 
2d  Vermont  Vols, 
3d 

4th  " 

5th       "  " 

6th  " 


Davidson^ s  Brigade. 
33d  N.  Y.  Vols. 
T7th  " 
49th  " 
7th  Maine  *' 


CASEY'S  DIVISION. 
Artillery. 

Regan's  Battery  7th  N.  Y.  Battery,      6  3-in.  ordnance  guns. 


Fitch's 
Bates' 
Spratt's 


Khim's  Brigade. 
85th  Penn.  Vols. 
101st  " 
103d  " 
96th  N.  Y.  " 


8th 

"A"  1st  N.  Y.  Art'y.  6  Napoleon 
"H"lst     "  4  3-in.  ordnance 


Infantry. 
Palmer's  Brigade. 
85th  N.  Y.  Vols. 
98th  " 
92d 

Slst  " 
98d 


  B7  igade. 

104th  Penn.  Vols. 
.52d 

.56th  N.  Y. 

moth  " 

11th  Maine  *' 


APPENDIX  A. 


195 


V. 

PROVOST  GUARD. 
2d  U.  S.  Cavalry. 

Battalion  8th  and  17th  U.  S.  Infantry. 

AT  GENERAL  HEADQUARTERS. 

2  Cos.  4th  U.  S.  Cavalry.  1  Co.  Oneida  Cav.  (N.  Y.  Vols.), 
1  Co.  Sturgis  Rifles  (111.  Vols.). 


The  following  troops  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  were  left 
behind,  or  detached,  on  and  in  front  of  the  Potomac  for  the 
defense  of  that  line,  April  1,  1862.  Franklin's  and  McCall's 
divisions  at  subsequent  and  different  dates  joined  the  active 
portion  of  the  army  on  the  Peninsula.  Two  brigades  of 
Shields'  division  joined  at  Harrison's  Landing. 

FIRST  CORPS.    GENERAL  McDOWELL. 
Cavalry. 

1st  New  York  Cavalry.  4th  New  York  Cavalry, 

2d         "  1st  Pennsylvania 

SHARrSHOOTEKS. 

2d  Regiment  Berdan's  Sharpshooters. 


FRANKLIN'S  DIVISION. 
Artilleey. 


Piatt's  Battery  * 
Porter's     "  * 

Hexamer's  "  ' 
Wilson's     "  ' 


Kearney's  Brigade. 
IstN.  J.  Vols. 
2d  " 
3d  " 
4th  " 


'D"  2d  U.  S., 
'  A ''  Mass., 

'A"  N.  J., 


G  Napoleon  guns. 

j  4-10  pds.  Parrott 
^  (  2  12-pds.  Howitzers 

j  4  10-pds.  Parrott 
"  /  2  12-pds.  Howitzers 


'  F  "  1st  N.  Y.  Art'y,  4  3-in.  ordnance 

Infantry. 
Slocum^s 


Ifjth  N.  Y.  Vols. 
27th  " 
5th  Maine  " 
96th  Penn. 


Newton^s  Brigade. 

18th  N.  Y.  Vols. 

31st  " 

82d  " 

95th  Penn.  '* 


McCALKS  DIVISION. 
Artillery. 

Seymour  s  Battery  "  C    5th  U.  S.,  6  Napoleon  guns, 
Eaton's         "       *' A "  Ist  Penn.,  4        "  " 
Cooper's        "       ''B"lst  6  IC-pds.  Parrott  guns. 

Kein's  "       "C"lst  ei^W  Parrott^ 


'  (  4  la-pds!  Howitzers    (  8™'' 


196 


THE  PENINSULA. 


Reynolds'  Brigade. 

1st  Penn.  Res.  Reg't. 

2d  '  

5th  " 
8th  " 


Infantry. 

Meade's  Brigade 

3d  Penn.  Res.  Rear't. 
4th  " 

7th    "        "  " 
nth  " 

1  Penn.  Reserve  Rifles. 


Ord: s  Brigade. 

6th  Penn.  Res.  Regt. 
9th  " 
10th  " 
12th 


Gibbon's  Battery 
Monroe's  " 
Gerrish's  " 
Durrell's  " 


•  Brigade. 


2d  Wis.  Vols. 
6th  " 
7th 

19th  Ind. 


KING'S  DIVISION. 

Aktilleet. 

'•B"  4th  U.  S.,  6  XapoleoTi  guns. 

"  D  "  1st  R.  I.,  6  lO-pds.  Parrott  guns. 

"A"'  N.  H.,  6  Napoleon.  " 

Penn.  6  10- pds.  Parrott  " 


Infantry. 

Patrick's  Brigade. 


Augur's  Brigade. 


20th  N. 
21st 
23d 
25th 


Y.  S.  "M. 

'  Vols. 


14th  N. 

22d  ' 
24th 
30th  ■ 


Y.  S.  M. 

'  Vols. 


FIFTH  CORPS.    GENERAL  BANKS. 
Cavalry. 


1st  Maine  Cavaliy, 
1st  Vermont  " 
l?t  Michigan  " 
1st  R.I.  " 


28th  Penn.  Vols. 


5th  New  York  Cavalry. 
8ch 

Keyes'  Battalion  Penn.  Cavalry. 
18  Cos,  Maryland  " 
1  Squadron  Virginia 

Unattached. 

4th  Reg't  Potomac  Home  Guard  (Maryland  Vols.). 


Best's  Battery 
Hampton's 
Thompson's 
Mathews' 

Knapp's 
McMahon's 


WILLIAMS'  DIVISION. 
Artilleey. 
"  F  "  4th  U.S.,  6  Napoleon  guns. 


Maryland, 

'*  F  "  Penn. 
"  M  "  1st  N.  Y. 
Penn. 
N.  Y. 


4  10-pds.  Parrott  guns, 
4  " 

6  3-in.  ordnance  '* 
6  10-pds.  Parrott  " 
6 

6  3-in.  ordnance  " 


Abercrombie's  Brigade. 


Infantey. 
 Brigade. 


J  2th  Mass.  Vols.  9th  N.  Y.  S.  M. 

2d      "        "  29th  Penn.  Vols. 

16th  Ind.      "  27th  Ind. 

1st  Potomac  Home  Brigads  3d  Wis.  ** 

(Md.  Vols.). 
1  Co.  Zouaves  d'Afrique  (Penn.  Vols.). 


 Brigade. 

28th  N.  Y.  Vols. 
5th  Conn.  " 
46th  Penn.  " 
1st  Mary  land  " 

12th  Ind. 
13th  Mass.  " 


APPENDIX  A. 


197 


Clark's 

Jenks'  ' 

Davy's 
Huntington's 

Robinson's 


 Brigade. 

14th  Ind.  Vols. 
4th  Ohio  " 
8th  " 
7th  Va. 
67th  Ohio  " 
84th  Penn.  " 


SHIELDS'  DIVISION. 

ArTII/LERY, 

Battery  "  E  "  4th  U.  S.,  6  lO-pds.  Parrott  gnns. 


''A"  1st  Va., 

"B"l.st  " 
"  A  "  1st  Ohio, 

"L"lst  " 

^4th  Ohio  Infy, 

Infantry. 


^  J  4  10-pds.  Parrott  | 
^l2  6pds.  fS^^"^- 
2  10-pds  Parrott  guns. 
6  13-pds.  James  " 
a  \  2  12-pds.  Howitzers")  ^ 

1  6  pds.  gun. 


 Brigade. 

5th  Ohio  Vols. 

«2d 

66th 

13th  Ind. 
S9th  111. 


 Brigade, 

7th  Ohio  Vols. 

29th 

7th  " 

1st  Va.  " 

11th  Penn 

Andrew  Sharpshooters. 


GENERAL  WADSWORTH'S  COMMAND. 

Cavalry. 
1st  New  Jersey  Cavalry,  at  Alexandria. 
4th  Pennsylvania  east  of  the  capital.  ^ 

Artillery  and  Infantry. 


10th  New  Jersey  Vols. 

104th  N.  Y.  Vols. 

1st  Wis.  Heavy  Art'y. 

3  Batteries  N.  Y.  " 

Depot  of  N.  Y.  Light  Art'y. 

2d  D.  C.  Vols. 

26th  Penn.  " 

26th  N.  Y. 

95th     "  " 

94th  " 

88th  Penn.  "  (Detachment). 

91st      "  " 

4th  N.  Y.  Art'y. 

112th  Penn.  Vols. 

76th  N.  Y. 

50th  " 

88th  Penn.     "  (Detachment). 

99th     -  " 

2d  N.  Y.  Light  Art'y. 

107th  Penn  Vols. 

54th  " 

Dickerson's  Light  Art'y. 
86th  N.  Y.  Vols. 

98th  Penn.    "  (Detachment). 

14th  Mass.  "  (Heavy  Art'y). 
56th  Penn.  " 

4th  U.  S.  Art'v  (Detachment). 

37th  N.  Y.  Vols.  (Detachment). 

97th 

101st  " 

12th  Va.  *' 

91st  N.  Y.    "  - 


and  '*Marcy." 


Bladensburg  Road. 
Kalorama  Heights. 
Fort    Cass,''  Va. 
Forts    Ethan  Allen ' 
Camp  "  Barry." 
Washington  City. 
G-  St.  Wharf. 
Fort  "  Lyon." 
Camp  "  Thomas." 
Alexandria. 


Franklin  Square  Barracks. 
Forts  '"Carroll"  and  "  Greble." 
F  rt  Saratoga," 
"  "Massachusetts." 

"Pennsylvania." 
"  "  Good  Hope." 
"  "Mahan." 
Forts  "  Ward,"    Worth,"  and  "  Blenker." 


Kendall  Green. 
East  of  the  capital. 


C  Forts  '*  Albany,"  "  Tellinghast." 
■I  "Richardson,"  "Runyor,"  "Jack- 
(  son,"  "Barnard,"  "Craig,"  "  Scolt." 
j  Fort  "  W^ashington." 

Fort  "  Corcoran." 


198 


THE  PENINSULA. 


IN  CAMP  NEAR  WASHINGTON. 

6th  New  York  Cavalry,  Dismounted. 
10th 

Suaim's  "  "  " 

2d  Pennsylvania    "  " 
(These  troop=',  8,359  men,  were  ordered  to  report  to  Colonel  Miles,  commanding 
Railroad  Guard,  to  relieve  3,306  older  troops,  ordered  to  be  sent  to  Manassas  to 
report  to  General  Abercrombie.) 

GENERAL  DIX'S  COMMAND.  (BALTIMORE.) 
Cavalry. 

1st  Maryland  Cavalry.    Detachment  of  Cav.  Purnell  Legion. 
Artlllery, 
Battery  "  I  "  2d  U.  S.  Artillery. 
"        —   Maryland  Artillery. 
"     "  L  "  1st  New  York  Artillery. 
2  Independent  Batteries,  Pennsylvania  Artillery. 
Infantry. 
Sd  New  York  Volunteers. 
4th        "  " 
11th  Pennsvlvania  *' 
87th 

111th        "  " 

21st  Massachusetts  "  (Detachment). 
2d  Delaware  " 
2d  Maryland  " 

1st  Eastern  Shore  Home  Guards  (Maryland  Volunteers). 

2d       "        "  " 

Purnell  Legion  (Maryland  Volunteers). 

2  Battalions   . 

In  this  mere  outline  of  the  formation  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  it  is  impossible  to  treat  of  the  eminent  services  of 
the  prominent  members  of  the  general  staff  in  detail.  The 
erection  of  a  line  of  forts  covering  a  large  city  like  Washing- 
ton,— a  line  thirty-three  miles  in  length,  was  the  work  of  able 
engineers  under  General  Barnard.  He  well  represented  the 
corps  of  United  States  Engineers,  of  which  the  country  has 
always  been  proud.  Skill  and  diligent  labor  were  necessary, 
and  the  Commanding  General  gives  full  credit  to  all  engaged 
in  the  work,  in  his  final  report.  General  Barton  S.  Alexan- 
der, General  D.  P.  Woodbury,  and  Captain  J.  C.  Duane  or- 
ganized and  equipped  the  engineer  troops,  comprising  the 
United  States  Engineers,  the  Fifteenth  New  York  Volun- 
teers, and  the  Fiftieth  New  York  Volunteers,  the  latter  well 
adapted  for  this  service,  containing,  as  they  did,  many  sailors 


APPENDIX  A. 


199 


and  meclianics.  Captain  Duane  prepared  the  engineer  and 
bridge  train,  afterward  so  necessary  to  the  movements  of 
our  army.  By  General  William  F.  Barry,  Chief  of  Artil- 
lery, eighty-one  batteries  were  organized  and  equipped  in  a 
few  months, — thirty  regular  and  sixty-two  volunteers,  if  we 
include  the  nine  present  after  Bull  Eun.  General  Stoneman, 
in  spite  of  all  obstacles,  rendered  a  praiseworthy  service  in 
giving  to  the  army  its  first  real  cavahy  organization. 


APPENDIX  B. 


CONFEDEEATE  NAMES  OF  THE  SKIRMISHES  AND 
BATTLES  ABOUND  EICHMOND. 

Events. 

May  81st,  Battle  of  Seven  Pines,  Va. 

June  1st,  Battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  Va. 

June  13th  to  15th,  Pamunkey  Expedition,  Va. 

June  15th,  Skirmish  at  Seven  Pines,  Va. 

June  18th,  Skirmish  at  Nine  Mile  Boad,  Va. 

June  20  nh,  Affair  at  Gill's  Bluff,  James  Eiver,  Va. 

June  25th,  Battle  of  King's  Schoolhouse  (French  Field,  Oak  Grove,  or  the  Or- 
chard), Va. 

June  25th,  26th,  Artillery  Engagement  on  Garnett's  Farm,  Va. 

June  26th,  Engagement  at  Point  of  Rocks,  Appomattox  Biver,  Va. 

June  26th,  Skirmish  at  Atlee's  Station,  Va. 

June  26th,  27th,  Skirmishes  at  Hundley's  Corner,  Va. 

June  26ch,  27th,  Battle  of  Mechanicsville  or  Ellison's  Mills,  Va. 

June  27th,  Battle  of  Cold  Harbor,  or  Gaines'  Farm,  Va. 

June  27th,  Engagement  at  Garnett's  Hill,  Va. 

June  28th,  Affair  near  Garnett's  House,  Va. 

June  29th,  Battle  of  Savage  Station.  Va. 

June  29th,  Battle  of  Garnett's  Farm,  Va. 

June  30th,  Battle  of  Frazier's  Farm,  Va. 

June  30th,  Battle  of  White  Oak  Swamp,  Va. 

June  30th,  Affair  at  Willis  Church,  near  Malvern  Hill,  Va. 

June  30th,  Engagement  at  Turkey  Bridge,  or  Malvern  Cliff,  Va. 

July  1st,  Battle  of  Malvern  Hill,  or  Crew's  Farm,  Va. 

July  2d,  Affair  near  Haxall's  Landing,  Va. 

July  4th,  Skirmish  at  Wescover,  Va. 


APPEIS^DIX  B.  201 


OEGANIZATION  OF  THE  AEMY  OF  NOETHEEN 
VIEGINIA  DUEING  ENGAGEMENTS  AEOUKD 
EICHMOND,  YA. 

JACKSON'S  COEPS. 
Major-Generai/  T.  J.  JACKSON,  Commanding. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER-GENERAL  W.  H.  C.  WHITING. 


First  Brigade. 
Brig. -Gen.  J.  B.  HoOD. 
18th  Georgia. 
1st  Texas. 
4th  Texas. 
5th  Texas. 
Hampton  Legion; 


Third  Brigade. 

(1)  Brig.-Gen.  Whiting, 

(2)  Col.  Law,  Com'd'g. 
2d  Mississippi. 

11th  Mississippi. 
4lh  Alabama. 
6th  North  Carolina. 
Staunton  Artillery. 

SECOND  DIVISION. 


Fourth  Brigade.* 
Brig.-Gen.  A.  R.  Lawto: 
Reilly''s  Battery, 
Balthis'  Battery. 


MAJOR-GENERAL  T.  J.  JACKSON. 


First  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  C.  S.  Windek. 
2d  Virginia. 
4th 

5tli  " 
27th  " 
33d  " 

Irish  Battalion  (Capt.  Lee). 
Rockbridge  Artillery. 
Carpenter's  Battery. 
Third  Brigade. 

(1)  Col.  J.  V.  FULKERSON, 

(2)  Col.  E.  T.  H.  Warren,  Com'd'g. 

10th  Virginia. 

23d 

37th 

Wooding's  Battery, 
Danville  Artillery. 


Second  Brigade. 

(1)  Jones. 

(2)  Col.  Cunningham,  Com'd'g 

21st  Virainia. 
42d 

48th  " 

1st  Virginia  Battalion. 
Hampden  Artillery. 
Jackson's  " 

Fourth  Brigade. 
Brig.  Geo.  A.  R.  Lawton. 

13th  Georgia 
26th 


31st 
38th 
60th 
61st 


or  4th  Battalion. 


THIRD  DIVISION. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  R.  S.  EWELL. 


Fourth  Brigade. 

(1)  Brig.-Gen.  A.  Elzey,  and 

(2)  Brig.-Gen.  J.  A.  Early,  Com'd'g. 

13th  Virginia. 
25th 

81st  " 
44th 

52d  " 
58th  " 
12th  Georgia. 


Seventh  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen'l  I.  R.  Trimble. 
15th  Alabama. 
21st  Georgia. 
16th  Mississippi. 
21st  North  Carolina. 
Wharton's  Battalion, 


*  Transferred  to  Jackson's  Division. 

9* 


202 


THE  PENINSULA. 


Eighth  Brigade. 

(1)  Col.  Seymouk,  and 

(2)  Col.  L.  A.  Stafford,  Com'd'g. 

6th  Louisiana. 
7th  " 
8th 
9th 


Mw  yland  Line. 
Col.  B.  T.  Johnson. 
BrockenbroughV-  Battery. 
Conrtenay's  " 
Carrington's  " 
Munford's  Cavalry. 


MAJOR-GENEBAL  D.  H. 
Fi7'st  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  R.  E.  Rodes. 
3d  Alabama. 
5th 
6th 
12th 

26th  " 
Carter's  Battery. 


HILL'S  DIVISION.* 

Second  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  G.  B.  Andeeson. 
2d  North  Carolina. 
4th 

14th  » 
80th 

Hardaway's  Battery. 


TJiird  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  S.  Garland. 
5th  North  Carolina. 
12th 
13th  " 
20th  " 
23d     "  ' 

Bondurant's  Battery. 


Fourth  Brigade. 
Col.  A.  H.  Colquitt. 
6th  Georgia. 

23d 

27th  " 
28th 


Fifth  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  R,  S.  Ripley. 
1st  North  Carolina. 
3d  " 
44th  Georgia. 
48th 

Rhett's  Battery. 
Jones'  Artillery. 
Nelson's  Artillery. 


MAJOR-GENERAL  J.  B.  MAGRUDER^S  COMMAND. 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
BRIGADIER'GENERAL  D.  R.  JONES. 
First  Brigade.  Third  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  R.  Toombs.  Col.  G.  T.  Anderson. 

2d  Georgia.  1st  Georgia  (Regulars). 

15th    "  7th  " 

17th  "  8th 
20th    "  9th 

11th  " 

Garnett's  Battery. 
Brown's  " 
Lane's  *' 


McLAWS'  DIVISION. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  L.  McLAWS. 
First  Brigade.  Fourth  Brigade. 

Brig.-Gen.  P.  J.  Semmes.  Brig.-Gen.  J.  B.  Kershaw. 

10th  Georgia.  2d  South  Carolina. 

53d  3d  " 

15th  Virginia.  7th    "  " 

o2d  8th    "  " 

Alexander's  Artillery. 


*  This  was  not  a  part  of  Jackson's  corps,  but  co-operated  with  it. 


APPENDIX  B. 


203 


MAJOE-aENERAL  J.  B. 
Second  Brigade. 
Brig. -Gen.  Howell  Cobb. 


MAGRUDER'S  DIVISION. 

Third  Brigade. 
Col.  Wm.  Baeksdale. 
18th  Mississippi. 
17th 
18(h 
aist 


2d  Louisiana. 
15th  North  Carolina. 
16th  Georgia. 
24th 

Cobb's  Georgia  Legion. 

Colonel  S.  D.  Lee,  Chief  of  Artillery  (temporarily). 
LONGSTREET^S  DIVISION.* 
Note. — At  battles  of  Seven  Pines  and  Fair  Oaks,  Va.,  Longstreet  commanded 
the  right  wing  and  G.  W.  Smith  the  left  wing,  subsequent  to  which  Smith's  com- 
mand appears  to  have  been  scattered  among  others. 

First  Brigade,  Second  Brigade. 

Brig.  Gen.  J.  L.  Kemper.  Brig.-Gen.  R.  H.  Anderson. 
1st  Virginia.  2d  South  Carolina. 

7th      "  4th  " 

5th  " 
6th  " 

Palmetto  Sharpshooters. 


11th  " 
17th  " 
24th  " 
Rogers'  Battery. 


Fifth  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  R.  A.  Pryor. 
3d  Virerinia. 
2d  Florida. 
14th  Alabama. 
14th  Louisiana. 
Louisiana  Zouaves. 


Third  Brigade, 

(1)  Brig.-Gen.  Pickett, 

(2)  Col.  J.  B.  Strange, 
Commanding. 

8th  Virginia. 
18th 
19th 
28th 
56th 

Sixth  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  W.  G.  Feth- 

vERSTON. 

12th  Mississippi. 
19th 

2d  Mississippi  Battalion. 


Fourth  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  C.  M.  Wilcox. 
8th  Alabama. 
9bh 
lOth 
11th 

Thomas'  Artillery  (Capt. 
Anderson). 

Note.— First  Company  Washington  Artillery  temporarily  attached  to  S.  D. 
Lee's  Artillery  in  engagements  of  July  5th,  6th,  7th,  and  8th — Col.  S.  D.  Lee, 
commanding  artillery. 

HUGER'S  DIVISION.t 
Major-General  B.  HTJGER,  Commanding. 


Second  Brigade. % 
Brig.-Gen.  R.  Ransom,  Jr. 
19th  North  Carolina. 
24th 
25th 
26th 
35th 
48th 
49th 

Third  Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen.  A.  R.  Wright. 

1st  Louisiana, 

3d  Georgia. 

4ch  '« 

22d  " 

44th  Alabama. 

Huger's  Battery. 


Second  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  Wm.  Mahone.- 
6th  Virginia. 
l-2th 

16th  " 

41st 

49th 

Grimes'  Battery. 

Fourth  Brigade. 
Brig.  Gen.  L.  A.  Armistead. 
9th  Virginia. 
14th 

38th  " 
53d  « 
5rth 

5th        "  Battalion. 
Turner's  Battery. 
Stribling's  Battery. 


*  Called  right  wing  at  Seven  Pines. 

t  This  corresponds  with  return  on  file  in  Archive  Office. 

X  Belongs  to  Department  of  North  Carolina,  temporarily  attached  to  this  Division. 


204 


THE  PENINSULA. 


WALKER'S  BRIGADE. 
Attached  June  26th  ;  detached  June  27th.    (See  Holmes'  command.) 

LIGHT  DIVISION. 
Majok-General  a.  p.  hill,  Commanding. 


First  Brigade. 
Brig. -Gen. Chas.W.  Field. 
40th  Virginia. 
47th 

55th  " 
6Uth  " 
Pegram's  Battery. 


Fourth  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.L.O'B, Branch. 
7th  North  Carolina. 
18th  " 
28th  " 
33d  " 
37th  " 

Johnson's  Battery. 


Second  Brigade. 
Brig. -Gen.  M.  Gregg. 
1st  South  Carolina. 
12th  " 
13th  " 
14th  *' 

1st      "         "  Rifles. 
Pee  Dee  Artillery  (Mc- 
intosh's), 

Fifth  Brigade. 
Brig. -Gen.  J.  J.  Archer. 

1st  Tennessee. 

7th 

14th 

2d  Arkansas. 
19th  Georgia. 
5th  Alabama  Battalion, 


Third  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  J.  R.  Anderson. 

14th  Georgia. 

35th 

45th 

3d  Louisiana  Battalion. 
Davidson's  Battery. 
Letcher  Art'y  (Greenlee). 


Sixth  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  W.  D.  Pender, 
16th  North  Carolina. 
22d 

34th  " 
38th     "  " 
2d  Arkansas  Battalion. 
Andrews'  Battery. 
2d  Virginia  Artillery. 
Crenshaw's  Battery. 
Masters'  Battery.* 
—  Vii'ginia  Battalion. 


DEPAETIVIENT  OF  NOETH  CAEOLINA. 
Major-General  T.  H.  HOLMES,  Commanding. 


Ransorn's  Brigade. 
Temporarily  attached  to 
Huger's  Division,  (See  Hu- 
ger's  Division.) 


Fourth  Brigade. 

(1)  Col.  J.  A.  Walker, 

(2)  Col.  Manning,  Com'd'g. 
30  th  Virginia. 
3d  Arkansas, 
27th  North  Carolina. 
46th  " 
48th*  " 
57th  Virginia. t 
2d  Georgia  Battalion. 
French's  Battery. 
Branch's  Battery. 
Goodwin's  Cavalry. 

WISE'S  COMMAND. t 
Brigadier-General  H.  A.  "WISE,  Commanding. 
26th  Virginia.  IQth  Virginia  Cavalry. § 


Third  Brigade. 
Brig.-Gen.  J.  Daniel. 
43d  North  Carolina. 
4oth  " 
50th  " 
Brem's  Battery. 
Graham's  Battery. 
Burrough's  Cavalry 

Battalion. 


46th  Virginia. 


Rive's  Battery. , 


Andrews'  Battery. 


*  Temporarily  ser\nng  with  the  reserve  artillery  during  this  campaign, 
t  While  this  brigade  was  serving  with  General  Huger  the  48th  North  Carolina 
was  substituted  for  the  57th  Virginia. 
X  This  corresponds  with  return  on  file  in  Archive  OflBce. 
§  Temporarily  detached  and  serving  with  Stuart. 


APPENDIX  B. 


205 


RESERVE  ARTILLERY. 
Colonel  JAMES  DESHLER,  Chief  of  Artillery. 
Brigadier-General  W.  L.  PENDLETON,  Commanding, 
Second  Battalion.  Sumter  Battalion. 

Major  Richardson.  Lieut. -Col.  Cctts. 

Anceirs  and  Milledge's  Batteries.  Lane's  Battery. 

Woolfolk's  Battery.  Ross'  " 

Davidson's  and  Masters'*  Batteries  Price's  " 

(temporarily).  Blackshear's  Battery. 

Third  Battalion.  Jones''  Battalion.^ 

Major  Wm.  Nelson.  Major  H.  P.  Jones. 

Huckstep's  Battery.  Clark's  Battery. 

Kirkpatrick's     "  Peyton's 

R.  C.  M.  Page's  Battery.  Rhett's  " 

FIRST  REGIMENT. 
Colonel  J.  T.  BROWN. 
Virginia  Artillery.  Richmond  Fayette  Artillery. 

Sd  Howitzers  (Smith's).  (Lieut.  Clopton's). 

Williamsburg  Artillery  (Captain  Coke's). 

CAVALRY  CORPS. 
Hampton's  Brigade. 
1st  North  Carolina,  Baker's. 

10th  Virginia,  Magruder  (belonged  to  Wise's  command). 
Georgia  Legion,  Young. 

Jeif .  Davis  Legion  (Cavalry)  and  4th  Virginia,  under  Martin. 
1st  Virginia,  Fitz  Lee. 
J,         8d      "  Goode. 
5th     "  Rosser. 
Cobb's  Georgia  Legion. 
Note. — From  Confederate  Military  Reports,  vol,  iv..  War  Department, Wash- 
ington, D.  C. 


*  Masters'  Battery  belonged  to  A.  P.  Hill's  Division, 
t  Temporarily  attached  to  D.  H.  HiU's  Division. 


Note. — Hegiments^  batteries,  etc.^  are  indexed  under  the  names  of 
their  States^  excepting  batteries;  called  by  their  captain's  or  by  some 
other  special  name.  These  are  iyidexed  imder  Batteries.  Megular 
troops  under  United  States  Army.  . 


Abercrombie,  General,  102,  108, 
111,  114,  156,  158;  brigade  of, 
196 

Acquia  Creek,  90 
Adams'  House,  114,  130 
Albany,  Forfc. — See  Fort  Albany- 
Alexander,  General  Barton  S.,  61 ; 

report  of,  62 
Alexandria,  Va.,  5,  6,  8,  28,  32,  84, 

38 

411en,  130,  181,  188 

Allen's  Farm,  battle  of,  137-139 

Anderson,  Ganeral,  119,  126,  132, 

160,  164 

Anderson,  General  J.  R.,  85,  90, 
93,  119 

Anderson,  R.  H.,  65,  76,  96,  119 
Annapolis,  Md.,  32 
Arjher,  General,  119,  126,  132 
Arlington,  Fort. — Sae  Fort  Arling- 
ton 

Arlington  Heights,  34 
Armistead,  General,  119,  156,  159, 

161,  163 
Ashby,  89 

Ashland  Road,  94,  95,  96,  124 
Auger,  General,  196 
Austerlitz,  135 

Averil],  Colonel,  43,  128 ;  brigade 
of,  193 

Ayres,  Captain  R.  B.,  66,  142 


Bailey,  Colonel,  103,  105 

Baker,  Colonel,  13 

Ball's  Bluff,  13 

Baltimore,  Md.,  171 

Banks,  General,  57,  85,  89,  90,  91 ; 

his  reverses,  92,  124  ;  corps  of, 

196 

Barhamsville,  82,  ^3 
Barksdale,  General,  163 
Barnard,  General  J.  G.,  23,  30,  34, 

38,  39,  61,  66,  100,  101,  179, 

186,  198 
Barnes,  Colonel,  130 
Barry,  General  William  F.,  7,  66, 

199 

Bartlett,  General,  111,  143 
Bates,  105 

Bath,  West  Virginia,  88 

Batteries :  Crenshaw's,  1^2 ; 
Daum's,  89;  Devon's,  111; 
Hazzard's,  137,  138,  140; 
Hood's,  108;  Hunt's,  34,  44, 
151 ;  Johnson's,  126,  132 ;  Ro- 
bertson's, 155  ;  Seeley's,  167  ; 
Upton's,  143;  Webber's,  75, 
76  ;  Wooding' s,  142 

Baxter,  Colonel,  112 

Beaveidam  Creek,  49,  119,  125, 
126,  130 

Bendix,  Colonel,  84 

Benson,  94,  95 


208 


INDEX. 


Berdan,  Colonel,  46,  164 

Berry,  General,  80,  103,  143,  146 

Big  Bethel,  44,  47 

Binford  House,  155 

Birney,  General,  80,  107,  114,  115, 

143,  165  ;  brigade  of,  194 
Bladensburgh,  33 
Blake,  General ;  his  brigade,  19 
Blenker,  General,  23,  90 
Boatswains'  Swamp,  130 
Boteler,  Mr.,  123 

Bottom's  Bridge,  84,  87,  97,  100, 

136 

Bracket's  Ford,  143 
Brady,  114 

Bramhall,  Captain,  75,  76 
Branch,  General,  93-96,  119,  126, 

133,  186 
Briggs,  Colonel,  107 
Broadhead,  89 
Brooks,  Colonel,  137-139 
Brooks,  General,  45,  64,  65,  73; 

brigade  of,  194 
Buchanan,  Colonel,  151 
Buchanan,  General,  129,  154 
Buckley,  Lieutenant,  130 
Buell,  General,  4,  10 
Bull  Run  (Manassas),  1,  9,  25,  199 
Burns,  General,  111,  112,  140,  148; 

brigade  of,  193 
Burnside,  General  A.  E.,  7,  10, 

123,  170,  171,  173 
Butler,  General,  4,  11 
Butterfield,  General,  46,  94,  96, 129, 

130, 154,  166 ;  brigade  of,  193 

Cabell,  Colonel  50,  167 
Caldwell,  General,  137,  146 
California,  First  Regiment  of,  112 
Carter's  Mill,  155 
Casey,  General  Silas,  7,  34,  44,  71, 
77,  81,  97,  101,  103,  103,  104, 


105 ;  gallantry  of  his  division, 
106, 1 07, 108, 1 16, 117 ;  assigned 
to  the  command  of  the  supply 
depot  at  the  White  House,  119, 
136,  139  ;  division  of,  194 

Catlett's  Station,  85 

Centreville,  Va.,  1,  13,  16,  18,  19; 
evacuated,  34-26,  31,  33,  169, 
181 

Chancellors  ville,  153 

Chandler,  Zachariah,- 15 

Charles  City,  99, 137,  143,  143, 147, 

148,  153 
Chase,  Secretary,  178 
Cheeseman's  Creek,  61 
Chesapeake,  170 

Chickahominy  River,  83,  87,  97- 
99,  100,  108,  110, 113,  113,  115, 
116, 118, 119,  133-126, 129, 130, 
135,  136,  138,  141,  143, 187, 188 

Chilton,  General  R.  H.,  159 

Cincinnati,  3 

Cobb,  Howell,  65,  119,  135,  163 
Cockletown,  Va.,  44,  46 
Cole's  Mills,  5 

Colquitt,  Colonel  A.  H.,  119,  160, 

203 

Commodore,  the,  33 

Connecticut,  Regiments  of  :  First, 
94 ;  Artillery,  First,  155 

Cooke,  General,  70,  139;  brigades 
under,  191 

Cooper,  Captain,  134,  135,  143 

Corcoran,  Fort. — See  Fort  Cor- 
coran. 

Couch,  General,  44,  45,  71,  73,  80, 
81,  100,  103,  103,  105,  107,  108, 
110,  111,  114, 116,  120, 154,  156, 
158,  159, 161, 164,  165, 166  ;  di- 
vision of,  194 

Courtney's  House,  111,  113 

Covode,  John,  15 


V. 


INDEX. 


209 


Cowan,  78 

Cram,  Colonel  T.  J.,  51,  53,  55 

Crenshaw,  Captain,  132 

Crew's  House,  154,  156,  162,  163, 

166 
Crimea,  3 

Cross  Keys,  battle  of,  93 
Cub  Dam  Creek,  77,  78 
Culpeper,  85 
Cumberland,  83 

Cunningham,  Colonel,  brigade  of, 
201 

Cunningham,  General,  119 
Custer,  Lieutenant,  78 

Dam  No.  1,  64,  71 

Dana,  General,  111,  112 ;  brigade 
of,  193 

Daniels,  General,  119 

Darbytown,  141,  143 

Daum,  Captain,  89 

Davidson,  General,  45,  77;  dis- 
abled, 140  ;  brigade  of,  194 

Davis,  Jefferson,  49,  109 

De  Hart,  Captain,  125 

Delafield,  General,  3 

Denison,  Governor  William,  3 

De  Russy,  Captain,  147,  167 

Devens,  General,  102,  104,  196 

Dietrich,  143,  144 

Dismal  Swamp  Canal,  171 

Dispatch  Station,  Virginia,  129, 
136 

Dix,  General,  command  of,  198 
Duane,  Captain  J.  C,  164,  192, 

198,  199 
Dumfries,  25 
Duryea,  General,  84 

Early,  General,  79,  160,  201 
Easton,  125 


Ellicott's  Mills,  136 
Ellison's  Mill,  125 
Ellsworth,  Fort.— See  Fort  Ells- 
worth 

Eltham  Landing,  82,  83,  184 
Elzey,  General  A. ,  119  ;  brigade  of, 
201 

Emory,  General,  70,  72,  73,  94,  95, 

129  ;  his  brigade,  191 
Evliugton  Heights,  167 
Ewell,  General  R.  S.,  90-92,  119, 

124,  133,  136,  157;  division  of, 

201. 

Fairfax  Court  House,  Va.,  26,  27, 
31,  37 

Fair  Oaks,  Va  ,  battle  of,  97,  99, 
102,  103,  108-118,  121,  137 

Featherstone,  General,  119 

Field,  General,  119,  126,  132,  150 

Fitch,  Captain,  105 

Fort  Albany,  5 

Fort  Arliagton,  5 

Fort  Corcoran,  5 

Fort  Ellsworth,  5 

Fort  Magruder,  71,  74,  75,  76 

Fort  Monroe,  20,  25,  27,  29,  31-33, 
36,  41-43,  47,  49,  51-54,  175, 
176 

Fort  Runyon,  5 

Fox,  G.  v.,  30,  38,  39,  42 

Franklin,  General,  17,  18,  23,  61, 
71,  81-83  ;  given  command  of 
the  Fifth  Army  Corps,  84,  97, 
118, 119, 121,  133,  135,  139-142, 
148, 155,  164, 181, 182, 184, 185 ; 
division  of,  195 

Franklin,  Va.,  91 

Fredericksburg,  Va.,  25,  85,  86,  91, 
93,  96,  98,  121,  177 

Fremont,  General,  90,  91,  92,  123, 
124 


210 


INDEX. 


French,  General,  111,  114, 115, 116, 

133,  135,  137,  192 
French,  Lieutenant,  111 
Front  Royal,  91 

Falkerson,  General  J.  V.,  119,  201 

Gaines'  House,  130 

Games'  Mills,  Virginia,  97,  110, 119, 

127;  battle  of,  128-136,  142, 

143,  144,  186,  187 
Galena,  the,  41,  153 
Gallagher,  Colonel,  125 
Gallagher,  Private  W.  F.,  144 
Garland,  General  S.,  99, 119,  160 ; 

brigade  of,  202 
Garnett,  General,  4 
G.ir row's  Chimneys,  64 
Georgetown,  D.  C,  6 
Georgia,  Regiments  of :  Sixth,  160 ; 

Anderson's  Georgia  brigade, 

65,  93 
Getty,  Colonel,  155 
Gettysburg,  battle  of,  150 
Glendale,  Va.,  142  ;  battle  of,  143- 

151,  156 

Gloucester,  Va.,  22,  32,  39,  41,  43, 

48,  53,  60-62,  176-178 
Golding's  House,  112,  138,  139 
Goldsborough,  Admiral  L.  M.,  30, 

38-42,  67 ;  his  letter,  170,  171, 

176,  177 
Gooch,  Daniel  W.,  15,  39 
Gordon,  General,  160 
Gordonville,  Va.,  28,  90 
1  Gorman,  General,  110,  111,  112 ; 

brigade  of,  193 
Gosport,  171 

Graham,  General,  45  ;  brigade  of, 
194 

Grant,  General  Ulysses  S.,  53 
Grape  Vine  Bridge,  108,  138,  139 
Gregg,  General,  119,  126,  132 


Griffin,  Captain,  96,  127,  129,  154, 

165,  166 
Griffith,  General,  113,  119,  138 
Grover,  General,  75,  76 

Half-way  House,  44,  45,  47.  51, 

53,  54,  70,  72 
Halleck,  General,  4,  10 
Hamilton,  General,  33,  43  ;  division 

of,  193 

Hampton,  General,  112,  113 
Hampton  Roads,  36,  39,  41,  42,  67, 

74,  171,  177 
Hancock,    General,   45,   73,   78 ; 

routs  the  enemy,  79,  80,  81, 

139,  185  ;  brigade  of,  194 
Hancock,  Md.,  89 
Hanover  Court  House,  93-95,  124, 

186 

Harrington,  Captain  F.  C,  65 
Harris,  Senator,  S7 
Harrisonburg,  Va.,  91,  124 
Harrison's  Plantation,  153,  167 
Hatton,  General,  113  ;  killed,  113 
Hayes,  Colonel,  147 
Hayes,  Colonel  William,  155 
Haxall's  Plantation,  153,  154,  155 
Hazzard,  Captain,  137,  138 
Heintzelman,   General :   is  given 
command   of    Third  Army 
Corps,  16,  23  ;  council  of  war, 
27-29,  32  ;  at  Fort  Monroe,  33, 
38,  44,  46,  50,  71  ;  jealousy  of, 
72,  74,  76,  77,  84,  97,  103,  106, 
107,  108,  109,  110,  115,  118, 
120 ;    bivouacks    at  Allen's 
Farm,  137,  140,  142,  143,  147, 
148,  155,   164-167;  corps  of, 
193 

Hexamer,  Captain,  143 
Hill,  General  A.  P.,  76,  98,  119, 
135,  126,   129,  132,  141,  143, 


IIsTDEX. 


211 


148  ;  statement  of,  respecting 

the  battle  of  Glendale,  150; 

division  of,  204 
Hill,  General  D.  H.,  60,  79,  82,  98, 

99,  108,  110,  117,  119, 129,  133  ; 

losses  of,  150,  157,  161,  163, 

165  ;  division  of,  202 
Hitchcock,  General,  178,  189 
Holmes,  General  T.  H.,  119,  151, 

152,  161,  162,  204 
Hood,  Captain,  108 
Hood,  General  J.  B.,  112, 113, 119, 

133,  184  :  brigade  of,  201 
Hooker,  General,  23,  25,34,  71-74; 

report  of,  74 ;  letter  from,  76- 

78,  80,  81,  97,  108,  120,  143 ; 

report  of,  145,  155,  167,  185 ; 

division  of,  193 
Howard,  General,  111,  114,  116, 

192 

Howard's  Bridge,  44,  47 

Howe,  General,  167 

Huger,  General,  53,  98,  99;  de- 
mands a  court  of  inquiry,  109, 
110,119,138,141,157-164;  di- 
vision of,  203 

Humphreys,  General  A.  A.,  22,  51, 
52,  154,  156,  164 

Hunt,  Colonel,  104,  155 

Hunt,  Colonel  Henry  J.,  34,  44, 
151,  155 ;  batteries  under,  192 

Hyde,  Colonel,  64 

Illinois,  Regiments  of:  Eighth 
Cavalry,  153 ;  Barker's  Cav- 
alry, 191 

Jackson,  General  T.  J.  (Stone- 
wall), 88;  remains  in  winter 
quarters  at  Winchester,  89 ; 
defeat  of,  89-91 ;  gains  the  bat- 
tles of  Port  Republic  and  Cross 


Keys,  92,  93,  97,  119,  121 ;  his 
letter  to  General  Johnston, 
122-127,  129,  130,  132,  133; 
size  of  his  army,  135 ;  report 
of,  136,  138,  139,  141-143,  148, 
151,  153,  ,157,  160,  167,  177, 
188  ;  corps  of,  201 

James  River,  28,  30,  35-37,  43,  44, 
48,  53-55,  62,  83,  87,  120,  128, 
130,  136,  138,  141,  142,  152- 
.  154,  156,  167,  171,  173,  175, 
176,  187 

Jamestown,  the,  175 

Jamieson,  General,  80,  103 ;  bri- 
gade of,  194 

Johnson,  Andrew,  15 

Johnson,  Colonel,  94 

Johnson,  Edward,  90,  91,  126 

Johnson,  Va.,  91 

Johnston,  General  Joseph  E.,  24  : 
his  reasons  for  evacuating  Cen- 
treville,  25,  26,  28,  31,  49,  53, 
59,  60 ;  report  of,  69,  70,  76, 
78,  79,  84,  90,  97  ;  his  narra- 
tive, 98-100,  102,  108;  report 
of,  109,  110;  severely  wounded  ■ 
at  Fair  Oaks,  115 ;  report  of, 
117, 168,  169, 170, 173, 175, 180, 
181,  185, 187 

Joinville,  Prince  de,  27 

Jones,  General  D.  R.,  82, 119, 138, 
163  ;  brigade  of,  201 

Julian,  George  W. ,  15 

Kearney,  General  Philip,  71,  73, 
77,  80,  81,  97,  103,  107,  143, 
146-148, 155,  162, 185 

Kearney,  Major  James,  51,  53 

Keim,  General :  brigade  of,  194 

Kely,  89 

Kemper,  General,  119 
Kenly,  Colonel,  91 


212 


INDEX. 


Kern,  Captain,  125,  143 

Keman,  Captain,  153 

Kemstown,  Ya.,  89 

Kershaw,  General  J.  B.,  119,  202 

Keyes,  General,  is  given  command 
of  Fourth  Army  Corps,  16,  23, 
27,  29  ;  at  Fort  Monroe,  33,  37, 
44 ;  report  of,  45  ;  his  progress 
toward  Half-Way  House,  47, 
50,  53,  54,  63,  72,  74,  77,  83, 84, 
97 ;  ordered  to  fortify  a  posi- 
tion on  the  Richmond  road, 
100,  102,  103  ;  report  of,  106, 
107, 108, 109, 110, 115, 118, 120  ; 
ordered  to  Malvern  Hill,  141, 
142,  153,  154,  155,  164,  180; 
corps  of,  194 

Kimball,  89 

King,  General,  85;  division  of, 
195 

Kingsbury,  Captain,  130,  165 
Kinney,  Doctor,  94,  95 
Kirby,  Captain,  111,  114,  144 
Knierim,  Captain,  143,  144 


Lander,  General,  88,  89 
Lansing,  Colonel,  95,  130 
Larabee,  Major,  78 
Lawton,  General  A.  R,  119,  123; 

brigade  of,  201 
Lee,  Colonel,  113 

Lee,  General  Robert  E.,  his  answer 
to  Jackson,  90;  given  command 
of  the  Army  of  i^'orthern  Vir- 
ginia, 115  ;  ofi&cial  estimate  of 
his  men,  119  ;  his  letter  to  Gen- 
eral Jackson,  122,  124,  128; 
size  of  his  army,  135, 136, 137 ; 
presses  forward  in  pursuit  of 
McClellan,  138,  142,  143,  151, 
157,  159,  161,  163,  188 


I  Lee's  Mills,  45,  49,  50,  54,  55,  64, 

I       70,  71,  73,  180 

i  Lightfoot,  Colonel,  113 

1  Lincoln,  Abraham,  President  of 
the  United  States,  2,  4, 10-12  ; 
his  campaign  plan,  13,  14,  15; 
he  divides  the  army  into  four 
army  corps,  16;  at  variance 
with  McClellan,  18  ;  yields  in 
favor  of  McClellan's  plan,  23  ; 
his  despatch  to  McClellan,  29  ; 
appoints  an  interview  with 
McClellan,  38,  58 ;  he  urges 
McClellan  to  break  the  line  of 
the  Warwick,  60  ;  McClellan's 
report  to,  84 ;  his  encouraging 
reply  to  McClellan,  85,  86,  87  ; 
his  telegram  to  McClellan,  92  ; 
his  feeling  toward  McClellan, 
169 ;  his  position  as  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, 173, 175,  177, 
178,  179,  180 
Lincoln's  War  Orders,  4,  18,  24,  27 
Long  Bridge,  143 

Longstreet,  General,  in  command 
at  Williamsburg,  76,  79,  81, 
98,  99,  108,  109,  110,  119,  129, 
131,  132,  134,  138,  141,  143, 
148, 150, 157,  159  ;  division  of, 
203 

Lord,  Colonel,  65 
Lovell,  General,  129,  154 
Lovell,  Major,  151 

McAllester,  Lieutenant,  100, 
101 

McCall,  General,  23,  61,  85,  119- 
121, 124, 125, 126,  127, 128, 129, 
134,  139,  143,  144,  145 ;  taken 
prisoner,  146  ;  reported  killed, 
147,  148,  150,  155,  156;  divi- 
sion of,  195 


INDEX. 


213 


McCarter,  Colonel,  106,  107 

McCarty,  Captain,  108 

McClellan,  General  George  Brin- 
ton,  relieved  from  command  of 
the  Army  of  the  West  and 
given  control  of  the  Potomac 
Army,  3 ;  sketch  of  his  life,  2- 
4 ;  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
forces  of  the  United  States,  4 ; 
his  report,  5-7  ;  his  campaign 
plans,  10-12  ;  the  President 
and  committee  dissatisfied 
with  his  inactivity,  13-16  ;  his 
illness,  17 ;  his  plan  at  vari- 
ance with  Lincoln's,  18  ;  Lin- 
coln yields  to  him,  23 ;  is  re- 
lieved of  all  command  save  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  27 ;  he 
adopts  the  Peninsula  plan,  27  ; 
his  despatch  to  the  War  De- 
partment, 28 ;  a  statement  of 
his  designs,  31 ;  his  report,  36  ; 
he  urges  the  necessity  of  naval 
co-operation,  38;  he  advances 
toward  Yorktown,  43  et  seq.  ; 
firing  and  skirmishing  begin, 
46  ;  brought  to  a  halt,  50  ;  his 
letter  to  Stanton,  60 ;  begins 
the  siege  of  Yorktown,  62 ;  af- 
ter the  evacuation  of  York- 
town,  keeps  his  headquarters 
in  that  neighborhood,  71 ;  ar- 
rives on  battle-field  of  Wil- 
liamsburg, 81;  calls  for  a  larger 
force  in  his  report  to  Lincoln, 
84  ;  letter  from,  87  ;  his  state- 
ment in  the  McDowell  court 
of  inquiry,  92,  93  ;  moves  to- 
ward Richmond,  97-100;  his 
telegram  to  Stanton,  103  ;  his 
advance  toward  Richmond  re- 
ceives a  repulse,  108,  110  ;  his 


army  defeats  the  rebels  at  Fair 
Oaks,  116,  117  ;  size  of  his 
army  before  Richmond,  119 ; 
applies  for  reinforcements, 
120  ;  exchanges  telegrams  with 
Stanton  respecting  Jackson, 
124  ;  is  defeated  in  the  battle 
of  Gaines'  Mill  after  a  stub- 
born resistance,  136  ;  resists 
three  attacks  successfully  in 
his  retreat  to  the  James,  152  ; 
the  discipline  of  his  army,  169  ; 
criticism  of,  173, 175, 178  et  seq. ; 
affection  of  his  army  for,  189 

McDowell,  General,  is  given  com- 
mand of  First  Army  Corps,  16  ; 
a  confidential  interview  with 
Lincoln,  17,  18,  23 ;  a  council 
of  war,  27-^  ;  his  corps  de- 
tached from  McClellan's  com- 
mand, 36  ;  his  letter  to  Mc- 
Clellan, 38,  42,  43,  57-62 ;  re- 
turns to  aid  McClellan,  84 ; 
size  of  his  army,  85,  86-88, 
90-93,  96,  97,  119-121,  123, 124, 
177,  178,  180, 186  ;  corps  of,  195 

McDowell,  Va.,  91 

McGee's  House,  129,  133 

Mcintosh,  Colonel,  126 

McKean,  Colonel,  125 

McKennedy,  Colonel,  65 

McLaw,  133,  161,  163 

McQuade,  Colonel,  94,  96,  154 

Magruder,  Fort.  See  Fort  Ma- 
gruder. 

Magruder,  General  J.  Bankhead 
(Confederate),  47-49,  51,  53, 
54,  57,  60,  65,  70,  98,  99,  119, 
134, 135,  138, 139,  140,  141, 157, 
158,  161-163  ;  losses  of,  in  bat- 
tle of  Malvern  Hill,  159,  164, 
165,  167 ;  army  under,  302 


2U 


INDEX. 


Mahone,  General,  119, 163 

Maine,  Regiments  of  :  Second,  96  ; 

Sixth,  78 ;  Eleventh,  100,  104, 

106 

Malvern  Hill,  Va.,  141,  148,  150, 

151,  153-167,  188 
Manassas,  Va.,  1,  8,*  14,  18-22,  25, 

28,  29,  31,  54,  60,  89,  168,  170, 

172,  173 

Marcy,  Captain  Randolph  B. ,  2 
Marshall,  Colonel,  94 
Martin,  Captain,  96 
Martindale,  General,  46,  94-96, 127, 

129,  130,  154,  166 ;  brigade  of, 
193 

Maryland,  Batteries  of  :  Thomp- 
son's, 143,  144,  147 

Massachusetts,  Regiments  of : 
Fifth,  165  ;  Mnth,  165  ;  Tenth, 
107  ;  Eleventh,  75  ;  Fifteenth, 
112;  Eighteenth,  130;  Mne- 
.  teenth,  112  ;  Twentieth,  112. 
Batteries  of :  A  (Porter's), 
143 ;  C  (Martin's),  96,  151 

Meade,  General  George  G.,  22,  124, 
125,  129,  143  ;  wounded,  150 ; 
brigade  of,  196 

Meadow  Creek  Valley,  127 

Meadows  Bridge,  98,  99,  125,  126 

Meagher,  General,  111,  114,  134, 
135,  166,  192 

Mechanicsville,  Va.,  94,  98,  119, 
124,  125,  126,  127,  128,  129, 

130,  132,  136 

Meigs,  Quartermaster-General,  17, 
18 

Merrimac,  the  (Virginia),  28,  30, 
40,  42,  48,  67,  171,  176,  177 

Mexico,  2,  174,  175,  189 

Michigan,  Regiments  of:  Fourth, 
165 ;  Seventh,  112 

Miles,  Colonel,  1 


Miller,  Captain,  108 
Milroy,  General,  91 
Minnesota,  Regiments  of :  First, 
111 

Minnesota,  the,  171 

Mississippi,  Regiments  of :  Se- 
cond, 114 

Missroon,  Commander,  letter  of, 
67 

Monitor,  the,  30 

Moore  House,  66 

Mordecai,  Major,  3 

Morell,  General,  46,  84,  94,  95,  96, 
119,  127,  128,  129,  130,  132, 
134,  154,  155,  164,  165,  166; 
brigade  of,  193 

Mott,  Captain,  64,  142 

Mulberry  Island,  48,  49,  55 

Munson's  Hill,  13 


Naglee,  General,  23,  97,  100,  101, 
104,  106,  119,  142  ;  brigade  of, 
193 

Nashville,  Tenn.,  10 

Nelson's   Farm,    battle    of. — See 

Glendale,  battle  of 
New  Bridge,  84,  87,  94,  99,  125, 

138,  143 
;  New  Cold  Harbor,  Va.,  129 
New  Hampshire,  Regiment  of: 

Fifth,  114,  116 
New  Jersey,  Regiments  of :  First, 

146;  Second,  134;  Third,  76; 

Battery  of :  A  (Hexamer's), 

143 

New  Kent  Court  House,  83 

New  Market,  Va.,  91,  137,  141, 

143,  154 
New  Orleans,  11 
Newport  News,  83,  41,  44,  176 
Newton,  General,  82,  143 


INDEX. 


215 


New  York,  Regiments  of :  Fifth, 
93 ;  Tenth,  84  ;  Thirteenth,  98; 
Fourteenth,  96,  154,  166 ;  Fif- 
teenth, 197  ;  Seventeenth  95, 
.  130  ;  Twenty-fifth,  94  ;  Thirty- 
third,  78;  Thirty-sixth,  165; 
Thirty-seventh,  147;  Forty- 
second,  112  ;  Forty-fourth,  96  ; 
Fiftieth,  197;  Fifty-sixth,  106 ; 
Sixty-third,  112,  114;  Seventy- 
first,  138;  Eighty-first,  104; 
Ninety-second,  104,  107  ;  One 
Hundredth,  104, 105 ;  Duryea's 
Zouaves,  84 ;  Batteries  of  :  A, 
First  (Bates),  105;  A  (Diet- 
rich's), 143,  144;  B,  First 
(Pettit's),  115,  116,  137,  140; 
C  (Knierim's),  143,  144 ;  First 
(Spratt's),  105,  140;  First 
(Wheeler's),  142 ;  Third 
(Mott's),    64,    142;  Sixth, 

'  (Bramhall's),  75,  76,  140; 
Seventh  (Regan's),  105; 
Eighth  (Fitch  i^),  105;  Cow- 
an's, 78 

Nine  Mile  Road,  99,  100,  106,  117 

Norfolk,  Va.,  22,  31,  49,  51,  53, 
109,  170,  177 

North  Carolina,  Regiments  of : 
Fifth,  79;  Fifteenth,  65; 
Twenty-third,  79 ;  Twenty- 
eighth,  95 

Noyes,  Lieutenant  E.  M.,  64 

Oak  Grove,  120,  124 

Occoquan  Creek,  13 

Odell,  Moses  F.,  15 

Old  Church,  93 

Old  Cold  Harbor,  Va.,  129 

Old  Point  Comfort,  28,  38,  40 

Orchard  Station,  137 

Ord,  General,  85 ;  brigade  of,  196 


Osborn,  Colonel,  140 
Owens,  Colonel,  112 

Palmer,  General,  101,  103,  104, 
120,  158,  164,  165  ;  brigade  of, 
194 

Pamunkey  River,  83,  86,  87,  93,  94, 
1^3,  136 

Paris,  Count  de,  48 

Patrick,  brigade  of,  196 

Patterson,  76 

Patterson,  General  R.,  74 

Peck,  General,  45,  80, 102, 103, 106 ; 
given  Casey's  division,  119, 
120,  155  ;  brigade  of,  193 

Pegram,  General,  4,  126 

Pender,  General,  119,  136,  150 

Pennsylvania,  Regiments  of :  Third 
Cavalry,  44 ;  Fifth,  143 ;  Sixth, 
94, 125  ;  Eighth,153;  Eleventh, 
125,  134 ;  Twelfth,  144,  145  ; 
Twenty- sixth,  75 ;  Thirty- 
seventh,  137 ;  Fifty-second, 
106;  Sixty-second,  165 ;  Sixty- 
third,  147;  Sixty-ninth,  112; 
Seventy-first,  112 ;  Seventy- 
second,  112;  Ninety-third,  106; 
One  Hundred  and  Second,  106, 
107  ;  One  Hundred  and  Third, 
103;  One  Hundred  and  Fourth, 
100,  104,  105.  Batteries  of: 
B,  First  (Cooper's),  124,  125, 
143 ;  C,  First  (McCarty's),  108; 
E,  First  (Miller's),  108 ;  Eas- 
ton's,  125,  143 ;  Kern's,  125, 
143 

Petersburg,  52,  98 

Pettigrew,   General,  112  ;  taken 

prisoner,  113 
Pettit,  Captain,  115,  116,  137 
Philadelphia,  Penn.,  2 
Pickett,  General,  76,  119,  132 


216 


INDEX. 


Poindexter's  House,  158 

Porter,  Captain,  143,  145 

Porter,  General  Andrew,  23 

Porter,  General  F.  J.,  7,  23,  33,  43, 
46,  47,  66 ;  made  director  of  the 
siege  of  Yorktown,  66,  71,  81 ; 
made  Commander  of  Sixth 
Army  Corps,  84,  93,  94,  95,  96, 
97,  119,  127,  128;  size  of  his 
army,  129,  130,  133,  134,  135 ; 
ordered  to  Malvern  Hill,  141, 
142,  151, 153,  154, 155, 164, 165, 
166,  182,  185,  186,  187,  188; 
division  of,  193 

Porter,  Sergeant,  105 

Port  Republic,  battle  of,  92,  122 

Portsmouth,  Ya.,  48 

Potomac,  army  of  :  its  strength,  7  ; 
whence  drawn,  8,  9  ;  it  moves, 
82,  124,  129,  132,  168,  169,  170, 
172,  173,  175,  176,  177,  181, 
182,  183,  184,  185,  186,  188, 
189  ;  details  of,  191 

Potomac  River,  86,  89,  91 

Po white  Creek,  129 

Pry  or.  General,  76,  119 

Quaker  Church,  143 
Quaker  Road,  141,  148,  151,  154, 
155,  156,  157,  160 

Randol,  Captain,  143,  145 
Randolph,  George  W.,  Confederate 

Secretary  of  War,  109 
Ransom,  General,  119,  160,  163 
Rapidan  River,  28 
Rappahannock  River,  25,  26,  28, 

29,  85,  86 
Red  River,  3 

Reynolds,  General,  124,  125,  129, 

143  ;  brigade  of,  196 
Rhode  Island,  Batteries  of :  A, 


I       First  (Tompkins'),  111,  140; 

B,  First  (Bartlett's),  111 ;  C, 
I       (Weeden's),  46,  94,  130,  154, 

165 

I  Rhodes,  General  R.  E.,  99,  119, 
I  160  ;  brigade  of,  202 
Richardson,  General,  34,  71,  81, 
j  111,  114,  115,  120,  134,  137, 
!  140,  142,  166,  183,  185;  divi- 
i       sion  of,  192 

Richmond,  5,  10,  13,  17-23,  25,  28, 
31,  32,  35,  36,  43,  53,  55,  62,  70, 
81,  83,  85,  86,  87,  92,  93,  95,  97, 
98,  100,  108,  117,  118-120,  122, 
123,  124,  136,  137,  141,  151, 
154 ;  end  of  first  advance  on, 
167,  172,  173,  175,  176,  177, 
180,  182,  184,  186, 187,  188 

Ripley,  General  R.  S.,  119,  160; 
brigade  of,  202 

Roach's  Mills,  5 

Roberts,  Major,  108 

Rodgers,  Captain,  61,  153 

Romney,  89 

Roper's  Church,  83 

Rosecrans,  General  W.  S.,  3,  88, 
89 

Rowley,  Colonel,  106 
Rumsey,  Adjutant,  105 
Runyon,  Fort. — See  Fort  Runyon 

Savage's  Station,  Va.,  97,  100, 

104,  106,  137,  i38;  battle  of, 

139-143 
Schenck,  General,  91 
Scott,  General,  2,  4,  174,  175 
Sedgwick,  General,  43,  71.  81,  82, 

110,  111,  114,  120, 137, 138, 140, 

161,  185,  193 
Semmes,  General  P.  J.,  brigade  of, 

202 

"  Seven  Days'  Battle,"  118,  120 


INDEX. 


Seven  Pines,  battle  of,  97,  99,  100, 
101,  102,  103,  106,  118,  120, 
186 

Seymour,  General  C,  119, 124, 125, 

129,  143,  144,  145,  202 
Shenandoah  River,  7,  8,  22,  23,  57, 

121 

Shenandoah  Valley,  88,  89,  90,  92, 

123,  176,  177,  179 
Sherman,  General  T.  W.,  4,  10 
Shields,  General,  85,  88,  89,  91,  92, 

123,  195;  division  of,  197 
Sickles,  General,  report  of,  116, 

167 ;  brigade  of,  193 
Simmons,  Colonel,  143,  144 
Simms,  General,  113 
Sittlington's  Hill,  91 
Skiff  Creek,  72 

Slocum,  General,  133, 134,  139, 142, 
143,  148,  164 ;  brigade  of,  82, 
84,  119,  195 

Smead,  25 

Smith,  Captain  A.  J.,  2 

Smith,  General  Gustavus  W.,  2, 
82,  98,  99,  100,  108-110;  re- 
port of,  113,  114 ;  directs  op- 
erations at  Fair  Oaks  after 
Johnston's  fall,  115,  117 

Smith,  General  Persif er  F. ,  3 

Smith,  General  Wm.  F.,  23,  44, 
45,  63,  64,  65  ;  reports  of,  66, 
71-74,  77,  78  ;  report  of,  80,  81, 
84,  119,  139, 140,  142,  155,  164, 
180  ;  division  of,  194 

South  Anna  River,  93 

South  Mills,  271 

Spratt,  Captain,  105 

Stafford,  Colonel  L.  A. ,  brigade  of, 
202  i 

Stanton,  Edwin  M.,  Secretary  of  i 
War,  15,  16,  19,  29,  31,  32,  37,  i 
38j  60,  85 ;  his  letter  to  Mc-  ' 

lO—III. 


217 

Clellan,  86,  103;  telegraphs 
McClellan  respecting  Jackson, 
124,  168, 170,  173,  174,  175, 178 
Starr,  Colonel,  brigade  of,  193 
Staunton,  90,  91 
Stevens,  Governor  Isaac  I.,  3 
Stewart,  Captain,  77 
Stewart,  General,  93,  98,  100,  120, 
142,  167 

Stoneman,  General  George,  8,  44, 
70,  71,  73,  83,  84, 130, 142, 167, 
199 

Stoughton,  Colonel,  65 

Strasburg,  89,  91 

Stuart,  General,  70,  73 

Suffolk,  Va.,  48,  51 

Sullivan,  Captain,  89 

Sully,  Colonel,  111,  112 

Sumner,  Generals  is  given  com- 
mand of  the  Second  Army 
Corps,  16,  23 ;  a  council  of 
war,  27-29;  at  Fort  Monroe, 
34,  57,  71 ;  jealousy  of,  72,  73 ; 
lack  of  method  of,  74,  75,  76, 
77,  80,  81,  84,  97,  110,  111,  114  ; 
checks  the  advance  of  the 
enemy  at  Fair  Oaks,  115,  117, 

118,  120, 135,  137,  138,  139, 141, 
143, 144, 147, 148, 155, 164, 167 ; 
army  of,  192 

Sumter,  3,  189 

Swift  Run  Gap,  90 

Sykes,  General  George,  9,  44,  84, 

119,  128, 129, 130,  132, 151, 154, 
166 


Taggart,  Colonel,  144,  145 
i  Taylor,  Colonel,  82,  135,  140 
Taylor,  General,  143,  148,  174 
Teazer,  the,  176 
Tenallyiown,  6 


218 


INDEX. 


Texas,  regiments  of  :  Second,  114 ; 
Fifth,  114 

Thomas,  General  L.,  24,  63,  178 

Thompson,  Captain,  143,  144,  149 

Tidball,  Captain,  130 

Tolopotomoy  Creek,  125 

Tompkins,  Captain,  111 

Toombs,  General  R.,  119,  160; 
brigade  of,  202 

Trimble,  General  I.  R.,  119 ;  bri- 
gade of,  201 

Trist,  Mr.,  174 

Tunstall  Station,  125 

Turkey  Bridge,  141,  153 

Turkey  Hill,  131 

Tyler,  Colonel  R.  O.,  89,  94,  192 

United  States  Army  (Regular 
troops):  Regiments,  First  Cav- 
alry, 70, 129  ;  Third  Infantry, 
9,  145;  Fourth,  146;  Fifth 
Cavalry,  44,  94,  129,  134 ;  Sixth 
Infantry,  Sixth  Cavalry,  70, 
94;  Ninth,  145;  Tenth,  145, 
151  ;  Eleventh,  151.  Batteries 
of  :  Benson's  94,  96,  155  ;  Car- 
lisle's, 151;  De  Hart's,  125; 
De  Russy's,  147 ;  Edwards', 
151;  Griffin's,  46,  96,  142; 
Kingsbury's,  130;  Kirby's, 
111,  112,  114,  140,  144;  Ran- 
dol's,  143,  145;  Smead's,  125, 
151,  163;  Tidball's,  130,  155; 
Weed's,  130,  151 

Upton,  Captain,  143 

Urbana,  Va.,  18,  20,  23,  27,  28,  30- 
32,  176 

Van  Valkenberg,  Major,  105 
Vermont,    regiments  of :  Third, 

64,   66;  Fourth,  64-66,  77; 

Sixth,  65 


Vicksbnrg,  53 

Virginia,  Regiments  of :  Fourth, 
146;  Fourteenth,  158,  165; 
Twenty-fourth,  79 ;  Thirty- 
eighth  79 ;  Fifty-fifth,  150  ; 
Sixtieth,  150 

Virginia,  the. — See  Merrimac 

Wachusett,  the,  171 
Wade,  Benjamin  F.,  15 
Wads  worth,  General,  57 ;  army  of, 
197 

Walker,  General,  119 

Warren,  Colonel  E.  T.  H.,  bri- 
gade of ,  201 

Warrenton,  Va.,  80 

Warwick  Court  House,  44,  45,  55 

Warwick  River,  47-52,  55,  58-60, 
62,  63,  64,  65,  66,  68,  69,  176 

Washington,  1-8,  12, 13,  18-23,  26- 
29,  33,  34,  36-38,  40,  42  ;  num- 
ber of  troops  left  for  protec- 
tion of,  57,  58,  62,  85,  86,  87, 
88,  92,  121,  127,  170,  175,  177, 
178,  179,  180,  189 

Washington,  General  George,  53 

Washington,  Lieutenant,  102 

Watson,  Mr.,  40 

Watt  House,  130 

Webber,  Captain,  75,  76 

Weed,  Captain,  130,  151 

Weeden,  Captain,  94 

Welles,  Gideon,  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  38-42,  171 

Wessels,  General,  101 ;  report  of, 
104,  119 

Western  River,  154 

West  House,  155 

West  Point,  N.  Y.,  2 

West  Point,  Va.,  18,  28,  32,  36, 
37,  43,  70,  81,  82,  176,  181 

West  View,  90 


INDEX. 


219 


Wheeler,  Captain,  142 

White  House,  Va.,  83,  87, 116,  120, 

128,  130,  136,  142 
White  Oak  Swamp,  Va.,  97,  118, 

128,  137,  139,  141,  142,  148, 

151,  153,  164 
Whiting,  General,  112,  123,  125 
Whiting,  General  W,  H.  C,  25, 

119,  132,  134,  135 ;  report  of, 

136,  157,  158,  161 ;  division  of, 

201 

Whitney,  General,  82,  134 
Wilcox,  General,  76,  119,  132 
WiUiamsburg,  Va.,  43-45,  47,  48, 
51  >  68-72;  battle  of,  opened,  73; 
defect  in  plan  of,  77 ;  loss  in 
battle  of,  81 ;   evacuated  by 
the  Confederates,  81,  83,  98, 
99,  100,  106,  107,  137,  138,  141, 
176,  180,  181,  182,  183,  184, 185 
Williams,  General,  division  of,  196 
Willis  Church,  141,  160 
Winchester,  Va.,  88,  89,  91 
Wind'er,  General  C.  S.,  119,  133, 
160 ;  brigade  of,  201 


Wisconsin,  Fifth,  78 

Wise,  General  H.  A.,  119,  151, 

1.52  ;  command  of,  204 
Woodbury,    General  D.   P.,  38; 

troops  under,  192,  198 
Wooding,  Captain,  142 
Woodruff,  Lieutenant,  111 
Woodstock,  89,  90 
Wool,  General,  38,  51,  170 
Wright,  General,  119,  163 
Wright,  General  H.  G,  53 
Wynne's  Mill,  49,  50,  64 


York  River,  28,  29,  32,  36,  37,  40, 
41,  43,  53-55,  57,  59,  60,  70,  83, 
86,  136,  171 

Yorktown,  the,  176 

Yorktown,  Va.,  22,  30,  32,  33,.  37, 
39-57,  59-68;"  abandoned  by 
the  Confederates,  68,  121, 135, 
171,  176,  177,  178,  179,  180, 
181,  182,  184 

Young's  Mills,  Va.,  44,  47 


MESSRS.  CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 


have  much  pleasure  in  announcing  that  an  undertaking  which 
they  have  had  in  progress  for  several  years  is  now  completed  ; 
and  that  they  have  begun  the  publication  of  a  work  which  they 
believe  will  prove  the  most  important  of  recent  contributions 
to  American  History. 

Under  the  general  title  of  THE 

Campaigns  of  the  Civil  War, 

they  will  issue  a  series  of  volumes,  contributed  at  their  soli- 
ciation  by  a  number  of  leading  actors  in  and  students  of  the 
great  conflict  of  1861-65,  with  a  view  to  bringing  together, 
for  the  first  time,  a  full  and  authoritative  military  history  of 
the  suppression  of  the  Rebellion. 


The  final  and  exhaustive  form  of  this  great  nAiTatiye,  in  which  every 
doubt  shall  be  settled  and  every  detail  covered,  may  be  a  possibility 
only  of  the  future.  But  it  is  a  matter  for  surprise  that  twenty  years 
after  the  beginning  of  the  Rebellion,  and  when  a  whole  generation 
has  grown  up  needing  such  knowledge,  there  is  no  authority  which  is 
at  the  same  time  of  the  highest  rank,  intelligible  and  trustworthy,  and 
to  which  a  reader  can  turn  for  any  general  view  of  the  field — for  a 
strong,  vivid,  concise  but  truly  proportioned  story  of  the  great  salient 
events. 

The  many  reports,  regimental  histories,  memoirs,  and  other  materi- 
als of  value  for  special  passages,  require,  for  their  intelligent  reading, 
an  ability  to  combine  and  proportion  them  which  the  ordinary  reader 
does  not  possess.  There  have  been  no  attempts  at  general  histories 
which  have  supplied  this  satisfactorily  to  any  large  part  of  the  public. 
Undoubtedly  there  has  been  no  such  narrative  as  would  be  especially 
welcome  to  men  of  the  new  generation,  and  would  be  valued  by  a  very 
great  class  of  readers; — and  there  has  seemed  to  be  great  danger  that 


the  time  would  be  allowed  to  pass  when  it  would  be  possible  to  give 
to  such  a  work  the  vividness  and  accuracy  that  come  from  personal 
recollection. 

These  facts  led  to  the  conception  of  the  present  work.  Its  possi- 
bility depended  first  of  all  on  the  consent  of  the  circle  of  authors  to 
whom,  only,  the  publishers  could  look  to  carry  it  out  worthily  : — but 
the  cordial  reception  which  the  suggestion  at  once  received  from  them 
and  from  all  others  consulted,  speedily  removed  all  doubt  upon  this 
subject. 

From  every  department  of  the  Government,  from  the  officers  of  the 
army,  and  from  a  great  number  of  custodians  of  records  and  special 
information  everywhere,  both  authors  and  publishers  have  received 
every  aid  that  could  be  asked  in  this  undertaking ;  and  ii  announcing 
the  issue  of  the  work  the  publishers  take  this  occasion  to  convey  the 
thanks  which  the  authors  have  had  individual  opportunities  to  express 
elsewhere. 


The  volumes  of  the  series  will  be  duodecimos  of  about  250 
pages  each,  illustrated  by  maps  and  plans  prepared  under 
the  direction  of  the  authors.  They  will  appear,  as  far  as 
possible,  in  the  chronological  order  of  the  Campaigns  of 
which  they  treat ;  and  by  their  preliminary  and  concluding 
chapters  will  be  so  far  connected  that  the  completed  work 
will  practically  cover  the  entire  field  of  the  war.  The  price 
of  each  volume  will  be  $1.00. 


The  following  volumes  are  now  ready  ^  or  far  advanced  in 
preparation,  and  will  appear  at  short  intervals  : 

I.— THE  OUTBREAK  OF  REBELLION.  By  John  G. 
NicoLAY,  Esq.,  Private  Secretary  to  President  Lincoln;  late 
Consul-General  to  France,  etc.    Now  ready, 

A  preliminary  volume,  describing  the  opening  of  the  war,  and  covering  the 
period  from  the  election  of  Lincoiu  to  the  end  of  the  first  Battle  of  Bull  Run, 


II.— FROM  FORT  HENRY  TO  CORINTH.    By  the  Hon. 

M.  F.  Force,  Justice  of  the  Superior  Court,  Cincinnati ;  late 
Brigadier- General  and  Bvt.  Maj.  Gen'l,  U.S.V.,  commanding 
First  Division,  17th  Corps  :  in  1862,  Lieut.  Colonel  of  the 
20th  Ohio,  commanding  the  regiment  at  Shiloh  ;  Treasurer  of 
the  Society  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee.    Now  ready. 

The  narrative  of  events  in  the  West  from  the  Summer  of  1861  to  May,  1862; 
covering  the  capture  of  Fts.  Henry  and  Donelson,  the  Battle  of  Shiloh,  etc.,  etc. 


III.  — THE  PENINSULA.    By  Alexander  S.  Webb,  LL.D., 

President  of  the  College  of  the  City  of  New  York ;  Assistant 
Chief  of  Artillery,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  i86i-''62;  Inspector 
General  Fifth  Army  Corps;  General  Commanding  2d  Div., 
2d  Corps ;  Major-General  Assigned,  and  Chief  of  Staff,  Army 
of  the  Potomac.    Ready  November  20. 

The  history  of  McClellan's  Peninsula  Campaign,  from  his  appointment  to  the 
end  of  the  Seven  Days'  Fight. 

IV.  — THE  ARMY   UNDER   POPE.    By  John  C.  Ropes, 

Esq.,  of  the  Military  Society  of  Massachusetts,  the  Massa- 
chusetts Historical  Society,  etc.    Ready  Novejiiber  20. 

From  the  appointment  of  Pope  to  command  the  Army  of  Virginia,  to  the  appoint- 
ment of  McCielfan  to  the  general  command  in  September,  1862. 

v.— THE  ANTIETAM   AND  FREDERICKSBURG.  By 

Francis  Winthrop  Palfrey,  late  Colonel  20th  Mass.  In- 
fantry, and  Bvt.  Brigadier  Gen'l  U.S.V. ;  Lieut.  Col.  of  the 
20th  Massachusetts  at  the  battle  of  the  Antietam  ;  Member  of 
Military  Society  of  Massachusetts,  of  the  Massachusetts  His- 
torical Society,  etc. 

From  the  appointment  of  McClellan  to  the  general  command,  Sept.  1862,  to  the 
end  of  the  Battle  of  Fredericksburg. 

VI.~CHANCELLORSVILLE  AND  GETTYSBURG.  By 

Abner  Doubleday,  late  Bvt.  Maj.  Gen'l,  U.S.  A. ;  and  Major 
Gen'l,  U.S. v.;  commanding  the  First  Corps  at  Gettysburg, 
etc. 

From  the  appointment  of  Hooker,  through  the  campaigns  of  Chanceliorsville  and 
Gettysburg,  to  the  retreat  of  Lee  after  the  latter  batde. 


VII.— THE  ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND.    By  Henry 

M.  Cist,  Brevet  Brig  Gen'l  U.S.V.;  A.A.G.  on  the  staff  of 

Major  Gen'l  Rosecrans,  and  afterward  on  that  of  Major  Gen'l 

Thomas,  Corresponding  Secretary  of  the  Society  of  the  Army 

of  the  Cumberland. 

From  the  formation  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  to  the  end  of  the  battles  at 
Chattanooga,  November,  1863. 

IX.  — THE    CAMPAIGN    OF   ATLANTA.     By  the  Hon. 

Jacob  D.  Cox,  Ex-Governor  of  Ohio ;  late  Secretary  of  the 
Interior  of  the  United  States;  Major  General  U.S. V.,  com- 
manding Twenty-third  Corps  during  the  campaigns  of  Atlanta 
and  the  Carolinas,  etc.,  etc. 

From  Sherman's  first  advance  into  Georgia  in  May,  1864,  to'the  beginning  of 
the  March  to  the  Sea. 

X.  --THE   MARCH   TO   THE  SEA— FRANKLIN  AND 

NASHVILLE.    By  the  Hon.  Jacob  D.  Cox. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  March  to  the  Sea  to  the  Surrender  of  Johnston — 
including  also  the  operations  of  Thomas  in  Tennessee. 

XL— THE   CAMPAIGNS   OF   GRANT  IN  VIRGINIA. 

By  Andrew  A.   Humphreys,  Brigadier  General  and  Bvt. 
Major-General,  U.S.A.;   late  Chief  of  Engineers;  Chief  of 
Staff,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  1 863-' 64;  commanding  Second 
Corps,  1 864-' 65,  etc.,  etc. 
Covering  the  Virginia  Campaigns  of  1864  and  '65,  to  Lee's  surrender. 


VIII.--THE  MISSISSIPPI, 

and  one  other  volume,  completing  the  series,  are  in  course  of 
preparation,  and  their  contents  and  authors  will  be  announced 
in  a  short  time. 


*^*  The  above  hooks  for  sale  by  all  booksellers,  or  ivill  be  sent^  ^ost-J>aid^  upon 
receipt  of  price  by 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS, 

743  AND  745  Broadway,  New  York. 


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UNIVERSITY  OF 
NORTH  CAROLINA 
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ENDOWED  BY  THE 
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